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ABSTRACT 
 
AN INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS TO THE EU‟S ENLARGEMENT 
POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLISH AND TURKISH 
ACCESSION PROCESSES 
 
Uslu Kutlukaya, Esra 
P.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. H. Tolga BölükbaĢı 
 
January 2013 
 
European Union (EU) enlargement has been somewhat neglected 
theoretically in studies of European integration despite its importance both for 
member states, applicant states and the EU itself. The main purpose of this 
dissertation is to make a theoretical contribution to the literature through applying an 
institutionalist analysis to the attitudes of European Commissioners and member 
states as expressed through their speeches. The major research question of this 
dissertation is: „Which theory of institutionalism, rationalist or 
constructivist/sociological, better explains the attitudes of European Commissioners 
and member states towards deepening relations with Poland and Turkey?‟ In order to 
answer this question, the different stages of the EU‟s Eastern enlargement are 
analyzed through the case studies of Turkey and Poland. The results of this analysis 
iv 
 
demonstrate that the logic of consequentialism rather than logic of appropriateness 
has prevailed in the formation of the attitudes of both European Commissioners and 
member states towards Poland and Turkey.  
 
Keywords: Rationalist Institutionalism, Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism, 
the European Commissioners, member states, Polish accession process, Turkish 
accession process, content analysis. 
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ÖZET 
 
AB‟NĠN GENĠġLEME POLĠTĠKALARINA KURUMSALCI BĠR BAKIġ: 
POLONYA VE TÜRKĠYE‟NĠN KATILIM SÜREÇLERĠNĠN 
KARġILAġTIRMASI  
 
Uslu Kutlukaya, Esra 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi:  Yard. Doç. Dr. H. Tolga BölükbaĢı 
Ocak 2013 
 
 
Avrupa Birliğinin geniĢlemesi, üye ülkeler, aday ülkeler ve Avrupa Birliği 
için önemine rağmen Avrupa entegrasyonunda teorik açıdan ihmal edilmiĢtir. Bu 
tezin temel amacı, AB Komisyonu üyelerinin ve üye devletlerin, yaptıkları 
konuĢmalar vasıtasıyla, tutumlarını kurumsalcı bir analiz yöntemiyle inceleyerek 
yazına teorik bir katkıda bulunmaktır. Bu tezin ana araĢtırma sorusu Ģudur: rasyonel 
veya inĢacı/sosyolojik kurumsalcı teorilerden hangisi AB Komisyonu üyelerinin ve 
üye devletlerin Polonya ve Türkiye ile iliĢkilerin derinleĢmesine iliĢkin tutumlarını 
en iyi Ģekilde açıklamaktadır? Bu soruyu cevaplamak için AB‟nin Doğu Avrupa 
geniĢlemesinin farklı aĢamaları Polonya ve Türkiye vaka çalıĢmaları üzerinden analiz 
edilmiĢtir. Analiz sonuçları, AB Komisyonu üyelerinin ve üye devletlerin Polonya ve 
vi 
 
Türkiye‟ye karĢı tutumlarının oluĢmasında uygunluk mantığından çok sonuçsalcılık 
mantığının hâkim olduğunu göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rasyonalist Kurumsalcılık, ĠnĢacı/Sosyolojik Kurumsalcılık, AB 
Komisyonu üyeleri, Üye ülkeler, Polonya‟nın katılım süreci, Türkiye‟nin katılım 
süreci, Ġçerik analizi.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 It has been nearly 54 years since Turkish relations with the European 
Economic Community (EU)1 began in 1959. Turkey first applied for membership in 
1987, gained candidate status at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, before 
formal accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005. Turkey‟s candidacy 
is one example of the dual process followed by the EU of deepening and institutional 
transformation, simultaneous to widening or enlargement. Since its formation, the 
EU has completed six rounds of enlargement. Although Turkey‟s application took 
place before the Central and Eastern European Countries‟ (CEEC) applications, 
Turkey is still waiting to become a member of the EU while Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
                                                          
1
 The name of the European Economic Community (ECC) altered in 1967 when the European 
Community (EC) became the new name. In 1992, with the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
name changed again to the European Union (EU). The name EU will be used in this dissertation to 
refer to all periods of the Community‟s history. 
2 
 
Hungary, the Cyprus Republic and Malta have all become members. The starting 
point for this dissertation is the quest to explain the slow progress of Turkish 
relations with the EU.  
Analysis of the literature on European integration reveals that the EU‟s 
enlargement has been somewhat neglected theoretically in studies of European 
integration. The literature has considered Central and Eastern European enlargement 
as the most challenging and complicated round. Many questions arose during this 
round, for example as to why and when the EU decided to enlarge in this way; how 
the candidates were chosen; and which criteria were used. Due to this complicated 
character, the most prominent scholars of EU integration have conceptualized the 
EU‟s Eastern enlargement as a theoretical puzzle (Schimmelfennig 1999, 2001; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). Specifically, this challenge has led to a new 
theoretical debate in the field between rationalist and sociological/constructivist 
institutionalism.  
For rationalist institutionalists, players with decision-making and institutional 
power, such as the governments of EU member states in this case, are seen as the 
principal actors of enlargement, whereas for constructivist/sociological 
institutionalists, the principal actors are norm and principle entrepreneurs, such as the 
European Commission. The European Commission, among other supranational 
institutions of the EU, such as European Parliament or European Council, can be 
seen in this light due to its special role in the enlargement process. In particular, it 
monitors the compliance of candidate states with EU requirements with the help of 
progress reports, using these to advise the European Council about the preparedness 
of a candidate state for membership.  
3 
 
Considering how these actors reach policy decisions, rationalists argue that 
utility driven EU member states make use of strategic bargaining and negotiation 
about the costs and benefits of enlargement for their own national interests. In 
contrast, for constructivist/sociological institutionalists, decisions on enlargement 
policy are supposedly taken collectively by member states with the help of European 
Commission, in accordance with the constitutive norms, principals and shared 
identity of the Union. In short, the driving force behind the enlargement process is 
the logic of consequentiality for rationalist institutionalists and the logic of 
appropriateness for constructivists/sociological institutionalists.  
This dissertation aims to explain the enlargement policies of member states 
and European Commissioners2 by taking into account this rationalist-constructivist 
debate. With the help of the case studies of Turkey and Poland, different stages of 
EU enlargement are analyzed in order to determine the extent to which the European 
Commissioners and member states acted according to the logic of consequentialism 
or logic of appropriateness.  
This dissertation posits five hypotheses to be answered through the case 
studies. The first is that „the support the European Commissioners‟ offer for 
improving Polish and Turkish relations with the EU is nearly the same.‟ The second 
hypothesis is that „the logic of appropriateness best explains the attitudes of the 
European Commissioners.‟ The third hypothesis is that Poland‟s EU candidacy has 
been prioritized over Turkey‟s.‟ Fourth, „France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and 
Greece can be categorized as „drivers‟ or „brakemen‟, and that their positions do not 
change within the time periods studied.‟ The final hypothesis is that „the logic of 
                                                          
2
 In the official documents of the EU, „European Commissioner‟ and „Member of the European 
Commission‟ were used interchangeably. From now on, „European Commissioner‟ will be used in this 
dissertation. 
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consequentialism has prevailed in the attitudes of member states towards Poland and 
Turkey.‟ 
 
1.1 Methodology 
 
1.1.1 Research Question 
The main research question of this dissertation is: Which theories of 
institutionalism, rationalist or constructivist, explains the attitudes of European 
Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey? In order to answer 
this question, certain additional questions also have to be addressed: Are the levels of 
support of European Commissioners for improvement in EU relations with Poland 
and Turkey the same? Did member states make certain prioritizations amongst 
applicants in the enlargement process? Who have been the drivers and brakemen 
concerning Poland‟s and Turkey‟s European aspirations? Do the positions of 
member states change within the time periods studied? Is there a partisan effect in 
any change of positions? What were the fundamental determinants of member states‟ 
preference formations? Did the European Commission decide to open accession 
negotiations with the candidate countries before making policy or institutional 
reforms? Which factors have had more impact on European Commissioners‟ and 
member states‟ decision to offer candidacy to Turkey and accept Poland as a member 
state?  
The dependent variable that this dissertation aims to explain is the attitudes of 
European Commissioners and member states towards Poland‟s and Turkey‟s 
European aspirations. For rational institutionalists, the independent variables that 
5 
 
affect attitudes are material factors, such as economic interests, security interests and 
political interests, while for constructivist/sociological institutionalists, the 
independent variables that affect attitudes are ideational factors, such as collective 
identity and moral duty. 
With respect to European studies, Moravcsik‟s liberal intergovernmentalism 
is the best example of the application of rationalist institutionalism to the field of 
European integration. The Moravcsik‟s methodology, as he (1998:19) points out, is 
the “formulation of concrete and falsifiable hypotheses from competing theories, the 
disaggregation of case studies to multiply observations and reliance whenever 
possible on primary sources”. When liberal intergovernmentalism is applied to the 
EU‟s enlargement policies, the main actors of enlargement are the member state 
governments because applicant countries are assumed to have a weak negotiating 
position with member states due to their desire to join the EU. Consequently, 
Moravcsik‟s rationalist framework, and its application to enlargement studies by 
Schimmelfennig is used in this dissertation to determine whether or not rationalist 
institutionalism can explain the attitudes of European Commissioners and member 
states.  
In contrast, European enlargement studies assume that decisions on 
enlargement policy are taken collectively by EU member states with the help of 
European Commission. Thus, the latter has a special role in enlargement. Member 
states justify enlargement on the basis of the responsibilities and duties resulting 
from various factors: their shared (European) identity, culture and history; being a 
part of the same family (sense of kinship); and belonging to the EU. 
Constructivist/sociological institutionalists mainly use constructivist tools, such as 
discourse and content analysis, in their evaluation of such social identities, values 
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and norms (Sjursen and Romsle, 2006). The constructivist/sociological 
institutionalism and its application to enlargement studies by Fierke and Wiener, 
Schimmelfennig, Sjursen and Sedelmeier is used in this dissertation to find out 
whether or not constructivist/sociological institutionalism can clarify the attitudes of 
European Commissioners and member states.  
 
1.1.2 Content Analysis 
 Content analysis is a research method that uses a set of procedures to make 
valid inferences from text (Weber, quoted in Neuendorf, 2002:10) or for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff, 1980:21). 
Content analysis is widely used in different academic fields, such as political science, 
sociology, cultural studies, marketing and media studies, literature and rhetoric. 
Content analysis includes analysis of the manifest and/or latent content of a text. 
Manifest content can be described as what is common to all, or what everyone can 
agree to (Krippendorff, 2004: 20), while latent content can be termed reading 
between the lines, or discovering hidden motivations (Krippendorff, 2004: 141). 
According to Krippendorff, one of the tasks3 that content analysis is used for 
by researchers is problem-driven content analysis. Krippendorff (2004:340) describes 
this as “motivated by epistemic questions about currently inaccessible phenomena, 
events or processes that the analysts believe texts are able to answer.” In such content 
analyses, as Krippendorff explains, analysts begin with research questions and 
proceed to find analytical paths to their answers through the choice of suitable texts.  
                                                          
3
 According to Krippendorff, the other two areas are text-driven content analyses and method-driven 
content analyses. 
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This dissertation uses problem-driven content analysis to answer the research 
question described earlier. That is, this study employs the content analysis of key 
documents to understand whether or not material factors, such as political, security 
or economic interests, or ideational factors, such as collective identity and moral 
duty, led the European Commissioners and member states to support Poland‟s 
membership and the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. These 
documents were selected from the FACTIVA database and the European 
Commissioners‟ speeches that were obtained from the RAPID database. RAPID4 is 
the official data base of the European Union. It includes EU press releases, memos, 
speeches, agendas, etc. released by the EU. The analysis aimed to reveal the 
documents‟ manifest content rather than latent content. 
The attitude of a member state towards an applicant state is revealed both in 
the speeches of the political and bureaucratic officials of member states and through 
media analyses. The speeches made by politicians can be obtained through press 
releases. In the content analyses literature, Lexis-Nexis and FACTIVA are the two 
research databases usually used for such systematic media analyses. Regarding the 
availability of these databases, the libraries of Bilkent University and Middle East 
Technical University were consulted. Since Bilkent University library has access to 
FACTIVA
5
 , this database was selected for this dissertation. 
Using RAPID, the relevant speeches of Commissioners were captured by 
applying date and text filters. The selected speeches were then analyzed to identify 
which kind of institutionalism, rationalist institutionalism based on economic, 
security and/or political interests, or constructivist/sociological institutionalism, 
                                                          
4
 The analysis from RAPID database was conducted since December 2011 using the internet site 
http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm  
 
5
 The analysis from FACTIVA database was conducted since September 2011. 
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based on European identity and/or moral duty, better explains the attitudes of 
European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey. Regarding the relations of 
member states with Poland and Turkey, FACTIVA was used to search through 
newspapers, such as the Financial Times and Times, and newswires like Reuters, 
Agency Europe and Dow Jones. The relevant press releases found using date and text 
filters were then analyzed to identify whether or not EU member states backed 
Poland and/or Turkey in their EU membership bids. In other words, the analysis 
aimed to identify the drivers and brakemen for Poland and Turkey. In addition, the 
analysis aimed to reveal whether material or ideational factors dominate relations 
between particular member states and Poland and Turkey. Tables and graphs were 
used to demonstrate the results. Because significant numbers of relevant primary 
press releases were captured from FACTIVA, specifically for 1996-2004 and 2004-
2012 for Turkey, it was also possible to conduct statistical tests on the data to support 
the study‟s qualitative findings. Statistical tests were also conducted using statistical 
software in order to determine the significance of attitudinal differences between 
successive governments within an EU member state or attitudinal changes resulting 
from domestic developments within member states. Although there may be other 
plausible ways to account for the attitudes of the European Commissioners or 
member states‟ towards EU enlargement to include Poland and Turkey, this study 
aimed to determine the most convincing explanation, based on the available 
empirical evidence and in terms of the theoretical framework of the dissertation. 
As outlined above, the primary sources in this dissertation are selected 
speeches of European Commissioners captured from RAPID, and selected speeches 
of politicians from selected member states obtained from FACTIVA. Additionally, 
secondary sources were also used, including newspaper or newswire releases 
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selected from FACTIVA and other books and articles about the EU‟s Eastern 
enlargement and the accession processes of both Poland and Turkey.  
Database searching was achieved by using filters such as date, subject and 
region. For the RAPID database, in the „Search Options‟ section, „Turkey‟ or 
„Poland‟ was typed. In the „Types‟ section, „SPEECH: EC Speech‟ was chosen. In 
the „Date Range‟ section, relevant dates were entered into the „Choose a date range‟. 
Using this filtering produced a list of candidate source speeches. The relevant 
speeches for this study were selected by reading them all. 
With respect to FACTIVA, in order to analyze, for example, Poland‟s 
relations with Germany in the period 1994-1998, „Poland and Germany‟ was first 
typed into the search builder. This search was then narrowed using „Poland‟ as the 
„Region‟ filter. Next, „European Union‟ was entered into the „Subject‟ filter. Finally, 
date was also filtered to select particular time periods. This process produced a list of 
677 press releases for the period 1994-1998. Using a similar process to analyze 
Germany‟s relations with Turkey, FACTIVA listed 312 press releases for the period 
of 1990-1995. 
Krippendorff (2004:113) suggests that when researchers analyze a sample of 
texts in place of a larger population of texts, they need a sampling plan to ensure that 
the textual units sampled do not bias answers to the research question. It is suggested 
(Frerichs, 2008: 3) that random sampling is a statistical sampling method where each 
unit remaining in the population has the same probability of being selected for the 
sample. In this study, the population was all the press releases available from 
FACTIVA for a single country, while the sample was the press releases chosen for 
analysis. In some periods, after using region and subject filters, enormous number of 
press releases appeared which were almost impossible to analyze without computer 
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software. In these cases, random sampling was used. Two main criteria were used for 
this sampling process. First, if the number of press releases produced from 
FACTIVA concerning a particular relationship was above 2,000, 50 percent were 
chosen for further analysis. Second, if the number of press releases was above 4,000, 
20 percent were chosen. For instance, having applied the filters described above, 
FACTIVA listed 3,683 press releases regarding German-Turkish relations for the 
period 1996-2004, so according to the sampling criteria 1,841 were  chosen for 
further analysis (i.e. Articles with even line numbers are chosen -press releases 
corresponds to the line 2, 4, 6, 8…-). For Turkish-Greek relations, for the period 
1996-2004, 7,031 press releases appeared so 1,406 of them were randomly chosen 
for analysis (i.e. Every fifth article is chosen -press releases corresponds to the line 
5,10,15,20...-) For German-Polish relations for 1998-2004, FACTIVA listed 4,419 
press releases so 883 of them were randomly selected for the analysis by applying 
the above mentioned selection algorithm. 
The selected press releases were each read, using the highlight function of the 
Word 2003 program to identify whether they were relevant to a specific relationship 
within the context of EU enlargement. This was necessary to exclude irrelevant press 
releases for tenders, OECD data, economic data or same press releases. For example, 
this process left 147 out of 677 press releases relevant press releases for German-
Polish relations and 117 out of 312 press releases for German-Turkish relations. 
In the content analysis literature, computer software programs such as NVivo, 
ATLAS.ti or MAXQDA are used for the systematic analysis of large numbers of 
texts. However, for this dissertation, the content of press releases and speeches 
needed to be analyzed individually by hand in order to reveal whether or not the 
member states or Commissioners supported the aspirations of Poland and Turkey, 
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and the reasons behind their support or reservation. The available computer software 
did not meet the needs of this study since it had to identify the specific tone of each 
document in order to avoid drawing false conclusions on the basis of a computerized 
analysis. However, when the number of press releases obtained from FACTIVA for a 
specific relationship exceeded 2,000, statistical random sampling methods are 
employed. 
 
1.1.3 Codes 
Krippendorff (2004:97) describes units as “wholes that analysts distinguish 
and treat as independent elements”. The units of analyses in this dissertation are 
individual press releases or „EC Speeches‟. All the categories, themes and codes used 
in the analysis were derived from the rationalist institutionalist and 
sociological/constructivist institutionalist literature. Specific issues within the codes 
were derived from the analysis of the two kinds of units, namely „EC Speeches‟ and 
press releases. The main categories identified were material factors and ideational 
factors. The themes falling under the category of material factors were political 
interest, security interest and economic interest, while the themes under the category 
of ideational factors were the EU‟s collective identity and moral duties. The Codes 
are as follows 
 
I-Material Factors: 
1) Political Interest: 
- Political Reasons: Whether or not political support or reservation is 
mentioned within the relevant text is searched. Political issues include, 
for Poland, the role of the EU in its transition to democracy and a 
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market economy, German unification, border claims, for Turkey, 
human rights, political reforms, Copenhagen Criteria, minority 
problems, the Cyprus problem, disputes in Aegean, ban of political 
parties, death penalty or for both Poland and Turkey, the own interests 
of the member state. 
- Geopolitical Reasons: For Poland, a fear of German dominance in 
the EU, shift of EU‟s center of gravity, fear of a shift of the EU‟s 
interest from Mediterranean states, Poland‟s strategic importance; for 
Turkey, its strategic importance, role as a „bridge‟ to the Muslim 
World, and a benchmark for democracy in the Muslim World, 
preventing Turkey from drifting towards Islamic fundamentalism. 
- Europhobia: For texts involving Great Britain, the desire for a looser 
federation of states, a fear of further deepening of the EU. 
- Inefficiency of the EU’s institutional system: Reservations about 
enlargement, particularly regarding voting procedures, fears about the 
EU‟s absorption capacity and ability to assimilate and integrate new 
member states. 
- Deepening versus Widening: the priority member states or the EU 
give to widening or deepening. 
2) Security Interest: 
- European Security: How much improved relations of Poland or 
Turkey with the EU contribute to European security, implications for 
EU energy security. 
- European Stability and Peace: Contribution of improved relations to 
European stability and peace. 
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- Immigration, Refugees, Illegal Drug trafficking: Fear of illegal 
immigration, refugee flows, border control issues and illegal drug 
trafficking. 
3) Economic Interest:  
- Expansion of Markets: Support for the improved relations in order to 
expand markets. 
- Competition in the EU market: Concern over sensitive sectors for 
member states, such as agriculture, coal, steel, etc. 
- Competition for EU funds: Member states‟ fears of reduced shares 
of EU funds, or diversion of EU funds towards Turkey or Poland. 
- Unemployment: Fear of rising of unemployment due to enlargement, 
specifically the free movement of Polish and Turkish workers into the 
EU. 
- Contribution to the EU budget: Member states‟ fears of increased 
contributions to the EU budget to fund enlargement.  
II-Ideational Factors 
1) EU’s Collective Identity 
- Common History: The emphasis of common history is analyzed. 
- Sense of Kinship: Kinship based analogies, such as being part of a 
family, cousin, sister, etc. 
- Common Values: Common values, common culture, EU values, 
common norms. 
- Common Religion: Phrases such as „Christian Club‟, „religious 
Berlin Wall‟, not sharing a common religion with Turkey. 
- Europeanness: The „Europeanness‟, or not, of Turkey or Poland. 
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2) Moral Duty 
- Special Responsibility: Sense of responsibility towards Poland and Turkey, 
for Turkey, the phrase Pacta Sunt Servanda (agreements should be 
respected). 
- Overcoming the Division of Europe: Phrases such as „overcoming the 
division of Europe‟, „unification of the continent‟.  
Within the selected texts, the support or reservation of European 
Commissioners and member states for Poland‟s or Turkey‟s European aspirations, 
and the factors, material or ideational, behind this support or reservation were 
analyzed using these coding criteria. If both support and reservation were observed 
within the same text, it was considered as expressing „reservation‟. To illustrate, a 
phrase like “Greece will support Turkey‟s application for membership of the 
European Community if there is a satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus problem” 
was counted as expressing political reservation. Although non-compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria was coded as political reservation, a sentence like “We want to 
help Turkey along the road towards full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria” 
was not coded as political reservation. 
As well as the specific codings described above, a general assessment section 
was also included in the content analysis of the documents. This allowed comparison 
of the relationship between each member state or European Commissioner and 
Poland or Turkey across different time periods. An EU member state was defined as 
a driver of enlargement if the content analysis revealed over 65 percent support for 
Poland or Turkey in primary documents and over 50 percent support in secondary 
documents. EU Commissioners were defined as drivers if the analysis revealed over 
65 percent support in their speeches for Turkey‟s or Poland‟s candidacy. On the 
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other hand, an EU member state or EU Commissioner was defined as a brakeman if 
analysis of the primary and secondary press releases or speeches respectively showed 
less than 35 percent support for the candidates. EU member states or Commissioners 
whose statements were analyzed as falling between 35 and 65 percent support were 
called „no label‟ as being neither a driver nor a brakeman. 
 
1.1.4 Limitations of the Method 
There are various limitations to the results that can be obtained by employing 
the methodology described above. The first one is language. The searches were done 
in English in both RAPID and FACTIVA. Therefore, speeches or press releases in 
other languages, such as French Spanish, Polish, German, Turkish, etc., could not be 
included in the study.  
Secondly, it is not clear whether the speeches included in the RAPID database 
reflect the EU‟s official public opinion or reflect the personal views of the speakers. 
However, this difference is not taken into account in this study, with all speeches 
being accepted as the official diplomatic opinion of the EU. 
Thirdly, the research is limited to those press releases and speeches 
obtainable via FACTIVA and RAPID. Press releases that are accessible through 
other databases, or speeches that are not included in RAPID, were not analyzed.  
 
1.1.5 Member State Selection  
Although there were 12 members of the EU in the 1990s, following 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, only Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain 
were chosen for the analysis regarding Poland, and only Germany, France, Great 
Britain and Greece were chosen for the analysis regarding Turkey. Of these 
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countries, Germany and Great Britain are considered to be drivers of Eastern 
enlargement. Great Britain favors widening over deepening whereas Germany favors 
widening and deepening at the same time. France and Spain are the brakemen and 
favor deepening over widening. Regarding Turkey‟s candidacy, Great Britain has 
been a driver whereas Greece can be considered a brakeman, although its attitude has 
varied. Similarly, the attitudes of Germany and France have varied during Turkey‟s 
accession process.  
According to the liberal intergovernmentalist literature, Germany is the main 
supporter of Poland‟s accession process because the Second World War left Poland 
and Germany with a legacy of common problems of minorities and boundaries. After 
the end of the Cold War, there was reconciliation in their relations and the problems 
of minorities and boundaries were solved peacefully. For instance, German foreign 
minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, as early as 1991, arranged the Weimar Triangle 
meetings between the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland in order to 
rebuild confidence between them following the end of the Cold War and German 
unification. These meetings allowed Poland have to gain privileged access to 
Germany and France, and to campaign for improvement of her European aspirations. 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as early as November 1988, visited 
Poland to show her support for Solidarity and Poland‟s transition to democracy, and 
Great Britain went on to become one of the main proponents of Poland‟s accession to 
the EU. Regarding the brakemen, France and Spain were specifically chosen because 
of their resistance to the Association Agreement with Poland. Although France, 
especially President Mitterrand, supported Poland‟s transition to democracy by 
encouraging Solidarity and offering economic help, France also emphasized that 
deepening should happen before widening, warning that “enlargement would take 
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tens and tens of years” (Mitterrand, quoted in Sjursen and Romsloe, 2006: 142). 
Economic interests also made it hard for France and Spain to reach generous trade 
and association agreements with Poland. Due to specific sectors in their countries, 
namely agriculture for France and steel for Spain, they engaged in hard bargaining 
over Poland‟s association negotiations. However, having opposed enlargement to 
begin with, France and Spain later altered their opinions and accepted Poland and the 
other CEECs as EU members.  
With respect to Turkey, Greece is known to be the main brakeman due to the 
Cyprus issue and other disputes in the Aegean. However, the earthquakes in Turkey 
and Greece in 1999 were a positive turning point for Greek-Turkish relations, and 
this reconciliation led Greece not to veto Turkey‟s candidacy at the Helsinki 
European Summit. Germany, especially Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, who was 
in office between October 1982 and October 1998, on the other hand, had economic 
reservations over its fear of mass migration of Turkish workers into Germany. With 
the inauguration of Social Democrat Gerard Schroeder to the Chancellorship in 
October 1998, the attitude of Germany towards Turkey changed positively, before 
becoming more negative again since Christian Democrat Angela Merkel‟s came to 
power in November 2005. This same partisan effect also applies to France. President 
Chirac who came to office in May 1995, for most of his presidency, supported 
Turkish accession, whereas President Sarkozy, who was in office between May 2007 
and May 2012, strongly opposed full membership for Turkey. Thus, it can be seen 
that there are more drivers and brakemen in Polish and Turkish accession than 
expected, and that the attitudes of some member states towards Turkey in particular 
have varied with the changes of government or domestic developments. 
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1.1.6 Case Selection 
With respect to case selection, a number of striking similarities between the 
Polish and Turkish cases make them valuable for comparative analysis. Both 
countries have strategic importance, large populations and large agricultural sectors, 
which are the main similarities that make Poland and Turkey important cases for 
comparison together with other similarities, such as their western orientation and the 
unconsolidated character of their democracies at the time of their membership 
applications. To start with the first similarity of strategic importance, Poland shares 
frontiers with Slovakia, Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and 
Germany, and this central European location increases Poland‟s strategic 
significance. In particular, sharing a border with Germany contributed to Poland‟s 
EU membership bid in two ways. First, as Schimmelfennig (Schimmelfennig, 2004: 
87) suggests, geographical proximity increases the chances of cross-border trade and 
capital movements. Secondly, in order to maximize her security interest, Germany 
made a readmission agreement with Poland to accept back immigrants mainly 
coming from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine that Germany expelled. That is, Poland‟s 
accession to the EU was in Germany‟s economic and security interest so this is one 
of the reasons why Germany became a driver of Poland‟s candidacy at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Turkey, meanwhile, is not only a bridge between Europe and Asia 
geographically but also a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. As the only 
secular, western-oriented Islamic state, Turkey is acknowledged as being a pole of 
stability in its region. In the supportive releases and support speeches, this 
geostrategic importance is underlined. 
19 
 
The second similarity is having large populations. Poland is the largest CEEC 
with a population of 38.6 million (European Commission, 1997: 7), while Turkey‟s 
population was already 53 million in 1988, so that Turkey was expected to have a 
bigger population than any EU member state (European Commission,1989:5). This is 
a constraint for both countries as large populations create a right to a larger number 
of seats in the EU parliament and greater voting weight in the European Council‟s 
decision mechanism. This created tensions during accession negotiations. For 
instance, although Spain and Poland have similar populations, in the negotiations for 
the Treaty of Nice, the French presidency tabled a proposal giving Poland 26 votes 
and Spain 28 votes on the European Council. Poland rejected this and in the end 27 
votes were allocated to both countries, with 29 votes going to the more populous 
Germany and France. In the negotiations for the European Constitution, voting rights 
were also a problem. A more egalitarian approach in terms of population was 
proposed, but Spain and Poland did not want to lose their voting rights and blocked 
the European Constitution in the European Council of December 2003. For Turkey, 
Schimmelfennig (2008:1) suggests that “Although the EU‟s institutional rules reduce 
the effect of population size on political power, Turkey would rank among the big 
member states with regard to seats in the European Parliament and votes in the 
Council and could gain at least considerable blocking power.”  As well as voting 
implications, population size also affects the distribution of EU funds.  
The existence of a large agricultural sector is a third similarity of Poland and 
Turkey which generates a problem for the EU‟s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and creates a demand for high net payments from the structural funds. At the time of 
Turkish application, more than 50 percent of its labor force (European Commission, 
1989: 6) was employed in agriculture, while in 1995, 26.9 percent of Poland‟s labor 
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force (European Commission, 1997: 22) was employed in agriculture. In the 
accession negotiations with Poland, due to economic reservations, France and Spain 
asked for a transition period for Poland before receiving the full benefits from the 
CAP. At the same time, Germany and Great Britain demanded changes in the CAP to 
decrease the size of their contributions to the EU budget. In addition, Poland‟s and 
Turkey‟s EU membership had the significant implications for labor migration 
towards the EU market. There were fears in EU public opinion about both Turkish 
and Polish workers
6
 migrating into the EU labor market and causing high 
unemployment in member states. Consequently, under Social Democrat Gerard 
Schroeder, Germany, together with Austria, asked for a seven-year transition period 
before allowing free movement of Polish workers after enlargement. Germany also 
raised similar concerns over possible mass immigration of Turkish workers 
following Turkey‟s EU membership application. 
The fourth similarity is Poland‟s and Turkey‟s European orientation. 
Integration into Western political and security structures, namely Europeanization 
and westernization, have been the main foreign policy aims of successive Turkish 
and Polish governments since 1944 and 1989 respectively. In order to realize this 
aim, Turkey applied to the European Economic Community on 31 July 1959 in order 
to sign an association agreement. In 12 September 1963, Turkey became an associate 
member of the EU by signing an Association Agreement, the Ankara Agreement, 
which created the Association Council. In 14 April 1987, Turkey officially applied 
for full membership of the EU. Two years later, on 18 December 1989, the European 
Commission presented its opinion on Turkey‟s application, advising against starting 
accession negotiations due to various obstacles, size, population, economic 
                                                          
6
 For Turkish workers, the name „gastarbeiter‟ is used, for the Polish workers, the name „Polish 
Plumbers‟ is used. 
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backwardness and democratic deficits, to Turkish accession. In contrast, diplomatic 
relations between the EU and Poland were established in 1988 and the association 
agreement, the Europe Agreement, was signed on 16 December 1991 and entered 
into force on 1 February 1994. This became the legal basis of Poland‟s relations with 
the EU in the early 1990s. On 5 April 1994, Poland presented its application for 
membership of the EU. In the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, the 
EU decided the list of the candidate countries for membership according to the 
Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 and Agenda 2000 proposals of the Commission. 
Poland, together with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus, 
was declared to start accession negotiations in 1998. In that summit, Turkey was not 
accepted as a candidate country but Turkey‟s eligibility was again confirmed. 
Helsinki European Council was an important cornerstone of the EU-Turkey relations. 
At the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the European Council declared Turkey as 
a candidate state but the accession talks were not started. The change of government 
in Germany and change of attitude of Greece towards Turkey were the main 
developments that led to the positive Helsinki decision. In the European Council 
Summit on December 17, 2004, the European Council accepted that Turkey fulfilled 
the Copenhagen Political Criteria and decided to open accession talks on October 3, 
2005. Turkey‟s accession process is still continuing since October 3, 2005. 
The last similarity is the unconsolidated character of both Polish and Turkish 
democracy, which is important in terms of compliance with the Copenhagen political 
criteria. Although both countries had completed their transition to democracy by the 
time of application, neither of them could be labeled as consolidated democracies. In 
the democratization literature, it is widely acknowledged (Whitehead,2002; 
Schmitter, 1996; Pridham, 1991, 1994) that the prospect of EU membership has a 
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positive effect on the consolidation of democracy in an applicant state. In order to 
fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, especially democratic conditionality, both countries 
have made extensive reforms in their political structures. In addition to domestic 
reform processes, the EU also has given financial aid for democratic reforms.  
In short, due to their similarities in terms of strategic importance, large 
population, large agricultural sector, western orientation and unconsolidated 
democracy at the time of their membership applications, Poland and Turkey were 
chosen as the two cases for this dissertation‟s analysis of EU enlargement decisions. 
More specifically, this study compares the attitudes of European Commissioners and 
member states towards Poland and Turkey through content analysis of key 
documents in order to see which factors, material or ideational, lie behind their 
support or reservation for each country‟s membership application. 
 
1.2 Chapters 
This dissertation is composed of five chapters. After introduction, the second 
chapter starts by analyzing the historical development of new institutionalism and its 
relationship with rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalism. After 
examining the basic premises of new institutionalism, rationalist institutionalism and 
constructivist/sociological institutionalism, the debate between rationalist 
institutionalism and constructivist/sociological institutionalism is analyzed in order 
to understand their approaches towards enlargement of the international institutions. 
Afterwards, the main hypothesis of liberal intergovernmentalism, which is an 
application of rationalist institutionalism to enlargement studies, is investigated, 
followed by the application of constructivist/sociological institutionalism. Finally, 
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the logics behind the two branches of institutionalism, consequentiality and 
appropriateness, are operationalized in order to shed light on the possible relevance 
of these theoretical approaches to explaining the attitudes of European 
Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey‟s European 
aspirations.  
The third chapter focuses on Polish accession to the EU. In this chapter, there 
are five sections. The first section, „Road to PHARE‟, analyzes the EU‟s initial 
responses to the CEEC and, as a part of it, Poland‟s transition to democracy and 
market economy. This section shows how bilateral trade agreements and the 
assistance program, „PHARE‟, were the EU‟s first tools for dealing with Poland, and 
that both the European Commissioners and member states supported Poland‟s 
transition to democracy and a market economy, although there was some hesitation 
about deepening Poland‟s relationship with the EU. The second section, „Europe 
Agreements‟ explains how both the European Commissioners and member states 
decided to formulate Europe Agreements in order to further link Poland to the EU. 
The negotiations involved some hard bargaining as the economic interests of France 
and Spain were challenged by the Europe Agreements. The third section, 
„Membership Application‟, reveals that the European Commissioners supported 
Poland‟s membership application in their public pronouncements, which highlighted 
the EU‟s political and security interests, together with the EU‟s responsibility 
towards unification of the continent. This section also shows that, among EU states, 
Poland‟s European aspirations were supported by Germany, Great Britain and 
France, under the Presidency of Chirac, while Spain had some economic 
reservations. However, under the Presidency of Mitterrand, France developed some 
political reservations. The fourth section, „Accession Negotiations‟, reports on the 
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level of support suggested by the public pronouncements of European 
Commissioners for Poland‟s accession process, along with various political 
reservations, particularly the EU‟s increasing prioritization of institutional reform 
during this period. With respect to member states, the section shows that Germany, 
France and Spain had some economic and political reservations. The final section, 
„General Assessment‟, makes a three-way quantitative content analysis of EU 
speeches selected from the RAPID database and press releases from FACTIVA 
regarding Poland‟s EU accession process: first, between each member state‟s 
attitudes as revealed in press releases at different periods; second, between the 
attitudes of European commissioners as revealed in their speeches at different 
periods; third, between the attitudes of different member states towards Poland.  
The fourth chapter deals with Turkish accession process to the EU, using a 
similar structure to chapter two of five sections. The first section, „Membership 
Application‟, shows that neither the European Commissioners nor member states 
were ready for Turkey‟s initial membership application. The second section, 
„Customs Union‟, demonstrates that, although the European Commissioners 
supported Customs Union with Turkey, there were significant political reservations 
over the Cyprus issue, Turkey‟s human rights problems and the EU‟s priority of 
deepening internal relations. With respect to member states, Great Britain and France 
supported Customs Union whereas Germany and Greece had political reservations. 
The third section, „From Helsinki Decision to Accession Negotiations‟, explains how 
the European Commissioners continued to voice their political reservations over the 
Cyprus issue, Turkey‟s human rights problems and its non-compliance with the EU‟s 
political criteria. Nevertheless, ideational arguments relating to the Europeanness of 
Turkey were also deployed in a number of supportive speeches. This section also 
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reports how, during this period, the attitudes of member states changed somewhat. 
For instance, while Germany‟s Christian Democrat Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had 
some political reservations about Turkey‟s European bid, his successor, Social 
Democrat Gerard Schroeder supported Turkey. Similarly, in contrast to Greece‟s 
previous political reservations, the detente that developed in 1999 meant that Greece 
did not veto Turkey‟s candidacy at the Helsinki European Summit. On the other 
hand, whereas President Chirac had supported Turkey‟s European bid, after the 
Justice and Development Party took power in Turkey, French politicians developed 
some doubts about Turkey‟s European orientation and secularism. The fourth 
section, „Accession Negotiations‟, shows how European Commissioners not only 
reiterated their political reservations over the Cyprus issue and Turkey‟s human 
rights problems, but also start to emphasize the EU‟s „absorption capacity.‟ On the 
other hand, for the first time, ideational arguments concerning the EU‟s moral duty 
of keeping promises previously given to Turkey became prominent. With respect to 
member states, that the section shows that Germany, France and Greece expressed 
political reservations, such as the Cyprus issue and Turkey‟s non-compliance with 
the Copenhagen Criteria, with only Great Britain clearly supporting Turkey‟s 
accession bid. The final section, „General Assessment‟, reports the findings of a 
similar quantitative content analysis to that in the previous chapter on Poland, using 
the same three-way comparison of selected European Commissioners‟ speeches and 
member state press releases.  
The final chapter contains two sections. The first section, „Comparison of 
Polish and Turkish Accession Periods‟, provides a dual qualitative and quantitative 
comparative analysis of the attitudes of European commissioners and member states 
towards Poland and Turkey. The second subsection, „Concluding Remarks‟, sets out 
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this study‟s responses to the hypotheses listed at the start of this dissertation, some 
comments on limitations and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
1.3  Expected Contribution 
EU enlargement has suffered from theoretical neglect in studies of European 
integration. This dissertation analyzes the attitudes of European Commissioners and 
member states within the framework of the debate between rationalist and 
constructivist/sociological institutionalists. By applying this debate to examining the 
attitudes of European Commissioners and member states, this study aims to make a 
novel theoretical contribution to the enlargement literature.  
The literature on EU enlargement has generally been based on qualitative 
analysis. This study is a rare example of using both qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis of the most important relevant primary sources, namely the speeches 
of European Commissioners and presidents, prime ministers and other ministers of 
EU member states. The findings of this dissertation also open the way to conducting 
further research on the attitudes of the European Parliament and European Council. 
Although there is already a large literature addressing Turkey‟s and Poland‟s 
accession process to the EU, there is a gap in the institutionalist literature on 
evaluating the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards 
Poland and Turkey. This study aims to make a significant contribution to filling this 
gap in the literature by demonstrating the value of applying the debate between 
rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalists to content analysis of 
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documents relating to the different phases of these two countries‟ accession 
processes.  
As already outlined, Poland and Turkey have similarities in terms of 
population, unconsolidated democracy and large agricultural sectors requiring EU 
structural funds. By analyzing how Poland previously overcame these disadvantages 
during its accession process, this study shed light on Turkey‟s EU membership 
prospects and offer policy recommendations to Turkish decision makers on the basis 
of the study‟s findings. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON RATIONALIST 
INSTITUTIONALISM CONSTRUCTIVIST/ SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
OF THE EU 
 
 
The conceptual framework of this dissertation is situated in the debate 
between rationalist and sociological/constructivist institutionalism. This debate not 
only provides the main central point of theorizing in international relations 
(Katzenstein et al 1999; Christiansen et al, 1999) and European Union Studies 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2000) but also has 
repercussions for enlargement studies. Hypotheses of both approaches have been 
tested against each other, especially concerning explanations of the EU‟s eastern 
enlargement, considered to have been the most challenging and complicated round 
due to the number of candidates and the long duration of the enlargement process. 
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This round ended in May 1, 2004, when Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Malta, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Cyprus became EU members. Before 
moving to discuss Eastern enlargement, a brief analysis of the basic premises of new 
institutionalism and rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalism is 
needed. 
 
2.1 The New Institutionalisms 
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new approach to institutional 
analysis, namely new institutionalism. With their article „New Institutionalism: 
Organizational Factors in Political Life‟, March and Olsen (1984) played a 
pioneering role in its development. This new approach developed in response to the 
behavioral perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s, which had earlier emerged in 
reaction to the tradition in which politics was identified with formal and legal 
institutional terms, specifically old institutionalism. Thus, in order to understand new 
institutionalism, it is necessary first to analyze the main assumptions of both old 
institutionalism and behavioralism. 
To start with old institutionalism (Peters, 2005: 1-25), its key defining 
element was legalism: the view that political institutions and government could only 
be examined through the formation and application of laws, which were assumed to 
constitute the basic structure for relations between governments and citizens. A 
second element of old institutionalism was structuralism, which suggested that 
structures matter in that they determine behavior and leave no room for individual 
action in influencing the government. A third defining characteristic of old 
institutionalism was holism, requiring the analysis of whole systems, such as 
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presidential or parliamentary, rather than individual institutions, such as the 
judiciary. However, this concentration on whole political systems also had its 
drawbacks. As Peters (2005:10) notes, “it tended to make generalization, therefore 
theory construction, more difficult.” Normative analysis was a fourth characteristic 
of old institutionalism, with its tendency to be concerned with good governance and 
improvement of institutions. Comparison of the institutions of different countries was 
widely used method in old-institutionalism in order to discover good external 
examples to implicate in institutions to make them better.  
The behavioral revolution, which occurred during the1960s and 1970s, 
developed as a response to old institutionalism. The fundamental criticism that the 
behavioral approach was built on was its view that old institutionalism paid 
insufficient attention to individuals due to its extensive concern with formal legal 
institutions. In contrast, the behavioral approach is suggested (Dimaggio and Powel, 
1991:2) to “interpreted collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate 
consequence of individual choice.” In other words, the primary actors in political 
settings were individuals, so in order to conduct political analyses, political scientists 
needed to examine mainly individuals and their behaviors, taking into account 
psychological, social and cultural factors.  
Immergut (1998:6) underlines that the emphasis on observable behavior was 
central to the behavioral approach. That is, rather than looking at political 
institutions, such as presidential or parliamentary systems, the main focus of political 
analysis was on individuals, such as voters, members of parliaments and citizens, 
because it was accepted that decisions are made by individuals within institutions. 
Unlike old institutionalists, who had concentrated on formal institutions, 
behavioralism is suggested (Peters, 2005: 15) to mainly concentrated on the inputs 
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from society into the political system, and how these inputs (such as voting or 
interest group activity) then affected outputs. The behaviors of political actors, 
considered as societal inputs, also had an effect on the government, so that in order to 
be re-elected, politicians needed to take these inputs seriously. Old institutionalism 
was further criticized (Lecours, 2005:3) by behavioralists for being descriptive and a-
theoretical. Old institutionalists mainly analyzed formal-legal institutions to explain 
how they worked, without being interested in elucidating political outcomes. 
Together with being descriptive, old institutionalism‟s holism led it to become a-
theoretical. By focusing on and merely describing whole political systems old 
institutionalism could not offer a method for theory development. On the other hand, 
it is suggested (Wu, 2009:107) that behavioralism‟s starting point was to make 
political science a true science, and for this aim, behavioralists studied political 
behavior in terms of various theories and methods, such as case analysis, 
experimental analysis, statistical analysis and system analysis. The behavioral 
approach also criticized old institutionalism for its normative implications. That is, in 
order to identify forms of supposedly good government, old institutionalists 
presented the world‟s industrialized democracies as model governments, which in 
turn led them to discriminate against other parts of the world. So, it was advocated 
(Wu, 2009:107) that “in transition from old institutionalism to new institutionalism, 
behaviorism acts as the important theoretical source.” 
New institutionalism has been identified (March and Olsen, 1984: 738) as 
bringing together elements of old institutionalism and behavioralism. Like 
behavioralists, new institutionalists also criticize old-institutionalism for being 
normative, descriptive, a-theoretical and holistic. Unlike old-institutionalists, 
however, who described institutions and analyzed how they work, new 
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institutionalists‟ main objective has been suggested (Lecours, 2005:14) to explain 
political outcomes and make attempts towards generalizations and building theory in 
order to study politics scientifically. Behavioralism‟s emphasis on observable 
behavior was the point of departure for new institutionalism. As Immergut (2008:6) 
points out, “The new institutionalists vehemently reject observed behavior as the 
basic datum of political analysis: they do not believe that behavior is a sufficient 
basis for explaining all of the phenomena of government.” That is, behavioralism 
was mainly criticized for allowing no role for institutions in their analysis of social 
and political processes. They were also criticized (Dimaggio and Powel, 1991:2) for 
“their neglect of social context and the durability of institutions.” New 
institutionalism therefore reversed this lack of institutions in social and political 
analysis. Accordingly, the crucial difference of new institutionalism from both 
behavioralism and old-institutionalism is suggested (March and Olsen, 1989: 17) to 
be not only its recognition of the importance of both the social context of politics and 
the motives of individual actors, but also its positing a more independent role for 
political institutions. For new institutionalists, as March and Olsen (1984: 738)  
indicates, institutions represent an autonomous force in politics that should be treated 
as political actors so a political scientist should mainly scrutinize the independent 
role of political institutions by taking into account the motives of actors. Thus, new 
institutionalism‟s main theoretical argument is that „institutions affect action‟ and its 
central question is: „How do institutions affect the behavior of individuals and 
corporate actors?‟  
New institutionalism has not, however, been a unified body of thought. 
Rather, there have been many new institutionalisms in economics, organization 
theory (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991), political science (Peters, 2005; Lecours, 2005), 
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history (Steinmo et al, 1992; Thelen, 1999; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002) and 
sociology (Finnemore, 1996), all of which agree that institutional arrangements and 
social processes matter. Some theorists (Bulmer, 1994) have divided these new 
institutionalisms into two major variants, namely rationalist and historical. However, 
it has been generally acknowledged (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2001) that historical institutionalism, rationalist institutionalism and 
constructivist/sociological institutionalism are the main approaches within new 
institutionalism. Although all three share the basic assumption that institutions affect 
behavior and should be analyzed, they differ in their methodology for scrutinizing 
the role of institutions. This chapter compares rationalist institutionalism and 
constructivist/sociological institutionalism in terms of the origins and fundamental 
assumptions of the two approaches.  
 
2 Rationalist Institutionalism 
Rationalist institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism) emerged from 
the study of American congressional behavior (Pollack, 2004: 138; Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 10-11; Powell and Dimaggio, 1991:5).7 For political scientists, the fact that 
there are stable legislative majorities in the US congress despite the multiple 
preference-orderings of legislators and the multidimensional character of issues 
seemed paradoxical. In order to understand this issue, institutional analysis came to 
the fore. Legislators need to reach a consensus and pass legislation in order to serve 
the electorate that they represent. However, clashes of interests and subsequent 
collective action problems have been frequently seen in congress. Thus, the 
                                                          
7
 Powell and Dimaggio label rationalist institutionalism as positive theory of institutions. 
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institutions that structure US politics are suggested (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991:5) 
to be viewed “as responses to collective action problems, which arise precisely 
because the transaction costs of political exchange are high.” With their help, 
legislators not only have a chance to gain through cooperation but also to pass 
required legislation. 
Rationalist institutionalists usually define institutions in a narrow manner, in 
terms of the formal rules, procedures or norms which shape and constrain individual 
behavior. For instance, according North (quoted in Shepsle, 2005:3), institutions are 
“rules of the game in a society or more formally … the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction.” Shepsle (quoted in Dimaggio and Powell, 1991: 5) 
similarly describes political institutions comprehensively as “ex ante agreements 
about a structure of cooperation” that “economize on transaction costs, reduce 
opportunism and other forms of agency „slippage‟ and thereby enhance the prospects 
of gains through cooperation.” For rationalists, institutions are the rules of the game 
which permit or prohibit actions of individuals or states in order to achieve collective 
action without free-rider problems among utility maximizing actors. 
In order to find an answer to the problem of explaining how institutions affect 
individual action, rationalist institutionalists emphasize that institutions, by providing 
information and enforcement mechanisms, create stability and certainty, both in 
political life and human relations. Hall and Taylor (1996: 7) notify that institutions 
also influence the behaviors of other actors “by altering the expectations an actor has 
about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with 
his own action.” For instance, in consolidated democracies, political parties are 
aware that if they do not serve the interests of their electorate, they will not be 
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elected again, while other groups, such as the military and judiciary, know that there 
is no other way to change the government except through elections.  
There is a variety of significantly differing rational choice perspectives
 
on 
institutions. However, they also share some fundamental assumptions. To start with, 
the social ontology of rationalist institutionalism is methodological individualism and 
materialism, which are borrowed from neo-classical economics. According to 
methodological individualism, relations involve “strategic exchange among actors 
with pre-social givens” (Kratocwill and Rugguie quoted in Moravcsik and Checkel, 
2000; 220). It assumes that humans are utility maximizers who behave strategically 
in order to attain a particular set of goals. Human action is thereby regarded as the 
cornerstone of any social scientific explanation. Thus, rationalist institutionalists 
posit a world of individuals or organizations seeking to maximize their material well-
being. In this approach, it is pointed out (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991: 8) that 
“institutions are the products of human design, the outcomes of purposive actions by 
instrumentally oriented individuals.” In order to maximize their material well-being, 
rational actors consciously establish institutions and accept the constraints imposed 
by these institutions since they also constrain other actors and make their behavior 
more predictable. 
Rationalist institutionalists believe that actors have a fixed set of preferences, 
or given interests, which are uninfluenced by institutions. An institution may offer 
the chance to its members to behave strategically; it may supply new information 
about strategies or it may change the advantages or disadvantages of various 
strategies. However, it does not modify the actors‟ underlying motivations. Unlike 
sociological institutionalists, who assume that institutions shape the preferences of 
actors through a social learning process, in rationalist institutionalism, rational actors, 
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aware of their given interests, try to reach their goals with the help of institutions, 
while not allowing them to alter their preferences. In other words, institutions are 
assumed to be an intervening mechanism. 
For rationalist institutionalists, the fundamental sources of human behavior 
are thought to come from outside the agent and her context. In other words, it is 
suggested (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 6) that institutions are often external-
exogenous to the agent unless actors are engaged in the conscious creation of rules. 
Thus, due to the exogenous character of institutions, rationalist institutionalists 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 432) scrutinize how “institutions structure incentives, 
instantiate norms, define roles, prescribe or proscribe behavior, or procedurally 
channel politics so as to alter political outcomes relative to what would have 
occurred in the absence of (or under alternative) institutions.” 
 Rationalist institutionalism is strongly influenced by game theory, which 
analyses how individuals make decisions if they know that the ultimate outcome is 
also influenced by other actors. Thus, rationalist institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 12) tend to see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas in which the 
action of one rational actor may produce an outcome that makes another actor worse 
off. In order to analyze the tension this creates between individual and social 
interests, metaphors such as „the Prisoners‟ Dilemma‟ or „the Centipede or the 
Chicken‟ are used (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). Rationalist institutionalists are 
interested in such games and their design: institutions are suggested (Steinmo, 
2001:3) to be simply the rules of the games. 
 To explain the persistence of institutions, rationalist institutionalists point out 
that, as long as institutions make the behaviors of others more predictable and are 
efficient at solving collective action problems, actors realize that compliance with the 
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rules of such institutions is better than disobedience, which in turn increases the 
resilience of the institution. For rationalists, efficiency is a key term for explaining 
institutional persistence. As Williamson (quoted in Dimaggio and Powell, 1991:4) 
nicely put it, “competition eliminates institutions that have become inefficient.” In 
other words, the more efficient an institution is in performing the tasks at hand, 
especially in constraining actors by creating stability, the greater the likelihood is that 
it will endure for a long time. 
Rationalist institutionalism embodies the „logic of consequentialism‟ (logic of 
expected consequences). According to this logic (March and Olsen, 1989: 23; March 
and Olsen, 1998: 950), political order is achieved by negotiation among rational 
actors pursuing personal preferences or interests. While making a decision, a rational 
actor first takes into account the alternatives and his/her values, then considers the 
consequences of each alternative for his/her values before finally choosing the 
alternative that has the best consequences. In order to simplify problems of 
preference complexity, this logic understands politics by decomposing complex 
systems into relatively autonomous subsystems, most commonly by linking them 
hierarchically. For instance, in the nation state, the interests of political actors are 
more significant because the interests of nation states are derived from them. In 
international organizations, the interests of member states are essential for the 
interest of international organization itself. Therefore, in this perspective, politics is 
seen as aggregating individual preferences, be they those of a rational actor or 
rational state, into collective actions through certain procedures of bargaining, 
negotiation, coalition formation and exchange. The international system, according 
to this logic, is thus understood as consisting of autonomous, egoistic self-interested 
maximizers. 
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With respect to international organizations, according to the rationalist 
account, they are instrumental and regulatory associations established to facilitate 
rational states to pursue their interests with the help of intergovernmental 
negotiations. It is suggested (Abbott and Snidal, 1998: 9) that states prefer 
international organizations to alternative forms of institutionalization due to two 
functional characteristics: centralization and independence. Through their concrete 
and stable organizational structures and supportive administrative apparatus, 
international organizations centralize collective activities. Moreover, in certain 
spheres, such international organizations are independent, having the authority to act 
with a degree of autonomy and often with neutrality. Thus, as Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2002:509) indicate, by pooling activities, elaborating norms, performing 
as a neutral information supplier and granting stable negotiation forums, international 
organizations make collective action less complicated and more efficient. According 
to Dimaggio and Powell (1991:7), in an effort to realize shared goals, nations 
therefore agree to bind themselves to international organizations that subsequently 
limit their freedom of action; that is, states accept to be constrained by international 
organizations on the expectation that other states are similarly constrained, which 
improves the chances of gains through cooperation. 
 
2.2.1 Rationalist Institutionalism and EU Enlargement 
With respect to the enlargement of international organizations, rationalists 
assume that decisions on membership may be made according to criteria of 
instrumental rationality. According to Schimmelfennig (1999:4), these decisions “are 
based on exogenously given and stable egoistic preferences of both members and 
candidates for membership, and they reflect the material conditions of the 
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international system.” Accordingly, a country would apply for membership of an 
international organization as long as the benefits of being a member exceed the cost 
of obeying the terms and conditions of that organization. Likewise, member states of 
an international organization would only accept a country if they all agree that the 
applicant country contributes to the international organization and its membership of 
would not challenge the interests of any other member states. Regarding relationship 
of Poland and Turkey with the EU, Poland‟s association agreements challenged the 
interests of France and Spain, so they negotiated and won concessions from Poland 
in return for signing the Europe Agreements. Greece has political reservations about 
Turkey, such as the Cyprus issue, so Greece has suggested that without the solution 
of the Cyprus issue, she will continue to block Turkish accession. 
 
3 Constructivist/ Sociological Institutionalism 
The roots of sociological institutionalism lie in the subfield of organizational 
theory (Hall and Taylor, 1996:13; Immergut, 1998:28; Finemore, 1996: 325). At the 
end of 1970s, some sociologists challenged the view that a modern organization 
requires only efficient institutional forms and procedures. They suggest that these 
forms and procedures should instead be explained in cultural terms specific to certain 
societies. 
These sociological institutionalists tend to define institutions much more 
broadly than rationalists institutionalists do. They not only include formal rules, 
procedures or norms, but also symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates 
and routines. For example, Scott (quoted in Peters, 2005: 117) defines institutions as 
“consisting of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that 
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provide stability and meaning to social behavior.” This way of defining institutions 
helps political scientists integrate culture within their analysis of institutions. 
In clarifying how institutions affect individual action, sociological 
institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 8) suggest that they not only affect actors‟ 
choices by offering moral or cognitive patterns for interpretation and action but also 
influence the identities, self-images and preferences of the actors. In an institutional 
environment, the policies that are implemented become a system of beliefs over time, 
so that eventually these policies affect the preferences of actors within that 
organization. This shaping of the preferences of actors usually takes the form of a 
process of social learning. Unlike rationalist institutionalists, who assume that 
instrumental calculation is the main motivation behind action, sociological 
institutionalists emphasize that actors determine their actions through interpretation 
of situations.  
To start with the basic assumptions of sociological institutionalism, its social 
ontology is both social and ideational, (Risse, 2004: 160) acknowledging that human 
agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively 
shared systems of meanings, namely culture in a broad sense.
 
Humans are satisfiers, 
whose behaviors are affected by their worldview. In order to attain their purposes, 
humans set up familiar patterns of behavior. Human interaction is shaped primarily 
by ideational factors, not simply material ones. Sociological institutionalists (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996: 16) emphasize that what an individual sees as „rational action‟ is 
itself socially constituted, so they imagine a world of individuals or organizations 
trying to find out and express their identity in socially appropriate ways. According 
to this approach (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991: 8), while institutions are certainly the 
result of human activity, they are not necessarily the products of conscious design. In 
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other words, institutions are not established by instrumentally oriented individuals in 
order to serve their interests, they evolve within a society in order to respond to its 
social needs. 
Sociological institutionalists challenge the rationalist assumption of 
exogenously given interests or fixed preferences. They try to reveal the underlying 
mechanisms behind preferences and interests. For them, preferences and interests are 
not fixed or given as assumed by rationalists; on the contrary, they are accepted as 
emerging from the interaction between actors and institutions in historically specific 
circumstances. Accordingly, social and cultural norms are (Fierke and Wiener, 
1999:723)  believed to shape actors‟ identities, behaviors and preferences; interests 
are, in turn, assumed to be affected by these cultural and social norms. 
Unlike rationalist institutionalists, sociological institutionalists argue that 
institutions are not external to the agent; rather, they are endogenous. Institutions are 
suggested (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999:432) to shape an actor‟s preferences “directly 
(e.g. by specifying the outcomes to be desired) or indirectly (e.g. through effects on 
actors‟ identities).” Given this perspective, sociological institutionalists (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 14) try to explain why organizations take on specific sets of 
institutional forms, procedures or symbols, emphasizing how such practices are 
diffused through organizational fields or across nations. Institutions are believed to 
be a part of an actor‟s behavior, and actors mostly take for granted the effects of 
these institutions on their actions. That is, they are not aware that they usually act 
according to what these institutions necessitate, although in interpreting the given 
situation, they actually act according to what is most appropriate in that institutional 
environment. 
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With respect to the resiliency of institutions, sociological institutionalists 
propose that they cannot be transformed by individual actions since they are 
collective constructions. Unlike rationalist institutionalists, who explain the 
resiliency of institutions through efficiency, for sociological institutionalists (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996:8), institutions are persistent because they structure the very 
choices about reform that the individual is likely to make. Thus, institutions can 
become resistant to change through their effect on the preferences and identities of 
actors. 
March and Olsen (1989:23, 1998: 951) suggest that sociological 
institutionalism draws on the „logic of appropriateness‟, which emphasizes the role 
of identities, rules and institutions in shaping human behavior. In a way, actions are 
understood as rule-based in this logic. Before acting, the actor determines what the 
situation is and what role is being fulfilled then thinks about the obligations of the 
role in that situation, before finally doing what is most appropriate. Thus, political 
actors are (March and Olsen, 1998: 952) seen as “acting in accordance with rules and 
practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted.” 
Thus, when making a decision, actors behave according to what they are expected to 
do. According to this logic, international society is viewed as a community of rule 
followers with distinctive socio-cultural ties, cultural connections, intersubjective 
understandings and senses of belonging.  
Regarding international organizations, sociological institutionalists suggest 
that they have autonomy from their member states while helping the members to 
build a community on the grounds of shared identity. International organizations are 
suggested (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999:707) to “become autonomous sites of 
authority independent from the state „principals‟ who may have created them, 
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because of power owing from at least two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-
legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and 
information.” Because the imposition of rational-legal authority requires impersonal 
rules, laws and procedures, states attribute legitimacy to international organizations 
and are, in turn, willing to submit to this kind of authority. International 
organizations also have control over technical knowledge and expertise, which helps 
them to be recognized as impersonal and neutral. Thus, unlike rationalist 
institutionalists, who suggest that international organizations are established to help 
rational states pursue their interests, for sociological institutionalists, they are 
assumed to have both autonomy from their members and the power to shape the 
preferences of member states. 
 
2.3.1 Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism and EU Enlargement 
Concerning the enlargement of international organizations, sociological 
institutionalists (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002:513) emphasize that 
“enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors and 
studying enlargement consists in the analysis of social identities, values and norms 
not the material, distributional consequences of enlargement for individual actors.” 
In other words, in applying for membership of an international organization or 
accepting an applicant state, applicants and member states respectively do not make 
cost-benefit calculations; rather social identities, values and norms are the defining 
factors in decision making. Thus, according to Schimmelfennig (1999:11), 
sociological institutionalists predict that international organizations are more likely to 
admit those states that share the fundamental values of the international community 
and adhere to its basic norms. For instance, as early as 1957, in Article 237 of the 
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Treaty of Rome, the EU declared that any European country may become member. 
Moreover, during the different phases of enlargement, in addition to being a 
European country, the EU referred to the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, 
minorities as fundamental values of the organization. Finally, the EU explicitly 
declares that those countries that share these fundamental values, and promise to 
abide by these norms, can apply for membership.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Rationalist Institutionalism and 
Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism 
 Rationalist Institutionalism Sociological/Constructivist 
Institutionalism 
Definition of Institutions Narrow-formal rules, 
Procedures or norms 
Broad-formal rules, Procedures, 
norms, symbol systems, cognitive 
scripts, moral templates, routines 
Social ontology Methodological individualism Social and ideational 
Actors Utility maximizers Satisfiers 
Role of Institutions for 
human action 
Exogenous Endogenous 
Actors’ preferences Given and fixed preferences Not fixed preferences shaped by 
social and cultural norms 
Effect on individual action By creating stability and 
certainty  
By offering moral or cognitive 
pattern for interpretation and 
action 
Logic Logic of consequentialism Logic of appropriateness  
Source: Based on concepts developed in March and Olsen 1989,1998; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2002  Sjursen, 2002; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; Piedrafita and Torreblanca 2005 
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4 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998) is an application of 
rationalist institutionalism to the field of European integration. Unlike neo-
functionalism, which emphasizes that the EU necessitates a sui generis explanation, 
the first assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that European integration is a 
case of general international politics with the EU being an international organization 
that can be explained through an international relations perspective in which states 
are the central actors operating in a context of anarchy. As Moravcsik (1993: 480) 
states, “The EC is best seen as an international regime for policy co-ordination.” 
Secondly, liberal intergovernmentalism tries to explain state preferences and 
collective outcomes as a result of aggregated individual actions based on these 
preferences. Thus, as Schimmelfennig (2004: 77) underlines, it “seeks to explain the 
establishment and design of international institutions as a collective outcome of 
interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations 
in an anarchical context.” 
 More generally, European integration, as Moravcsik (1998:18) points out, can 
best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These 
choices are affected by constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic 
interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the 
international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of 
interstate commitments. Liberal Intergovernmentalism puts forward a liberal theory 
of national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations, 
and a functional theory of institutional choice in order to explain the sequence of 
negotiation outcomes. Thus, Moravcsik‟s rationalist framework suggests that 
international negotiation be disaggregated into a causal sequence of three stages: 
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national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. In order 
to explain different national preferences, he analyses geopolitical and economic 
interests as the sources of national preferences. According to Moravcsik (1993: 481), 
in the formation of foreign policy goals, national governments are “viewed as 
varying in response to shifting pressures from domestic social groups, whose 
preferences are aggregated through political institutions.” Thus, state preferences are 
not fixed or uniform, but can change across time, depending on the issue and 
according to the different domestic actors‟ preferences. In the second stage, aware of 
domestically determined national preferences, state executives bargain at the EU 
level in order to provide their domestic social groups with the desired outcomes. In 
the final stage, the states choose institutional arrangements that maximize their 
individual utility. 
 
2.4.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Eastern Enlargement 
Moravcsik and Vachudova have applied the bargaining theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism to the EU‟s Eastern enlargement. The CEEC‟s desire to join 
the EU was widely accepted by EU members due to the CEEC‟s expected benefits of 
full market access, incentives for foreign direct investment, budgetary receipts and 
having a voice in EU decision making. Therefore, CEECs consistently found 
themselves in a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis their EU partners, and 
accordingly (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003:44) “conceded much in exchange for 
membership.” That is, relations between the EU and the CEECs have been 
characterized by asymmetrical interdependence. 
Schimmelfennig criticized Moravcsik and Vachudova by pointing out that the 
application of only the bargaining theory of liberal intergovernmentalism leads to a 
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partial analysis of Eastern enlargement. A complete liberal intergovernmentalist 
analysis, he argues, would necessitate explaining the enlargement preferences of EU 
members and the intra-organizational bargaining process. 
The enlargement preferences of EU member states, which diverged both 
regarding the speed and the extent of EU enlargement, can be reasonably be 
explained by liberal intergovernmentalism. As Schimmelfennig (2004: 87) points 
out, “Whereas the „drivers‟ advocated an early and firm commitment to Eastern 
enlargement, the „brakemen‟ were reticent and tried to put off the decision and 
whereas one group of member states pushed for a limited (first) round of 
enlargement focusing on the central European states, others favored an inclusive 
approach for all ten candidates.” 
 
Table 2: Member state enlargement preferences for CEECs 
 Limited enlargement Inclusive enlargement 
Drivers Germany Great Britain 
Brakemen      - France, Greece, Spain 
Source: Schimmelfennig, 2006: 211 
 
Table 3: Member State Preferences on Turkish Accession 
Member State 1997 1999 2004/2005 2006 
Germany - + +/- - 
France + + +/- - 
Great Britain + + + + 
Greece - + - - 
Source: Schimmelfennig, 2008: 27 
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According to Schimmelfennig, for the accession of the CEEC‟s, the 
geographical location of existing member states plays a vital role in determining their 
enlargement preferences due to their chances of increased cross-border trade and 
capital movements. That is, international interdependence increases with 
geographical proximity, so the countries bordering Central and Eastern Europe 
became, excepting Greece, drivers of enlargement. Central European countries 
preferred limited enlargement because they shared borders with these candidate 
states and expected to increase economic relations with them. Geographical 
proximity also clarifies why southern states like France and Greece supported 
Bulgaria and Romania whereas northern states like Denmark and Sweden supported 
Baltic applicants. 
In order to analyze why border states, such as Greece and Spain played the 
role of brakemen for the CEECs, one should also look at the potential losers from 
Eastern enlargement. As Schimmelfennig 2001: 51) notes, “the unequal distribution 
of these losses mainly results from differences in socio-economic structure among 
the EU member countries.” It was expected that poorer, less highly developed and 
more agricultural EU members would be negatively influenced by eastern 
enlargement due to competition in trade and for EU funds. Moreover, most of the 
brakemen, especially Spain, were (Sjursen, 2002:498) suggested to have trade 
deficits with the East European States. Thus, these potential losers were expected to 
prefer association agreements with CEECs instead of enlargement because of their 
fear of losing EU structural funds and their share in EU markets.  
In addition to geographical proximity, enlargement preferences are also 
influenced by geopolitical interests. For instance, France and Greece particularly 
feared German dominance in EU decision making because they expected that CEECs 
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would support Germany in most issues in return for Germany‟s support for their 
membership. According to Schimmelfennig (2001:53), British preferences cannot be 
explained geographically or economically for both CEECs and Turkey. The British 
enthusiasm for enlargement can rather be explained by the „Europhobia‟ of 
conservative governments. Moreover, for Turkey, political issue of Cyprus shaped 
Greek preferences whereas opposition of Christian Democratic Party of Germany 
based on cultural grounds (Schimmelfennig, 2008:7). Thus, enlargement preferences 
across the EU diverged not only due to economic interests but also due to 
geopolitical or ideological interests. Moreover, with respect to Turkish case, 
Schimmelfennig (2008:8-10) also underlines that the attitudes of member states 
towards Turkish European bid changed in different periods due to the domestically 
induced changes in governments. 
Eastern enlargement was also expected to create high financial costs for the 
EU itself. The CEECs and Turkey are suggested (Mattli and Plümber, 2002: 552) to 
be economically backward countries compared to EU member states meaning they 
would have to receive EU transfers and would be unable to make net payments to the 
common budget or a net positive contribution to the EU. Moreover, most CEECs and 
Turkey are agricultural states so Eastern enlargement would be expected 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001:52) to destabilize “the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
structural policies that together comprise around 80 percent of the Community 
budget.” It was predicted that CEEC and Turkish farmers would benefit more from 
the CAP than existing member states, while their low income levels would lead 
CEECs to receive a greater share of EU structural funds. Thus, in both the short and 
medium terms, it is acknowledged (Sjursen, 2002:497) that in the existing EU states‟ 
opinion, “the economic costs of enlargement would outweigh the gains.” 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU proposed to conclude association 
agreements offering CEECs rapid and asymmetrical liberalization of trade in 
industrial products. However, in those sectors where CEEC economies were 
competitive, such as agriculture, textiles, coal and steel, the EU reserved protectionist 
anti-dumping and safeguard measures for itself. These asymmetries in bargaining 
power affected the substantive outcomes. As Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003:44) 
argue, the CEECs were not in a position to credibly threaten reluctant member states 
with alternative unilateral or multilateral policy options. The drivers, mainly 
Germany and Great Britain, were also in the same position. Subsequently, as it is 
indicated (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 521), this situation was, in game-
theoretical language, a „suasion game‟ in which “the CEECs and the proponents of 
enlargement had the dominant strategy to agree with whatever the „brakemen‟ saw as 
in their best interest.” 
Therefore, the association agreements represented the highest level of 
cooperation with the CEECs that member states could agree on in that potential 
winners might enhance their economic benefits in CEEC markets while potential 
losers, such as Spain, might be protected from trade and budget competition. On the 
side of the CEECs, Europe Agreements which brought about association were better 
than weaker trade agreements. Through this analysis, liberal intergovernmentalism 
offers a convincing explanation for the main sources of opposition to enlargement, 
the strong initial unwillingness among member states to offer membership prospects 
to CEECs, and the formulation of association agreements with CEECs without the 
promise of eventual membership.  
The European Council, however, decided at its June 1993 Copenhagen 
Summit that the associated countries would eventually become EU members. Given 
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the analysis above, it is therefore a puzzle for liberal intergovernmentalism to explain 
why member state governments did not stop the enlargement process at this early 
stage, and why the EU accepted the CEECs as candidate states for membership. 
 
 
5 Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism and Eastern Enlargement 
On the other side of the debate, sociological institutionalists argue that liberal 
intergovernmentalism fails to explain the EU‟s decision to go beyond association and 
offer full membership to CEECs despite suggested (Baldwin et al, 1997) substantial 
financial costs of enlargement (especially for existing member countries which need 
EU structural funds) and the new members‟ likely heavy impact on the efficiency of 
the EU‟s institutional system.  
They argue that the EU‟s decision to enlarge can be explained by its 
constitutive norms, common standards of legitimacy and collective identity, 
according to which the EU could not reject the membership demands of CEECs 
because they emphasized European values such as democracy and free markets. In 
most sociological institutionalist studies, norms are considered vital in explaining the 
EU‟s Eastern enlargement, although there are nuances primarily concerning the 
nature of norms that are relevant in the enlargement process. The strategic use of 
norms and identities by applicant states and drivers in order to change the decision of 
brakemen in favor of enlargement has been addressed in several ways: Fierke and 
Wiener consider speech acts; Schimmelfennig employs rhetorical action. Meanwhile, 
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Sedelmeier and Sjursen highlight the constituting characteristics of norms on 
identity.8 These four approaches are considered in more detail below. 
 
2.5.1 Strategic Use of Norms and Identities 
2.5.1.1 Speech Acts 
Based on Wittgenstein‟s theories on the constitutive character of language, 
Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (1999) refer to the power of „speech acts‟ (Waever, 
1996) in explaining the paradox of the enlargement processes of both the EU and 
NATO, which do not seem to be in the material self-interest of member states. 
During the Cold War, both organizations developed a specifically western 
identity, embedded in the construction of shared democratic norms. According to 
Fierke and Wiener, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe‟s 1975 
Helsinki declaration is the speech act which entailed a „promise‟ to encourage the 
spread of western democratic norms, such as free flow of information, people and 
goods, as well as respect for human rights, across the division of Europe. The CEECs 
were encouraged by the West and its institutions to act in accordance with these 
ideals in resisting totalitarianism. 
With the end of the Cold War, however, Fierke and Wiener (1999: 725) 
propose that “the meaning of the Cold War „promise‟ of Helsinki was transformed 
into a threat.” In other words, Helsinki‟s promise created unintended effects, 
including commitments and moral obligations that were hard to get out of. This 
threat took the form of both potential instability in the East and also failure to fulfill 
the promise; exposure of this failure represented a threat to the identity of both 
                                                          
8
 For a similar approach of Constructivist arguments, see Evrim TaĢkın “Theoretical Approaches to 
Turkey‟s Accession to the European Union” unpublished Master of Science Thesis, Sabanci 
University, Istanbul 2006 
53 
 
organizations. Therefore, it is underlined that (Fierke and Wiener, 1999:736) in order 
to sustain their identity as victors in the Cold War, “western institutions had to act 
with some semblance of consistency with the normative ideals which they 
represented.” The CEECs drew on these normative ideals to pressure the West to 
keep their promises because the West, as the embodiment of the victory of liberal 
ideals in the Cold War, had a responsibility to assist them in achieving those ideals 
that the West had encouraged them to aspire to during the Cold War. As a result of 
this pressure, both the EU and NATO redefined their interests regarding expansion to 
conclude that the CEECs could not be excluded, over the long term, from western 
organizations. 
 
2.5.1.2 Rhetorical Action 
In elaborating on the EU‟s decision to enlarge, Frank Schimmelfennig 
introduces a new mechanism, which he terms „rhetorical action‟. He defines (1999:2) 
rhetorical action as the strategic use of norm-based arguments. In an intersubjectively 
structured institutional environment, “rational political actors need legitimacy and 
must take into account common values and norms but manipulate them through the 
strategic use of arguments.” In this way, these rational actors will be able to change 
collective outcomes. 
Schimmelfennig claims that the EU is a community organization, 
characterized by a common ethos based on principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. For 
Schimmelfennig, this collective identity as a liberal community explains the EU‟s 
enlargement puzzle to a large degree. 
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He argues that both the CEEC governments and EU member state drivers 
depended on the community ethos in order to compensate for their inferior 
bargaining power by shaming the reticent majority into acquiescence with 
enlargement. The CEECs portrayed themselves as part of the wider European liberal 
international community, sharing the norms and values of European culture and 
civilization. Advocates of enlargement presented it as an issue touching on the EU‟s 
very identity, which therefore ought not to be, decided according to national interest 
or material cost benefit calculations. As Schimmelfennig (2004:91) reports, 
“advocates accused the reticent EU member states of acting inconsistently and 
betraying the fundamental values and norms of their own community if they failed to 
commit themselves to enlargement.” However, “the rhetorical action of the drivers 
did not change the basic enlargement preferences of the „brakemen‟ but effectively 
silenced and prevented them from openly opposing the enlargement project and its 
gradual implementation.” Thus, through rhetorical action, norms were able to 
function as constraints on reticent member states‟ behaviors. As Schimmelfennig 
(2008:22) acknowledges, for Poland, the brakemen were entrapped in accepting the 
membership prospect whereas for Turkey, due to the compliance of Turkey with the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the brakemen were entrapped in opening of accession 
negotiations. 
 
2.5.2 Norms as Constituting Identity 
2.5.2.1 Special Responsibility 
Ulrich Sedelmeier (2000, 2005) also contributes to the debate from a 
sociological institutionalist perspective with his analysis of the role of social factors 
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in the EU‟s Eastern enlargement. His main argument is that EU‟s collective identity 
vis-à-vis the CEECs has been the key factor determining the EU‟s policy. 
Since the late 1980s, as Sedelmeier (2005:9) asserts, “EU policy-makers have 
discursively constructed a particular role for the EU in its relations with the CEECs.” 
This role assigns the EU a “special responsibility” towards them to support their 
political and economic reforms and integration with the EU. According to 
Sedelmeier (2005:29-50), both identity and the norms that define it have constitutive 
and regulative effects on actors. In the case of the constitutive effect of norms and 
identities, the actors internalize certain norms and identities, to the extent that this 
identity forms a large part of their social multiple identities and influences their 
preference formation and interest definition. Norms and identities can also play a 
purely regulative effect in merely affecting behavior by prescribing or proscribing 
appropriate ways of acting for a given role. With respect to Eastern enlargement, in 
its constitutive form, the EU‟s identity requires it to actively support transformations 
in the CEECs and their integration into the EU. In its regulative form, the EU identity 
is suggested (Sedelmeier, 2005: 9) to “silences opposition to taking account of the 
CEECs‟ preferences by de-legitimizing opposition that is purely motivated by the 
incumbents‟ narrow self interest.” 
The impact of EU identity, however, varies across EU policy makers. Those 
actors who identified most closely with the EU‟s identity, especially officials in the 
Commission responsible for relations with CEECs, acted as principled policy 
advocates for Eastern enlargement. For others, the role-specific collective identity of 
the EU acted primarily as a constraint on open opposition to enlargement, and raised 
the reputational cost of a veto. Thus, EU identity helped policy advocates to set the 
EU on a path towards further enlargement. 
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2.5.2.2 Kinship-based Arguments 
Helene Sjursen‟s (2002, 2006) main concern is to examine “mobilizing 
arguments” in the EU‟s enlargement policy in order to provide a better understanding 
of prioritizations made. She (2002: 508) criticizes Schimmelfennig‟s use of norms 
for its instrumentalism: “Norms do not matter because it costs something not to 
comply with them but because they are ends in themselves.” For Sjursen, norms 
constitute the identity of the actors by forming their worldviews and preferences.  
Based on the Habermas‟s theory of communicative action, she makes an 
analytical distinction between three different types of argument that might be used to 
justify enlargement: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments and moral 
arguments. The pragmatic approach is based on a means-ends type of rationality 
where actors are considered to take decisions from calculations of utility based on a 
given set of interests. Thus, in order to support the enlargement, actors should be 
convinced that they will gain utility from it. In an ethical-political approach, 
justification would rely on a particular conception of the collective „us‟ and a 
particular idea of the values represented by the specific community. The justification 
for enlargement would then come from emphasizing the responsibilities and duties 
emerging as a result of belonging to that particular community. In a moral approach, 
the aim would be to find justifications that rely on universal standards of justice. 
According to Sjursen (2002: 494), the first approach has more in common with the 
logic of consequences, while second and third approaches are more closely related to 
the logic of appropriateness. 
In the case of the EU, based on a distinction between rights-based and value-
based normative justifications, Sjursen suggests that ethical-political factors, such as 
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sense of kinship, shared identity or common history, are the main driving forces 
behind the Eastern enlargement. Moreover, Sjursen underlines that a sense of 
“kinship-based duty” contributes to the explanation of prioritizations made. 
 
6 Comparison of Two Institutionalisms’ Expectations and Hypothesis about 
Enlargement 
When rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are applied 
to the EU‟s enlargement policies, we arrive at competing expectations and 
hypotheses. For rationalists, the players with decision-making and institutional 
power, namely member state governments, are seen as the principal actors of 
enlargement, whereas for sociological institutionalists the principal actors are norm 
and principle entrepreneurs, such as the European Commission (Torreblanca, 2002: 
21). For rationalists, in developing enlargement policies, utility-driven EU member 
states make use of strategic bargaining and negotiation about the costs and benefits 
of enlargement in terms of their own national interests. In contrast, for sociological 
institutionalists, decisions on enlargement policy are believed to be taken 
collectively, with the help of the European Commission, in accordance with the 
constitutive norms, principles and shared identity of the Union.  
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Table 4: Comparison of Rationalist and Constructivist/Sociological 
Institutionalisms on EU Enlargement 
 RATIONALIST 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
CONSTRUCTIVIST/SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
Logic Logic of consequentiality 
-When making a decision, 
actors use procedures 
such as bargaining, 
negotiation, coalition 
formation and exchange 
to achieve what is best for 
them 
Logic of appropriateness - When making a 
decision, actors behave in accordance with 
rules and practices that are socially 
constructed, publicly known, anticipated 
and accepted. 
Purpose To advance the interests 
and preferences of 
member states 
To build a collective identity  
Actors Actors with decision-
making and institutional 
power, such as influential 
EU member states -
Germany, France, Great 
Britain 
Norm and principle entrepreneurs, actors 
having widely recognized moral authority - 
European Commission 
Independent 
variable 
Material interests -
economic, political and 
security interests 
Collective identity, common rules and 
principles of the EU 
Decision-
making 
Bargaining and 
negotiation processes 
Socialization processes 
Accession 
Criteria 
Prejudiced and cost-
oriented 
Unbiased and principle-oriented 
Timing Enlargement continues  
gradually and/or in stages 
Enlargement continues  
Speedily 
Distribution of 
Costs 
Candidates bear the costs 
 
Member states accept the costs 
 
Decision to 
enlarge 
 
Contentious, hesitant and 
postponed 
 
Consensual, willing and fast 
Impact 
on enlargement 
policy 
 
National interests 
succeed 
 
Constitutive norms succeed 
 Source: Based on the tables prepared by Torreblanca 2002 and concepts developed in March and 
Olsen 1989, 1998; Schimmelfennig, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, Sedelmeier Sjursen, 2002; Moravcsik 
and Vachudova 2003; Piedrafita and Torreblanca 2005 
 
59 
 
For rationalists, the key independent variables that affect the EU‟s 
enlargement decisions are material interests, whether economic, security or political. 
For sociological institutionalists, they are collective identity, and the common rules 
and principles of the EU. For rationalists, the purpose of enlargement is to advance 
the interests and preferences of member states, while for sociological institutionalists 
it is to build a collective identity (Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005: 37). Regarding 
the choice of accession criteria, rationalists support discriminatory and cost-driven 
criteria, while constructivists favor non-discriminatory, principled and norm-driven 
criteria. With regard to question of when to enlarge, rationalists wish to proceed 
slowly and in stages, whereas constructivists insist on a fast process. In sum, across 
these dimensions, the driving force behind the enlargement process is the logic of 
consequentiality for rationalists and the logic of appropriateness for constructivists. 
The distinctions between rationalist and sociological institutionalist expectations are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 In the enlargement literature, it is widely acknowledged that the EU‟s 
decision to sign association agreements without the promise of membership can be 
explained in terms of rationalist institutionalism. However, rationalist 
institutionalism fails to explain why the EU offered full membership to the CEECs 
despite the substantial financial costs of doing so. It is widely believed that 
sociological institutionalism, through concepts of collective identity, shared norms 
and principle, offers more explanatory power regarding this decision. This suggests 
that rationalist and constructivist theories of institutions can be seen as partially 
competing and partially complementary in different phases of EU enlargement. 
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Therefore, the main aim of this dissertation is to test the main hypotheses of 
institutionalist debate through comparatively examining the case studies of Poland 
and Turkey.  
In the next chapter, Poland‟s accession process is analyzed analyzed in order 
to test whether a rationalist or constructivist institutionalism can explain the 
decisions of member states and the European Commissioners to accept Poland as a 
member state. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
POLISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
In this chapter, Poland‟s accession to the European Union is scrutinized in 
order to find out which approach, rationalist or constructivist/sociological 
institutionalism, can better explain the attitudes of European Commissioners and 
member states.   
This part of the dissertation analyzes four periods. First, the EU‟s PHARE 
program is examined, covering the period between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 
1989. 1988 is important as the beginning of Polish transition and this year is chosen 
in order to find out whether or not the EU and other member states supported Poland 
in her transition to democracy. 31.12.1989 is important because PHARE was 
launched by the EU on December 4, 1989. The second period covers the signing of 
association agreement, or the Europe Agreements, covering the period between 1 
January.1990 and 31 December 1993. 31 December 1993 is chosen because the 
ratification of the Europe Agreements by member states occurred in 1994, after 
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which Poland applied for EU membership in April 1994. The third period covers 
Poland‟s membership application between 1 January.1994 and 31 December 1997. 
As Poland began accession negotiations in March 1998, 31 December 1997 marks 
the end of this period. Finally, the accession negotiations with Poland between 1 
January 1998 and 1 May 2004 are investigated. Poland became an EU member on 1 
May 2004, so this date marks the end of the final period of analysis. 
 In each period, the EU‟s relations with Poland are investigated in two ways. 
The first is to understand the EU‟s policies and the European Commissioner‟s 
policies towards the CEECs in general and towards Poland in particular. Secondly, 
the attitudes of particular member states, Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain, 
towards Poland are evaluated in order to find out whether or not they supported 
Poland in her bid for EU membership and to discover the real motivations, whether 
rationalist or constructivist/sociological, behind their support or non-support for 
Poland. Following Schimmelfennig, these states are chosen according to their 
position on enlargement. Specifically, according to the literature, while Germany and 
Great Britain were among the drivers of Eastern enlargement, France and Spain were 
among the brakemen. Germany had been the main supporter of Polish accession 
process because the Second World War had left Poland and Germany a legacy of 
common problems of minorities and boundaries, and after the end of the Cold War, 
reconciliation was seen in their relations that allowed problems of minorities and 
boundaries to be solved peacefully. British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as 
early as November 1988, visited Poland to show her support for the Solidarity 
movement and Poland‟s transition to democracy. Great Britain went on to become 
one of the main proponents of Polish accession to the EU. France and Spain are 
especially chosen as brakemen because of their resistance to the association 
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agreement with Poland. Due to specific sectors in their countries, such as agriculture 
for France and steel for Spain, they engaged in hard bargaining during the 
association negotiations with Poland. Although these states had originally opposed 
enlargement, they finally accepted Poland, and other CEECs, as members. This 
chapter analyzes the reasons behind this change in attitude towards enlargement with 
the help of both rationalist institutionalist factors, such as economic interests, 
security interests and political interests, and constructivist/sociological 
institutionalists‟ factors, such as collective identity and moral duty. 
In the General Assessment part, a quantitative content analysis of the 
documents found through the databases of RAPID and FACTIVA is made in order to 
examine attitudes of both European Commissioners and member states 
comparatively.  
 
3.1 Road to PHARE 
3.1.1 EU-Poland Relations 
3.1.1.1 Historical Context of Poland’s Transition from 
Communist Rule 
At the beginning of the Second World War, in 1939, the Republic of Poland
9
 was 
partitioned and annexed by Germany and the Soviet Union, with the Nazis,  
establishing an extremely brutal regime for the next six years in their area. After the 
Second World War, Poland recovered its independence, although there was a lack of 
                                                          
9
 The Republic of Poland was founded in 1918 and enjoyed only a short period of parliamentary 
democracy before a military coup was staged in 1926. A semblance of parliamentary democracy 
returned from 1935 to 1939. 
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consensus among the Great Powers at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 
concerning Poland‟s western frontiers, which meant (AkĢit, 2006: 127) Poland, had 
to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union for its survival. Stalin wished Poland to fall 
under the influence of Soviet foreign policy so he supported the Polish United 
Workers‟ Party (PZPR), by crushing the opposition,10 so , as Cordell (2000:2) asserts 
“by 1949, the process of Sovietisation was all but complete.” However, most Poles, 
including workers, peasants, the Catholic Church and intellectuals, complained about 
the economic difficulties and political terror, and were involved in a series of 
uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 that the Polish people‟s disapproval of the 
Moscow imposed regime.  
In the late 1970s, the Polish economy was bankrupt, the government was heavily 
in debt to the West (AkĢit, 2006: 140) and it is argued (Mason, 1989: 43) that 
economic growth had leveled off or even declined. This led to increasing frustration 
among workers culminating, in the summer of 1980, with workers starting a protest 
in Gdansk against the government‟s decision to raise food prices. This workers 
movement led to the formation of Solidarity, a trade union movement headed by 
Lech Walesa. Solidarity, supported by the Catholic Church and the intelligentsia, 
helped to mobilize millions of Poles against Communist rule. Due to this popular 
support, Solidarity was suggested (AkĢit, 2006: 142) to become powerful enough to 
threaten the communists‟ single-party hegemony, which in turn led the Soviet regime 
to pressure the Polish Communist Party to crush Solidarity.  In December 1981, the 
Jaruzelski-led government declared martial law and suspended trade union activities 
by banning Solidarity; however, Solidarity carried on its activities by organizing 
illegal strikes and demonstrations. The declaration of martial law and the suppression 
                                                          
10
 The Polish Workers Party and Polish Socialist Party merged in 1948 to form the Polish United 
Workers‟ Party 
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of Solidarity were condemned by many Western States, who froze relations with 
Poland. 
Although Jaruzelski tried to institute political, social and economic reforms in 
order to solve Poland‟s deep socio-economic, crisis reform attempts failed to bring 
any significant changes in the lives of Poles. With foreign debt rising to $39 billion, 
Poland applied for membership of the IMF in June 1986 and, in order to improve its 
image, the Jaruzelski government submitted its 1987 programme of price rises and 
promised democratization to a referendum in November 1987. However, as Francis 
(1999: 298) suggests, the government failed to win the support of the majority which 
led to a new wave of workers‟ strikes and protests organized by Solidarity in May 
1988. At the same time, there was a dramatic change in the Moscow regime when 
Gorbachev introduced the policies of perestroika (restructuring of the economy) and 
glasnost (political liberalization). After two months of strikes, as Castle and Taras 
(2002: 66) state, Gorbachev visited Poland and declared that the Poles had the right 
to determine their own political destiny. In August 1988, Solidarity staged a second 
wave of strikes and in the light of Gorbachev‟s personal endorsement, the leader of 
the Communist Party, Jaruzelski, agreed to hold talks with Solidarity. 
 The Round Table negotiations began in 6 February 1989 between government 
representative and the opposition led by Solidarity. The Catholic Church was not 
officially part to the negotiations but it sent representatives to mediate and facilitate 
discussions. Although it declared its neutrality, when there was a stalemate, it is 
suggested (Castle and Taras, 2002: 73) that church representatives backed the 
positions advocated by Solidarity. The negotiations were concluded in 5 April 1989 
and, according to the agreement, Solidarity‟s demand for legalization was confirmed, 
freedom of the press allowed, the president would be elected jointly by the Sejm, the 
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lower house, and the Senate in joint session and parliament would be bicameral with 
a freely elected Senate and a partly freely elected Sejm. The agreement, as Terry 
(2000: 9) states, was also intended to guarantee the country‟s continued loyalty to the 
Warsaw Pact by leaving formal control over foreign and security affairs in the hands 
of a presidency elected by the Sejm and Senate for a six-year term, a post designed 
expressly for Jaruzelski. Furthermore, the Communists tried to retain their dominant 
position by reserving 65 percent of the 460 seats in Sejm. However, as Francis 
(1999: 299) points out, in the elections of 4 June 1989, Solidarity won all 161 freely-
contested seats in the Sejm and 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate. Jaruzelski was 
elected as president on July 19 1989 by the parliament and Sejm, as decided in the 
Round Table agreement. On September 12 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity 
activist, officially formed the first non-Communist government in Central and 
Eastern Europe since 1945, signaling the completion of the first negotiated transition 
of power from the communists. The end of communist rule in Poland presaged the 
fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe during the „velvet revolutions‟ of 
1989. 
 
3.1.1.2 The Non-Communist Government’s First Policies 
After the peaceful takeover of power from the communists, the new 
government needed to make two crucial decisions. The first related to foreign policy, 
and the second to the economy. According to Stawarska, (1999: 823) the slogan of 
the Polish Revolution, as declared by the first Solidarity Prime Minister, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, was „Return to Europe‟. However, while trying to pursue this foreign 
policy aim, the new Polish government was also aware that they still needed to take 
into account the Soviet Union. After the revolution, negotiations with the EU for 
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trade and cooperation agreements continued, although, because of the influence of 
communists in Poland‟s foreign policy making, there were suggestions of 
alternatives to EU entry. For instance, President Jaruzelski, in January 1990, alluded 
to the hope that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or 
COMECON) could transform itself into a genuine supranational organization. Prime 
Minister Mazowiecki also emphasized (Los-Nowak, 2000: 12), the continuing 
importance of the COMECON, albeit unwillingly, in order not to antagonize either 
the Soviet Union or its Polish allies, while Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski 
was suggested (Federowicz, 2007: 537) to be often criticized in Poland for his 
excessive caution in discussions with the Soviet Union. In short, the Polish 
government took any decisions during this period to improve relations with the EU in 
order to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union. 
With respect to the economic dimension of the revolution, the Polish 
economy was suggested (Hunter and Ryan, 2009: 35) to be in deep crisis when the 
first non-communist government came to power, overwhelmed by hyperinflation 
running at an annual rate of 639.6 percent, a foreign debt that had reached an 
alarming 64.8 percent of Polish GDP, and an economy that was literally verging on 
collapse. Mazowiecki appointed Leszek Balcerowicz as Finance Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in 8 September 1989, assigning him the 
task of developing a comprehensive program of economic reform. Walesa 
emphasized that in order to implement a neoliberal shock therapy strategy for 
economic reform, the government needed special powers. However, as Orenstein 
(2001: 32) states, Mazowiecki rejected Walesa‟s suggestion on the basis of principles 
of parliamentary democracy, which was the beginning of a major split within 
Solidarity. Balcerowicz introduced shock therapy in 1 January 1990. This neoliberal 
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institutional reform was suggested (Orenstein, 2001:33) to be based on stabilization, 
liberalization and privatization measures, aiming primarily at withdrawing the state 
from the economy and freeing up markets to adjust spontaneously to the new macro-
economic conditions. As a result of this reform, as Los Nowak (2000:14) underlines, 
Balcerowicz believed that the Polish economy would become leaner, fitter and more 
capable of early EU membership. The Polish government, on the other hand, was 
also fearful that the transformation of the country‟s planned economy into a market 
economy would cause serious social hardship, so it asked (Binyon, 2011) for support, 
in the form of foreign financial assistance, from friendly governments. 
 
3.1.1.3 The Inception of Polish- EU Relations 
 The EU‟s relations with communist Poland date back to the 1970s in the 
form of trade agreements, especially textile and agricultural products with individual 
COMECON countries. Negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement between the 
EU and COMECON began in 1977. However, these negotiations were broken off in 
1980 by mutual agreement. Relations were resumed between the EU and 
COMECON in June 1985, when COMECON proposed the establishment of relations 
with the EU. In January 1986, the Commission confirmed its readiness to resume its 
dialogue with COMECON while specifying that the EU would also seek to establish 
bilateral relations with individual European member countries of COMECON. 
Within this framework, the Commission held exploratory contacts with Poland on 
establishing official relations with the EU. Relations between Poland and the EU 
(1988, June 25) formally commenced when a Joint Declaration was signed between 
the EU and COMECON. This aimed to establish official relations between the EU 
and COMECON and develop greater cooperation between the parties. After the Joint 
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Declaration had opened the way for official ties, as it is reported (“Poland asks”, 
1988, July 22), Poland requested diplomatic relations with the EU in 22 July 1988, 
which were formally established in 16 September 1988.  
 After the commencement of Round Table negotiations, the EU welcomed 
the start of negotiations in the hope of bringing democratic reforms to Poland, and 
these developments were seen as an essential factor for future cooperation between 
Poland and the EU. Negotiations were concluded on April 5 1989, and right after the 
signing of the agreement, the European Commission (1989, April 6) welcomes  
 
The announcement of the successful conclusion of the Round Table 
talks in Poland involving the legalization of previously banned trade 
unions and the decision to hold parliamentary elections in June. This 
constitutes a major step forward in the process of liberalization and 
constitutional reform in Poland. With this end in view, the first 
informal round of negotiations between the two parties took place on 
22 March in Brussels and the Community looks forward to the early 
conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. 
 
On May 22 1989, at the EU Foreign Ministers‟ meeting in Brussels, the 
European Commission prepared a proposal to encourage Poland‟s political reforms 
by lending EU finance to the deeply-indebted Poland. The proposal involved the 
Luxembourg-based European Investment Bank lending for the first time to a 
COMECON country. However, the proposal, which won backing from Germany and 
Denmark, ran into objections from the UK, France and Netherlands. Nevertheless, 
the Commission President, Jacques Delors (quoted in Buchan, 1989, May 23) said he 
hoped to raise the Polish debt issue at forthcoming summits of the EC and the Group 
of Seven. 
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3.1.1.4 The EU’s First Response to Events in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Trade and Cooperation Agreements and PHARE  
 With the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, the EU engaged in an 
enormous internal reform process in order to reorganize its own structure. The Single 
European Act updated previous treaties by specifying new areas of Community 
competence, many of which were already being handled at Community level, such as 
monetary policy, protection of the environment, and industrial research and 
innovation. The Single European Act was also essential for the attainment of the 
EU‟s ambitious project to create a truly frontier-free EU market by the end of 1992. 
That is, the aim of the Single European Act was to prepare the ground for deepening 
Europe‟s integration process towards the eventual transformation of the European 
Communities into the European Union. 
Due to the Cold War, and preoccupied with its own internal restructuring, the 
EU had no plan to establish relations with the CEECs. However, the dramatic 
political changes that took place in both the Soviet Union and the CEECs 
necessitated a redefinition of the EU‟s policies towards the CEECs. As Sedelmeier 
(2005: 407) points out, there was broad consensus among member states that, due to 
policy differences between the 12 member states towards the CEECs, the EU, 
especially the EU Commission, should play a central role in responding to the 
challenge of Eastern Europe. However, the main problem here was the definition of 
the role of the EU.  
The Rhodes European Council (1988) emphasized the role of the EU in 
overcoming the division of Europe and promoting common values by declaring that 
The European Council reaffirms its determination to act with renewed 
hope to overcome the division of our continent and to promote the 
Western values and principles which member states have in common.  
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We will strive to achieve the development of political dialogue with 
our Eastern neighbors. 
 
Immediately after the transitions in the CEECs, the EU‟s first policy response 
focused on normalizing relations with these countries and providing technical aid for 
their economic transition. The procedure the EU formally followed was to use trade 
agreements, possibly providing for subsequent trade cooperation, as the first step in 
developing relations. The EU Commission therefore made bilateral trade and 
cooperation agreements with CEECs. It was reported (“Chance for”, 1989)  that  
these trade agreements could be seen as political in that the EU was selectively 
rewarding those East Europeans who tried to be more capitalist and democratic with 
more attractive treaties than their conservative neighbours signed. Although the EU, 
with good intentions, tried to support the dual transformation process of the CEECs 
financially through these agreements, as Beach (1997: 5) indicates, they did not give 
the CEEC‟s real access to EU markets in the sectors in which they were competitive, 
such as steel, textiles, clothing and agriculture. 
With respect to relations with Poland, informal negotiations on the Trade and 
Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Poland commenced on 22 
March 1989, in Brussels. With this agreement, it was expected that EU import quotas 
on Polish industrial and agricultural goods would be eased. During the negotiations, 
it is suggested (“EC Poland”, 1989) that France, West Germany and the Netherlands 
were believed to have had some concerns over the timing and scope for easing 
quotas on Polish agricultural goods. However, these concerns were addressed so that 
the negotiations could be completed in July, allowing the signing of the agreement to 
take place in Warsaw on 19 September 1989. This was a non-preferential agreement 
providing reciprocal Most Favored Nation treatment, which necessitated the gradual 
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abolition of the quantitative restrictions applied by the EU on Polish imports over a 
five-year period. It is suggested (European Community, 1989, September 25) that the 
agreement allowed Poland to be included in the Generalized System of Preferences, 
meaning it could export industrial and agricultural goods to the EU free of customs 
duties and without imposition of ceilings or quotas, except for European Coal and 
Steel Community products and products covered by other sectoral agreements 
(textile and agricultural agreements). In 27 November 1989, the EU decided to 
temporarily grant Poland and Hungary special trade facilities in order to contribute 
towards solving their specific political and economic problems. The first EU-Poland 
Joint Committee under the Agreement on Trade, Commercial and Economic 
Cooperation was held on 4 and 5 December 1989 in Brussels.  
 The EU‟s second policy response was the Poland and Hungary assistance 
programme (PHARE11). It was an initiative to provide technical assistance from the 
G-24 and EU, especially the European Commission. Jacques Delors raised the Polish 
debt issue at the G-7 Summit in Paris in July 1989. At this summit, it was 
emphasized that the reform processes of Hungary and Poland would be supported, 
and the interested countries and the EU Commission Community were asked to take 
the necessary initiatives in agreement with other EU member states and all interested 
countries to organize a meeting for this support. Consequently, the Paris Summit 
gave the EU Commission responsibility for coordinating economic assistance to 
Poland and Hungary. In taking on the coordination role, the EU Commission (quoted 
in “French Leader”, 1989) stated that “The European Commission has the firm wish 
to fulfill the task entrusted to it, in order to contribute to an efficient cooperation 
                                                          
11
 PHARE (Pologne, Hongrie: aide a la restructuration economique) is the French acronym for Poland 
and Hungary Assistance to Economic Restructuring. 
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between Poland and those countries which want to play a role in the success of the 
economic reforms undertaken by the Polish people.”  
 After the Paris Summit, the European Commission took the necessary steps 
to get its “Operation PHARE`” coordination plan underway. In response to an 
invitation from the Commission, 24 Western countries12 met in Brussels on 1 August 
1989 for the first coordination meeting to give effect to the Conclusions of the Paris 
Summit. At their first meeting, the Group of 24 identified the priority sectors for 
action coordinated by the Commission. These were supplying food products to 
Poland and using the resulting counterpart funds; investment, capital formation and 
joint ventures; management and management training; increased market access for 
Hungarian and Polish exports; and cooperation on environmental matters. On 26 
September, the Group of 24 held their second meeting in Brussels at which Jacques 
Delors and Frans Andriessen, the EU‟s External Affairs Commissioner, (Binyon, 
1989, September 27) told donor representatives that Poles and Hungarians could well 
find their new freedoms threatened by economic disorder, and that such disorder 
could only be eased by rapid action. After this meeting, the Commission (1990, 
January 11) presented an action plan for Operation PHARE. The plan followed the 
directives the Commission had received from the Paris Summit, while also reflecting 
its determination to take the initiatives needed to implement certain specific 
operations. Action was to be focused on five areas: agriculture, supply and 
restructuring, access to markets, investment, vocational training and environment. 
 The Group of 24 also suggested at their meeting that Poland and Hungary 
should conclude agreements with the International Monetary Fund to set up effective 
                                                          
12
 The participants were as follows: the Group of Seven (United States, Canada, Japan, France, 
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom); the other Member States of the European Community; the EFTA 
member countries (Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); Turkey, New 
Zealand and Australia 
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programmes for structural adjustment and reform, which would make external 
financing a lot easier. It was also suggested that such agreements would provide an 
appropriate framework for further assistance operations by the Group of 24 in those 
countries. The Commission‟s proposal for the establishment of a legal basis for 
economic aid to Poland and Hungary was transmitted to the Council on 25 October 
1989 and accepted on 4 December 1989. In this way, the PHARE programme came 
to be launched before being later extended to most of the CEECs. The main aim of 
PHARE funding was to help CEECs in general, and Poland in particular, undertake 
the transition to democracy and a market economy. As Kramer (1993: 223) points 
out, the programme provided aid for economic transformation with an emphasis on 
agriculture (including food aid), industry, investments, energy, education, 
environmental protection, trade and services. Its main focus was the support and 
development of the private sector in these areas of economic activity. 
 PHARE funding, despite expectations, did not give the CEECs a preferential 
position regarding EU membership. There were also problems related to the funding, 
as Sedelmeier (2005:408) underlines, such as when consultants from Western Europe 
prevented funding reaching intended CEEC beneficiaries, and the relative lack of 
resources allocated to the management of the programme, which led to inefficiencies 
using the aid. 
 
3.1.1.5 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
 During this period, the public speeches and statements of members of the 
European Commission emphasized ideational arguments, such as the role of the EU 
in healing the division of Europe, the Europeanness of Poland and the promotion of 
liberal democracy and market economies. For instance, on the establishment of 
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diplomatic relations between the EU and five CEECs, Willy De Cleck (quoted in 
European Community, 1988, August 17) the Commissioner responsible for external 
relations and trade policy, announced that “It … represented another step forward in 
the rapprochement between Europeans and signified that the irreplaceable role now 
played by the European Community had been recognized.”  
 Frans Andriessen (1989, June 8), the Commissioner responsible for trade, 
competition and agriculture, described the EU‟s support for Eastern Europe‟s 
transition in terms of European peace and security: “The Community is determined 
to mobilize the considerable policy instruments at its disposal in pursuit of these 
objectives, which are shared by all members of the western alliance, and so to make 
its contribution to strengthening the peace, security and well-being of all the 
inhabitants of our continent.” 
 The EU‟s supposed moral duty to promote a market economy in the CEECs 
was also emphasized. According to Karel Van Miert (1989, January 13), the 
Commissioner responsible for transport, credit and investment, for example, “the 
European Community offers a mechanism for immediate common action to help the 
countries of Eastern Europe to build the competitive economies which are crucial if 
they are to sustain and develop their new political freedoms.” 
 
3.1.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Poland 
The member states of the EU were unable to act collectively to meet the 
challenges posed by the end of Cold war because their interests in the region 
differed, leading to inconsistent policy proposals for the appropriate course of action. 
Due to the demands of CEEC governments, the need to find a longer term framework 
for relations with the CEECs emerged. To the extent that a discussion did take place, 
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it was mainly framed by the conventional antithesis of „widening versus deepening‟ 
and the new geopolitical balance within Europe. Some states favored deepening, 
suggesting that, although the EU should play a significant role in giving political and 
economic support for the transformation of CEECs, it should focus on its own 
transformation before embracing new members. On the other hand, other states 
favored widening as a policy measure to support the transformation of CEECs. The 
following section analyses member states‟ politics to reveal the level of support or 
non-support for Poland‟s transition to democracy and a market economy and the 
improvement of Polish relations with the EU. 
 
3.1.2.1 Germany 
To start with Germany, the Second World War had not only strained relations 
between Poland and West Germany but also left them with a legacy of common 
problems of minorities and boundaries. Starting from the early 1970s, Germany‟s 
new foreign policy of the Social Democrat Party, Ostpolitik, towards Eastern Europe 
searched for the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe, and the German 
Democratic Republic in particular, and cooperation between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Eastern Europe.  Within this framework, as Zaborowski (1999:7-8) 
indicates, bilateral normalization occurred in relations between Poland and West 
Germany, as seen by West Germany‟s temporary recognition of the Oder-Neisse 
border and Poland‟s consent for the departure of ethnic Germans from Poland. 
Zaborowski (2006: 106) suggests that, in the 1980s, the left wing of West Germany‟s 
Social Democrat Party aimed to integrate Germany‟s eastern environment with the 
EU. However, the Cold War environment prevented this idea becoming a reality.  
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Germany‟s rapid and positive response towards the CEECs in general and 
Poland in particular can be explained against this background. With the end of Cold 
War, Germany advocated (Kramer, 1993: 221; Sedelmeier, 2005:407) a strong and 
generous common policy on the part of the 12 towards the „new East‟, particularly 
with the idea of re-establishing ties with the German Democratic Republic.  
Due to tense relations related to the legacy of the Second World War and the 
Cold war, Germany‟s relations with Poland were mainly through the international 
institutions during this period, such as the EC and G-7. It is reported (“EC Cool”, 
1989, May 23) that, Germany‟s support to Poland was seen firstly in May 1989, 
when it backed the European Commission‟s proposal to encourage Poland‟s political 
reforms by providing EU finance a loans to the deeply-indebted Poland. Moreover, at 
the Paris Summit of G-7, Germany was among the states which urged providing aid 
for Poland. 
Bilateral relations firstly commenced when West German Chancellor 
Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl visited Poland on 9 November 1989. During his 
visit, Kohl (quoted in Heritage, 1989, November 14) used ideational arguments, such 
as the Europeanness of Poland: 
Germany needs Poland and Poland needs Germany. We belong 
together ... Europe needs understanding and reconciliation between 
our peoples. Europe is incomplete and inconceivable without Poland. 
 Kohl and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki signed a joint 
declaration intended to launch a new era of Polish-West German relations. In the 
declaration, it was stated (Heinrich, 1989, November14) that 
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People‟s Republic 
are deeply convinced that the development of their relations mapped 
out in this Joint Declaration is of fundamental importance for peace, 
security and stability in Europe and for the positive development of 
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the East-West relationship as a whole ...The inviolability of borders as 
well as respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states 
in Europe in their existing borders are a fundamental precondition for 
peace.  
It is reported (“West Germany”, 1989)  that the declaration also outlined 
German aid for the Polish economy and suggested that West Germany would press 
for a long-term rescheduling of Poland‟s debts to the Paris Club of creditor nations to 
which Poland owed two-thirds of its 39 billion dollar debt. Kohl‟s visit to Poland and 
the joint declaration led to reconciliation between Poland and West Germany. 
However, the border issue and minority problems were not solved during this period. 
On the other hand, this reconciliation appeared to form the basis for Germany‟s later 
support of Poland in her bid to join the EU. 
 
3.1.2.2 France 
With the end of the Cold War, as Bozo (2008: 396-397) suggests, the 
foremost objective of French diplomacy became the pursuit of a European political 
structure, a vision of a pan-European architecture beyond „Yalta‟, and its role was 
seen as pivotal for Europe at large. Therefore, closer economic links with the CEECs 
and financial aid were both supported by France. Vernet (1992: 658) underlines that, 
at the same time, the possibility of German unification and the possibility of a change 
in Europe‟s balance of power in favour of Germany caused concern in France. For 
this reason, France was the most enthusiastic supporter of deepening the EU before 
widening membership to CEECs. By supporting deepening, Kramer (1993: 222) 
emphasizes, “France hoped to be able to preserve the EC in its present shape which, 
for Paris, [was] the best means of containing Germany.” 
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France froze relations with Poland when Communist leader Jaruzelski 
imposed martial law in 1981 to try to crush Solidarity and during Poland‟s transition 
to democracy, France continued to show its support to Solidarity. For example, it is 
reported (“Minister Says”, 1988) that, Mitterrand invited Solidarity leader Walesa to 
visit France for the 40th anniversary celebrations of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. After the Round Table talks, as a sign of support for Poland‟s 
transition to democracy, France offered to help it tackle its economic crisis. French 
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas (quoted in “France Offers”, 1999) suggested that 
“France will make herself Poland‟s advocate in institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club and the European Community (EC) to obtain a 
re-scheduling of its debt and to strengthen economic and commercial relations 
between the West and this country.” With respect to relations with the EU, he 
(quoted in “France To”, 1989) also emphasized that “France will also continue to be 
a spokesman for your country in current trade negotiations between Poland and the 
European Community.” However, Buchan (1989, May 23) indicates that, France, 
together with some other EU countries, opposed the European Commission‟s 
proposal to encourage Poland‟s political reforms by providing EU loans to Poland 
because it believed that giving aid to Poland and other countries went beyond the 
EU‟s competence. After the partly free elections won by Solidarity, in June 1989, 
Mitterrand became the first Western leader to visit Poland. His three-day visit also 
closed the chapter of tense relations with Poland. Mitterrand had meetings with 
President Jaruzelski and Solidarity leader Walesa who asked for economic help.  As 
Tagliabu (1989, June 17) reports, Solidarity officials also wanted Mitterrand to 
circulate the proposal among the governments of the seven industrialized nations 
scheduled to meet in Paris. Mitterrand duly confirmed an economic package for 
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Poland that included credit and debt rescheduling, (quoted in Sachs, 1989, June 15) 
claiming that the package was “a realistic and concrete support for the reforms that 
are under way.” France was also among the states which supported the provision of 
aid for Poland at the G-7‟s Paris Summit, and French ministers also promoted Polish 
interests in various international forums. For instance, French Foreign Minister 
Roland Dumas (“West Has”, 1989, September 15) used ideational arguments, such 
as the moral obligation of the western world, to help Poland: 
The entire Western world called for changes in Poland. Today it‟s not 
only a political but a moral obligation to find long term aid that 
responds more exactly to modern Poland‟s needs ... The West must do 
more and better for Poland. 
 
 
In addition to the French Foreign Minister, French Finance Minister Pierre 
Beregovoy (quoted in “France Urges”, 1989, September 26),  in a speech to the 
opening session of the IMF annual meeting, highlighted that Poland and Hungary 
chose to undertake courageous programs of economic reform and “these countries 
deserve our support.”  However, it is reported (“France Approves”, 1989, October 
25) that Solidarity‟s Lech Walesa, charged France and other nations of talking more 
than acting, and as a response to this accusation, the French government approved an 
emergency three-year aid plan for Poland worth almost four billion francs. 
With respect to Poland‟s relations with the EU, France was not as enthusiastic 
as she was over the aid issue. In a special EU meeting called by France, President 
Mitterrand (quoted in Riding, 1989, November 19) argued that the EU‟s commitment 
to completing its own integration program meant that it would not be possible for 
new members to join the 12 before 1993, which concerned not only Turkey and 
Austria, who had already applied for membership, but also the countries of Eastern 
Europe. In this way, Mitterrand, as early as November 1989 declared France‟s 
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preference for deepening before widening. Therefore, in this period, relations 
between Poland and France were based on French support for Poland‟s transition to 
democracy by agreeing to aid packages and promoting Polish interests in terms of aid 
in international forums. However, the French also emphasized that Poland and other 
CEECs could not develop institutional relations with the EU before the EU had 
completed its own process of deepening. 
 
3.1.2.3 Great Britain 
Because the end of Cold War, as Kramer (1993: 223) asserts, required Great 
Britain to support the newly emerging democracies of the CEECs by means of 
favoring widening, the British government regarded the new European situation as a 
welcome development for preventing the further deepening of EU integration. 
There were historical ties between Great Britain and Poland due to their 
common struggles of the Second World War and the fleeing of the Polish 
Government to exile in London. However, when Communist leader Jaruzelski 
imposed martial law in 1981 to try to crush Solidarity, Great Britain, like other 
Western Governments, froze relations with Poland. Following the initiation of 
reform movements British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to Poland for a 
three day visit, as early as November 2 1988, while there were tense relations 
between Poland‟s communist government and Solidarity. During her visit, she had 
meetings with both government officials and leaders of the outlawed movement. 
Although she stressed that she did not intend to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
Poland, in her meeting with the Polish Prime Minister, which was devoted to 
Poland‟s economic problems, she also (quoted in Gregson, 1988, November 2)  
asserted that no communist-type, centrally-planned economy could ever succeed. She 
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(quoted in Oakley, 1988, November 4) also underlined that only political 
liberalization would open the door to broader economic and financial aid, in the form 
of support for an IMF program, debt rescheduling and support for private British 
investment in Poland. She also called on the Polish government to recognize the 
banned Solidarity, which she (quoted in Tagliabue, 1988, November 5) described as 
“the expression and focus of opposition in the country, and as such is a very, very 
important group of people.” She left Poland, claiming that she had received an 
assurance from Jaruzelski. As she reported (quoted in Diehl, 1988, November 5), he 
“assured me that the Polish government is very serious about the round-table talks 
and wanted to get them under way soon ... I‟m very encouraged indeed that that is 
possible.” 
Following the round table agreement, Great Britain promised to encourage 
other nations to help Poland on condition that the reform process continued. As 
Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (quoted in “Jaruzelski To”, 1989,  April 21) stated, 
“We believe Poland has taken a decisive step forward and so, in the weeks and 
month ahead, if that progress is sustained, we shall be identifying with our friends, 
allies and the various international bodies, the positive ways we can help.” After 
June‟s partly free elections, Jaruzelski visited Great Britain on 10 June 1989 to talk 
with Prime Minister Thatcher about the Polish debt issue. After their meeting, 
Jaruzelski (quoted in Boulton, 1989, June11) stated: “What I think particularly 
valuable [is that] she has pledged to support our position with the European 
Community and generally among other countries of the West.” A British aid package 
was also announced during his visit, and in September, Thatcher sent letters to 
Presidents George Bush and Francois Mitterrand, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
using ideational arguments such as references to common values by (quoted in 
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Dourian, 1989, September 6) highlighting that there was “an historic opportunity for 
the West to help Poland make a success of its reforms and demonstrate that the 
country can successfully make the transition from Communism to a market-based 
economy.” During Walesa‟s visit to the UK to ask for economic cooperation, 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (quoted in Giles, 1989, November 30) told him that 
the Government would increase its aid package to Poland to 50 million pounds to 
help its transition to democracy and ensure economic stability. 
 In addition to supporting Poland in economic terms, Great Britain also 
favored long-term institutional relations between Poland and the EU, together with 
the other CEECs. For instance, in November 1989, the British government suggested 
that association agreements could be an appropriate framework for relations with the 
CEECs.  That is, Great Britain chose widening of the EU as opposed to deepening, 
consequently supporting Poland in her transition to democracy. After Poland‟s 
elections, the Great Britain provided economic aid to Poland. Margaret Thatcher also 
promoted Polish economic interests, asking for economic help from other western 
governments to deal with Poland‟s debt problems. In addition, Great Britain also 
offered an association agreement for Poland (and Hungary) in order to link them to 
the EU. 
 
3.1.2.4 Spain 
 The EU‟s smaller member states feared that the unilateral activities of the 
larger member states would create tension within the EU. Due to their economic 
backwardness, they also feared that they might not be able to compete with the 
CEECs in the EU market. Spain, which had also experienced a transition to 
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democracy in 1975, supported the Polish transition, promoting common values of 
democracy and a market economy. After the formation of the first Solidarity-led 
government in Poland, King Juan Carlos of Spain made a three-day visit to Poland in 
October 1989. During this visit, the King (quoted in Boyes, 1989, October 4), in a 
declaration to the Polish people, expressed his country‟s support for the changes 
under way in Poland: “The Spanish people are watching the process of reform 
pursued in Poland with attention and friendliness.” In the same vein, government 
spokeswoman Rosa Conde (quoted in “Spanish King”, 1989, October 3) also 
underlined Spain‟s support in declaring that “It eloquently testifies to a great desire 
by Spaniards to support Poland‟s political and economic changes and it is to prove 
that our eyes are turned to Poland.” As one of the less developed countries of the EU, 
Spain also was vigilant about the EU‟s and other western governments‟ attitudes 
towards Poland. For instance, it is reported (Auerbach, 1989, December 3) that 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland feared that many of the expected gains from the 
elimination of internal barriers within Western Europe would be diluted by the new 
interest of Germany and other European powers in Poland. 
In short, although Poland‟s transition to democracy was welcomed by Spain, 
she was also cautious about Polish relations with the EU due to a fear of competition 
in the EU market. 
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3.2 Europe Agreements 
 
3.2.1 EU-Poland Relations 
 
3.2.1.1 The Way to Find a Solution to the CEECs’ and 
Polish Demands: Europe (Association) Agreements 
with Poland 
 Because the early trade agreements and financial aid did not meet the 
expectations of the CEECs, the EU realized that a long-term framework for relations 
with the CEECs was needed in order to strengthen cooperation. As Bruce Millan 
(European Community, 1990, January 12), the European Commissioner for  
Regional  Policies, suggested: “The  changes  we  have seen in Eastern  Europe  
since  last  summer  require  the development of a new form or new forms of  
relationship  between  the Community and those countries.” 
 The need for a longer-term framework was supported not only by Great 
Britain and the German governments but also by parts of the Commission. Thatcher 
(quoted in “Thatcher Calls”, 1989, November 13), emphasized association 
agreements as a valuable form of relations with the CEECs , suggesting that “We 
must stretch out the hand of cooperation, and develop new forms of association with 
the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe - Poland, Hungary, East Germany - and 
we hope others will follow.” This suggestion seemed to be accepted in the 
Strasbourg European Council (1989) which declared that the Community “will 
encourage the necessary economic reforms by all the means at its disposal, and will 
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continue its examination of the appropriate forms of association with the countries 
which are pursuing the path of economic and political reform.”   
 Kaluzynska (1990, February 2) reports that the idea of offering association 
was discussed between Commission president Delors and Polish Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki during Mazowiecki‟s visit to Brussels. Before the Dublin 
European Council, EU President Delors (1990, April 26) emphasized the 
contribution of association agreements for helping Eastern European states feel 
European: “We present a second generation of association agreements which would 
make it possible for each of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to feel full 
members of the Greater Europe.” Afterwards, the Presidency Conclusion of The 
Dublin European Council of (1990) declared that 
 Discussions will start forthwith in the Council, on the basis of the 
Commission‟s communication, on Association Agreements with each 
of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which include an 
institutional framework for political dialogue. The Community will 
work to complete Association negotiations with these countries as 
soon as possible on the understanding that the basic conditions with 
regard to democratic principles and transition towards a market 
economy are fulfilled. 
 
 Following the encouragement it got from Dublin European Council, it is 
reported (“Poland Asks”, 1990, May 28) that  Poland presented an official 
application to the EU for negotiations of an association agreement in order to take its 
relations with the EU a step beyond the trade and cooperation agreements and 
commence negotiations for the association agreements as soon as possible. As early 
as June 1990, Poland declared that it aimed to achieve full membership of the EU.  It 
is reported (Kaluzynska, 1990, June 21) that Jerzy Makarczyk, Poland‟s Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, presented Frans Andriessen a memorandum outlining 
Poland‟s view of how it could upgrade relations with the EU, announcing that 
“Poland‟s aim is to become a full member of the community eventually.” In 
87 
 
September 1990, Andriessen declared that, in order to establish a strong 
interconnection between the community and the CEECs, negotiations for Europe 
Agreements would begin the following month. However, regarding eventual EC 
membership, he (quoted in “EC Plans”, 1990, September 21) stressed that “If it is 
true that Poland needs the EC, the EC needs Poland in order to create the Europe we 
have in mind, perhaps not in two or three years, but Europe at the end of this or the 
beginning of the next century”. In October, Poland entered exploratory talks with the 
EU on association agreements. However, even before the commencement of these 
negotiations, it is reported (Nisbet, 1990, November11) that EU officials made clear 
that the Europe Agreements would not automatically offer full EU membership.  
 The Rome European Council (1990) emphasized that “The Community hopes 
to conclude European Agreements as quickly as possible and these will mark a new 
stage in the Community policy of developing increasingly close relations with those 
countries.” On the basis of the negotiation directives adapted by the Council on 18 
December 1990, the Commission (“EC Commission”, 1990, December 20), which 
was given the negotiation mandate, began negotiations on Europe Agreements with 
Poland (as well as Hungary and Czechoslovakia). On 26 January 1991, with the 
Council of Ministers Resolution 11/91, the office of the Government Plenipotentiary 
for European Integration and Foreign Assistance was established. The goal of this 
institution was, as Jasinski (2001) states, to prepare Polish governmental structures 
for changes relating to the establishment of a structured system of cooperation with 
the EU, and to run this process expertly. Based on the Council of Ministers 
Resolution 11/91, the Bureau for European Integration and the Bureau for Foreign 
Assistance were also set up within the Council of Ministers Office with a mission to 
support the work of the Government Plenipotentiary. 
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 The second round of real negotiations was held in February 1991. On 
February 13, Poland presented a proposal for liberalization in the Common 
Agricultural Policy and threatened to leave the negotiations. Poland‟s chief 
negotiator, Jaroslaw Mulewicz (quoted in “EC Poland”, February 14) recalled that 
they went through the most difficult problems point by point, and it had been very 
difficult that time. 
The EU‟s insistence, as Guilford (1991, February 26) indicates, on 
Association Agreements not automatically offering EC membership continued even 
during the negotiations. During the third round, which took place March 19-20, the 
parties got tougher on sensitive products. In principle, the EU would give more 
concessions for the first five years of a ten-year deal to help Poland‟s reform process. 
However, Poland‟s chief trade negotiator Andrzej Olechowski (quoted in “Poland 
Says”, 1991, March 19) criticized the EU for reversing this so-called „asymmetry‟ 
for not agreeing to open EU markets to those products for which Poland had a 
comparative advantage, such as coal, steel, textiles and food, and also for taking a 
narrow technocratic approach. As puts it: “The object of our negotiations is not just 
another commercial agreement, but a treaty of historic importance.” (quoted in 
Kaluzynska, 1991, March 20) adding that Poland‟s main priority would be (quoted in 
Broniatowski, 1991, March 21) to win better conditions for its foreign trade: 
Our strategy should be based on growth of exports. We are not 
begging. It is the future of Europe which is at stake. Whether it is to 
be a unified and integrated Europe and whether the Poland-EC border 
is to be a border between poverty and prosperity. 
 
Walesa (quoted in Nisbet, 1991, April 3) also expressed disapproval of the 
EU‟s foot-dragging on opening her markets to Polish goods: “We would not like the 
Iron Curtain to be replaced by a silver curtain between a rich west and a poor east”. 
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He (quoted in “Walesa Says”, 1991, April 6) also criticized the EU for giving lessons 
to Poland in democracy while not letting Poland join the EU. In this way, as 
Schimmelfennig (1999: 36) suggests, Olechowski and Walesa had wisely started to 
emphasize ideational arguments by referring to European identity and the EU‟s self-
declared role in overcoming the division of Europe in order to get concessions from 
the EU in the negotiations.  Schimmelfennig (1999: 36) points out that due to 
Poland‟s insistence on an open commitment to eventual membership and opening of 
EU markets for their most important exports, the negotiations stalled (as they did 
with Hungary and Czechoslovakia). It is reported (Kaluzynska, 1991, April 21) that 
in order to continue the negotiations, at the EU Foreign Ministers‟ meeting of April 
15, the Council allowed the Commission a certain flexibility in its negotiation 
mandate, with ministers agreeing to include a reference to eventual EU membership 
in the association agreements, and to relax some of the technical trade restrictions, 
especially on the products for which Poland had a comparative advantage, such as 
food, steel and textiles. 
 In the fourth round of negotiations, which took place on April 22-23, 
Poland‟s chief negotiator, Jaroslaw Mulewicz, emphasized that if experts from both 
sides could make progress in drafting an agreement, there would be a good chance of 
finalizing it in June, although difficult problems still remained over agriculture and 
textiles. With respect to agriculture in particular, the Polish negotiator Czyzowicz 
complained that delegates negotiating over Polish farm exports had become lost in 
the labyrinth of protectionism of the EU‟s Common Agricultural Policy, He claimed 
that Polish farmers were for the first time putting strong pressure on their 
government to block EU farm imports. In addition, Mulewicz (quoted in Nisbet, 
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1991, April 23), suggested that the Commission should agree to mention in the text 
of the draft agreement Poland‟s ultimate aim of acceding to the EU. 
Although the Commission decided to relax some technical trade restrictions 
for Poland, such as on food, there was still a contradiction between what had been 
promised by the EU and what was actually done.  For example, Leszek Balcerowicz 
(quoted in “Polish Minister”, 1991, May 15) criticized the EU and its member states 
over the contradiction between their actions and words, and for not opening the EU‟s 
market:  
There is really little point in talking about unifying Europe across the 
great divide ... or about Poland's membership of the (European) 
Community by the year 2000, if in the meantime Poland and the 
other Central European countries are denied access to Community 
markets for some of their main industrial produces. 
 
On June 11, the fifth round of talks considered the free movement of workers 
and services. Poland‟s cheaper costs created some problem for the services issue, but 
eventually both sides came close to agreement over the free movement of labor. 
However, agriculture was again the main problem in the negotiations. Farming 
lobbies in the EU feared that association agreements would give concessions to the 
partner countries that would further depress farm incomes. However, Polish 
Agricultural Minister Adam Tanski (quoted in Blackburn, 1991, July 2) argued that 
farm imports from Poland were very small for the EU but very important for Poland, 
so the EU should not fear them. 
In the sixth round of talks, on July 9, it is reported (“Poland EC”, 1991, July 
12) that although EU negotiators agreed to lift import quotas on 80 per cent of Polish 
industrial goods, including steel, Poland maintained its disappointment about the 
EU‟s attitude in the negotiations regarding agriculture, textiles and financial 
cooperation, and wanted to see the Community commit itself to supporting the 
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reforms. As Polish negotiator Joroslaw Mulewicz (quoted in “Poland Hopes”, 1991, 
July 15) put it, “We have gained political satisfaction because the preamble to the 
accord will include a formula on Poland‟s eventual membership of the EC, but this 
success is not reflected in the economic part of the accord.” Andrzej Olechowski 
expected the Group of Seven summit, which would take place in July 15, to help 
break the deadlock caused by EU‟s refusal to open its markets to Polish agriculture, 
(quoted in “Poland Hopes”, 1991, July 15) predicting that “If there is no G7 decision 
on lifting curbs on trade it will be difficult to reach a compromise on the association 
accord during the next round of negotiations.” However, the G7 meeting did not end 
as Olechowski expected and Olechowski  (quoted in Trevelyan, 1991, July 19) also 
warned that they would have a lot of difficulty in sitting down at the negotiation table 
again in September if a political decision from the EU to lower its barriers to Polish 
farm goods did not come. In the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, no decision was 
taken to continue the negotiations so they decided to wait until the negotiations 
which would take place in September. Another problem was a split within the Polish 
delegation which prevented Poland from negotiating successfully. While Poland‟s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to conclude the negotiations and sign an 
agreement rapidly, the Polish Council of Ministers focused on the quality of the 
agreement. As Friss (quoted in Beach, 22) underlines, aware of this split within the 
Polish delegation, the Commission was not impressed by Polish criticisms of the 
EU‟s position. 
An unexpected event in 19-21August 1991, however, changed the attitude of 
both the EU and member states towards Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A 
coup attempt by hard-line members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to 
take over power from Gorbachev led the EU to hold emergency talks about the 
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Soviet crisis. During these talks, it is reported that (“EC Summit”, 1991, August 21) 
granting Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia better trade terms and pushing ahead 
with negotiations were discussed. At the meeting, the Commission President (quoted 
in Nelson and Du Bois, 1991, August 21) criticized the leaders of the member states: 
You cannot on Sunday make speeches with tears in your eyes and 
during the week send your representatives, who refuse to make the 
smallest concessions ... You have to put your money where your 
mouth is. 
 
Poland also took this opportunity to remind the EU of the importance of the 
accord for European stability in order to pressure the EU to speed up association 
negotiations. As Jan Kulakowski (quoted in Kaluzynska, 1991, August 22), Polish 
envoy to the EU, put it, 
It took this drama to bring home to the Community how vital our link-
up with the bloc is to the stability of Europe. It‟s a shame it came to 
this, but I believe it could end up helping us … The events in the 
Soviet Union should speed up our association accords, they should 
make EC ministers more flexible in meeting our aims. 
  
The intense negotiations between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the 
EU continued until December 1991. On 16 December 1991, the EU and Poland, 
Hungary and the Czechoslovakia signed the Europe Agreements. These agreements 
also needed ratification by member states so until the agreements came into force, as 
Zelof (1993, March 12) indicates, the EU entered into another interim agreement 
with Poland on 1 March 1992 in order to implement the provisions of the Europe 
Agreements on trade and trade related matters. The Association Council, the 
Association Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee, as indicated in the 
Europe Agreements, were also established in 1992. 
Mayhew (2000: 5) assert that the dispute between the new democracies and 
the EU about the Preamble to the Agreements also showed that Poland‟s goal of 
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accession had not been accepted by all member states. Therefore, as Sedelmeier 
(2005: 409) suggests, the decision to create Europe Agreements “reflected the 
preferences of most member states for deepening rather that widening” because, 
through the Europe Agreements and the concessions that they provided, the future 
enlargement of the EU was postponed. 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Other Proposals 
 
-European Confederation 
 
 In order to pursue post-Cold War French foreign policy, President François 
Mitterrand wanted to establish cooperative links with the CEECs. However, France, 
particularly Mitterrand, also supported the idea of deepening the EU before widening 
was also. In his opinion, CEEC EU membership would take a long time so an interim 
solution should be found.  As an interim solution to link the CEECs to the rest of 
Europe, he came up with the idea of a European confederation with EU member 
states as its core element. In his speech made 31 December 1989, he (quoted in 
Sjursen and Romsle, 2006: 145) suggested that “Based on the agreements made in 
Helsinki I expect that we will see, during the 1990s, the birth of a European 
confederation, in the true sense of the term, which will bring together all the states of 
our continent in a joint and permanent organization of trade, peace and security”. By 
European Confederation, Mitterrand (quoted in Vernet, 1992: 660) meant “an 
institutional framework within which the various European entities would discover 
their raison d‟être, where their functions would be complementary and sometimes 
overlapping, around a „stable centre‟ represented by the European Community.” 
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 In order to publicize the idea of a European Confederation, Mitterrand visited 
the CEECs in January 1990. He explained to the leaders of these countries that a 
confederation was needed as these countries could not enter the EU at that time due 
to its strict rules.  He organized a Conference on a Future Confederation of Europe 
commenced on 12 June 1991 in Prague and lasted for three days. It is reported that 
(Kettle, 1991, June 14) the idea was criticized in the conference on the basis that 
organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
NATO, the European Community and the Council of Europe already existed to unite 
the continent‟s nations and peoples, so there was no need for another confederation. 
 In order to convince the CEECs that the confederation would not be a 
substitute to enlargement but a first step towards it, Mitterrand (quoted in Sjursen 
and Romsloe, 2006: 146) in his speech to the Assembly of the Council of Europe 
stated that 
To enlarge the Community without preparation and in dispersed order 
would mean assuming that the present net-contributors to the 
Community could do more than they are capable of. It would mean 
assuming that the candidate countries would bear the weight of harsh 
constraints represented by the Community standards without their 
authenticity disappearing and their resources being overhauled by 
foreign companies. We have to prepare. We have to organize in the 
coming years in order to find our path and to finally succeed in 
founding this Confederation which I truly desire. 
 
Mitterrand, however, could not convince the CEECs leaders about the 
confederation idea. Consequently, because it was supported neither by the CEECs 
due to their desire to become full EU members nor by EU member states, 
Mitterrand‟s idea was not accepted as a European project. 
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-Affiliate Membership 
 
 Bearing in mind that the EU should act in order to achieve stability in the 
region without weakening its drive towards deepening, Frans Andriessen suggested a 
new form of relationship with the new democracies and long-standing partners of the 
Community: „affiliate membership‟, a concept which was not in the Community 
treaties or Europe Agreements.  According to Andriessen (1991, April 19),  
 Affiliate membership would provide membership rights and 
obligations in some areas, while excluding others at least for a 
transitional period. It would give the affiliate member a seat at the 
Council table on a par with full members in specified areas together 
with appropriate representation in other institutions, such as 
Parliament. Two areas in which affiliate members could become 
active at an early date are political cooperation and monetary   affairs. 
As “like-minded countries”, affiliate members could take part fully in 
foreign policy decisions coming within the Community sphere. 
 
 
 Andriessen claimed that, with this formula, a solution to the debate between 
deepening and widening could be found, allowing them to proceed simultaneously. 
This formula also would also permit each country to pursue integration according to 
its own capacities and needs, in other words a „variable geometry‟. Andriessen 
argued that this would mean that “Countries facing problems of adaptation would not 
be faced with the obligation to take on board all the Community‟s accomplishments, 
the acquis communautaire, when becoming affiliate members.”  
 The demands of the countries seeking membership forced the EC to 
develop new proposals, instead of membership, in order to respond to them. 
However, it was believed that the process of European integration should be 
completed before enlarging to the new states. Therefore, Andriessen came up with 
the idea of affiliate membership, which, in his mind, would extend the process of 
European integration to the states seeking membership. However, Andriessen‟s 
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ambitious suggestion, despite an acceptance of its merits for resolving the dilemma 
between deepening and widening, was not supported by the CEECs. 
 
3.2.1.2 Acceptance of the principle of CEECs’ Membership 
 The European integration process gained momentum with the Maastricht 
European Council of December 1991, in which EU leaders agreed on the draft Treaty 
on European Union which revised the EU‟s founding treaties. This treaty envisaged 
closer economic, monetary and political ties within the Community, including a 
single currency, before the end of the decade, and a framework for a common foreign 
and security policy. 
 In this European Council, it was recalled that the Treaty on European Union 
provided that any European States whose systems of government were founded on 
the principle of democracy might apply to become members of the Union, and that 
negotiations on accession to the European Union on the basis of the Treaty could 
start as soon as the Community had terminated its negotiations on own resources and 
related issues in 1992. At this summit, the European Council also instructed the 
Commission to examine questions related to enlargement, including the implications 
for the Union‟s future development in time for the European Council in Lisbon. 
However, it is reported that (“EC To”, 1991, December 3) the suggestion to first 
commission a study by the Commission was regarded with suspicion by those who 
wanted the Community to expand quickly, due to the fear that it could delay any new 
accession by raising the massive institutional problems that enlargement would 
bring. 
 
Meanwhile, the Visegrad countries started to act collectively in their relations 
with the EU and other international organizations. After a Visegrad Triangle summit 
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in May 1992, the leaders of the three countries adopted a joint declaration on their 
relations with the EU, NATO and other international organizations.  
 In response to the request of the Maastricht European Council, the European 
Commission prepared a report entitled “Europe and the challenge of enlargement”, 
which was released on 24 June 1992. At the time of the preparation of the report, 
seven countries, including Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Sweden, Finland and 
Switzerland, had applied for membership and others had announced their intention to 
apply. The report (1992: 9-10) highlighted the EU‟s moral duty by suggesting that 
integration of new democracies into the European family presented a historic 
opportunity, so the EU, which had never been a closed club, could not refuse to take 
up this historic challenge to assume its continental responsibilities and contribute to 
the development of political and economic order for the whole of Europe. On the 
other hand, the report (1992: 10) reminded both member states and applicants that 
widening should not be at the expense of deepening, and should not lead to a dilution 
of the Community‟s achievements. 
The basic membership condition was stipulated in Article 237 of the Rome 
Treaty, and Article O of the Maastricht Treaty, which states that “any European State 
may apply to become a member.” In Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
principles of democracy and the respect of fundamental human rights are listed as 
fundamental characteristics of the Union. However, the founding treaties did not 
state the comprehensive conditions or criteria related to membership. Therefore, the 
report (1992: 11-12) presented wide-ranging criteria for EU membership. Firstly, 
states had to satisfy the basic conditions of European identity: democratic status and 
respect for human rights. Secondly, States had to accept the Community system and 
have the capacity to implement it. To do this, a functioning and competitive market 
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economy, and an adequate legal and administrative framework in the public and 
private sectors were necessary. Thirdly, states should also accept and be able to 
implement the EU‟s common foreign and security policy. Finally, states had to 
accept the rights and obligations of the Community system and its institutional 
framework, the Community‟s acquis. 
 Regarding the EFTA states, the report suggested that, for certain countries 
whose state of preparation for membership was well advanced, negotiations for 
accession could be opened with the prospect of a satisfactory conclusion within a 
reasonable period of time, namely, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by EU 
member states. However, with regard to the CEECs, the report (1992: 17) warned 
that a period of preparation would be necessary before the possibility of membership 
could realistically be envisaged. Moreover, for these countries, the report also 
emphasized that the Community should use all available means, in particular its 
various forms of bilateral agreements, to promote their economic and social 
development in such a way as to facilitate their eventual integration into the 
Community. 
 For the states with whom Europe Agreements were concluded but which had 
not applied for membership and which were not in a position to accept the 
obligations of membership, namely Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the 
Commission offered a new framework, the European Political Area, to guide 
relations between these states and the Community, midway between association and 
membership. The report proposed that the basis for these new relations should be the 
Europe Agreements. With their dynamic and evolutionary nature, it was emphasized 
that these agreements could be exploited and improved in the fields of the 
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development of administrative and legislative infrastructure, determining a calendar 
for adoption of the Community acquis, strengthening of economic cooperation, etc. 
 The Commission presented its report to the Lisbon European Council of 26-
27 June 1992, and the report was added to the Conclusions of the European Council. 
As Michalski and Helen Wallace (1992, July 28) state, the meeting agreed that 
official negotiations with those EFTA countries that had already applied for 
membership could begin as soon as the Treaty on European Union was ratified by 
finding a solution to deal with Denmark‟s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, and as 
soon as an agreement was concluded on the second package of structural and 
financial measures, namely the Delors II package, by which income, expenditure and 
cohesion-funding would increase. 
The Presidency Conclusion of the Lisbon European Council (1992) declared 
that the European Council welcomed the progress made in the establishment and 
deepening of relations with the CEECs, and in particular the entry into force of the 
Intermediate Agreements to the European Agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland. The Community‟s will to develop its partnership with CEECs 
within the framework of the Europe agreements was also reaffirmed. Furthermore, 
the document promised that political dialogue would be intensified and extended to 
include meetings at the highest political level, and that cooperation would be focused 
systematically on assisting the CEECs efforts to prepare for their desired accession to 
the Union. In addition, the Commission was again given the duty to evaluate 
progress made and to report to the next European Council. 
In response to a request of the Lisbon European Council and the European 
Commission (1992) prepared a report entitled „Towards a Closer Association with 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.‟ The report predicted that, in the coming 
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decade, Europe Agreements would be the principal framework for the Community‟s 
relations with the countries concerned. The main aim of the report was to find 
answers to the questions of “how partnership can be developed within the framework 
of the Europe Agreements and how this framework can, itself, be extended.” 
The report (1992: 3) recommended that “The European Council should now 
confirm that it accepts the goal of eventual membership in the European Union for 
the countries of central and Eastern Europe when they are able to satisfy the 
conditions required.” The real motivation behind such a declaration was explained in 
the report as being the Community‟s need to provide encouragement to those CEECs 
pursuing reform by indicating that at the end of these economic and social processes 
of adjustment, the countries would become EU members. 
The report (1992: 3) also specified the membership conditions of the EU, 
which formed the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria. These were as follows: “the 
capacity of the country concerned to assume the obligations of membership (the 
acquis communautaire); the stability of institutions in the candidate country 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; the 
existence of a functioning market economy; the candidate‟s endorsement of the 
objectives of political, economic and monetary union; its capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union; the 
Community‟s capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of 
European integration”. 
The Commission‟s report was welcomed by the Edinburg European Council, 
with the Europe Agreements being seen as the means by which the community 
intended to support and encourage political stability and economic growth in the 
CEECs. The most crucial result of the Edinburgh European Council for the associate 
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countries was the declaration that the European Council at its meeting in 
Copenhagen would reach decisions on the various components of the Commission‟s 
report in order to prepare the associate countries for accession to the Union. It is 
reported (“Poland Fears”, 1993, March 31) that Poland, together with Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, welcomed the report and the commitment to study it and take 
decisions at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993. 
 Before the Copenhagen European Council, Polish Prime Minister Hanna 
Suchocka sent a letter to the prime ministers of member states and Commission 
President Jacques Delors. In her letter, she (quoted in “Polish Premier”, 1993, June 
4) requested that the up-coming Copenhagen meeting make a political declaration on 
behalf of the EU, declaring that the EU wanted Poland and other associated countries 
to become future EU members. She also argued that it would have a positive impact 
on the process of reform if the Copenhagen meeting also confirmed and increased the 
EU‟s commitment for Poland and other parties to the European treaties.  
  The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 was the most important 
European Council in meeting the demands of the associate countries by sending them 
a very explicit political message. In the Presidency Conclusion of the Copenhagen 
Summit, ideational arguments were used to express the support of member states for 
the efforts of associate countries to ensure their transition to a market economy and 
democracy. As the document (1993: 13) put it, “Peace and security in Europe depend 
on the success of those efforts.” After this declaration, the EU accepted for the first 
time the principle of membership for the associate countries. It was (1993: 13) 
agreed by the European Council that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union” as soon as they 
satisfy the requisite political and economic conditions. 
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 The membership criteria, which had been suggested in Commission reports 
about enlargement, were also confirmed at this European Council. It was (1993:13) 
pointed out that “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.” These membership criteria were later named the „Copenhagen 
Criteria‟, becoming the basis for relations between the EU and all candidate 
countries. 
The Presidency Conclusion also noted that membership presupposed the 
candidate‟s ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union. However, the EU left room for 
itself over the decision to enlarge even if the candidate states complied with all the 
criteria by (1993: 13) suggesting that “The Union‟s capacity to absorb new members, 
while maintaining the momentum of European integration is also an important 
consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.” 
 
The Copenhagen Criteria can be seen as signaling the EU‟s commitment to 
the prospect of accession for the CEECs. However, the Copenhagen Criteria can also 
be criticized for being over-general and hard to assess because they are open to 
interpretation, especially the political criteria. Bearing in mind that the CEECs were 
making a transition to democracy and the market economy, it was a real challenge 
for them not only to abide with the political and economic criteria but also to adopt 
the whole body of Community legislation, namely the acquis. Among other issues, 
the criteria did not mention a timetable for accession, and it failed to provide an 
outline, a pre-accession strategy, for the CEECs to comply with these criteria. 
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3.2.1.3 Attitudes of the European Commissioners towards 
Poland 
 In the speeches of European Commissioners, ideational arguments were 
used frequently. For instance, Commission President Delors (1990, January 17) 
emphasized the EU‟s special responsibility towards Eastern Europe by suggesting 
that “we are duty-bound to help them as they embark on the unique experiment of 
moving from Communism towards a market”. Likewise, Vice President of the 
European Commission Hennig Christophersen (1991, April 16) underlined the EU‟s 
responsibility towards Eastern Europe: “We in the Community and the Commission 
have for historical and geographical reasons felt this responsibility clearly.” 
 The question of accepting Eastern European states as members, and the 
dilemma between enlargement and internal reinforcement, namely widening versus 
deepening, was also raised in this period. However, arguments supporting deepening 
were emphasized repeatedly. For instance, concerning the 1992 programme of 
economic and monetary union, Leon Britton (1990, January 19) declared that “It is 
part of our contribution towards the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe - and a 
very important part, at that - that we should complete the process we have started 
within the Community.” Likewise Andriessen (1990, April 25) stated that 
To my mind, priority must be given to internal reinforcement. This 
means the Single Market must be completed by the date agreed, a 
political decision must be taken on economic and monetary union and 
its gradual introduction; and a greater political dimension must be 
given to the European Community. Only then can further enlargement 
be considered. 
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 The Soviet Coup attempt in August 1991, however, changed Andriessen‟s 
attitude in favor of widening. He (1991, October 18) suggested that “Appropriate 
means must be found to permit widening and deepening to proceed together, 
enabling the Community to preserve its autonomy and dynamism while reaching out 
to those for whom there is no alternative.” As a result, he came up with the idea of 
„affiliate membership‟, which tried to reconcile deepening and widening. 
 On the membership question, Leon Brittan (1992, April 24) , warned the 
new associate members who were preparing to apply for membership that “from 
helping them, a premature entry into the European Community would shatter their 
fragile economies which could not bear the full disciplines of the Single Market.” 
 Hans Van den Broek (1993, March 3), emphasized the importance of the 
conditions for membership, noting that “if we are to build a lasting and fruitful 
relationship with  the countries concerned, certain conditions as regards the rule  
of law,  protection  of  human  rights and the  holding  of  free  and  fair elections 
will have to be met.” Leon Brittan (1993, May 27) shared this view, saying that 
“when the countries in question are able to satisfy the conditions required they 
should be welcomed as full members of the European Union.” In addition, Brittan 
saw the importance of the EU responding positively to the challenge of Eastern 
Europe, stressing the dimensions of economy, security and common values:  
The prize is enormous: the addition to a unifying Europe of an area of 
enormous historical and cultural importance to us all, the creation of a 
zone of stability, rather than the risk of disorder and mass 
immigration, and ultimately the strengthening of the whole European 
economy, with new opportunities for trade and investment in both 
directions. 
  
 To sum up, although the European Commissioners used ideational 
arguments in their support speeches, they also underlined the need of institutional 
105 
 
reform of the EU before widening of the EU as well as unpreparedness of CEECs for 
EU membership. 
 
 
3.2.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Poland 
This section analyses the policies of Germany, France, Great Britain and 
Spain to reveal their support or non-support for Poland‟s association agreement and 
to EU enlargement. 
 
3.2.2.1 Germany 
The process that led to German unification was first viewed hesitantly in 
Poland as the Polish government watched cautiously, especially regarding common 
problems of minorities and boundaries. As early as 30 January 1990, Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki (quoted in Davidson, 1990, January31) declared that Poland 
wanted guarantees for Poland‟s western frontier, arguing that the German question 
should be solved “with the agreement of all the interested parties, and in a manner 
which will guarantee the inviolability of the western frontier of Poland.” Helmut 
Kohl (quoted in Alterman, 1990, March 5) on the other hand, asked that for Germany 
to recognize Poland‟s borders, Poland should give up any claims for war reparations. 
The Polish government sent Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to the Paris 
„two-plus-four‟13 conference on the boundary problems between Germany and her 
neighbours in July 1990. At this conference, five principles applying to the final 
settlement of the territorial aspects of German unification were decided, which were 
                                                          
13
 Diplomats from East and West Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain 
participated in this conference 
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later incorporated into the Moscow Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to 
Germany concluded on 12 September 1990.  
This process led to reconciliation between Poland and Germany, so that 
before German unification on 3 October 1990, Skubiszewski (quoted in Worsnip 
1990, October 2) suggested that “Unification of Germany will become, we hope, a 
powerful factor of European stability and unification.” The united Germany and 
Poland signed the Treaty on the Confirmation of the Existing Border between 
Germany and Poland on 14 November 1990.  
The association negotiations with Poland commenced in December 1990. 
Germany had mixed feelings about them. Mostly, they seemed to support Poland, 
although when Germany‟s interests were at stake, she raised objections to Polish 
products due to the fears of domestic producers. For instance, in March, the 
suggestion to maintain the 1990 steel import quotas from Eastern Europe raised 
tensions between the European Commission and member states. Nisbet (1991, March 
7) reports that Belgium, France, Italy and Spain had argued for a reduced quota 
compared to 1990 whereas other countries, including Germany, had highlighted the 
political importance of an adequate steel accord to support the struggling reform 
governments of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Buchan (1991, April 19) reports 
that, in the April negotiations, Germany did not want Polish coal to be traded freely 
due to her own interest in a special regime for coal. 
On the Polish side, it was acknowledged (“Poland Hurd”,1991, May 8) that 
“The way to the EC leads through Germany which is Poland‟s largest trade partner” 
which led Poland to sign a treaty with Germany elaborating economic, cultural and 
political relations between the two states, including the rights of Poland‟s German 
minority. Following negotiations, the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly 
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Cooperation was signed on 17 June 1991. It is reported that (Holman, 1991, June 18) 
the most important part of the treaty for the association negotiations of Poland was 
that the newly united Germany accepted the inclusion of a clause (Article 8) 
supporting Poland‟s accession to the EU as soon as the necessary preconditions were 
met. 
On the way to the peaceful resolution of the minority and border problems, 
together with Article 8 of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Germany had started 
to show her support, though not full support, for Poland in the association 
negotiations. For instance, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in a 
letter to Jacques Delors, advised the European Community to accelerate trade and 
membership talks with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, reminding him of the 
Dublin Summit‟s recommendation for an early conclusion to the association 
negotiations. Using ideational arguments, he (quoted in “Germany Urges”, 1991, 
June 5) suggested that there must be no dividing line in Europe. However,   
Kaluzynska (1991, July 7) reports that two days after this letter, due to the fears of 
their domestic producers, France and Germany resisted allowing Poland to export 
farm products, mainly beef and cereals, freely into the EU. 
 The Soviet coup attempt reminded Germany that she should support Poland 
in the negotiations. Genscher emphasized that the negotiations on association treaties 
should accelerate in order to show Poland and Czechoslovakia encouragement. In 
addition, he (quoted in “Germany Wants”, 1991, August 20) stated that “It would 
also make clear that we view the development towards democracy in Europe and 
independence as irreversible.” Moreover, it is reported (“French German”, 1991, 
August 30) that at the end of August, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and 
Poland agreed to meet once a year, adopting a joint resolution affirming that France 
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and Germany supported efforts aimed at bringing the Community closer to Poland 
and the new democracies of Eastern Europe.  
In November 1991, a Commission proposal relating to steel exports from 
Poland, Hungary and the Czechoslovakia again became a problem for the 
negotiations, raising concerns in France and Spain. However, although Germany 
would be affected seriously by these exports, it was suggested (“Steel Exports”, 
1991, November 4) that Germany supported the commission plan on political 
grounds, although before the signing of the Europe Agreements at the end of 
November, it appeared that Germany was worried about imports of geese from 
Poland. 
After signing the Europe Agreements, German support for Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary continued.  For instance, in February 1992, German 
Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher ( quoted in “Enlargement Imperative”, 
1992, February 6) said that the central European troika of Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary should become members of the European Community “as soon as 
possible”, suggesting that the fear of political instability on Germany‟s borders lay 
behind this support.  German President Richard von Weizsaecker (quoted in 
Soderlind, 1992, March 30) assured Walesa when he visited Germany that Bonn 
backed Poland‟s bid to join the European Community. After the appointment of 
Waldemar Pawlak as the new Polish Prime Minister, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl 
Reaffirms”, 1993, October 27) assured him that Bonn would continue to support 
Warsaw‟s bid for closer links with the EU and that his government would keep on 
backing both political and economic reform in Poland. 
The German emphasis on its security interests was also seen in 1993. 
Immigration and the flow of refugees to Germany were also one of the main issues 
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between Poland and Germany. To limit refugees and immigration, Germany needed 
the support of Poland and the Czech Republic. As Benjamin (1993, February 25) 
states, according to the proposed amendment to the German constitution, declared in 
December 1992, the government would be allowed to return refugees to the countries 
from which they came into Germany if those countries were certified as safe, which 
meant that Poland and the Czech Republic, as safe countries, would be responsible 
for the refugees passing through their territory. It was suggested in the Polish media 
(Borger, 1993, February 16) that the German interior ministry had confirmed that 
closer ties with the EU depended on the steps that Poland took to limit immigration. 
Following these demands, as reported (“Single Market”, 1993, July 7; “Exporting 
Immigration”, 1993, July 14) ,  Poland reached an agreement with Germany giving it 
financial assistance, 75 million USD for expenses, and eventually a visa-free border 
in exchange for acceptance of a maximum of 10,000 immigrants annually rejected 
for admission into Germany after having tried to enter through Poland. With this 
agreement, German-Polish cooperation intensified.  
To sum up, Germany had some economic reservations in the negotiations of 
the Europe Agreements. Afterwards, however, Germany resisted to the domestic 
concerns and became a driver of Poland‟s European aspirations. 
 
3.2.2.2 France 
French relations with Poland in this period were based on Mitterrand‟s vision 
that EU membership for the CEECs would take a long time so an interim solution 
should be found. This solution was behind his idea of the European Confederation. 
However, as early as June 1991, Mitterrand realized that his ideas were not supported 
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by the CEECs or other member states. Despite its declared support for Poland in her 
transition to democracy, France did not show this in the association negotiations with 
Poland. It would not be wrong to describe France as one of the laggards in the 
negotiations, especially in the area of farm products, mainly due to the large size of 
the agricultural sector in both the French and Polish economies. For instance, it is 
reported (“French Polish”, 1991, July 8) that France, together with Germany, refused 
to accept free exports of Poland beef and cereals into the EU, arguing that “We have 
no problem opening our market to Polish industrial products, but for some farm 
products such an accord would be a real threat for our producers and we are not 
willing to make any concessions”. 
 During the Soviet crisis following the attempted coup, President Walesa 
(“Poland Says”, 1991, August 20) contacted Mitterrand to ask for French support for 
Poland‟s efforts to accelerate its association with the EU, requesting Mitterrand to 
declare his support for closer cooperation of European nations. After the coup 
attempt, Mitterrand (Nelson, 1991, August 23) even reduced the time frame for 
CEEC membership from “tens and tens of years” to “years”.  
However, French resistance to Polish farm products, particularly meat, 
continued even in September 1991. The Commission proposed some trade 
concessions for the three eastern European countries, including decreasing tariffs on 
their agricultural imports by 20 per cent annually over three years and raising the 
volume of imports by 10 per cent per year over five years. However, the French, 
thinking of their beef industry, and joined by Ireland and Belgium, opposed this 
proposal, stating (“EC Meat”, 1991, September 9) that “This would be catastrophic 
for our farmers.” Mitterrand declared that  
We, citizens of France, we are examining the situation of imports of 
agricultural products from Eastern Europe. Let it be clearly said that 
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we are not hostile to the draft agreements envisaged between the 
Community, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We are simply 
asking for guarantees. I believe that this problem will be settled this 
month, to everyone‟s satisfaction. 
 
It is reported (“French Farmers”, 1991, September 30) that over 200,000 
French farmers marched through the streets of Paris to protest what they called their 
falling standards of living due to falling prices and competition from the East. The 
European Community foreign ministers finally agreed to offer Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia improved access to the EU market for their agricultural exports once 
France (“EC Agrees”, 1991, September 30) dropped its objections after the 
guarantees she received for loading extra meat on the Soviet market, making checks 
on fraudulent exports from the three countries, and implementing sanitary controls.  
 At the beginning of November, France, Spain and Italy again were reported 
(“Steel Exports”, 1991, November 4) to resisted the Commission‟s proposal to phase 
out voluntary restraints on steel exports from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
asking for wording in the agreements that kept the concept of voluntary restraints. 
However, on November 6, the EU was suggested to (“EC Irons”, 1991, November 6) 
found a compromise that included safeguard clauses removing the need for voluntary 
export restraints to ease French, Spanish and Italian concerns over steel exports from 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.  
 At the end of November 1991, the EU initiated the Europe Agreements, with 
France‟s economic interest being emphasized during the negotiation process, as 
(quoted in “France signs”, 1991, November 22) indicated in the foreign ministry‟s 
statement that “These accords, negotiated with a view to preserving France‟s 
economic interests, are an essential element of the new European architecture”. After 
the signing of the association agreements, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas 
112 
 
(quoted in “French Foreign”, 1992, January 18) confirmed France‟s support for 
Poland‟s bid to join the EU by the year 2000. 
In September 1993, Mitterrand (quoted in Sjursen and Romsle, 2006: 147) 
openly referred to the economic interest of enlarging the EU:  
 
The present member countries of the Community would not be able to 
carry this burden. There are only three countries out of twelve that are 
so-called net contributors, that is they give more to Europe that they 
receive. These are Germany, Great Britain and France. The burden is 
already quite heavy. One cannot expect these three countries to carry 
the costs of all that is left to be done in Poland, in Hungary, in the 
Czech Republic, in Slovakia and everywhere else. 
 
 
Therefore, the Europe Agreements challenged French economic interest 
and in order to protect her farmers, France resisted giving concessions to Poland 
in agricultural products. As stated in the intergovernmentalist literature, this 
economic interest led France become a brakeman in this period. 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Great Britain 
In the period between 1990 and 1993, British support for the CEECs 
accession process to the EC was evident, and continued during John Major‟s 
government. Major and Walesa signed a joint declaration (“Government Signs”, 
1991, April 25) in which Great Britain undertook to encourage investment in Poland 
and expressed its support for Poland‟s bid to become an associate member  of the EU 
and EU member when ready. 
During the association negotiations, the trade protectionism of some member 
states was highly criticized by Great Britain. For instance, British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Norman Lamont (quoted in Carrington, 1991, July 19) suggested that 
“It‟s nonsensical to give large amounts of aid to Eastern Europe and then deny them 
access to the markets of the (European) Community.” Likewise, Prime Minister John 
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Major (quoted in Sachs, 1991, September 12) also used ideological arguments, such 
as referring to artificial divisions: 
There is no purpose in giving countries aid and denying them trade 
access. It would be absurd and potentially dangerous to preach the 
virtues of the free market but to practice old-fashioned protectionism 
... We cannot allow one artificial division in Europe to be replaced by 
another. We in the EC cannot say: „Here is our club. We have made 
the rules and we will make new rules regardless of your interests‟ ... I 
believe the Community should welcome them in as soon as they are 
ready politically and economically. 
 
Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd (quoted in “Enlargement Imperative”, 1992, 
February 6) stated that Great Britain‟s mission during its EU presidency in the 
second half of 1992 would be enlargement. In order to show British commitment to 
the idea of enlargement, the Prime Minister began a tour of Central Europe in May 
1992. During his visit to Poland, he (quoted in Travis, 1992, May 27) declared that 
“Nothing would give me greater pleasure personally than to see Poland ready for full 
membership at the end of this decade … I hope Poland and Great Britain will start 
the next century together at the heart of Europe”. During its EU presidency, Great 
Britain also invited the associate states to a conference. At this conference, in order 
not to create expectations, Hurd (quoted in “EC Resists”, 1992, October 5) 
emphasized that it was hard to envisage a timetable for them to join the EU but he 
(quoted in “Britain As”, 1992, October 6) also suggested that they were working to 
improve the association agreements to create greater trade freedom, and highlighted 
the security threat of unstable countries: “We will pay a heavy price later in terms of 
unstable countries on our doorstep and unhappy crowds knocking on our door if we 
are not forthcoming now.” 
The prime ministers from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland also attended a 
special summit meeting arranged by John Major, and EU Commission President 
Jacques Delors in October 28. Ministers from the three countries underlined (“East 
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Europeans”, 1992, October 28) the importance of cementing ties for economic 
reasons and, with the turmoil in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in mind, 
their security. However, Major (quoted in “Distractions and Disappointments”, 1992, 
November 5) again did not mention a timetable, instead suggesting that “What I 
think is going to be much clearer are the criteria that are necessary for membership 
…We should set out as clearly as possible what the criteria will be so that it is more 
possible [for the Central Europeans] to determine domestic policies and also assess 
progress towards full membership.” 
Major continued to use European security arguments to justify his support for 
Polish accession. As he (quoted in “Poland In”, 1993, January 4) indicated, “There is 
no recession so severe, no problem of economic integration so serious, that cannot be 
overcome to achieve a degree of European unity that may prove essential for the 
peace, the development, and, eventually, the prosperity also of Europe as a whole.” 
During her visit to Great Britain, Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka asked 
for British help over Poland‟s EU membership bid. Major (Baker, 1993, March 4) 
confirmed that Great Britain wanted “to assist Poland to become a member and we 
hope we can take progressive steps towards that during the rest of this decade”, while 
reminding Poland that it needed to develop its economy before it could become a full 
member. 
 With respect to the debate between deepening versus widening, Great Britain 
mostly supported the wideners by promoting enlargement. For instance, Margaret 
Thatcher (quoted in Savill, 1990, September 22) said,  
This is no time for the European Community to say that it is too 
concerned with its own development to take the longer view. Now that 
the Cold War is dead and the barriers down, we must not lose time. 
The European Community should declare unequivocally that it is 
ready to accept all the countries of Eastern Europe as members, if they 
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want to join, when their economies are strong enough and when 
democracy has taken root.  
 
John Major (quoted in Travis, 1992, May 27) was said to have underlined 
“the importance he places on European enlargement at the expense of deeper EC 
integration by talking privately of the dangers of a rich man‟s club which throws a 
girdle around itself”. However, in its political declarations, Great Britain tried to 
show that she both supported widening and deepening together. For example, after 
the Maastricht summit, Major (quoted in Nelson and Du Bois, 1991, December 12) 
was pleased that the EU had not had to choose between deepening versus widening, 
stating that “It means that we can do both of those things”. 
To conclude, Europe Agreements did not challenge national interest of Great 
Britain.  Great Britain continued to be a driver of Poland‟s European aspirations in 
this period. 
 
3.2.2.4 Spain 
 Spain was not as enthusiastic as Great Britain in support of the signing of 
association agreements or the accession process. Indeed, it is not wrong to say that 
Spain was the main brakeman in the association negotiations. Spain also raised 
concerns about the structural funds that would be paid to Poland due to the fear of a 
reduction in her funds. 
 Negotiations with the EU did not go as Poland expected due to the 
protectionism of member states over sensitive sectors for their producers. At the 
beginning of November 1991, Spain (“Steel Exports”, 1991, November 4) dragged 
her feet over steel exports from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and together 
with France, resisted the Commission‟s proposal to phase out voluntary restraints. 
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Spain‟s resistance over steel imports continued till the last minute, due to the fear of 
disruption in its own market. Spain wanted a declaration about steel imports. Another 
issue which was important for Spain was citrus fruits (“EC To” 1991, November 22), 
for which she wanted better access to Poland‟s markets. However, in the end, Spain 
(“Association Agreements”, 1991, November 22) did not stand in the way of signing 
the association agreement on 22 November 1991. However, it again fought till the 
last minute before the signing to win more protection for its steel producers. Spain‟s 
resistance was broken by a form of words allowing it to raise the alarm if it felt 
threatened by floods of steel imports. Finally, on 16 December 16 1991, the Europe 
Agreements were signed with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
The transfer of EU funds to the CEECs also raised concerns in Spain. In May 
1992, Spain (“Britain‟s Wider”, 1992, May 27) emphasized that it would block all 
new members until it reached agreement on large cohesion subventions to help the 
poorer states to prepare for monetary union. Then, in November 1992, regarding the 
Maastricht Treaty, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales (“Maastricht John”, 
1992, November 5) threatened that if Spain did not obtain satisfaction at the 
Edinburgh Summit of December 1992, it could veto any enlargement of the 
Community. In addition, Great Britain made a proposal at the summit regarding the 
Delors II package, which dealt with future EC financing. The British proposal 
included cutting EU funding and reducing the cohesion fund for helping the poorer 
EU members, specifically Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland. However, Spain and 
Portugal (Brown, 1992, December 4) agreed to present a united front at the 
Edinburgh Summit and said that there could only be enlargement of the EU after 
both ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and approval of the Delors II package. 
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In the debate between deepening versus widening, Spain supported 
deepening. Facing the demands of the Visegrad states for a timetable and conditions 
for full EU membership, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (quoted in “Spain 
Says”, 1993, April 23) replied “Don‟t ask us the impossible, because the community 
must resolve its own most urgent problems ... At the same time be constant, do not 
lose the final goal because I am sure that it will not be long before the community 
can give to Poland and the other countries of the Visegrad group more concrete dates 
on the horizon of integration.” Likewise, Spanish Minister Javier Solana (quoted in 
“Mr. Petersen”, 1993, February 2) also insisted on ratification of Maastricht and the 
implementation of the full potential of the treaty, stressing that enlargement had to go 
hand in hand with a strengthening of the EU‟s institutions. After publishing the 
Commission Report, Towards a Closer Association with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, ministers avoid setting any timetable for enlargement. As one 
Spanish diplomat (quoted in “Ministers To”, 1993, May 6) put it, “We support the 
objective of membership but only at the right time.” 
 To sum up, Spain‟s economic interest was at stake in the negotiations of the 
Europe Agreements. Due to economic interest, Spain did not support Poland‟s 
improvement of relations with the EU and became a brakeman  
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3.3 Membership Application 
 
3.3.1 The EU-Poland Relations  
 
3.3.1.1 The Way to Limited Enlargement: From the Pre-
Accession Strategy to Treaty of Amsterdam  
 
3.3.1.1.1 The Pre-Accession Strategy 
 
 Europe Agreements, after ratification by all member states, entered into force 
in 1 February 1994 and the Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak officially 
presented Polish application for the EU membership in 5 April 1994. Shortly after 
the application, in June 1994,  as Los-Nowak (2000:19) states, „Strategy for Poland‟ 
was devised which formed a road map for the negotiation process including  the 
specific issues of economic reform, agriculture, reducing the state subsidies to heavy 
industry, the reform of working practices and employment law, etc.  
Although the accession conditions were declared, the Copenhagen European 
Council did not state a pre-accession strategy for the associate states. This strategy 
was developed by the following European Councils. In the Corfu European Council 
of 24-25 June 1994, the membership application of Hungary and Poland were 
welcomed and it was confirmed that Europe Agreements and the decisions taken in 
Copenhagen formed the framework for deepening. Moreover, the European Council 
also gave the Presidency and the Commission the duty of making specific proposal 
for the further implementation of the Europe Agreements and the decisions taken in 
Copenhagen and reporting the progress made on this basis. 
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 As a response to the demand of the Corfu European Council, “The Report 
from the Council to the Essen European Council on a strategy to prepare for the 
accession of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe” was prepared 
and put in the annex IV of Essen European Council of 9-10 December 1994. The 
main goal of this strategy was to prepare a road plan for the associated countries in 
order to integrate them into the internal market of the Union as they were preparing 
for accession and they needed to assume responsibilities of a member state. The 
strategy was highlighted to be realized through the measures of establishment of a 
„structured relationship‟ between the associated states and the institutions of the 
European Union, as decided upon in Copenhagen and Europe Agreements and 
“preparation for the internal market.”  
In addition to the pre-accession strategy, in the Essen European Council, the 
European Council also requested from the Commission to submit a White Paper, a 
detailed analysis of the effects of enlargement on Union‟s current policies and their 
future development. As Mayhew (2000: 7) suggests, the associated countries 
generally reacted rapidly, preparing their own strategies for transposing and 
implementing the internal market acquis. 
 As a part of the pre-accession strategy, the White Paper named “Preparation 
of the Associate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the 
Internal Market of the Union” as demanded by the Essen European Council was 
prepared by the Commission in 3 May 1995. The main purpose of the White Paper 
was declared to provide a guide to assist the associated countries in preparing 
themselves for operating under the requirements of the European Union's internal 
market by identifying the key measures in each sector of the internal market for the 
approximization of the legislation and to outline steps to be taken by the 
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Commission, the associated countries and the Member states. The Cannes European 
Council of 26-27 June 1995 welcomed the White Paper as a useful guide for the 
associate countries in the context of the process of reform already initiated and of the 
implementation of the Europe Agreements.  
In order to adopt the acquis as mentioned by the White Paper, Poland had 
made intensive institutional restructuring. For instance, as Francis (1999: 307) states, 
the Council of Ministers charged the Government Plenipotentiary with producing a 
supplementary work schedule for all Ministers, an EU integration unit was 
established by each ministry and twenty-nine working groups were established to 
work on the pre-accession strategy. 
Poland, together with other Visegrad countries demanded to know the date 
for the enlargement in order to continue the reform process in their countries. In 
September 1995, Sir Leon (1995, September 11) responded to this demand: 
 
 The issue of whether we should set an opening date should be one of 
the main items on the agenda of the European Council immediately 
following the IGC negotiations. We should not wait for the ratification 
of the IGC's conclusions. 
 
As a response to the request of Essen European Council, the Commission 
prepared reports on the effects of enlargement on the policies of the EU, on 
alternative strategies in agriculture and on the progress of the pre-accession strategy 
for the associated countries and in the Madrid European Council of 15-16 December 
of 1995, the European Council took note of these reports. In this European Council, 
the Intergovernmental Conference on the needs of the EU for the next enlargement 
was decided to launch on 29 March 1996. Madrid European Council requested from 
the Commission to further evaluate the effects of enlargement on Community polices 
mainly with respect to agricultural and structural policies and to review the financial 
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aspect of the enlargement. Furthermore, in order to treat equally to applicant 
countries, the Commission was also asked to speed up preparations of its 
membership opinions to be forwarded to the Council after the Conclusion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference. The Intergovernmental Conference began on 29 
March 1996 as agreed.  The questionnaires were sent to each of the applicant 
countries in April 1996 to be completed by the end of July 1996. The inquiry sheet 
included a series of questions totaling 170 pages and covering 23 different subject 
areas needed to be coordinated by Poland and as Los-Nowak (2000: 21) indicates, 
three months later the Polish government submitted its response. Bilateral meeting 
were also held with each of the applicant countries, which were given an opportunity 
to provide any further information concerning their preparations. 
The preparation for the questionnaire showed that more coordination was 
needed in order to be ready for the EU accession. As a response to this coordination 
setback, under the act of 8 August 1996, the Committee for European Integration 
(Committee-KIE) was established. The Committee was a “supreme governmental 
administration body competent for programming and co-ordination of policy relating 
to Poland's integration with the European Union, programming and co-ordination of 
Poland's actions adjusting Poland to European standards as well as for co-ordination 
of state administration actions in the field of foreign assistance obtained.” The 
Committee was composed of chairman -the prime minister-, secretary and members 
who were ministers from the government. To support the tasks of the Committee, the 
Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) was set up by a Regulation 
of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of 2 October 1996. UKIE, which has 
continued the works previously conducted by the Bureau for European Integration 
and the Bureau for Foreign Assistance, had the duty of coordinating the works of all 
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ministers and institutions directly engaged in the process of Poland‟s integration with 
the EU. On 28 January 1997, Poland published a National Integration Strategy 
setting out a plan for preparing for accession to the EU and on 22 May, the document 
was adopted by the Parliament.  
In Amsterdam European Council of 16-17 June of 1997, the 
intergovernmental conference was successfully concluded with full agreement on a 
draft Amsterdam treaty which would be declared to be signed in October 1997. The 
conclusion of the IGC was declared to open the way for launching the enlargement 
process in accordance with the conclusions of the Madrid European Council. 
Moreover, it was also emphasized that by mid July, the Commission would present 
its opinions on the accession applications, a comprehensive communication covering 
the development of Union policies with respect to enlargement, namely Agenda 2000 
and future financial framework beyond 1999. Furthermore, the General Affairs 
Council was invited by the European Council to examine in detail the Commission‟s 
opinions as well as its Agenda 2000 and present an all-inclusive report to the 
European Council at its December meeting in Luxembourg.  
 In 16 July 1997, the Commission presented “Agenda 2000: For a Stronger 
and Wider Union” which explained the policies of the Union, the challenge of 
enlargement and the new financial framework for the years 2000-2006. In this 
document, the policy of economic and social cohesion, common agricultural policy, 
growth, budgetary discipline and accession of new members were emphasized. 
Moreover, the Commission opinions on the accession applications of the ten 
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe were made public. In the part of 
„Challenge of Enlargement‟, it was emphasized that the conclusions and the 
recommendations were based on the Copenhagen Criteria and having evaluated the 
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extent that candidates already met these criteria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus were recommended by the European 
Commission to start accession negotiations. 
 On 15 July 1997, the Commission released “Agenda 2000-Commission 
Opinion on Poland‟s Application for Membership of the Union”. In the preparation 
of its opinion, the Commission used the Copenhagen Criteria. With respect to 
political criteria, it was emphasized (European Commission, 1997: 18) that Poland 
presented the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, however, in 
the document, certain limitations to freedom of press and implementation of a new 
law limiting access to public service for certain categories of persons were also 
criticized. As for the economic criteria, in the opinion, it was stressed that Poland can 
be regarded as a functioning market economy and Poland should be well able to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term. 
Nevertheless, it was also acknowledged (European Commission, 1997: 35) that 
larger state owned companies were suggested to cause problems for the economy and 
agriculture needed to be modernized. When the ability of Poland to take on the 
obligations of membership was evaluated, it was suggested that if Poland continues 
its efforts on transposition of the acquis relating particularly to the single market, 
Poland should become able to participate fully in the single market in the medium 
term. However, it was also emphasized (European Commission, 1997: 114) that in 
the sectors of agriculture, environment and transport, further effort and investment 
would be needed and administrative reform would be indispensable to meet the 
acquis. Consequently, the Commission recommended that negotiations for accession 
should be opened with Poland. 
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In the Commission opinion, ideological arguments were also seen such as 
historic process and overcoming the division of the continent. For instance, it was 
underlined (European Commission, 1997: 5) that “Poland‟s accession is to be seen as 
part of an historic process, in which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
overcome the division of the continent which has lasted for more than 40 years, and 
join the area of peace, stability and prosperity created by the Union.” 
Poland‟s formal response to Commission Opinion was approved by Council 
of Ministers in 14 October 1997. In December 1997, the European council adopted a 
strategy as proposed in Agenda 2000. The strategy‟s objective was to provide Poland 
and other associate members with practical and financial assistance to implement 
reforms which are a prerequisite for full EU membership. Moreover, it was also 
decided that from the end of 1998, the Commission would make regular reports to 
the Council, reviewing the progress of each Central and East European Applicant 
State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria. 
However, the relations with the EU did not continue smoothly as expected by 
Polish government. For instance, in the end of 1997, Prime Minister Jery Buzek 
faced with a potential trade dispute with the EU over reform of the country's steel 
industry and tariffs on EU steel which supposed to be cut from %9 to %3 in 1998 by 
Poland. According to Smith, (1997, November 28) EU officials feared that Poland 
may not implement the %3 tariff in 1998 and EU officials also warned that an 
unreformed steel industry might create a big obstacle to Poland's entry. On the Polish 
side, Prime Minister suggested that they would solve the problem. Moreover, in 
December 1997, as Walker (1997, December 5) reports, Polish dairy and milk 
exports to Europe were banned by the EU after EU inspectors found major hygiene 
and operational problems in half of Poland's dairies. According to Grodsky (quoted 
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in Francis, 1999: 312), the polish government, argued that the ban was political and 
that competitors notably French could hardly be seen as dispassionate analysts of 
Poland‟s agricultural standards.  
 
3.3.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
The Copenhagen Criteria is the main reservations for European Commissioners. 
For instance, Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Hans Van Den Broek 
(1994, March 17) emphasized the Copenhagean Criteria, as the basis for future 
membership of CEECs to the EU, however, concerning additional conditions for 
membership, he emphasized that  
 It would be counter-productive to support reforms with a view to 
membership in the Union while at the same time erecting new 
barriers. This could only lead to disenchantment with the Union in 
eastern Europe, to the benefit of nationalist and sectarian elements. 
 
The Hans Van Den Broek, reiterated that applicant countries could not relax 
their reform efforts on the assumption that early membership would be guaranteed on 
political grounds and there would be derogations to the acquis communautaire. 
Instead he (1996, October 18) suggested that “new member states will be expected to 
accept the acquis of the Union, that is all the rights and obligations arising from the 
EU treaties and legislations, as a whole, from the date of accession....Partial 
membership is not envisaged by the Treaties and, quite rightly, no one would wish to 
be a second class member.” 
 The deepening of the EU was another reservation which emphasized 
frequently by the Commissioners. To illustrate, concerning the debate between 
widening versus deepening, Bruce Millan (1994, June 6) was in the side of 
deepening: 
126 
 
 The long-term aim is of course that Poland should join the European 
Union, but neither Poland nor the Union is in a position to take this 
step in the near future.  On the Union side we need to devise 
institutional arrangements which will allow decision-making to 
remain both effective and democratically controlled before we can 
contemplate further enlargement. 
 
Similarly, Sir Leon Brittan (1994, November 23) suggested that “In the 
Union we must review our own policies and structures to see where they need to be 
adapted to allow accession to take place.” 
In the second half of 1994, there was a debate about having an inner circle, a 
hard core of countries which would push forward with integration within the Union. 
Concerning this debate, Sir Leon Brittan (1994, September 16) underlined that “Any 
model which appears to place the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in a separate 
core, lane or speed must be avoided.” However, he also mentioned that some 
variability related to policies and actions could be held within the member states like 
the British opt-out from EMU and he offered to have flexibility, namely “variable 
geometry” in some policy areas in a European Union which would further be 
enlarged to the CEECs. 
 
3.3.2. Attitudes of Member States towards Poland 
 
3.3.2.1 Germany 
Germany, in this period, became the main driver of the enlargement of the EU 
but her emphasis was on a two tiered enlargement in which Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic would be in the first wave. 
Germany had used all the occasions to show her support to CEECs. For 
example, in Germany‟s rotating presidency which began in July 1994, Helmut Kohl 
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(quoted in “Germany Wants”, 1994, July 19) suggested a proposal of inviting leaders 
of four Eastern European countries to EU summits. Moreover, Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Wolf, 1994, July 19) also emphasized that improving links 
with Eastern Europe is a key aim of Germany's EU presidency. In October 1994, as it 
is reported (“German Plan”, 1994, October 5), Germany also put forward a paper to 
set up joint meetings, like EU‟s Council of Minister meetings, between EU ministers 
and their counterparts in six CEECs including Poland but five EU states, including 
France, Spain and Belgium, objected to regular meetings, and they said that it must 
be made clear that no decisions can be made at them. In addition, Kohl (quoted in 
“Kohl Links”, 1995, July 2) also underlined that  
I am an advocate of the thesis that Poland should join the EU as 
quickly as possible. About when exactly this will happen, Poland must 
itself decide. The Poles themselves must say we are ready, we want to 
be in the Union. 
 
Furthermore, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Says”, 1995, July 8) also declared a 
timetable for the Polish accession to the EU by stressing that “I believe the major 
progress that Poland has made allows us to assume that Polish accession will take 
place by the end of this decade -- the 1990s.” 
One of the reasons behind German support was security interests. For 
instance, Kohl (quoted in Streel, 1994, January 14) emphasized that “the deepening 
and simultaneous expansion of the European Union are decisive for securing peace 
and freedom.” Moreover, Kohl (quoted in “EU Must”, 1994, January 27) also 
suggested that it would be intolerable if Germany's border with Poland remained the 
European Union's eastern frontier and underlined that “Such a frontier would have 
catastrophic consequences.” Furthermore, in his visit to Poland in July 1995, 
pledging support for Polish entry to the EU and NATO, Kohl (quoted in Barker, 
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1995, July 7) who wanted to draw Poland firmly into the group of stable prosperous 
European states, emphasized that “This is in the well-considered interests of 
Germany.” In addition to this, Walesa and Kohl were (quoted in “Germany Kohl”, 
1995, July 7) suggested to agree that Poles and Germans could give Europe “peace, 
tranquility and prosperity.” Likewise Kohl (quoted in Jasser, 1995, July 9) 
highlighted that “Germany's benefit from Poland's entry into the European Union 
would be the strengthening of peace.” Before the Madrid European Council, Kohl  
(Barber, 1995, December 14) who thought that the first political priority for the EU 
should be to stabilize Germany‟s eastern borders, suggested to have the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary in the first wave of next round of enlargement. 
 Ideational argument such as Europeanness of Poland was also used by 
Germany in her support to Polish accession process. For example, Kohl (quoted in 
“Germany‟s Kohl”, 1995, July 6),  highlighted that Poland and Germany were a part 
of Europe and as Brzezinski (1995, July 7) reports, Poland needed Europe, but 
Europe also needed Poland, without Poland, Europe would be incomplete. Likewise, 
Kohl (quoted in “EU Decision”, 1995, December 7) underlined that “Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, to name just some, are just as much a part of 
Europe and embody its culture just as much as France or Italy, Germany or Spain.” 
Besides, German president Roman Herzog (quoted in “Herzog Assures”, 1996, 
January 9) stated that “In our view, Poland's return to Europe should be secured by 
your country becoming a full member of the European Union and NATO as soon as 
possible.” Ideational argument of overcoming the division of Europe, was used by 
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Clayton, 1994, October 31) in the 
joint committee meeting of foreign ministers of eastern European states: “We must 
bring Europe together.” Moreover, special responsibility of Germany was 
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emphasized as well. For example, Kinkel (quoted in “Kinkel Says”, 1997, December 
14) was underlined to suggest that Germany had a historical duty to promote the 
efforts of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia to gain entry 
to the EU and it would play the role of advocate in membership negotiations. 
 Germany, in this period became the real driver of Poland‟s European 
aspirations. In German support, security interest was emphasized together with the 
ideational arguments of responsibility of Germany in overcoming the division of 
Europe. 
 
3.3.2.2 France 
The French attitude towards Poland can be analyzed with respect to the two 
different presidents because there was a significant difference of support between 
Mitterrand‟s presidency and Chirac‟s presidency.  
In Mitterrand‟s period, only support for Poland‟s European bid was showed by 
French Prime Minister Balladur in his visit to Poland. He (quoted “Balladur 
Supports, 1994, July 5) suggested that France wanted “to welcome Poland within the 
European Union as soon as possible." On the other hand, the concern for the change 
of EU‟s center of gravity was the main French reservation for enlargement in 
Mitterrand‟s period. For instance, in November 1994, a game plan for eventually 
bringing Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia into 
the EU and giving aid for their preparation was agreed in a meeting of EU foreign 
ministers. However, France and Spain were worried that the move towards Eastern 
Europe would shift the bloc‟s centre of gravity too away from them and they offered 
some proposals, which suggested holding a conference to discuss a similar program 
of aid and closer relations for future relations with the countries of the Mediterranean 
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region. As French Foreign Minister Allain Juppe (quoted in Gaunt, 1994, November 
28) stated, “We simply want there to be balance with the Mediterranean.” German 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Goldsmith, 1994, November 1), on the 
other hand, responded to the criticisms that EU was focusing too much on Central 
and Eastern Europe by stating that the EU was “taking particular care to ensure a 
balanced approach” to the Mediterranean region. 
 
After Jacques Chirac was elected as president of France, the emphasis on 
French support for Polish accession to EU and NATO increased.  Regarding 
membership, French President Chirac (quoted in “Paris Reassures”, 1995, 
November 21) underlined that “you can be sure that in this great undertaking, 
your country can count on France's friendly support.” Moreover, in Chirac‟s visit 
to Poland, Chirac was quoted (Barker, 1996, September 12) to express  
  The hope that in three or four years Poland will be a member of the 
European Union… and this will require efforts by all involved…We 
will do everything in our power for Poland's entry into the European 
Union to take place as fast as possible and on the best possible terms. 
 
Furthermore, while speaking to a joint session of Polish parliament‟s chambers, 
Chirac (quoted in “France‟s Chirac”, 1996, September 12) also suggested that “I 
desire that, in the year 2000, Poland will join our Union” With respect to the date 
2000, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (quoted in “French Polish”, 1997, 
November 6) suggested that “it will be an excellent stimulant for EU and Polish 
negotiators to settle problems arising in the talks and conclude them as fast as 
possible.” 
 Kinship based arguments used by Chirac in his support for Polish accession 
to EU and NATO. For instance, he (quoted in Bobinski and Owen, 1996, September 
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13) underlined that, after the enlargement, “Poland will be France‟s natural partner, 
its sister in the east.” 
 The main reservation of France in Eastern enlargement was protecting her 
farmers economically and she objected to the proposals for changing CAP and cuts 
in subsidies. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (McEvoy, 1997, July 22) 
underlined that “We want to make sure that that European agriculture can continue to 
export and that our farmers' incomes are ensured.” On the other hand, with respect to 
the Polish integration to the CAP, France asked for changes in the CAP or 
derogations for Poland in order Poland not to benefit from CAP. For example, the 
French agriculture minister Philippe Vasseur (quoted in “France To”, 1996, 
September 27) suggested that France would support Poland to participate in the EU's 
CAP, but noted that the CAP would have to evolve to allow for new members. 
Moreover, it was underlined (“Cimoszewicz's Second”, 1997, January 31) that in 
French opinion Polish agriculture would have to remain under special EU 
supervision for at least ten years, during which time the problems of Poland's 
agricultural surpluses would have to be solved and its agriculture adjusted to EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
Another political reservation for France was the need for reform of 
institutional structure of the EU, namely deepening, before widening. For instance, in 
September 1996, Chirac (quoted in “France‟s Chirac”, 1996, September 12) was 
emphasized to state that before admitting new members, the EU should first 
consolidate its monetary and foreign policies to become stronger. Likewise, in 
October 1997, France, Italy and Belgium (“World News”, 1997, October 25) issued a 
formal warning that they would halt the admission of any new member states until 
the EU decision-making structures are reorganized. Moreover, Chirac (“Spain-
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France”, 1997, December 2) underlined that “We must be brave enough to reform 
EU structures before new countries are admitted into the union.” 
Therefore, in Mitterrand‟s period, France continued to be a brakeman by 
underlining the political reservation of concern for shift of balance towards 
Germany. However, brakeman position of France changed with President Chirac. 
Despite the political reservations of priority of deepening and economic reservation 
of opposition to reforms of CAP, French support overweighed the reservations and 
France became a driver of Poland‟s European aspirations. 
 
3.3.2.3 Great Britain 
Great Britain continued to be the main driver of Polish bid to the EU and 
enlargement in general. For instance, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd 
(quoted in “Hurd Tells”, 1995, April 12) reiterated that “We in Great Britain are 
convinced that Poland will join as a full member of NATO and the European Union, 
that these are irresistible processes.”  Likewise, in December 1997, Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook was suggested (“Brittan Wants”, 1997, 1 December) to emphasize that 
“As a friend and partner of Poland we will strive to do everything for you to join us 
at the Brussels table as quickly as possible.” 
Unlike Germany, Great Britain was in favor of all inclusive approach about 
Eastern enlargement. As Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in Black, 1997, 
November 27) underlined “Great Britain believes that the European Union should be 
open to the whole of Europe” and he also used ideational arguments in clarifying 
British support for enlargement such as overcoming the division of Europe by 
warning that the iron curtain should not be replaced by a velvet one and stated that 
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“Great Britain is determined that the message we send to the second wave of 
applicants should be as positive as the one we send to the first.” 
Great Britain‟s Queen Elizabeth II (quoted in Barker, 1996, March 25) used 
security arguments for explaining British support for enlargement: 
We strongly support the enlargement of the European Union and 
NATO. We welcome your aspirations to join these institutions. There 
is a chance to build a secure, prosperous and undivided Europe, 
sharing values of democracy and freedom. We must not lose this 
historic chance. Poland and Britain must grasp it together as partners. 
According to Schimmelfennig, another reason for British support for 
enlargement is the Europhobia or Euro-skepticism of Great Britain. Barber (1994, 
April 8) underlined that in British opinion, enlargement would loosen the centralized 
administration from Brussels or prevent the formation of a centralized European 
State. 
The main reservation for Great Britain in enlargement was the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the subsidies that would be given to Eastern European 
farmers unless CAP would change. As Great Britain‟s agricultural minister Douglas 
Hogg (quoted in Moskwa, 1995, 5 October) emphasized “CAP is bound to change 
before the next enlargement…The cost of applying the unchanged CAP after the 
accession of the Visegrad Four would be 17 billion pounds sterling (annually).”  
To sum up, in British support, Europhobia was emphasized as well as security 
interest. However, Great Britain also raised concern about the British contributions to 
the CAP. Despite this reservation, Great Britain continued to be the driver of 
Poland‟s European bid.  
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3.3.2.4 Spain 
Unlike Germany which emphasized a two-tiered enlargement, Spain, (“EU‟s 
Van”, 1997, November 11) preferred the idea of a regatta, to start at the same time 
with all ten applicants from Central and Eastern Europe. Spanish support for Polish 
membership was only seen in official visits of state officials to Spain or vice versa.  
For instance, in Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy‟s visit to Madrid, it was 
underlined (“Spain‟s Support”, 1995, September 27) that Spanish Prime Minister 
Felipe Gonzalez affirmed his country's support for Poland's political reforms and its 
bid to join the European Union. Likewise, another Spanish Prime Minister, Jose 
Maria Aznar (quoted in “Jose Maria” 1997, June 9) stated that Poland was one of the 
leading candidates for NATO and in a few years Poland would “become also a 
perfect candidate for the European Union.” 
For Spain, the main reservation for enlargement was the fear of diversion of 
EU‟s funds. Spanish minister for Europe (quoted in Goldsmith, 1994, November 29) 
highlighted Spanish concern by suggesting that “Of course we will have to grant 
more money for the newcomers but not at the expense of the current member states.” 
Like France, the concern for the change of EU‟s center of gravity towards Eastern 
Europe was another Spanish reservation for enlargement. For instance, in 1994, 
Spain offered some proposals including aid and closer relations for future relations 
with the countries of the Mediterranean region. In July 1995, in her presidency, 
Spain (Lazar, 1995, July 14) offered sun-belt strategy which aimed to preserve and 
promote political stability in the Mediterranean by means of EU aid flows. However, 
it could also be argued that the reason behind this proposal was to shift EU‟s focus 
from Eastern Europe to Mediterranean region. 
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In April 1997, there was a clash between Spain and Poland about the VAT 
rate, 22 percent, that Poland charged for citrus fruits. Spain took the issue to the EU 
and the EU pressured on Poland to decrease the rate, however, Poland (“No 
Progress”, 1997, April 21) would expect the EU to make it easy for accession of 
Polish agricultural products to the EU in exchange for the reduction of the VAT rate. 
Moreover, If Polish side would not compromise to lower the VAT rate to 7 percent, 
Spain was argued to threaten to block the Poland-EU Association Council scheduled 
for April 30, nevertheless, Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz (quoted in 
Cimoszewicz Rosati”, 1997, April 25) criticized that “The threat to block the 
Association Council meeting in Luxembourg is a rather controversial way of dealing 
with the problem” and emphasized that the controversy between Poland and Spain 
should not be used to threaten dialogue between Poland and the EU. In the end of 
April, Poland bowed to pressures from the EU and decreased the VAT to 7 percent, 
as demanded by Spain and the Association Council was held as agreed. Nonetheless, 
Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (quoted in “Polish Premier”, 1997, April 
29) complained that “Unfortunately, some countries of the Union are playing on their 
advantage from this situation….The Spanish put forward demands concerning tax on 
imported citrus in a form that is hard to accept.” 
 
Therefore, Poland‟s accession to the EU challenged the economic interest of 
Spain with respect to agricultural products and EU funds together with the political 
reservation of concern for shift of balance towards Germany. So, Spain continued to 
be a brakeman of Poland‟s European aspirations. 
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3.4 Accession Negotiations 
 
3.4.1 The EU-Poland Relations 
3.4.1.1 The Process of Accession Negotiations 
In the beginning of 1998, some part of the Polish society, who blamed the EU 
for their social hardships started to have demonstrations. For instance, it is reported 
(Bowdler quoted in Francis, 1999: 313) that in February 1998, two thousands 
farmers rallied through Warsaw declaring that Poland‟s accession to the EU would 
take place “over their bodies”.  Francis (1999:313) stated that in March 1998, 
employees of the insolvent Tractor Factory burned the EU‟s blue and gold flag in 
order to show where they thought the blame lay. Poland appointed Jan Kulakowski, a 
68-year-old lawyer and former secretary general of the International Labour 
Organisation, as its chief negotiator with the European Union. Accession process of 
Poland was formally launched on 31 March 1998 and screening process began on 3 
April 1998.  In May, Poland presented the first version of a National Programme for 
the Adoption of the Acquis.   
In the presidency conclusion of the Cardiff European Council that took place 
in June 1998, it is suggested that the Union‟s priority was to maintain the 
enlargement process for the countries covered in the Luxembourg European Council 
conclusions. Moreover, it is also underlined that much would depend on the efforts 
made by the candidate countries themselves to meet the criteria. The progress report 
of the Commission that was released in the end of 1998, (European Commission, 
1998) suggested that Poland continued to fulfill Copenhagen Criteria, it should be 
well able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in 
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the medium term; however, it was criticized that there were still gaps in institutional 
areas.  
 In order to enlarge the EU, the institutional issues which had not been settled 
in Amsterdam had to be resolved. The Cologne European Council of June 1999 and 
the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 emphasized the need for an 
intergovernmental conference to resolve the institutional problems. Following the 
opinion of the Commission, „Adapting the institutions to make a success of 
enlargement‟ that was released on 26 January 2000; the intergovernmental 
conference was opened on 14 February 2000 and resulted with the Treaty of Nice.  In 
the Nice European Council of December 2000, the Treaty of Nice amending the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities was 
agreed by heads of states or governments. The main aim of the Treaty was preparing 
the EU for enlargement by revising the Treaties in four key areas such as size and 
composition of the Commission; weighting of votes in the Council; extension of 
qualified-majority voting and enhanced cooperation. The Treaty was signed on 26 
February 2001. 
 In the negotiations towards the Nice Treaty, the French Presidency offered 
that in the future Poland would have 26 votes in the EU council of ministers as 
opposed to 28 votes of Spain. However, it is reported (“Poland Unhappy”, 2000, 
December 9) that Poland criticized this proposal by suggesting that Poland had the 
same demographic potential as Spain and did not accept being treated differently. As 
a result of support of other member states, Poland and Spain got 27 votes each.  
Despite the fact that Irish voters rejected the Nice Treaty in a referendum by 54-46 
percent in June 2001, in the Gothenburg European Council of June, the commitment 
to enlarge the EU in 2004 was reaffirmed. 
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In the parliamentary elections that took place in September 2001, the center 
left alliance formed by Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union won a land slide 
victory by getting %41 of votes. On 19 October 2001, Leszek Miller, leader of 
Democratic Left Alliance was appointed by President Aleksander Kwasniewski to 
form the government. The new government won the vote of confidence on 26 
October 2001.  
In 13 November 2001, the Commission released the document named 
„Making a Success of Enlargement‟ in which Poland, together with the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta 
were labeled as the countries that would be  ready for membership  in 2004.  
For Poland, there were sensitive issues such as sale of Polish land to 
foreigners, free movement of Polish workers immediately after the enlargement, the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the share of EU funds that would be given to 
Poland in the accession negotiations. For the free movement of Polish workers, 
Germany and Austria demanded transition periods up to seven years. Due to fear of 
being a late comer in enlargement, in November, Poland‟s new government agreed to 
give some concessions such as scaling back to 12 years from 18 for the transition 
period of land sales and a two year transition periods for free movement of Polish 
workers.  Poland's chief EU integrator Danuta Hubner (quoted in “Polish Govt”, 
2001, December 10) suggested that 
We expect political closure on these two issues by the end of the year. 
We need to clear the table of these two emotionally and politically 
loaded issues, since next year we want to pursue our key demands in 
chapters of regional policy, budget and agriculture. 
In the Laeken European Council of December 2001, in line with the 
Commission opinion, it was declared that ten countries would be ready to join the 
EU. In 24 December 2001, Poland completed the chapter of its EU accession 
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negotiations concerning free labor flow between member states. It is reported (“Free 
Labour”, 2001, December 24) that  Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark gave 
up all limitations upon the day of Poland's accession to the Union, Spain, Great 
Britain and France promised to liberalize the employment procedures for Poles 2 
years after enlargement whereas for Germany and Austria, transition period was 7 
years. 
In the end of January 2002, the European Commission published 
recommendations that farmers from candidate countries could receive direct 
payments worth only 25 percent of what farmers in current member states obtained 
in the first year after enlargement which would rise to 100 percent over 10 years. The 
offer provoked angry reaction in candidate countries, but some EU states who 
wanted to reform farm policy say it was too generous. Polish Agriculture Minister 
Jaroslaw Kalinowski (quoted in Lein, 2002, January 29) reacted to the Commission 
proposal by suggesting that “The issue is to guarantee equal partnership conditions to 
Polish agriculture…If there aren't (equal conditions), our farmers will of course vote 
against Poland's membership in the referendum.” 
 The farm subsidy issue continued throughout the 2002. In the last quarter of 
2002, Germany and France could not find a solution to the issue of CAP reform. 
Germany demanded to cut her contribution to the farm subsidies but France tried to 
retain them. Moreover, France also saw Poland as an ally in the CAP reform issue. 
The row between Germany and France was criticized by other member states for 
delaying enlargement. For instance, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen (quoted in 
Jones, 2002, October 22) underlined that “France and Germany know better than any 
of us how important it is for us to reach a compromise which is necessary for the 
enlargement process”. Moreover, Poland‟s chief coordinator for EU accession 
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Danuta Hubner (quoted in Newman, 2002, October 23) suggested that “A delay will 
mean we can't stick to the road map for EU accession by 2004, or at the very least 
serious problems in negotiating a farm package without knowing the basic elements 
of EU‟s offer.” In 24 October 2002, Germany and France agreed on EU farm reform.  
In November 2002, Irish voters approved the ratification of Nice Treaty and pawed 
the way for enlargement. Before the Copenhagen European Council, farm minister, 
Jaroslaw Kalinowski (quoted in Grice and Castle, 2002, December 12) warned that 
  You cannot describe recent relations between Poland and the EU as 
negotiations. I think the Commission is trying to force Poland to 
surrender totally to its demands. I gave the [Polish] cabinet certain 
negotiating minimums. If they are breached I will have to say `no' to 
European integration. 
 
 In 14 December 2002, the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen   
(quoted in Staunton, 2002, December 13) notified Poland that the EU was prepared 
to go ahead with enlargement without Poland unless a deal was reached and this 
week could delay Poland's entry to the EU by years. Finally, financial compromise 
was reached in December 14. This compromise led to the way to completion of EU‟s 
bigger enlargement which took place in May 1, 2004. 
In 9 April 2003, as Brand (2003, April 9) reports,  the European Union's 
Parliament endorsed the bloc's historic expansion eastward by separate votes for each 
of the 10 acceding nations scheduled for May 1, 2004. On 16 April 2003, the 
Accession Treaty was signed by 10 new members.  McEvoy (2003, June 8) states 
that in the referendum for EU accession in June 6-7, the Polish people said yes to 
join the EU with 81.7 percent voting in favor. Finally, in May 1, 2004, Poland 
became a member of the EU together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. 
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3.4.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
With the launch of accession negotiations, it is seen that ideational arguments 
such as unification of European continent and moral duty are observed. For instance, 
Commissioner Franz Fischler (1998, June 5) underlined that “Following the 
completion of the internal market, the launching monetary union and the recent 
revisions of the European treaty, the Council has opened the path to a peaceful 
unification of our continent.” Moreover, Mario Monti (1999, May 18) underlined 
that “On the political front, we have a clear duty to cement and underpin the new 
democracies of Eastern Europe.” 
Security interest in peace and stability of the continent is also underlined. 
Considering enlargement, Hans Van Den Broek (1998, October 13) suggested that 
“It is an investment in peace, stability and prosperity for the people of the whole 
European continent and beyond.” Moreover, Franz Fischler (1998, October 15) 
underlined that “For the Union of the Fifteen, the benefits will also be enormous, not 
only in terms of prosperity within a growing internal market, but also in terms of 
stability and security.” 
The need of institutional reform is one of the reservations that are expressed 
by the Commissioners. Romano Prodi (2000, October 12) underlined that “The 
reforms I have just described are simply the minimum changes necessary - and I 
repeat necessary - before enlargement, to ensure that enlargement does not 
irreversibly undermine the European Union's ability to act.” Similarly, Anna 
Diamantopoulou (2001, January 9) suggested that “The most important thing it 
demands is that we make sure that European institutions are ready to welcome the 
new members, in a way that means the Union can function efficiently. For 
enlargement to succeed, the IGC must succeed.” 
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Compliance to the Copenhagen Criteria is also evaluated by the 
Commissioners. Although Poland continued to be ahead of others especially with 
respect to economic criteria, considering state aid controls, Han Van Den Broek 
(1998, November 5)  underlined that “Greater progress has been made in adopting 
EU standards and certification rules, although a number of candidates (Poland, 
Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria) have considerable work to accomplish in this 
area.” Franz Fischler (2000, June 8) also emphasized the implementation problem 
and suggested that “accepting the acquis wouldn't be enough. Poland as well as the 
other Candidates will need to incorporate the acquis into its legal order and ensure its 
effective implementation upon accession.” Economic reservations such as agriculture 
are also underlined. Franz Fischler (1999, May 25) pointed out that “Agriculture is 
an extremely sensitive area for most applicant countries.” 
Political interest of EU is also underlined when there is a clash of interest 
between members and candidates. For the controversial free movement of labor 
issue, member states demanded transition periods after the enlargement. On the other 
hand, candidate states wanted to have this freedom immediately after the 
enlargement. It is seen that Commission sided with member states in this issue and in 
the commission proposal, transition periods were envisaged. In this issue Gunter 
Verheugen (2001, September 9) suggested that 
The Commission's job is to defend the interests of the entire Union. It 
is in the interests of the entire Union that no Member State should 
bear more than it can bear. In its proposals the Commission also has to 
take account of what would not be bearable for the candidate countries 
and future member states. 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
3.4.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Poland 
3.4.2.1 Germany 
This period of Germany can be analyzed with respect to two chancellors. 
Chancellor Kohl continued to be the main supporter of Polish European aspirations. 
In February 1998, Kohl (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1998, February 21) suggested that 
“We want Poland in the EU as quickly as possible.” However, Social Democrat 
Gerard Schroder was blamed to be not as enthusiastic as Chancellor Kohl. The main 
issue was high unemployment in Schroeder‟s election campaign and he declared his 
reservations towards movement of Polish workers before elections. After becoming 
chancellor in October 1998, he (quoted in Taylor, 1998, December 1), suggested that 
Germany would not be in a hurry for enlargement and underlined that “We do not 
think we can say now with any degree of precision when this process will be 
completed.” 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, however, had more conciliatory 
tone towards Poland. In order to soothe Polish fears about its entry into the European 
Union, he (quoted in “German Foreign”, 1999, January 6) suggested that “there was 
no alternative to enlarging the European Union to include former Warsaw Pact 
countries and that not doing so would be a historical failure of Europe.” Moreover, 
he (quoted in “Germany Poland”, 1999, August 31) underlined that “Political, 
economic and cultural relations between the two countries are closer than ever 
before.” Considering accession date, he (quoted in “German Foreign”, 2000, 
September 4) stated that “I hope that the first group, including Poland, will join the 
EU at the beginning of 2005 at the latest...But it is still possible that it will take place 
earlier than that.” 
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After the formation of new Polish government in October 2001, Schroeder 
(quoted in Moulson, 2001, October 24) underlined that “We can't imagine (EU) 
expansion without Poland in the first wave… We agree that we still have a tough 
road ahead of us, but we're optimistic that the new government can bring a new 
dynamic to the negotiations so that the goal can be reached.” Similarly, Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in Busvine, 2001, November 8) suggested that “We 
cannot imagine that enlargement can take place without Poland.” In June 2002, 
Schroeder (quoted in (“EU Must”, 2002, June 19) tried to soothe Polish fears about 
enlargement: 
We are certain that enlargement negotiations will end on schedule and 
Poland will be a member of the European Union before the 2004 
European parliamentary elections…We are against any delays. Poland 
can count on us in support of this deadline. 
Security interest in having close relations with Poland is underlined in the 
support releases. Schroeder (quoted in Tanner, 2001, August 14) suggested that “We 
have a chance to make a continent which survived such bloody wars over the past 
century into a place of long-term peace and prosperity.” On the other hand, ideational 
factors are emphasized as well. For instance, in May 2000 German Chancellor 
Schroeder (quoted in “Gniezno Summit”, 2000, May 2) suggested that the EU's 
enlargement was a historical commitment and an act of solidarity with the Visegrad 
countries. Moreover, Fischer (quoted in “Germany‟s Fischer) underlined that 
Germany had a historical obligation to make sure neighboring Poland was one of 
acceding countries. Furthermore, before the Nice Summit, Schroeder (quoted in 
Lein, 2000, December 6) pointed out that “Think of Europe, the nations of central 
and eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states. We must succeed in the 
historical task of constructing a united Europe.” German politicians also emphasize 
economic interest in their support. Schroeder (quoted in “Polish German”, 2002, 
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June 19) suggested that “Germany is dependent on exports. We need new markets. 
We want the candidate countries to develop because in the future they will be 
purchasing goods made in Germany.” 
The main reservation for Germany is fear of Polish workers pouring into 
German labor market. Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Says” 1998, June 17), even 
before his chancellorship, declared that there should be a transition period, after 
Poland joined the European Union, before Polish workers could freely seek jobs in 
Germany. Moreover, Gunter Verheugen (quoted in “German Foreign”, 1998, 
October 29),  minister of State in the German Foreign ministry suggested that Poland 
and EU countries should agree on long transitional periods before allowing for a 
completely free flow of work forces between them due to the large salary differences 
between Poland and EU countries. However, Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek 
(quoted in “German Foreign”, 1998, October 29) stressed that German society had 
no reason to fear that EU‟s enlargement would cause an inflow of Polish workers on 
the German market. Likewise, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski (quoted in 
“Polish President”, 1998, November 18) underlined that “We are not interested in the 
outflow of qualified labor force from Poland.” In June 2001, Schroeder underlined 
the fear of cheap labor among the people living in the borders but Prime Minister 
Jerzy Buzek (quoted in “German Polish”, 2001, June 19) responded that “I can 
understand these fears on the German side...Though I don't share them, I respect 
them. But I expect our viewpoints will converge over time.” 
 Another economic reservation for Germany is her budget contribution 
especially related to the CAP subsidies. Schroeder (quoted in “German Chancellor”, 
2002, June 18) suggested that “at present the union could not afford to subsidize the 
countries that were joining the community and other countries of the union had to 
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give up some of their agricultural subsidies which would let the new countries get at 
least such subsidies as will ensure that on entering the European Union they did not 
become net contributors.” Similarly, he (quoted in “EU Must”, 2002, June 19) 
pointed out that “The EU is based on rules and ideals of solidarity…This means rich 
countries share with poorer ones and this is why subsidies were created…It is also 
why current beneficiaries of CAP should share with applicant countries.” Moreover, 
about the CAP reform, he (quoted in “Schroeder Says”, 2002, July 20) also reminded 
that “We have always supported Poland's wish to join…This question is not a 
question between Poland and Germany.” In October 2002, a compromise was found 
between France and Germany about farm subsidies. It was agreed to open up farm 
subsidies to new EU member states beginning in 2004. Moreover, European leaders 
reached an agreement to provide another billion Euros to Poland over three years in 
order to clinch a deal on its EU membership. Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Says”, 
2002, December 13) underlined that “We believe we have found the way to resolve 
the problem and achieve a breakthrough with Poland.” 
 Consequently, free movement of Polish workers and German contributions to 
the EU budget challenged German economic interest. So, as opposed to the literature, 
it is seen that Germany was not the driver of Polish European aspirations in the 
chancellorship of Gerard Schroeder. 
 
3.4.2.2 France 
This period is marked with French support for Poland especially in the 
primary releases.  For instance, Jacques Chirac (quoted in Bobinski, 1999, July 16) 
showed his support for Poland by suggesting that the 15 member states of the EU 
wanted Poland to join as soon as possible and added that the EU should aim to allow 
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Poland to join in 2000. Likewise, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (quoted in 
“French Prime”, 1999, July 16) reiterated that “France expects Poland's speed 
accession.” As a response to the criticisms that France did not want a speedy 
accession, French Minister for European Affairs Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “France 
Wants”, 2000, August 2) suggested that “France loves Poland, France has interests in 
Poland, France wants Poland to join the European Union soon.” Moreover, Chirac 
(quoted in “France Assures”, 2000, September 19) underlined that “Generally, our 
friendship rests on an old basis….and which leads France during its presidency to do 
everything to support the accession of Poland according to the terms it desires.” 
In the secondary releases, however, reservations dominated. France, in 1998, 
was reported to slow down enlargement due to her request from the Commission 
about full political assessment of enlargement negotiations. One Commissioner 
(quoted in Peel, 1998, September 30) criticized French move by suggesting that “The 
French want to use this document to say it would not be very smart to go ahead with 
the next phase.” 
Agricultural sector in Poland is the one of the reservations for France but 
French politicians denied this reservation. For example, about the allegations that 
France did not want Poland in the CAP, French European Affairs Minister Pierre 
Moscovici (quoted in “French Min”, 2000, June 12) suggested that “I'd like to dispel 
all doubts: We won't oppose Poland's membership because of conflicts in 
agriculture...Just the opposite, because Poland is a big agricultural country we want it 
to join the E.U. as soon as possible.” However, French Finance Minister Laurant 
Fabius (quoted in Busvive, 2001, June 1) warned that “Poland's bloated agricultural 
sector may not be ready to face the music in the EU's single market.” Moreover, 
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (quoted in Jones, 2002, February 10) 
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underlined that “We are open on the question of allocating direct payments (to 
farmers from the new member states), but we have a problem with the level of 
structural funds.” On the other hand, during a visit in Poland, Pierre Moscovici, 
France's Minister for European Affairs (quoted in “France Seeks”, 2002, February 
15) underlined that “It cannot be that we conduct a brutal CAP reform and only then 
enlarge the European Union” and added that France and Poland would be the two 
biggest agricultural states in an enlarged EU and as such had a mutual interest in the 
future development of policy.” Considering the German proposal to reform CAP 
before enlargement, President Chirac (quoted in “France Germany”, 2002, October 
22) suggested that France would not “call into doubt the common agricultural policy 
before 2006.”After meeting with President Chirac and heard about French offer to 
give extra cash for Polish farmers, President Kwasniewski (quoted in Grajewski and 
Taylor, 2002, December 3) underlined that “On the one hand, he wants there to be 
mechanisms within the EU supporting agriculture. On the other, he is perfectly aware 
that Polish agriculture is in competition with French farming.” 
Before the Nice Summit, French presidency proposed that in the future 
Poland would have 26 votes in the EU council of ministers as opposed to 28 votes of 
Spain, however, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Minister for European integration, was 
quoted (“Poland Unhappy”, 2000, December 9) to suggest that “Poland has the same 
demographic potential as Spain and cannot accept being treated differently.” 
Deepening of the Community, namely institutional reform, before 
enlargement is emphasized as a political reservation. For example, France‟s Minister 
for European Affairs (quoted in “French Minister”, 1999, February 9) underlined that 
the European Union must complete its internal reforms before aspiring members 
such as Poland can join up. 
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 Dispute over Iraq, especially allegation of siding with the US, is another 
reservation for France. At an emergency European Union summit on Iraq held in 
Brussels, Chirac (quoted in “EU Candidates”, 2003, February 18) advised the 
candidates that “They should have kept quiet…They are on the one hand not very 
well brought up and a bit unaware of the dangers that a too-rapid alignment with the 
American position could bring with it.” Moreover, French Defence Minister Michele 
Alliot- Marie ( quoted in “France Warns”, 2003, February 18) warned that “the entry 
into the EU has to be ratified…In the interest of these countries themselves I say take 
care that there will not be a reaction from citizens, saying these countries do not want 
peace inside the European family.” Poland's deputy foreign minister Adam Rotfeld 
(quoted in “Poland Rejects”, 2003, February 18) responded that                                            
If it is believed that accepting new members is a great gesture on their 
part toward us, like Chirac said yesterday... then it is a great 
misunderstanding…We believe our entry into European Union is a 
great chance for us, but also a chance for the European 
Union…Poland and other countries have the right to decide what is 
good for them, and France should respect it. 
 Therefore, although France supported Polish European aspirations in the 
primary press releases, it is observed that in the secondary releases, reservations were 
highlighted.  In this period, deepening of the EU, the reform of the CAP, competition 
in agriculture and Iraq war became the main reservations for France.  
 
3.4.2.3 Great Britain 
Britain continued to support Polish European relations in this period. Prime 
Minister Tony Blair (quoted in “Blair Arrives”, 2000, October 5) suggested that “I 
want Britain to be a champion of enlargement...to include countries like Poland was 
a vital part of the EU's future.” Moreover, as he (quoted in “Britain Wants”, 2000, 
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October 6) underlined, “Poland should join the European Union as soon as it is ready 
to join.” Considering negotiations, Blair (quoted in “British PM”, 2002, November 
16) suggested that “I think that Poland will attain the best possible terms with the 
European Union...Britain remains absolutely committed to the entry of Poland in the 
European Union.” Moreover, he (quoted in “British Prime”, 2002, November 15) 
added that “The whole purpose of the negotiations is to make sure that no accession 
country is worse off as a result of the negotiation.” 
Political interest in widening before deepening is constantly highlighted in the 
speeches. As one British diplomat (quoted in Rice-Oxley, 2000, October 5) 
suggested “They seem to want deepening before widening, and we want widening 
before deepening Britain is keen to style itself as the gateway into Europe for these 
countries.” 
Political interest in being opposed to federal Europe, namely Europhobia, is 
emphasized as well. As Tony Blair (quoted in “Polish Premier”, 2001, November 2) 
pointed out “Both Britain and Poland believe in a Europe that moves closer together 
but does so firmly anchored in the nation and our nationhood of which we are 
proud.” Security interest is also underlined in the speeches. Tony Blair (quoted in 
Hamilton, 1998, March 12) underlined that “The whole objective...is creating a 
Europe which is stable, peaceful, secure and prosperous.” Similarly, he (quoted in 
Rice-Oxley, 2000, October 6) underlined that  
Nobody who considers that the EU has underpinned peace and 
democracy in the reconstruction of postwar Western Europe can doubt 
the benefits that enlargement will bring post-Cold War Western 
Europe and the Balkans… Without enlargement, western Europe will 
always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass 
migration on its borders. 
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British politicians also used ideational arguments such as overcoming the 
division of Europe in their speeches. For instance, Britain's Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook (quoted in “EU Begins”, 1998, 31 March) underlined that “We are finally 
overcoming the cruel and unnatural division of our continent.” 
One of the reservations for Great Britain in this period was Poland‟s 
compliance with the EU acquis. For instance, Robin Cook (quoted in “Geremek In”, 
1998, April 1) suggested that Poland would become a European Union member only 
after it agreed to accept the whole of the EU legislation and applied it in its legal 
practice. Another reservation for Great Britain was the need for CAP reform.  As 
Grajewski (2002, February 11) reports, Britain, together with Germany and the 
Netherlands, wanted to reach an agreement on reforming the EU‟s costly CAP before 
enlargement. 
To sum up, Britain continued to be the driver of the Polish European 
aspirations in this period as stated in the literature despite the reservations of the 
reform of the CAP and compliance of the acquis. 
 
3.4.2.4 Spain 
Spanish reservations toward Poland‟s accession continued in this period. 
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, in his visit to Poland, signed a joint 
declaration on „Spain's support for Polish membership and on intensifying political 
and economic ties‟ with Prime Minister Buzek and Aznar (quoted in “Spain 
Supports”, 1998, January 20) warned that negotiations with the EU would be long 
and difficult but concerning the EU negotiations he suggested that they could make a 
direct use of Spain‟s experiences and  he  gave the assurance that Spain would take 
on its share of the responsibilities resulting from the enlargement of the union. 
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Moreover, in Buzek‟s visit to Spain in September 1999, Aznar (quoted in “Polish 
PM”, 1999, September 19) reiterated that “Spain's desire is that Poland, which is 
already a NATO member, joins the EU as soon as possible…we have worked 
intensely to achieve it and we will continue to do it.” In addition, when France, at the 
EU summit in Nice proposed that Poland should have 26 votes in the future EU 
Council of Ministers than Spain having 28 votes, which had a population the same 
size, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (quoted in “Spain Germany”, 2000, 
December 9) called Prime Minister Buzek and made sure that “Spain had nothing 
against having the same number of votes as Poland in an enlarged EU.” 
 The main reservation for Spain, like the other periods, was the fear of losing 
funds from the EU as a result of enlargement. For instance, at an EU foreign 
ministers meeting, Prime Minister Jose-Maria Aznar was suggested to threaten to 
ruin the entry talks with Eastern European nations unless he got a guarantee that aid 
for Spain would not be cut and Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique (quoted in 
“Cheap Labor”, 2001, May 5) emphasized that “We don't want to hinder or slow 
down enlargement but find a position of solidarity.” Spain also sent a memorandum 
to the European Commission explaining its fears and making a direct link between 
the funds issue and the enlargement negotiations, however the Commission's 
enlargement spokesman, Jean-Christophe Filori (quoted in Jones, 2001, May 13) 
underlined that “The concerns of Spain are 100 percent legitimate and we are ready 
to talk about them, but only in an appropriate framework, not in the framework of the 
accession negotiations.” Moreover, as Jones (2001, May 15) reports, Spain, asking 
for guarantees of continued access to EU regional funds after enlargement, did not 
want to compromise on the proposal of Germany and Austria which demanded to 
have a transition period up to seven years after enlargement about free movement of 
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Eastern European workers. Foreign Minister Josep Pique (quoted in “Spain Seeks”, 
2001, May 16) after coming to Warsaw, suggested that Spain wanted to safeguard 
the continuity of regional policy beyond 2007, after which candidates like Poland 
would benefit and underlined that “Don't be mistaken. We, Spain and Poland, 
advocate the same thing.” Likewise, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar (quoted in “Spain 
Wants”, 2001, May 17), who stated that he supported enlargement without any 
reservations emphasized that “We don't wish to block anything. We want the 
political problem to be recognized...I sincerely believe there will be a logical solution 
as in all European Union problems.” 
However, Spain is reported (“End of Spanish”, 2001, May 30) to drop her 
objection and accepted a much flexible proposal on the ban on free movement of 
Eastern European labor which suggested that Poles would be approved to take jobs 
freely in the majority of EU countries two years after accession, and Germany and 
Austria would wait another three years after accepting Poles to their work markets, 
but annulment of the restrictions in the two countries could be postponed for another 
two years. In December 2001, Poland completed the chapter of its EU accession 
negotiations concerning free labor flow between member states and Spain (“Free 
Labor”, 2001, December 24), together with Great Britain and France promised to 
liberalize the employment procedures for Poles 2 years after enlargement. 
Concerning the fear of Spain‟s dragging on her feet on regional funds issue, 
in December 2001 in his visit to Warsaw, Aznar (quoted in “Spain Wows”, 2001, 
December 3)  confirmed that “We will do all we can so that the timeline of European 
Union integration is kept” and he added that regional aid issue would be discussed 
after enlargement by suggesting that “I am sure that if Poland's access to the regional 
aid has a negative impact, there will be a positive solution to this.” 
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After the decision to enlargement of the EU was confirmed in the end of 
2002, Poland and Spain started to become allies in different issues. For instance, in 
the beginning of 2003, it is reported (“Poland and Czech”, 2003, April 3) that 
Poland, together with Spain and Great Britain sided with the US in the Iraq war. 
Moreover, in the Nice Treaty, Poland and Spain was given 27 votes in the European 
Council. However, in the negotiations of the EU Constitution, it was proposed that 
the votes of Spain and Poland should be more proportional to their populations. As 
Eatwell (2003, December 12) states, Poland, together with Spain reacted to this 
proposal and in the Brussels European Council of December 2003, both vetoed the 
European constitution. 
Therefore, the main economic reservation continued to be the fear of sharing 
of EU funds. This economic challenge led Spain, as stated in the literature, remain 
the brakeman of Polish European aspirations.  
 
3.5 General Assessment 
 
3.5.1 Comparison between Different Periods of Each Member 
State 
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3.5.1.1 Germany 
Table 5: Comparison of Different Periods for Germany 
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1988-1989 52 4 0 4 0 0 0% 2 2 50% 
1990-1993 78 41 1 40 0 1 0% 29 11 72% 
1994-1997 147 130 9 121 7 2 78% 94 27 78% 
1998-2004 610 220 8 212 4 4 50% 51 161 24% 
 
 
In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary press releases. In the 
secondary press releases, 50 percent (2 out of 4) support is seen. This support is 
related to improvement of Polish relations with the EU with respect to aid. 
Between 1990 and 1993, there are no primary support releases and only one 
reservation release. This reservation is related to German border issue. 72 percent (29 
out of 40) support is observed in the secondary press releases. 14 out of 29 support 
releases are related to Association Agreement whereas 15 out of 29 support releases 
is related to improvement of Polish relations with the EU. 
 In the period of 1994-1997, 78 percent (7 out of 9) of primary press releases 
and 78 percent (94 out of 121) of secondary releases include support for the 
improvement of relations of Poland with the EU. Therefore, it can be argued that 
there was noteworthy support in the period of Helmut Kohl‟s chancellorship. 
Consequently, the analysis shows that 1994-1997 was the period in which 
Germany‟s support for Polish membership bid was highest. As stated in the 
literature, in this period, Germany is the main driver of Polish European bid. 
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 Between 1998 and 2004, 50 percent (4 out of 8) of primary press releases are 
support press releases. In the same period, 24 percent (51 out of 161) of secondary 
press releases are support press releases.  In that period, the support for Polish bid 
was lowest. This period also coincides with Gerard Schroeder‟s chancellorship, the 
leader of Social Democratic Party of Germany whose main issue was to combat 
unemployment and for this aim, he asked for transition periods for Polish workers to 
work in Germany. Moreover, he had also concerns about the contribution of 
Germany to the costly CAP and he asked for changes in the CAP. 
 Consequently, when all the periods of related to Germany are taken into 
account, the analysis showed that support for Polish bid for EU membership changed 
with different chancellors coming from different parties. Support rate is highest in 
Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl period and lowest in Social Democrat Gerard 
Schroeder period.  Polish accession to the EU, together with other 9 candidates 
became possible after the resolution of the problems related transition period for 
Polish workers and German contribution to the CAP in the way Germany demanded.  
 
Figure 1: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for Germany 
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When the primary and secondary press releases are compared, it is seen that 
in the first two periods, there are no support releases.  It is interesting to note that for 
the last period, the percentage of support in the primary press releases is significantly 
higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases. 
 
Table 6: Germany Primary Press Releases 
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1988-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1990-1993 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
1994-1997 
           
Support 0 1 0 1 3 0 3 3 7 14% 42% 
Reservation 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1998-2004 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 0% 25% 
Reservation 1 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 4 100% 0% 
 
 In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press 
releases that could be obtained. In the period of 1990-1993, there are no primary 
support releases whereas there is only one primary reservation press release. This 
political reservation is about German-Poland dispute about Polish borders.  In the 
period of 1994-1997, 14 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 7) 
indicate material arguments. This press release is about security interest in having 
cooperation with Poland.   
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On the other hand, in 42 percent of primary support releases (3 out of 7) the 
ideational factors and Europeanness of Poland are emphasized.  In the remaining 3 
out of 7 releases, no specific reason is mentioned regarding the support. 100 percent 
of all primary reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are referring to material factors 
referring to political reservations and emphasize institutional reform of the EU before 
widening.  
In the period of 1998-2004, 25 percent of primary support press releases (1 
out of 4) are about ideational arguments. It is emphasized that it was an historical 
obligation of Germany to help Poland in her bid to the EU.  In 3 out of 4 support 
releases, the reason behind the support is not specified.  100 percent of primary 
reservation releases are referring to material factors. 3 out of 4 releases are about 
need for a transition period for Polish workers whereas 1 out of 4 releases is about 
political issue of institutional reform of the EU before widening.   
 Consequently, it is observed that from 1994 to 2004, the number of primary 
support ideational press releases is higher than the number of primary support 
material releases whereas the number of primary support releases indicating material 
factors is higher than the number of primary support releases indicating ideational 
factors for the period of 1990-1993. On the other hand, only material factors are 
observed in reservation press releases. German politicians used ideational arguments 
in four releases among 18 primary press releases. It is also observed that ideational 
factors are used only in the support releases.  
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Table 7: Germany Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   
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1988-1989 
 
Support 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1990-1993 
 
Support 10 3 0 13 0 2 2 14 29 45% 6% 
Reservation 1 0 10 11 0 0 0 0 11 100% 0% 
1994-1997 
 
Support 4 11 2 17 4 2 6 71 94 18% 6% 
Reservation 8 1 16 25 0 0 0 2 27 92% 0% 
1998-2004 
 
Support 7 2 0 9 1 4 5 37 51 17% 9% 
Reservation 8 2 145 155 0 0 0 6 161 96% 0% 
 
 
In the period of 1988-1989, 100 percent of secondary support press releases 
(2 out of 2) refer to material factors. All two releases are related to the EU aid to 
Poland in order to support transition to democracy. In the same period, 100 percent 
of reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are pointing to material factors. German 
economic interest in keeping quotas of steel and agriculture for Poland is underlined.  
Between 1990 and 1993, 45 percent of secondary support press releases (13 
out of 29) refer to material factors. In the 10 out of 13 support releases, political 
interest in Polish transition to democracy and accession to the EU is underlined.  6 
percent of support releases (2 out of 29) refer to ideational factors. In all two 
releases, responsibility of Germany in the unification of Europe is highlighted. On 
the other hand, material factors are emphasized in 100 percent of secondary 
reservation releases (11 out of 11). 1 out of 11 releases is about a political reservation 
of border issue whereas 10 out of 11 releases are about economic reservations. In 
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these releases, sensitive issues for Germany such as agriculture and coal are 
underlined in the negotiations of the Association Agreement.  
Between 1994 and 1997, 18 percent of secondary support press releases (17 
out of 94) include material factors. 4 of these 17 support releases are showing 
political factors where geopolitical significance of Poland and national interest of 
Germany are highlighted. In 11 out of 17 support releases, security interest in 
stabilizing German-Polish border and European stability is underlined whereas in 2 
out of 17, economic interest is pointed out. 6 percent of releases (6 out of 94) is about 
ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Poland and special responsibility in 
the unification of continent are highlighted. According to the analysis, remaining 71 
releases do not include a specific reason. 
In this period, 92 percent of secondary reservation press releases (25 out of 
27) are about material arguments. 8 out of 25 reservation press releases contain 
political reservations such as Copenhagen Criteria and institutional reform of the EU. 
1 out of 25 reservation releases indicate security reservations for tightening Polish 
borders.  16 out of 25 reservation press releases include economic reservations where 
mainly economic cost of Poland to the EU and contribution of Germany to the EU 
budget is specified. Finally, in the remaining 2 releases no reason is specified. 
In the period of 1998-2004, 17 percent of secondary support press releases (9 
out of 51) include material factors. 7 out of 9 releases include political arguments in 
which geopolitical significance of Poland and German interests in Polish accession to 
the EU are underlined. In 2 out of 9 releases, security interest is pointed out.  9 
percent of releases (5 out of 51) include ideational factors. 1 out of 5 support releases 
is about Europeanness of Poland whereas 4 out of 5 releases are about moral duty of 
unification of the continent. In the remaining 37 releases, no reason is mentioned for 
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support. In this period, 96 percent of secondary reservation press releases (155 out of 
161) are about material factors. Among 155 reservation press releases 145 of them 
are about economic interest of Germany having transition periods for Polish workers, 
contribution of Germany to the EU budget and the proposals of Germany for CAP 
reform in order to decrease the amount of farm subsidies. 8 out of 155 releases are 
about political reservation in which institutional reform and elections in Germany 
were underlined. 2 out of 155 releases are about security reservations.   
To sum up, it is observed that in all periods, the number of press releases 
indicating material factors is higher than the number of press releases referring 
ideational factors. Ideational arguments are seen only in 13 press releases among 377 
secondary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used only in 
the support releases. 
 
 
3.5.1.2 France 
Table 8: Comparison of Different Periods for France 
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1988-1989 52 12 3 9 3 0 100% 7 2 77% 
1990-1993 107 98 9 89 3 6 33% 5 84 5% 
1994-1997 87 77 2 75 2 0 100% 32 43 42% 
1998-2004 946 282 11 271 10 1 91% 75 196 28% 
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Between 1988 and 1989, 100 percent support (3 out of 3) is observed in the 
primary press releases. In the secondary press releases, 77 percent (7 out of 9) 
support is seen. This support is mainly due to improvement of Polish relations with 
the EU with respect to aid. 
When the period of 1990-1993 is analyzed, it is seen that 33 percent of (3 out 
of 9) primary releases supports Polish European aspirations whereas 5 percent of (5 
out of 89) secondary releases supports Polish European aspirations. Most of the 
reservation releases are about Polish Association Agreement. This analysis indicates 
that 1990-1993 was the period in which France‟s support for Polish membership bid 
was lowest. As proposed in the literature, in this period, France is one of the 
brakeman of Polish European bid.  
 In the period of 1994-1997, 100 percent (2 out of 2) of primary press releases 
and 42 percent (32 out of 75) of secondary releases are supporting improvement of 
relations of Poland with the EU. All primary support releases are from Jacques 
Chirac‟s presidency. When the Mitterrand and Chirac‟s presidency is compared in 
this period, 16 percent support (4 out of 25) is seen in Mitterrand period where as 56 
percent support (28 out of 50) is observed in Chirac period.
14
 Between 1998 and 
2004, 91 percent (10 out of 11) of primary press releases are support press releases 
and 28 percent (75 out of 271) of secondary press releases are support press releases.   
Therefore, when all the periods of France are compared, it is observed that 
France is one of the drivers of Polish European bid except for the period of 1990-
1993 when the primary support releases are taken into account. However, according 
to secondary releases, there are French reservations towards Poland. Similar to 
Germany, support rate changes with different French governments. 
                                                          
14
 This difference is significant at 99% confidence level (p-value: 0.001129). 
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Figure 2: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for France 
 
Comparison of the primary and secondary press releases shows that, the 
percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than 
percentage of support in the secondary press releases in all periods of the analysis. 
 
Table 9: France Primary Press Releases 
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Support 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3  100%   0% 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -   - 
1990-1993 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 6 100% 0% 
1994-1997 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1998-2004 
           
Support 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 7 10 10% 20% 
Reservation 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
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 In the period of 1988-1989, 100 percent of primary releases (3 out of 3) 
indicate material factors. Political support of France is seen in this period and French 
politicians suggested that they would advocate Poland regarding the EU aid. On the 
other hand, there are no primary reservation press releases that could be obtained. 
Between 1990 and 1993, 3 primary support releases are detected but no reason is 
mentioned behind this support. 100 percent of reservation releases (6 out of 6) are 
economic reservations in which in the Association Agreement negotiations, French 
resistance to open her markets to Poland with respect to agricultural products is 
emphasized. In the period of 1994-1997, 2 primary support releases are found but no 
material or ideational factors are emphasized. In the period of 1998-2004, 10 percent 
of primary support press releases (1 out of 10) is about material factors where 
economic interest of France in Polish accession to the EU is underlined. 20 percent 
of support releases (2 out of 10) are about ideational factors. In one out of 2 releases, 
unification of Europe is emphasized whereas in the other one Europeanness of 
Poland is emphasized. In the remaining 7 releases, no factors are pointed out. 100 
percent of primary reservation (1 out of 1) releases are referring to material factors. 
In that release French politicians warned Poland that she was putting her membership 
plans at risk by supporting the US on Iraq. 
 As a result, it is observed that only in 1998-2004, the number of primary 
support ideational press releases (2 out of 10) is higher than the number of primary 
support material releases (1 out of 10). On the other hand, material factors are 
emphasized in reservation press releases. French politicians used ideational 
arguments in two releases among 25 primary press releases. It is also observed that 
ideational factors are used in the support releases only.  
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Table 10: France Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   
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1988-1989 
 
Support 5 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 7 71% 29% 
Reservation 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1990-1993 
 
Support 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 5 40% 0% 
Reservation 2 0 79 81 0 0 0 3 84 96% 0% 
1994-1997 
 
Support 2 1 0 3 2 2 4 25 32 9% 13% 
Reservation 31 0 9 40 0 0 0 3 43 93% 0% 
1998-2004 
 
Support 6 0 19 25 0 1 1 49 75 33% 1% 
Reservation 94 5 80 179 0 0 0 17 196 91% 0% 
 
 
In the period of 1988-1989, 71 percent of secondary support press releases (5 
out of 7) refer to material factors. All five releases are related to French support for 
the EU aid to Poland. 29 percent of support releases (2 out of 7) refer to ideational 
factors where moral duty of helping Poland is emphasized. In the same period, 100 
percent of reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are pointing to material factors. 
Political reservation of deepening of the EU is emphasized before having relations 
with Poland.  
Between 1990 and 1993, 40 percent of secondary support press releases (2 
out of 5) refer to material factors. In all two releases, French political interest in 
supporting Poland is pointed out. In the remaining 3 releases, no reason is mentioned 
regarding support. On the other hand, in 96 percent of secondary reservation releases 
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(81 out of 84), material factors are emphasized. Among 81 secondary reservation 
releases, two releases are about political reservation of deepening of the EU and 
membership conditions for Poland whereas 79 releases are about economic 
reservations. In these releases, importance of agriculture and cars for France is 
underlined in the negotiations of the Association Agreement.  
Between 1994 and 1997, 9 percent of secondary support press releases (3 out 
of 32) include material factors. 2 of these 3 support releases are indicating political 
factors whereas security is underlined in the other support release. 13 percent of 
releases (4 out of 32) is about ideational arguments in which kinship based 
arguments such as sister in the East and special responsibility in the unification of 
continent are highlighted. According to the analysis, remaining 25 releases do not 
include a specific reason.   
In this period, 93 percent of secondary reservation press releases (40 out of 
43) are about material arguments.  31 out of 40 reservation press releases contain 
political reservations such as fear of France in shift of center of gravity of the EU, 
lack of interest in the Mediterranean region and priority in institutional reform of the 
EU, namely deepening. 9 out of 40 reservation releases indicate economic 
reservations in which France opposed changes in the CAP.  Finally, in the remaining 
3 releases no reason is specified. 
Between 1998 and 2004, 33 percent of secondary support press releases (25 
out of 75) include material factors. 6 out of 25 releases include political arguments 
where French interests in Polish accession to the EU are underlined. In 19 out of 25 
releases, economic interest is pointed out in which French resistance to the reform of 
the CAP is seen. Among 75 secondary support releases only one of them include 
ideational factors. In this release, unification of Europe is emphasized. In this period, 
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91 percent of secondary reservation press releases (179 out of 196) are about material 
factors. 80 out of 179 reservation releases are related to the resistance of France for 
CAP reform in order to protect her farmers.  94 out of 179 releases are about political 
reservations in which institutional reform and elections in France, priority of France 
for Bulgaria and Romania, non-compliance with the acquis were underlined. 5 out of 
179 releases are about security reservations about porous Polish border which could 
not prevent immigration. In the remaining 17 reservations no specific reason is 
provided.   
To conclude, it is observed that in all periods, except for the support releases 
of 1994-1997, the number of press releases indicating material factors is higher than 
the number of press releases ideational factors. Ideational arguments are observed 
only in 7 press releases among 344 secondary press releases. Additionally, it is also 
observed that ideational factors are used only in the support releases. 
 
3.5.1.3 Great Britain 
Table 11: Comparison of Different Periods for Great Britain 
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1988-1989 46 5 0 5 0 0 0% 4 1 80% 
1990-1993 76 41 4 37 4 0 100% 35 2 94% 
1994-1997 78 41 4 37 4 0 100% 24 13 64% 
1998-2004 557 107 8 99 8 0 100% 53 46 54% 
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Between 1988 and 1989, there are no primary press releases. In the secondary 
press releases, 80 percent (4 out of 5) support is seen. This support is about British 
support for Poland with respect to the EU aid. In the period of 1990-1993, 100 
percent of support (4 out of 4) is seen in the primary releases whereas 94 percent of 
support is observed in the secondary releases. Great Britain underlined that in the 
Association Agreement negotiations, Poland should be supported because market 
access is emphasized to be better than aid. Thus, the analysis indicates that 1990-
1993 was the period in which British support for Polish membership bid was highest. 
 In the period of 1994-1997, 100 percent (4 out of 4) of primary press releases 
and 64 percent (24 out of 37) of secondary releases are supporting improvement of 
relations of Poland with the EU. In the period of 1998-2004, %100 (8 out of 8) of 
primary press releases are support press releases. In the same period, 54 percent (53 
out of 99) of secondary press releases are support press releases.  In this period, the 
support for Polish bid was lowest in the secondary releases. British reservations such 
as reform of the CAP and contribution to the EU budget are emphasized.  
 Consequently, when all the periods of Great Britain are compared, the 
analysis showed that support for Polish bid for EU membership did not change with 
the different governments. In other words, unlike Germany and France, supporting 
enlargement is a state policy for Great Britain. Therefore, as proposed in the 
literature, Great Britain is the main driver of Polish accession to the EU in all 
periods.  
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Figure 3: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for Great 
Britain 
 
Comparison of the primary and secondary press releases shows that, the 
percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than 
percentage of support in the secondary press releases in all periods except for the 
period of 1988-1989 because there is no primary support releases in this period.  
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Table 12: Great Britain Primary Press Releases 
 
  
  
  
  
  
Material 
  
  
  
Ideational  Other  Total 
  
  
  
 
       
 
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
S
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
T
o
ta
l-
M
a
te
ri
a
l 
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
 I
d
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
o
ra
l 
D
u
ty
 
T
o
ta
l 
Id
ea
ti
o
n
a
l 
  M
a
te
ri
a
l+
Id
e
ti
o
n
a
l+
o
th
er
 
P
e
r
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(T
o
ta
l 
M
a
te
ri
a
l/
T
o
ta
l)
 
P
e
r
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(T
o
ta
l 
Id
e
a
ti
o
n
a
l/
T
o
ta
l)
 
1988-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -   -  
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -   - 
1990-1993 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 4 0% 75% 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1994-1997 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 0% 25% 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1998-2004 
           
Support 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 6 8 25% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
 
 In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press 
releases that could be obtained. In the period of 1990-1993, 75 percent of releases (3 
out of 4) indicate ideational factors. It is emphasized that supporting Poland is a 
moral duty for Great Britain due to the historical background of Poland and Great 
Britain. In the remaining one release, no reason is mentioned behind the support. 
There is no reservation release in this period. Between 1994 and 1997, 25 percent of 
primary support press releases (1 out of 4) indicate ideational argument. Historical 
importance of supporting Poland is emphasized.  In the remaining 3 releases, there is 
no mention of reason behind the support. No reservation release is found. 
In the period of 1998-2004, 25 percent of primary support press releases (2 
out of 8) are about material arguments. In one out of 2 releases political support is 
171 
 
seen due to the Europhobia of Britain, namely fear of further deepening of the EU. In 
the other one, economic interest is Polish accession to the EU is underlined.  There is 
no mention of reason in the remaining 6 releases. There is also no reservation release 
in this period. 
 Subsequently, it is observed that from 1990-1997, the number of primary 
support ideational press releases is higher than the number of primary support 
material releases. British politicians used four times ideational arguments among 16 
primary press releases.  
 
Table 13: Great Britain Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   
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1988-1989 
 
Support 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 100% 0% 
Reservation 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
1990-1993 
 
Support 7 1 1 9 0 1 1 25 35 26% 3% 
Reservation 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1994-1997 
 
Support 5 2 0 7 0 1 1 16 24 29% 4% 
Reservation 3 0 10 13 0 0 0 0 13 100% 0% 
1998-2004 
 
Support 17 3 4 24 0 1 1 28 53 45% 2% 
Reservation 5 1 40 46 0 0 0 0 46 100% 0% 
 
 
In the period of 1988-1989, 100 percent of secondary support press releases 
(4 out of 4) refer to material factors. All four releases are related to the British 
support for the EU aid to Poland. In the same period, 100 percent of reservation press 
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releases (1 out of 1) are pointing to material factors. The competence of the EU in 
dealing with Poland is questioned. Between 1990 and 1993, 26 percent of secondary 
support press releases (9 out of 35) refer to material factors. In the 7 out of 9 support 
releases, political interest in widening of the EU and Europhobia of Great Britain are 
emphasized. In one out of 9 support releases, security interest in having peace, 
stability in Europe is underlined whereas in the other press release, economic interest 
is having more trade with Poland is pointed out.  3 percent of support releases (1 out 
of 35) refer to ideational factors in which responsibility of Great Britain is 
underlined. In the remaining 25 releases, there is no mention of reason behind the 
support. On the other hand, in 100 percent of secondary reservation releases (2 out of 
2), material factors are emphasized. In one release, economic reservation of Great 
Britain in textile sector is underlined whereas in the other economic backwardness of 
Poland is pointed out.  
Between 1994 and 1997, 29 percent of secondary support press releases (7 
out of 24) include material factors. 5 of these 7 support releases are showing political 
factors such as Europhobia of Great Britain. In 2 out of 7 support releases, security 
interest is underlined. 4 percent of releases (1 out of 24) are about ideational 
arguments in which historical importance of supporting Poland is pointed out. 
According to the analysis, remaining 16 releases do not include a specific reason. In 
this period, 100 percent of secondary reservation press releases (13 out of 13) are 
about material arguments.  3 out of 13 reservation press releases contain political 
reservations such as Copenhagen Criteria and institutional reform of the EU. 10 out 
of 13 reservation releases indicate economic reservations such as farm subsidies, 
economic backwardness of Poland and coal sector of Great Britain.   
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In the period of 1998-2004, 45 percent of secondary support press releases 
(24 out of 53) include material factors. 17 out of 24 releases include political 
arguments in which Europhobia or Euroscepticism of Great Britain as well as 
prioritization of enlargement to deepening are underlined. In 3 out of 24 releases, 
security interest is emphasized. 4 out of 24 releases pointed out economic interest in 
Polish accession to the EU. 2 percent of releases (1 out of 53) include ideational 
factors in which overcoming the division of the continent is pointed out. In the 
remaining 28 releases, no reason is mentioned for support. In this period, 100 percent 
of secondary reservation press releases (46 out of 46) are about material factors. 5 
out of 46 reservation releases is about political reservation such as noncompliance to 
the acquis and need for institutional reform. 1 out of 46 releases is about security 
reservation related to borders of Poland. 40 out of 46 releases show economic 
reservation of Great Britain such as need for reform of the CAP, contribution of 
Great Britain to the EU budget, coal sector of Great Britain. 
In short, it is observed that in all periods, the number of press releases 
indicating material factors is higher than the number of press releases showing 
ideational factors. Ideational arguments are seen only in 3 press releases among 178 
secondary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used only in 
the support releases. 
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3.5.1.4 Spain 
Table 14: Comparison of Different Periods for Spain 
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1988-1989 4 0 0 0 0 0  - 0 0 - 
1990-1993 67 37 1 36 0 1 0% 3 33 8% 
1994-1997 113 69 1 68 0 1 0% 5 63 7% 
1998-2004 585 124 7 117 2 5 29% 21 96 18% 
 
 
In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary or secondary press releases. 
In the period of 1990-1993, there is no primary support release where as only one 
reservation release. 8 percent (3 out of 36) support is observed in the secondary press 
releases. All three of the releases are from 1993. In other words, in the period of 
Association Agreement negotiations, there is no support release. In the period of 
1994-2007, 0 percent (0 out of 1) of primary press releases and 7 percent (5 out of 
68) of are supporting improvement of relations of Poland with the EU.  
In the period of 1998-2004, 29 percent (2 out of 7) of primary press releases 
are support press releases. In the same period, 18 percent (21 out of 117) of 
secondary press releases were support press releases.  In this period, the support for 
Polish bid was highest compared to other periods but still reservations exceed 
support.  
 Consequently, when all the periods of Spain are compared, the analysis 
showed that support for Polish bid for EU membership did not change with the 
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different governments. As stated in the literature, Spain is the brakeman in all three 
periods. 
 
 
Figure 4: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for Spain 
 
There are only two primary support releases in the period of 1998-2004. In 
the other periods, there are no primary support releases. In the secondary releases, it 
is seen that support rate is highest in the period of 1998-2004. 
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Table 15: Spain Primary Press Releases 
 
 
Material  Ideational  Other Total 
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1988-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -   -  
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -   - 
1990-1993 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
1994-1997 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
1998-2004 
           
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 100% 0% 
 
 In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press 
releases that could be obtained. In the period of 1990-1993, there is no primary 
support releases whereas there is only one primary reservation press release. This 
reservation is related to Polish being not ready for the EU.  In the period of 1994-
1997, there is also no primary support releases. 100 percent of primary support press 
releases (1 out of 1) indicate material arguments. This press release is about non-
compliance of Poland to Copenhagen criteria. In the period of 1998-2004, there are 
only two primary support releases but there is no reason underlined behind the 
support.  100 percent of primary reservation releases are referring to material factors. 
In all five releases, economic reservation of sharing of EU funds with Poland is 
pointed out. Consequently, it is observed that from 1990-2004, no ideational 
arguments is used by Spanish politicians.   
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Table 16: Spain Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   
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1988-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1990-1993 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 31 31 0 0 0 2 33 94% 0% 
1994-1997 
 
Support 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 5 20% 0% 
Reservation 10 0 51 61 0 0 0 2 63 97% 0% 
1998-2004 
 
Support 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 20 21 5% 0% 
Reservation 2 2 88 92 0 0 0 4 96 96% 0% 
 
 
In the period of 1988-1989, there are no secondary support or reservation 
press releases. In the period of 1990-1993, there are only 3 support releases but no 
reason is specified in the releases. On the other hand, in 94 percent of secondary 
reservation releases (31 out of 33), material factors are emphasized. All 31 
reservation releases are about material factors in which economic interest in having 
quotas for steel sector, agricultural sector are underlined. In the remaining two 
releases, no reason is pointed out. 
Between 1994 and 1997, 20 percent of secondary support press releases (1 
out of 5) include material factors. In this release, political interest of Spain in Polish 
accession to the EU is underlined. Remaining 4 releases do not include a specific 
reason.  In this period, 97 percent of secondary reservation press releases (61 out of 
63) are about material arguments.  10 out of 61 reservation press releases contain 
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political reservations such as fear of Spain in shift of center of gravity of the EU, lack 
of interest in the Mediterranean region.  51 out of 61 reservation press releases are 
economic reservations such as sharing of funds and vat tax of Poland for Spanish 
citrus fruits.  Finally, in the remaining 2 releases no reason is specified. 
In the period of 1998-2004, 5 percent of secondary support press releases (1 
out of 21) include material factors. This release is about Spanish support for having 
same size of votes (27 votes) with Poland in the Nice Treaty. In the remaining 20 
releases, no reason is mentioned for support. In this period, 96 percent of secondary 
reservation press releases (92 out of 96) are about material factors. 88 out of 92 
reservation releases is about economic reservation of funds and opposition to the 
reform of the CAP. 2 out of 92 releases are about political reservation of non-
compliance to Copenhagen Criteria 2 out of 82 releases are about security 
reservations of immigration. To sum up, it is observed that in all periods, ideational 
factors are not used.  
 
3.5.2 Comparison between Different Periods of Commissioners 
Speeches 
Table 17: Comparison between Different Periods of European Commissioners’ 
Speeches 
European Commissioners’ 
Speeches  
Total  EC 
Speeches  
EC Speeches Related to 
Poland’s Improvement 
of Relations with the 
EU 
Number of 
Support 
Number of 
Reservation 
Percentage of 
Support  
1988-1989 14 8 7 1 88% 
1990-1993 59 56 39 17 70% 
1994-1997 46 43 24 19 55% 
1998-2004 120 73 34 39 46% 
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 When the period of 1988 and 1989 is examined, it is seen that, 88 percent 
of speeches (7 out of 8) indicates support for improvement of relations with Poland.  
When the period of 1990-1993 is investigated, it is observed that 70 percent of 
speeches indicate support for Poland‟s European aspirations, namely close 
cooperation and integration on the basis of Europe Agreements. In the period of 
1994-1997, it is seen that 55 percent of speeches indicates support for Poland‟s 
European Union membership. Finally in the period of 1998-2004, 46 percent of 
support is observed for Poland. 
   
Table 18: Poland-European Commissioners’ Speeches-Material/Ideational 
Factors 
 
  
 Material  Ideational Other Total 
         
 
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
S
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
T
o
ta
l-
M
a
te
ri
a
l 
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
 I
d
e
n
ti
ty
 
M
o
ra
l 
D
u
ty
 
T
o
ta
l 
Id
ea
ti
o
n
a
l 
  M
a
te
ri
a
l+
Id
e
ti
o
n
a
l+
o
th
er
 
P
e
r
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(T
o
ta
l 
M
a
te
ri
a
l/
T
o
ta
l)
 
P
e
r
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(T
o
ta
l 
Id
e
a
ti
o
n
a
l/
T
o
ta
l)
 
1988-1989 
 
Support 3 2 0 5 0 2 2 0 7  71%   29% 
Reservation 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 100% 0% 
1990-1993 
           
Support 21 3 2 26 1 10 11 2 39 66% 28% 
Reservation 15 0 1 16 0 0 0 1 17 94% 0% 
1994-1997 
           
Support 6 4 0 10 0 4 4 10 24 41% 17% 
Reservation 15 0 4 19 0 0 0 0 19 100% 0% 
1998-2004 
           
Support 0 14 1 15 1 12 13 6 34 38% 25% 
Reservation 27 0 12 39 0 0 0 0 0 100% 0% 
 
 Considering 1988-1989 period, 2 out of 7 speeches indicates security 
interest by linking improvement of relations with the internal stability in Europe 
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whereas, in 2 out of 7 speeches, ideational factors, such as moral duty and 
responsibility of the EC to help Poland are observed. Moreover, in 3 out of 7 
speeches, political interest in helping Polish transition is emphasized. On the other 
hand, 12 percent of speeches (1 out of 8), political conditionality is emphasized in 
order to help transition. 
With respect to the period of 1990-1993, in the support speeches, ideational 
factors such as responsibility and common culture are observed as well as material 
factors such as political interest in helping transition to democracy and market 
economy and widening and deepening of the Community at the same time; economic 
interest and security interest. Nevertheless, the percentage of speeches that refers to 
material factors is higher that percentages of speeches that refers to ideational 
factors. When the reservations in the speeches are analyzed, it is seen that political 
interest in deepening the EC before widening  as well as the economic reservation of 
Polish economic backwardness are underlined. 
With respect to factors in the speeches for the period of 1994-1997, it is seen 
that ideational factors such as responsibility of the EC and overcoming the division 
of Europe are emphasized. Material factors such as political interest in helping Polish 
transition and widening of the Community and security interest in stability in Europe 
with Polish accession are also observed. However, 10 out of 24 support speeches 
refer to material factors whereas 4 out of 24 speeches refer to ideational factors. With 
respect to reservations, it is seen that political interests in institutional reform before 
widening and Polish compliance to Copenhagen Criteria are emphasized. Moreover, 
economic reservations such as Polish agriculture and Polish economic backwardness 
are also underlined.  
181 
 
Considering factors in the speeches, for the period of 1998-2004, it is seen 
that material factors such as security interest in having stability, security and peace 
are emphasized. With respect to ideational factors, it is observed that the importance 
of unification of Europe is underlined. On the other hand, 15 out of 34 support 
speeches refer to material factors whereas 14 out of 35 speeches refer to ideational 
factors. With respect to reservations, it is seen that political interests in institutional 
reform before accession and Polish compliance to Copenhagen Criteria as well as 
implementation of the reforms are emphasized. Moreover, economic reservations 
such as handicaps of Polish agriculture and protectionism of Poland are also 
underlined.  
 
3.5.3 Comparison of Member States’ Attitudes towards Poland15 
 
Table 19: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1988 and 1989 
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Germany 52 4 0 4 0 0 0% 2 2 50% 
France 52 12 3 9 3 0 100% 7 2 77% 
Great Britain 46 5 0 5 0 0 0% 4 1 80% 
Spain 4 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
 
Between the years 1988 and 1989, limited number of releases related to 
Poland‟s improvement of relations with the EU are found in Factiva database. Only 3 
of press releases were from primary resources and all of them were supporting 
                                                          
15
 Due to low number of primary press releases, statistical tests comparing support rates of member 
states are not conducted for Poland. 
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Poland‟s improvement of relations with the EC. In the secondary press releases, it is 
observed that support rate of France is 77 percent whereas support rate of Great 
Britain is 80 percent. Regarding Germany, 50 percent of releases are supporting 
improvement of Polish relations with the EU.  On the other hand, there is no support 
or reservation releases emanating from Spain.  
Therefore, in this period, main drivers for Poland‟s European bid were France 
and Great Britain. Despite the political reservations such as priority of deepening of 
the EU, France and Great Britain continued to support Poland. Germany has some 
economic reservations whereas there are no press releases regarding Spanish attitude. 
 
Table 20: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1990 and 1993 
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Germany 78 41 1 40 0 1 0% 29 11 72% 
France 107 98 9 89 3 6 33% 5 84 5% 
Great Britain 76 41 4 37 4 0 100% 35 2 94% 
Spain 67 37 1 36 0 1 0% 3 33 8% 
 
When the findings regarding the period 1990-1995 are analyzed, it is seen 
that there is significant increase in the number of press releases that could be 
obtained from the Factiva Database. Releases related to France are highest among 
other member states (similar to the 1988-1989 periods).  In the primary resources, 
support releases of Great Britain are higher than other member states whereas 
reservation releases of France are higher than other member states.  A similar result 
can be obtained for Great Britain in the secondary releases where around 94 percent 
of the releases are supportive whereas only 5 percent of releases of France are 
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supportive.  Regarding Germany, 72 percent of releases shows support whereas for 
Spain, this percentage decreases to 8 percent. 
Consequently, as stated in the literature, Great Britain and Germany are the 
drivers for Poland‟s improvement of relations with the EU whereas France and Spain 
are the brakemen for Polish relations with the EU. 
 
Table 21: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1994 and 1997 
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Germany 147 130 9 121 7 2 78% 94 27 78% 
France 87 77 2 75 2 0 100% 32 43 42% 
Great Britain 78 41 4 37 4 0 100% 24 13 64% 
Spain 113 69 1 68 0 1 0% 5 63 7% 
 
Between 1994 and 1997, in primary resources support rate was relatively low 
in Spain and France compared to Germany and Great Britain. According to primary 
releases, Germany, France and Great Britain support Polish European bid whereas 
support rate of Spain is 0 percent.  In the secondary releases, support rate is highest 
in Germany with 78 percent. Great Britain is following Germany with 64 percent 
whereas 42 percent of releases show support for France. However, when a 
comparison is made between Mitterrand presidency and Chirac‟s presidency, it is 
seen that support rate of Polish European bid is increased from 16 percent to 56 
percent in Chirac‟s period. Regarding Spain, only 7 percent of releases show support. 
To sum up, as proposed in the literature, Great Britain and Germany are the 
drivers for Poland‟s improvement of relations. With respect to France, in the same 
line with literature, France is brakeman in the Mitterrand‟s presidency. However, 
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support rate increased to 100 percent in primary and 56 percent in secondary releases 
in Chirac‟s period. Therefore, France is no longer a brakeman in Chirac‟s period. In 
this period, Spain continues to be the brakeman for Polish relations with the EU. 
 
Table 22: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1998 and 2004 
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Germany 610 220 8 212 4 4 50% 51 161 24% 
France 946 282 11 271 10 1 91% 75 196 28% 
Great Britain 557 107 8 99 8 0 100% 53 46 54% 
Spain 585 124 7 117 2 5 29% 21 96 18% 
 
In the last period that is analyzed in this study, it is again observed that the 
support rate is significantly higher regarding Great Britain compared to all other 
countries and the support rate related to Germany decreases drastically.  On the other 
hand, support of Spain, when compared to other periods, slightly increased. The 
results of the analysis of secondary releases also support this assessment.  
Therefore, it is observed that, as opposed to the literature, Germany is no 
longer a driver of Polish accession bid due to the economic reservations of free 
movement of Polish workers and contribution of Germany to the EU budget. As 
stated in the literature, Great Britain continues to be driver whereas Spain continues 
to be brakeman. Regarding France, according to primary releases, France is driver, 
however, according to secondary releases, support rate decreases to 28 percent due to 
the high number of releases related to French opposition the reform of the CAP. 
Consequently, some general conclusions can be derived from this analysis. 
Firstly, Great Britain is the main driver for Poland‟s European aspirations in all 
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periods. So it can be argued that for Poland, the British support for enlargement of 
the EU is a state policy which does not change with changes in government.  
Secondly, although in the literature, it is widely acknowledged that Germany 
is the main driver of Polish European aspirations, this study shows that Germany has 
reservations in some specific periods. For instance, in the association agreement 
negotiations, Germany has some economic reservations. After the signing of Europe 
Agreements, Germany, especially Helmut Kohl, became the main driver in the Polish 
relations with the EU. However, with the chancellorship of Gerard Schroeder, 
Germany again expressed economic reservations towards free movement of Polish 
workers because unemployment was the main priority for Schroder government. 
Another reservation was German contribution to the EU budget with regard to the 
CAP.  
 Thirdly, it is seen that France, in all periods, prioritizes deepening of the 
Community. Moreover, French governments are sensitive about domestic concerns 
and emphasized economic reservations in order to protect French citizens from the 
effects of enlargement.  For Poland, in the period of 1988-1989, the relations 
between Poland and France were based on French support to Polish transition to 
democracy by confirming aid packages and advocating Polish interests in terms of 
aid in the international forums. However, French also emphasized that Poland and 
other CEECs could not have institutional relations with the EC before deepening of 
the EC. On the other hand, in the period of 1990-1993, France became the brakemen 
due to economic reservations related to Association Agreement in order to protect 
her farmers. In the period of 1994-1997, especially after the election of Jacques 
Chirac as president of France, the emphasis on French support for Polish accession to 
the EU and NATO increased.  Between 1998 and 2004, the main reservation for 
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France was proposals of other member states for changing Common Agricultural 
Policy and inclusion of Poland in CAP.  In order to protect French farmers, France 
asked for transition periods for inclusion of Poland in the CAP.  
 Finally, Spain is the main brakeman for Poland. For the Association 
Agreement, the main economic reservation for Spain was its steel industry according 
to the secondary releases. Afterwards, the main Spanish economic reservations 
became the fear of losing funds from the EU as a result of enlargement and proposals 
for the change of the CAP. Spain even used this fund issue against the demands of 
Germany and Austria for a transition period of free movement of Polish workers 
after enlargement.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
TURKISH ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
This part of the dissertation deals with Turkish accession process to the EU. 
The main aim of this analysis is to understand whether rationalist or 
constructivist/sociological institutionalism can explain the attitudes of European 
Commissioners and member states to support Customs Union, accept Turkey as a 
candidate, open accession negotiations, but not yet accept Turkey as a member state.  
There are four periods to consider. The first concerns Turkey‟s initial 
membership application between 1 January 1987 and 31 December 1989 1987 is 
significant because Turkey applied for membership in April 1987. 31 December1989 
is important because the European Commission issued its opinion regarding 
Turkey‟s membership application. The second period examines the Customs Union 
negotiations between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1995. 31 December1995 is 
significant because it was agreed on March 1995 that Turkey would have Customs 
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Union with the EU, effective from January 1996. The third period covers Turkey‟s 
acceptance as a candidate in the Helsinki European Council and setting the date for 
the opening of accession negotiations between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 
2004. 31 December2004 was chosen because, in December 2004, Turkey was given 
the date of 3 October 2005 for the opening of formal accession negotiations. The 
final period includes these accession negotiations between 1January 2005 and 31 
July 2012. This final date is cut-off point for the database searches for this study.  
In analyzing each period, this chapter first investigates the EU‟s relations 
with Turkey in order to understand the EU‟s policies and the European 
Commissioners policies towards Turkey, Secondly, it examines the attitudes of four 
member states, Germany, France, Great Britain and Greece, towards Turkey in order 
to determine whether or not they supported Turkey in her EU membership bid and to 
reveal the source of the motivation, rationalist or constructivist-sociological, behind 
their support or non-support to Turkey. That is, this chapter analyzes the reasons 
behind the attitude of these states towards enlargement in relation to rationalist 
institutionalist factors, such as economic, security and political interests, or 
constructivist/sociological institutionalist factors, such as collective identity and 
moral duty. 
To the final part of the chapter reports on the content analysis of the 
documents selected from the RAPID and FACTIVA databases for analysis of the 
expressed attitudes of European Commissioners and member state politicians. 
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4.1 Membership Application  
4.1.1 EU-Turkey Relations  
4.1.1.1 Historical Context of Turkish Politics 
 
In Turkey, democratization has been an important element of its 
modernization project. It was initiated in the late Ottoman period, especially by those 
officers and administrators who had been educated in Europe. For them, 
modernization was primarily understood and practiced as material westernization, 
with the implication that if the empire was to survive, it would have to 
modernize/westernize its structure according to western values, such as liberal 
democracy, secularism and capitalism. However, as Okyar (1984: 50) suggests, “The 
impulse towards change had to come from the top; it had to be imposed upon a 
largely indifferent and even unwilling population”. In other words, modernization 
was largely a state-imposed project, which was imposed without regard to social 
resistance. Although westernization took place, albeit slowly, within the military, the 
central and local administration, and the educational system, these attempts proved 
ineffective and could not ensure the Ottoman Empire‟s survival. The First World 
War brought about its end. After the war, Turkey successfully fought against 
Western occupation in the War of Independence, and in 1923, the Turkish Republic 
was proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. His primary goal was a modernized, 
secular Turkey which could compete successfully with other states at the highest 
level of contemporary civilization. Landau (1984: 2) states that “Ataturk [was] 
successful in the creation of a modern republican state structure with a constitution, 
an elected parliament and other western type institutions; founding of a political 
190 
 
party as the chief agent of modernization which is Republican People‟s Party (RPP); 
creation of a modern bureaucracy; secularizing education and the courts and 
emancipation of women both politically and socially”. These reforms were made in 
line with the Ataturk‟s western, secular, nationalist principles, called „Kemalism‟.16 
Thus, it can be suggested that Ataturk shared the modernization and westernization 
understandings of the Ottoman elite and tried to raise the country to contemporary 
European levels through developing liberal democracy, secularism and the western 
institutions. 
Ataturk did not want to rule the country as a one-party dictator, seeing 
democracy as the main component of his modernization project. Therefore, he briefly 
allowed the formation of an opposition party17 in 1924-25, and encouraged the 
formation of another18 in 1930. However, as Rustow (1988: 244) notes, “he soon 
called off these experiments when they gave rise to strong expressions of 
traditionalist Islamic and even separatist movements.” Turkey‟s transition to 
democracy came with the initiation of multiparty politics in 1945. Ismet Inonu, 
Ataturk‟s successor, allowed a free press and the formation of opposition parties. The 
first multiparty elections took place in 1946, although the governing RPP‟s 
replacement by the Democratic Party, which was the main opposition party, only 
came in the second multiparty elections of 1950.  
                                                          
16
 The six Kemalist principles of republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and 
reformism-revolutionarism, were incorporated into the RPP ideology in 1931, and into the Turkish 
constitution in 1937. 
 
17
 The Progressive and Republican Party was established in 1924 as the first opposition party. 
However, the Kurdish-led Sheik Said Rebellion broke out in Turkey‟s southeast. The introduction of 
emergency laws and tribunals in order to deal with the rebellion led the government to put an end to 
this first attempt at multiparty politics. 
 
18
 The Free Party was established in 1930 with the encouragement of Ataturk. However, the party 
became the centre of anti-regime elements. The party was compelled to close it down as a result of a 
religious rebellion called the „Menemen Case‟. 
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 Turkish democracy has been interrupted three times by military coups in 
1960, 1971 and 1980 and damaged severely by post modern coup in 1997 and e-
memorandum in 2007) (Ahmad, 1997; Hale, 1988; Harris, 1988; Heper, 1988, 
Ozbudun 2000; Güney, 2002; Candar, 1999; Aydınlı, 2011). According to 
Karaosmanoglu (1991, 160), “all military interventions had a civilian-oriented 
character, instead of the establishment of an authoritarian regime. They were 
regarded by the military as necessary to preserve, rather than abrogate, the country‟s 
democratic institutions”. In other words, following all three interventions, the 
military tried to restore democracy and return the power to the civilians because they 
saw themselves as the guardians of the democratic regime and Kemalist reforms. 
However, as Ozbudun (2000:105) emphasizes, “on each occasion the military gained 
important exit guarantees that enhanced its role in the subsequent democratic 
regime.” The most important exit guarantee was the National Security Council 
(NSC), established after the 1960 coup and further enhanced after the 1980 coup. 
This was composed of the highest military and civilian leaders, meeting under the 
chairmanship of the president of the republic. With this institution, even after the 
transition to democracy, the military retained an important, albeit informal, role in 
Turkish politics, and Turkey has not been able to exert civilian control over the 
military because of the existence of this institution. This has led to criticism of 
Turkish democracy by EU because this institution has been seen as an obstacle for 
the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. 
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4.1.1.2 Brief History of EU-Turkish Relations 
 
Relations with the EU date back to 1959 when Turkey, together with Greece, 
applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community. It was 
obvious that the Turkish elite wanted Turkey to be a member of the EU, not only for 
its economic benefits, but also because they believed that membership would help 
Turkey continue its modernization and democratization process and fulfill its search 
for recognition as part of the European family. However, Greece‟s application was 
also an important factor. Even though there was a breakdown in democracy with the 
military coup of 1960, the military, immediately after the coup, stated that they 
would pursue Turkey‟s existing foreign policy. As ÇalıĢ (2008:86) states, “The first 
government that was established after the coup gave importance to relations with the 
EU because they saw the EU as an instrument in which they could explain their 
justness to the European states which are very sensitive about democracy”. However, 
on the European side, the 1960 coup was not welcomed. Çınar (quoted in ÇalıĢ, 
2008:97) reports that “The European Council, which was convened in September 26-
27 1961, decided to postpone the negotiations about the association membership 
until there would be free elections in Turkey.” 
 On September 1, 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the EU by 
signing an Association Agreement, the Ankara Treaty, which created the Association 
Council. Article 28 of the Ankara Treaty explicitly states that “As soon as the 
operation of the Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full 
acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of accession of 
Turkey to the Community.” Thus, the Ankara Treaty marks the first time that the EU 
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recognized Turkey‟s eligibility for EU membership. In December 1964, the treaty 
entered into force. There was also a financial cooperation side of the treaty which 
was renewed regularly through financial protocols. The first Financial Protocol (EU, 
1989, December 12) concluded for a five-year period from December 1964, made 
175 million units of account available to the Turkish authorities in the form of loans 
at reduced interest rates. 
 In 1970, the Association Agreement was supplemented by an Additional 
Protocol (EU, 1989, April 25) which laid down the steps for achieving the Customs 
Union and developing economic cooperation between the partners, including the 
accomplishment of free movement of goods, persons and services by the end of a 
period of 22 years. The second Financial Protocol (EU, 1989, December 12), 
covering the period 1973-76, made available ECU 195 million in the form of 
ordinary loans from the European Investment Bank, while the third Financial 
Protocol (1979-81) presented ECU 220 million in loans at reduced interest rates and 
ECU 90 million in EIB loans. 
 The Association Agreement (EU, 1989, April 25) was regenerated by the 
Association Council‟s decisions of June 1980, which set the timetable and conditions 
under which the EU would eliminate, by 1 January 1987, its customs duties on 
Turkish agricultural products, and also the principles governing the employment, 
freedom of movement and rights of Turkish workers and their families in the EU. In 
addition, this Council, owing to Turkey‟s difficult economic situation, also decided 
to provide ECU 75 million of special aid to bridge the gap between the third and 
fourth Financial Protocols. Finally, the Association Council (EU, 1989, December 
12) also agreed to open negotiations on the fourth Financial Protocol, covering 1982-
87.  
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Relations with the EU deteriorated again following Turkey‟s third military 
coup on 12 September 1980. The EU reacted cautiously to the military coup, 
declaring on 13 September, that it expected the return to civilian rule as soon as 
possible. Despite the coup, the Fourth Financial Protocol, making ECU 600 million 
available to the Turkish authorities, was negotiated and signed in June 1981. 
However, in 1981, the arrest of the leaders of several political parties led to 
criticisms from the EU, who responded by suspending the fourth Financial Protocol. 
In addition, in January 1982, the EU decided to officially suspend the Ankara 
Agreement and freeze its political relations with Turkey. Finally, the European 
Parliament decided not to renew the European wing of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee until general elections were held and a parliament established in Turkey.  
After elections were once again held in 1983, one of the most important aims 
of the first Ozal government was improving Turkey‟s relations with the EU and 
gaining EU membership. By 1986, democratic political developments in Turkey 
allowed the EU to move towards restoring normal relations. For example, on 17 
February 1986, the Council (EU, 1988, April 22) agreed to the first meeting of the 
EU-Turkey Association Council, which took place in September 1986. 
 
 
4.1.1.3 Turkey’s Application for EU Membership 
 
On 14 April 1987, the Foreign Minister of Ozal‟s government, Ali Bozer, 
officially applied for full membership of the EU on the basis of Article 237of the 
EEC Treaty, Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 205 of the EAEC Treaty. In 
order to increase Turkey‟s chances, the government, following a referendum in 
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September 1987, lifted the ban imposed after the 1980 coup on former political 
leaders, and an early general election was held in November 1987.  
Turkey‟s application for full membership was not welcomed by the EU as the 
country was seen as unready for the membership because of its size, population, 
economic backwardness and democratic deficits. Moreover, the EU had just 
completed its Mediterranean enlargement and did not wish to continue enlargement 
with Turkey, while Greece also used her membership to influence Turkish-EU 
relations, such as by suggesting blocking financial aid for Turkey and opposing 
Turkey‟s membership before solution of Cyprus problem. Regarding Cyprus, the 
European Commissioner for Mediterranean Affairs, Claude Cheysson (quoted in 
McElroy, 1988, May 21) on a visit to the island, suggested that 
Partition is clearly unacceptable in international terms … Why Turkey 
should insist on keeping forces (in north Cyprus), should insist on 
being guilty in terms of international law, embarrassing all the 
countries with which they want to work … I am delighted that at long 
last the European Parliament has understood the proper dimensions of 
the Cypriot problem … For too long, they had taken it only as a 
technical problem. Now all political forces in Europe have understood 
that there is a fundamental political problem. 
After a two-year decision period, the European Commission presented its 
opinion on Turkey‟s application on December 18, 1989. In the opinion, with respect 
to enlargement in general, it was emphasized that the Community was progressing in 
accordance with the objectives of the Single Act on the road towards economic and 
monetary union, and that the EU was improving the operation of its institutions and 
thereby reconciling enlargement and consolidation. The report (1989: 2-3) concluded 
that it would be unwise, therefore, with regard both to the candidate countries and to 
the member states, to envisage new accession negotiations before 1993 at the 
earliest, except in exceptional circumstances. Thus, the opinion emphasized the 
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importance of deepening of the Community over enlargement, and clearly underlined 
that the EU was not ready for further enlargement before the completion of economic 
and monetary union.  
The document used a number of geopolitical arguments in referring to 
Turkey. It described Turkey as one of the member states‟ partners in the Atlantic 
alliance, occupying a strategically important geopolitical position. However, 
although the importance of Turkey‟s geopolitical position was indicated, the 
European Commission did not recommend starting accession negotiations due to 
various obstacles to Turkey‟s membership. First, the document (1989:4) noted 
structural problems: “Turkey is a large country - it has a greater geographical area 
and will eventually have a bigger population than any Community Member State - 
and its general level of development is substantially lower than the European 
average”. Secondly, the report (1989: 5) noted four kinds of economic problems that 
Turkey needed to overcome: major structural disparities in both agriculture and 
industry; worsening macro-economic imbalances; high levels of industrial 
protectionism; and a low level of social protection. 
With respect to the EU‟s political criteria, although the document (1989:7) 
acknowledged positive developments in Turkey‟s human rights situation and identity 
of minorities, it also warned that “these have not yet reached the level required in a 
democracy.” Moreover, the report noted the “negative effects of the dispute between 
Turkey and one member state of the Community”, namely Greece, and reference was 
also made to the “Situation in Cyprus”.  
Consequently, due to the Community‟s own problems and the economic and 
political situation in Turkey, the report (1989:8) concluded that “it would not be 
useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away.” Instead, under the 
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framework of the Association Agreement, the Commission suggested four measures 
to develop relations with Turkey. These were completion of the Customs Union in 
1995, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of 
industrial and technological cooperation, and the strengthening of political and 
cultural links.  
 
4.1.1.4 Attitudes of the European Commissioners towards 
Turkey 
  
 Only five speeches by Commissioners appear in the RAPID database, of 
which two are relevant. First, Commissioner Van Miert‟s speech (1989, January 13) 
acknowledged the Association Agreement‟s aim to prepare for Turkey‟s future 
accession. Second, European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Ray Mac Sharry (1989, May 19) used the ideational argument of Turkey‟s 
Europeanness, labeling it as a suitable candidate by suggesting that “Turkey, which 
is also a European country and a candidate for accession, comes under this area of 
the Community‟s relations.” However, in both speeches, the Commissioners also 
suggested that deepening of the Community was more important than widening. 
 
4.1.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey 
   
4.1.2.1 Germany 
In Turkish-German relations between 1987 and 1989, the main issues were 
political reservations over human rights conditions in Turkey and economic 
reservations over Turkish migrant workers in Germany. Even before Turkey‟s 
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application for EU membership, Germany was reported (Peel, 1987, April 7) to 
oppose the request out of fear of the possibility of an increase in the number of 
Turkish workers, or Gastarbeiter, in Germany that could follow membership.  
In the Association Council Meeting of 24 April 1988, Greece demanded the 
inclusion of a reference to Cyprus in the opening statement of the joint EU statement 
that West Germany wanted to present to the Turkish side. In response, the Turkish 
side left the meeting. Nevertheless, after the Council, West German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher (quoted in Alterman, 1988, April 26) stated that “My 
assumption is that we will be able to overcome these problems”, and also suggested 
that “a new EU opening statement would be drafted for the next meeting, which he 
hoped to hold before West Germany hands over the rotating EU presidency to 
Greece on July 1.” However, it was (“West Germany”, 1988, May 21)  announced  
by West Germany that it could not arrange another ministerial level meeting of the 
Turkey-EU Associated Council before its presidency expired in June. As Pope (1988, 
April 28) suggests, West Germany‟s attitude led both Turkish and foreign 
commentators to conclude that EU states, including Germany, which had well known 
reservations about Turkish demands for free movement of labor in the EU, were 
hiding behind Greece and manipulating Greek-Turkish hostility in order to exclude 
Turkey. 
 During the official visit of Turkish President Kenan Evren to West Germany 
in October 1988, he asked for German support for the realization of full Turkish EU 
membership. However, Kohl (quoted in Heinrich, 1988, October 18) replied that, 
while West Germany would actively maintain expanded trade between the EU and 
Turkey, it could not openly lobby for Turkish membership. One West German 
diplomat (quoted in Ertugrul, 1989, October 31) suggested that “The main issue is 
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Turkish workers circulating freely in Europe. … In West Germany there is already a 
strong backlash against Turkish immigration.” 
 Thus, Germany acted as a brakeman during this period regarding Turkey‟s 
European bid due to its political reservations over Turkey‟s human rights problems 
and economic reservations over the free movement of Turkish workers within the 
EU. 
 
4.1.2.2 France 
  Like Germany, France also opposed Turkey‟s membership application plan. 
Even before the application, France‟s Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond 
(quoted in Peel, 1987, April 7stressed that “It is difficult to react favorably to such a 
request.” Moreover, he also argued that the Community needed to digest the latest 
enlargement of membership that had included Spain and Portugal. However, in 
January 1988, in response to the request of Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz 
for French support in joining the Community, Jean-Bernard Raimond was quoted 
(“France Says”, 1988, January 12) as suggesting that France would not be against 
Turkey‟s application. Likewise, during an official visit to France in November 1988, 
Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was notified by French President Francois 
Mitterrand (“President Says”, 1988, November 28) that France had no objections in 
principle to Turkey joining, but no new members would be allowed before 1993, 
namely before the introduction of the EU‟s integrated market. In response, Ozal 
(quoted in “Ozal Hints”, 1988, November 29) suggested that “Turkey is aware of the 
priority problems in the Community. We also feel the need to prepare ourselves for 
membership.” Thus, France prioritized deepening of the EU in this period and 
reacted cautiously to Turkey‟s membership application. 
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4.1.2.3 Great Britain 
Great Britain also had hesitations about Turkey‟s application. Earlier, British 
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe (quoted in “The Foreign Secretary”, 1987, 
April 15) had informed Turgut Ozal that full Turkish membership of the Community 
should be left to a later date, although Great Britain wanted a stronger Turkish 
Association Agreement with the EU. Howe (quoted in Dawkins, 1987, April 15) also 
warned that the Great Britain expected progress on human rights before it would 
back the Turkish application. 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (quoted in Gregson, 1988, April 8) 
during a visit to Ankara in April 1988, compared Turkey‟s application for EU 
membership with Great Britain‟s twelve-year wait for entry, recommending that 
Turkey should not be too pessimistic about its chances of gaining membership. A 
Turkish foreign ministry spokesman, Inal Batu (quoted in “Turkey Seeking, 1988, 
April 7) emphasized the Turkish government‟s belief in British support, stating “We 
hope she will have a sympathetic ear to our arguments and when the time comes we 
will be able to count on (British) support.” Turkish President Kenan Evren, during 
his visit to London in July 1988, also asked for British support for the Turkish bid. 
However, although Great Britain was believed to be one of the EU members most 
sympathetic to Turkey‟s European aspirations, Thatcher (“President Kenan”, 1988, 
July 14) made no final commitment on the application. In short, this period was 
characterized by British uncertainty about Turkey‟s European bid due to political 
reservations over deepening of the EU and Turkey‟s human rights problems. 
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4.1.2.4 Greece 
As early as April 1987, Greece made it clear that it would oppose Turkey‟s 
planned application for membership due to political reservations, such as the Cyprus 
Problem and territorial sovereignty in the Aegean. Greece also opposed giving 
financial assistance to Turkey under the Association Agreement. For instance, in 
January 1988, the European Commission decided to release ECU 10 million, which 
was the remaining part of an aid package approved before Greece‟s EU accession. It 
is reported (“Greece Is”, 1988, January 21) that Greece, however, took this decision 
to the European Court of Justice over a claim of improper decision making and 
insufficient human rights conditions in Turkey. In response to this move, the Turkish 
government (“Athens Has”, 1988, April 6) asked Greece to lift its objections on the 
release of funds, especially the fourth Financial Protocol, which would give Turkey 
ECU 600 million in development aid. Greece, however, wished to impose several 
conditions for the release of funds, including the complete withdrawal of Turkish 
occupation troops from Cyprus and the improvement of human rights conditions. In 
September 1988, the European Court of Justice (“Court Rejects”, 1988, September 
27) ruled that the correct decision making procedures had been followed in the 
release of ECU 10 million. 
 Greece also demanded the inclusion of a reference to the Turkish occupation 
of Cyprus in the joint EU statement that West Germany wanted to present to the 
Turkish side in the EU-Turkey Association Council that took place in April 25, 1988. 
Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mesut Yilmaz (“Rapprochement with Greece”, 
1988, May 6)  refused to accept an opening statement from West Germany‟s Foreign 
Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that Cyprus affected the relationship 
between the Community and Turkey, so Genscher then suspended the meeting 
202 
 
indefinitely. In response, Greek Minister for EU Affairs Theodoros Pangalos (quoted 
in Alterman, 1988, April 26) suggested that 
Turkey has difficulty understanding how we work in the community. 
It is not acceptable to say you will not listen. That is undemocratic. 
You can say you do not accept it, but you do not have the right to tell 
the other side what it can and cannot say … This is something they 
must learn if they want to join the community. 
 Mesut Yilmaz responded by declaring that “We will talk about Cyprus but 
not at the Association Council”. Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (Pope, 1988, 
April 28) commented that  
Turkey cannot accept linkage (of Cyprus) to EC membership, (but) we 
must approach these critical periods with statesmen‟s calmness … 
Turkey must be patient and cautious about entering the EC. Turkey 
does not have to enter the EC at all costs and our last actions show 
this. 
 The Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (quoted in “Greece Will”, 
1988, May 21) also linked the Cyprus issue with Turkey‟s accession to the EU, 
suggesting in May 1988 that Greece would back Turkey if the Cyprus issue was 
solved, and adding that “If the troops go, that for me would be sufficient.” In June 
1988, Turkish President Ozal (quoted in “The Turkish Prime” 1988, June 14) during 
an official visit to Athens, reiterated Turkey‟s position by warning that “There exists 
no Turkish policy to accede to the EU at all costs.” Ozal did not even mention 
Cyprus, while Greek Prime Minister Papandreou based his speech on Cyprus 
problem. Greek Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias (quoted in “Greece Pledges”, 
1988, July 5) also showed the importance given by the Greeks to the Cyprus problem 
by explicitly stating that “The (Greek) presidency aims to seek untiringly a solution 
to the Cypriot problem which will be based on the unity, independence and territorial 
integrity of the island.” With respect to Turkey‟s application, he (quoted in Buchan, 
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1988, July 6) stressed that “in the immediate future there should be no discussion of, 
or action on, any further enlargement of the Community.” 
 
4.2 Customs Union 
 
4.2.1 EU-Turkey Relations 
 
4.2.1.1. Customs Union Negotiations 
 The European Commission‟s report about Turkey‟s membership 
application was analyzed in the European Council at its meeting on 3 February 1990. 
On 5 February, the European Council asked the Commission to prepare more 
detailed proposals for strengthening cooperation with Turkey. In response, the 
Commission released a proposal on 6 June 1990, called the Matutes Package, 
containing four interdependent sections: bringing about a customs union by 1995; 
stepping up industrial and technological cooperation in a number of areas directly or 
indirectly connected with customs union; re-establishing financial cooperation; 
promoting political cooperation. In the section on re-establishing financial 
cooperation, the Commission asked the European Council and the European 
Parliament to approve the Fourth Protocol which had been negotiated in July 1981 
but had not been given to Turkey for political reasons. However, due to Greece 
continuing its veto, it was still not possible to implement the package. 
 An international crisis also had an effect on relations of Turkey with the EU 
when Iraq occupied Kuwait in August 1990, and the frontline states, Egypt, Jordan 
and Turkey, suffered from the resulting embargo on Iraq. Therefore, in October 
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1990, European Council (EU, 1991, January 30) decided to give a financial aid 
package to these countries in order to alleviate the economic and social injury caused 
by the Gulf crisis.  At the end of March 1991, the Iraq refugee crisis erupted, 
requiring the EU to finance further aid to help Turkey deal with the refugees on its 
border with Iraq. Further international aid was also organized by the EU (1991, April 
13). 
 On 30 September 1991, the 32
nd
 meeting of the EU-Turkey Association 
Council was held. On the same day (EU, 1991, September 30), Commissioner Abel 
Mattutes and Turkish Foreign Minister Safa Giray signed agreements for financing 
two cooperation projects. In the European Commission report „Europe and the 
challenge of enlargement‟, it was underlined that Turkey was experiencing serious 
difficulties in taking on the obligations resulting from adopting the EU‟s economic 
and social policies. Therefore, the report (1992: 7) recommended that the association 
agreements should be more actively applied. In advising further support for Turkey, 
the report noted its geopolitical significance: “Events have highlighted Turkey‟s 
geopolitical importance and the role which it can play as an ally and as a pole of 
stability in its region; the Community should take all appropriate steps to anchor it 
firmly within the future architecture of Europe.” The Presidency Conclusions of the 
Lisbon European Council of June 1992 also commented on Turkey‟s role in the 
present European political situation, suggesting that, in line with the prospects laid 
down in the association agreement, cooperation should be intensified. On 8 
November 1993, the 34
th
 meeting of EU-Turkey Association Council was convened. 
In a resolution concerning the Customs Union, the document reiterated the 
determination of both parties to implement the decisions needed in sufficient time to 
enable the Customs Union to become operative by 1995.  
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One of the EU‟s main political reservations of the EU concerned the Kurdish 
Problem (Gunther 1988; Barkey, 1993). The EU repeatedly warned that reforms on 
the Kurdish issue were essential before Turkey could become an EU member. The 
Kurdish issue had also become a military problem since 1984 when the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (Partiya-Karkeran Kurdistan- PKK), established by Abdullah Ocalan, 
began fighting a war against Turkey. Turkish governments, however, always viewed 
the PKK as a terrorist and separatist organization. The security-liberalization 
dilemma also shows itself in this conflict in the way that, as Beriker-Atiyas 
(1997:441) puts it, “the measures taken to control the conflict act to impede the 
development of democracy in Turkey.”  Human rights issues such as torture and 
other mistreatment became common throughout the 1990s. 
In the early 1990s, with the initiation of President Ozal,
19
 the Turkish 
government took some measures to improve the conditions of its Kurdish citizens. 
First, Ozal presented a language bill permitting Kurdish to be used in everyday 
conversation and folklore music recordings. Second, a general amnesty was granted 
that also applied to many Turkish Kurds. Following the 1991 elections, a Kurdish 
party, the People‟s Labour Party (HEP), gained representation in the parliament as a 
result of forming a coalition with the social democrats. However, such reforms were 
not seen as satisfactory, and the violence in the Southeast increased in 1992. In 1993, 
HEP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court because it was argued that the 
integrity and the unity of the Turkey had been violated by its relations with the PKK. 
In the same year, a new Kurdish party, the Democratic Party (DEP), was established. 
However, the summer of 1993 witnessed much more violence from the PKK, and 
while the conflict in the southeast became bloodier, it was argued that some DEP 
                                                          
19
 Turgut Ozal was elected as the president of the Turkish Republic on October 9, 1989. 
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members made pro-PKK statements leading the Turkish parliament to lift the 
political immunity from prosecution of seven DEP parliamentarians in March 1994. 
In response, the EU (1994, March 31) issued a statement stating that “the fight 
against terrorism should be conducted within the law and with full respect for human 
rights.” 
In the same year, the constitutional court closed DEP and its parliamentarians 
received prison sentences ranging from three to fifteen years. This action aroused 
harsh western criticism, both from the EU and individual western governments. The 
EU demanded the immediate release of the parliamentarians. 
In the Presidency Conclusion of the Madrid European Council of December 
1995, the European Parliament‟s assent to Customs Union with Turkey was 
welcomed. However, the European Council also recalled the value it attached to 
respect for human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, offering support 
to all those in Turkey endeavoring to put such reforms into practice. 
 
4.2.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Turkey 
Commissioner Leon Brittan (1990, January 19) indicated in a speech the 
Association Agreement‟s aim to prepare for Turkey‟s future accession. In April 
1990, European Commissioner Andriessen (1990, April 25) used the ideational 
argument of the Europeanness of Turkey in order to call Turkey a candidate by 
suggesting that “Turkey, which is also a European country and a candidate for 
accession, comes under this area of the Community‟s relations.” However, both 
speeches also emphasized the EU‟s political interest in deepening. 
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Commissioner Ray MacSharry (1992, July 27) stated that the relations would 
be based on the Association Agreement: 
 As regards Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, the Lisbon European Council 
concluded that relations with these countries should be strengthened 
on the basis of the existing association agreements, and that each 
application for membership should be looked at on its own merits. 
 
 Commissioner for External Political Relations Hans Van Den Broek (1993, 
May 13) talked about the Customs Union negotiations between the EU and Turkey, 
using geopolitical arguments to underline the importance of Turkey as a partner: 
 
Turkey‟s strategic position, at the cross-roads between Europe and 
Asia, its creative and numerous population, its importance in the 
Black Sea region, its impressive economic performance and still more 
impressive potential, help to explain why Turkey is such an important 
partner for Europe. 
 
 He (1993, May 27) also described Turkey as an important partner, which 
was an example to other states in the region: “Turkey‟s importance stems from its 
strategic position ... and potential and, above all, its standing as a secular, market-
oriented democracy, and the value of its example to other states in the region.” He 
(1993, June 4) then described Turkey as “a secular Islamic state with a pivotal role in 
a highly sensitive area.” Commissioner Leon Brittan (1994, February 10) similarly 
labeled Turkey as a partner, using geopolitical arguments: “In an increasingly 
interdependent world, Turkey draws increasing strength from its position as a bridge 
between developed and developing neighbours, a bridge between Asia and Europe, a 
bridge between the religions of Islam and Western Europe.” Likewise, 
Commissioner Van Den Broek (1995, April 24) underlined that “it is also seeking to 
preserve the state‟s secular traditions, which are unique in the Moslem world and a 
model for the newly independent states in central Asia. 
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 These speeches also deployed ideational arguments about Turkey‟s 
Europeanness of Turkey. For example, Van Den Broek (1993, May 27) indicated that 
“Turkey is a valued associate of the Community, whose European vocation is 
reflected in the Association Agreement and through the many links between us.” 
 Security arguments were also used. Van Den Broek (1993, May 27) 
suggested that “The Community needs Turkey, as a pole of stability and prosperity in 
a particularly sensitive region.” He (1993, September 16) also claimed that “the 
Union's security interests in the broad sense of the term also require us to give closer 
attention to our relations with Turkey, the Maghreb and the Middle East.” In 
considering dialogue for foreign policy, Commissioner Leon Brittan (1992, February 
10) argued that “Our common interest in the stability of our region and its hinterland 
is the essential basis for that dialogue.” With respect to the Customs Union, he (1994, 
February 11) predicted that “one result will be the increasing ability of EU and 
Turkish businessmen to cooperate with each other and their governments not only to 
bring increased prosperity but also to bring increased stability to our region and the 
world.” Commissioner Van Den Broek (1994, June 17) also commended “Turkey‟s 
constructive engagement in working with the European Union to make our continent 
and its surrounding regions a safer place.” 
 Speeches also referred to the Cyprus issue as an important political issue 
for relations between the EU and Turkey. Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) urged 
Turkey to “play a full part in efforts to resolve this conflict which is one of the 
obstacles which must be overcome in bringing Turkey and the Community closer 
together.” Commissioner Van Den Broek (1994, June 17) noted that the Cyprus 
problem “has complicated relations between the Union and Turkey.” 
209 
 
 Another political reservation of the EU regarding Turkey was human rights. 
For instance, Commissioner Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) declared: “The 
commitment of Turkey‟s leaders to strengthening the respect for human rights is 
appreciated in the Community. But there is some concern that more action is needed 
to ensure that this commitment is implemented effectively.” He (1993, May 27) 
stressed that “as a friend of Turkey, I must express the Community‟s hope of 
continuing improvements with regard to human rights abuses in Turkey, especially in 
police stations and detention centers, and in the south-east”. Commissioner Leon 
Brittan (1994, February 10) also warned that “More generally, a comfortable 
relationship between Turkey and the European Union depends on further progress in 
the development of human rights and the rule of law”. Commissioner Van Den 
Broek (1994, June 17) restated the EU‟s concerns: “Turkey‟s friends feel growing 
concern about a deterioration in the protection of certain human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” 
 Economic issues were also a source of reservation. For example, 
Commissioner Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) said that “Turkey needs sustained 
non-inflationary growth in order to narrow the economic gap with the Community.” 
 In expressing reservation, several speeches used ideological arguments 
regarding religion, particularly following the election of mayors from the Islamic 
Welfare Party to metropolitan municipalities in local elections. These arguments 
were nuanced however, as can be seen from this speech by Commissioner Van Den 
Broek (1994, June 17): 
Far from being an obstacle to participation in the process of European 
integration, Turkey‟s Islamic culture is an asset in a continent which 
has always sought unity in diversity and which wishes to improve 
relations with the Moslem world. The election to public office of 
candidates from the Islamic Welfare Party is in itself no cause for 
alarm, provided that they accept the values upon which the Turkish 
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constitution and, indeed, the European Union and of the Atlantic 
Alliance are based. 
 
  
4.2.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey 
 
4.2.2.1 Germany 
During this period, Germany confirmed that Turkish membership was 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, but still tried to show her support for the moves 
that would bring Turkey closer to the EU. For example, in July 1992, German 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in “Germany Says”, 1993, July 13) declared 
that Germany would “do [its] best to bring Turkey closer to Europe through stronger 
association with the EU.” Moreover, in the Customs Union negotiations in 1995, 
Kinkel (“Kinkel Urges”, 1995, February 9) tried to persuade Greece to give up its 
resistance to the Customs Union agreement, while Kohl (quoted in “German 
Politicians”, 1995, December 5) supported Turkey by stating that the Customs Union 
would be “an important step toward Turkey and the European Union drawing closer 
together.” 
In expressing this support, Germany used geopolitical arguments, such as the 
strategic and political importance of Turkey with respect to her relations with 
Turkey. For instance, Kinkel (quoted in Lyon, 1992, July, 12) commented that 
“World developments this year, especially in the Middle East, Europe, Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, have unexpectedly increased Turkey‟s strategic 
and political importance.” In, German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe (1993, 
September 9) described the geopolitical importance of Turkey as follows: 
 It is a strategic cornerstone, an island of stability in the crisis triangle 
of the Caucasus-Iran-Iraq region, and a bridge to the Islamic states of 
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Central Asia. As the only secular, Western-oriented and allied Islamic 
state, Turkey can serve as a stabilizing influence for the whole region. 
Turkey thus deserves the greatest possible degree of political and 
material support from the West. 
Germany also used geopolitical arguments in her support of Customs Union 
with Turkey. For instance, Kinkel (quoted in “Germany continues”, 1995, January 
12) warned that “If we don‟t succeed in getting Turkey into the Customs Union, it 
will start to drift away” from its westward orientation and fall in the orbit of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
 Germany‟s main reservations over Turkey‟s relationship with the EU 
involved political arguments, such as the human rights problems related to the PKK 
and Kurdish problems, and Germany constantly criticized Turkey for her human 
rights record related to the Kurdish issue. For instance, German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher on learning that Turkey might be using German supplied 
weapons against Kurds, warned to cut off military aid to Turkey if the news were 
true. In addition, he (quoted in “Bonn Urges”, 1992, March 27) warned that “We 
consider it necessary that beyond our protest the European Community present itself 
and that the issue be taken up by the CSCE (pan-European security conference).” He 
(quoted in “Germany Asks”, 1992, March 27) also demanded that the EU Council 
communicate a shared Community disapproval of Turkish military activities against 
its civil population, declaring that it was vital for Turkey to respect human and 
minority rights. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin (quoted in Lyon, 
1992, March 27) criticized Germany‟s response: 
 We resent the fact that without first obtaining correct information via 
diplomatic channels, political figures of friendly and allied countries 
issue statements that do not conform with the truth or the historical 
understanding of friendship between our countries. 
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  In January 1994, at a meeting between the foreign ministers of Turkey, 
Germany and Great Britain, Kinkel (quoted in Rugman, 1994, January 21) suggested 
that “Turkey should do some homework on its human rights record.” On the other 
hand, following the March 1994 detention of eight Turkish Kurdish parliamentarians, 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (quoted in “Demirel Reacts”, 1994, March 14) 
informed Turkish President Demirel that misinformation and erroneous reports about 
the issue were circulating that were tarnishing Turkey‟s image, adding that he had 
absolutely no intention of interfering in Turkey‟s internal affairs, but only wanted to 
express certain ideas as a friend of Turkey and of the President. After 
parliamentarians were sentenced to up to 15 years imprisonment, a statement issued 
on behalf of the 12-nation group by Germany (quoted in “EU Voices”, 1994, 
December 9) declared that “The European Union regrets that the trial has ended with 
sentences condemning a number of the defendants to long-term imprisonment.” 
Linking these problems to the Customs Union, German Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel (quoted in Bell, 1994, December 14) warned that “Turkey has got to give its 
contribution to the process, I‟m thinking of human rights in particular ... about the 
sentences on Kurdish politicians. That has not really improved the situation, I must 
admit.” He (quoted in “Turkey‟s Right”, 1994, December 19) also noted that “If 
Turkey wants to join Europe, it must not turn a cold shoulder to everything Europe 
stands for.” Following the subsequent Turkish court of Cassation‟s verdict to uphold 
sentences on four of the Kurdish deputies on separatist charges, Kinkel (quoted in 
“Germany Criticizes”, 1995, October 27) declared that 
Bearing in mind the (forthcoming) decision of the European 
Parliament on the creation of a customs union between the EU and 
Turkey, everything must be done on the Turkish side to create the 
appropriate conditions …Yesterday‟s verdict certainly did little to 
help in this respect. 
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  With respect to Turkish incursions into Iraq in pursuit of PKK fighters, 
Kinkel (quoted in “Turkish Raids, 1995, March 23) stated that “Turkey‟s actions in 
northern Iraq give rise to the greatest concern. The Kurdish problem must be solved 
in the first instance through political and legal means, not military means.” He 
(quoted in Sarıoglu, 1995, March 23) also made the demand that “The Turkish armed 
forces must withdraw from northern Iraq”, and warned that “If it stays in the region 
for a long time the approval of the European Parliament for the customs union will 
become more difficult.” Finally, he (quoted in Christie, 1995, April 1) added: 
I will tell my Turkish colleague Inonu that the ongoing military action 
in north Iraq is straining Turkey‟s ties with the 15 Europeans and its 
NATO partners … One must be able to tell one‟s partners: You can't 
do that. Pull out of northern Iraq. Observe human rights and a sense of 
proportion and protect the civilian population. 
Overall, analysis of these speeches indicates that Germany supported the EU‟s 
Customs Union decision, despite Germany‟s heavy political reservations regarding 
the use of German weapons against Turkish civilians, the imprisonment of DEP 
deputies, and human rights problems related to military operations within Turkey. 
 
4.2.2.2 France 
France was one of the main supporters of Turkey during this period for trying 
to integrate Turkey with the EU. French support was openly seen in negotiations 
over the Customs Union, when France occasionally used ideational arguments such 
as the Europeanness of Turkey. For instance, during a parliamentary debate about 
Turkey, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe (quoted in “France Links”, 1994, 
December 14) responded to the criticisms of an opposition deputy by saying: “You 
are making a serious political error by declaring that Turkey has no place in Europe.” 
France also used security arguments, such as the stability of Turkey, in expressing 
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French support for the Customs Union. As French Prime Minister Alain Juppe 
(quoted in Clayton, 1995, February 2) put it, “We attach a lot of importance to the 
stability of a prosperous and democratic Turkey and I think the conclusion of a 
customs union agreement would contribute toward this goal.” President Chirac 
(quoted in Goldsmith and Latour, 1995, July 12) appealed to the European 
Parliament to ratify Customs Union, using similar geopolitical arguments: 
If we reject [Customs union] we run a twofold risk, strengthening 
fundamentalists in Turkey and encouraging Turkey to turn to other 
forms of cooperation which we may later regret … Let us not fall into 
the hands of the fundamentalists in Turkey who are telling the Turkish 
people that Europe is rejecting them simply because they are Muslims. 
 France also spoke against postponing the Customs Union decision scheduled 
for December 1995. As French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette (quoted in 
“Don‟t Delay”, 1995, November 22) argued, 
Thinking that putting off the European Parliament‟s decision on the 
customs agreement between the European Union and Turkey would 
be a middle way between a yes and a no vote would be a dangerous 
illusion … Postponement would be seen as an extremely negative sign 
by the Turkish government and public opinion. 
 
As the term president of the EU during this period, France can be seen as the 
state which worked hardest to persuade Greece to give up her resistance to the 
Customs Union deal. This support was also acknowledged by Turkish politicians, as 
Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1995, 
February 13) noted: “We are receiving considerable assistance from EU term 
president France.” When Greece raised four new conditions for accepting the 
Customs Union deal with Turkey, Alain Juppe (quoted in “EU Warns”, 1995, 
February 17) warned Greece that 
There comes a moment when we will no longer be able to make 
counter-proposals. At that moment, it is take-it or leave-it. If the 
answer is „leave it‟, then there will be no association council with 
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Turkey, but there will also be no association council with Cyprus. 
That must be clear. 
 
 Alain Juppe (quoted in “France Holds”, 1995, February 20) also stated that 
“We have gone a long way to accommodate Greece ... We are looking at ways of 
getting progress before March 6”, and he (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1995, February 
20) warned that he did not want to see “a horse-trading session” between EU 
members. Finally, with the help of French diplomacy, Greece finally lifted her veto 
on the Customs Union with Turkey. However, after the decision, following 
comments of Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin, Greece sent a letter of 
protest about Turkey to Alain Juppe. Juppe (quoted in Taylor, 1995, March 7) 
responded that 
The Union of course would not accept a veto by anyone on the 
rapprochement between itself and the Republic of Cyprus. It is our 
decision and no one can interfere from outside in this decision. The 
threats which some people perceived in certain Turkish statements are 
thus from our point of view null and void. We could not accept from 
anyone the threat to partition Cyprus. 
Like Germany, for France, the main reservations over deepening Turkey‟s 
relations with the EU concerned human rights problems related to the Kurdish issue, 
which France expressed through political arguments. For example, Alain Juppe 
(quoted in “France Links”, 1994, December 14) stated that 
There are political, economic and social forces in Turkey which have 
decided to move towards democracy and towards Europe. These 
forces must understand that this also involves the respect of the rights 
of the individual. 
As for Turkish operations in Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK fighters in 
March 1995, Alain Juppe visited Turkey with other EU foreign ministers and (quoted 
in Sarıoglu, 1995, March 23) stressed that the operation had gone beyond “the right 
216 
 
of hot pursuit”, adding (quoted in “President Demirel”, 1995, March 30) a warning 
about possible effects on the Customs Union agreement: 
 We understand Turkey. However, we are raising questions about 
northern Iraq because we are concerned that if Turkey remains there a 
long time, this would have a negative effect on the European 
Parliament on the eve of the vote on the Customs Union. 
 Alain Juppe (quoted in Folloain, 1995, April 9) asked Turkey to end 
operations as soon as possible and, replying to a question about the EU would do if 
Turkey did not end operations, stated that “The European Parliament has scheduled a 
meeting to ratify a treaty on a customs union with Turkey. We have other diplomatic 
pressures and we will of course use them.” 
 France also emphasized the need for democratic reforms in Turkey in order to 
speed up ratification of the Customs Union. For instance, Alain Juppe (quoted in 
“France Urges”, 1995, June 20) declared that “I hope they will be achieved as soon 
as possible and will allow for in-depth democratization in order to allow for 
ratification of the Customs Union.” 
 In short, France was one of the drivers of the Customs Union negotiations by 
pressurizing Greece to lift her veto. At the same time, however, France also 
expressed its political reservations over human rights problems and Turkish military 
operations. 
 
4.2.2.3 Great Britain 
There was significant British support for Turkish-EU relations during this 
period. For instance, as early as 1992, British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd urged 
the EU to strengthen its links with Turkey, using geopolitical arguments to justify 
this support. According to one British official (quoted in Powel, 1992, May 1), 
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“Turkey‟s role as a regional power is growing in importance ... It has increasing 
influence in the Turkic zones of the ex-Soviet Union.” 
Great Britain also supported the Turkish Customs Union agreement with the 
EU. For instance, in February 1995, regarding the negotiations, Great Britain‟s 
Minister for European Affairs (quoted in “EU Ministers”, 1995, February 7) noted: 
“We‟re pleased with the progress. There‟s momentum behind it”. Moreover, Foreign 
Secretary Malcom Rifkind (quoted in Binyon, 1995, September 7) promised that 
Great Britain would lobby the European Parliament for ratification of Turkey‟s 
customs union with the European Union while, after meeting with Turkish Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller, Prime Minister John Major (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 1995) 
November 22 declared:  
I reiterated our support for a proper customs union agreement between 
the European Union and Turkey and I very much hope that that is the 
decision that the parliament will take in Europe in a few days‟ time … 
I think it's important for the European Union and I think it will be a 
very welcome decision for Turkey as well. 
 Like other EU member states, the main reservation for Great Britain in this 
period was the political problem of human rights related to the PKK and the Kurdish 
issue. For instance, about Turkish operations in Northern Iraq, Douglas Hurd (quoted 
in Binyon, 1995, March 29) warned that operations must be short and sharp and 
should not be directed against Kurdish civilians, making it clear that tolerance in 
Great Britain and NATO for Turkey‟s intervention was wearing thin. Malcom 
Rifkind (quoted in Binyon, 1995, September 7) also stated that, while they 
understood Turkey‟s right to protect its citizens, “We know, too, that the fight 
against terrorism can only be successful if it recognizes the human rights and 
legitimate concerns of the people caught up in it.” Thus, Britain can also be 
considered a driver of Turkey‟s European bid during this period. 
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4.2.2.4 Greece 
During the period leading up to Customs Union, the Cyprus problem was the 
top issue dividing Turkey and Greece. For instance, speaking about Turkey‟s bid for 
EU membership, Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis (quoted in “Greek 
Premier”, 1990, June 5) underlined the importance of solution to the Cyprus 
problem: 
Cyprus is the key to [Turkish-EU] relations. We don‟t want to totally 
block them. An improvement [in the situation in Cyprus] will be 
sufficient for us … It would not be rational to say the dispute can be 
solved as long as Turkish soldiers remain on Cyprus … Cyprus lies at 
the heart of Turkish-Greek ties. This is an inalienable condition for 
Greece. 
  When the 32
nd
 session of the EU-Turkey Association Council met on 30 
September 1991, for the first time since 1986, under Greek pressure, the meeting‟s 
concluding statement included a phase (“EU-Turkey”, 1991, October 4) noting that 
“The Cypriot problem did affect relations between Turkey and the Community.” 
Greek European Union Affairs Minister Theodore Pangalos (quoted in Greece‟s 
Foreign”, 1994, January 14) claimed that “Turkey is the only country in the world 
which occupies militarily the territory of an independent state.” 
 In contrast to their reservations over the Cyprus dispute, Greek politicians, 
though rarely, also used geopolitical arguments to express support for strengthening 
Turkey‟s ties with Europe. For example, Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis        
(quoted in “Greek Premier”, 1991, May 21) declared that “We have always said that 
we favor a pro-European orientation in Turkey. Turkey must be attracted to Europe 
so as not to fall under the influence of Islam. It is a great danger for all Europe and 
especially for us Greeks as we are (Turkey's) closest neighbours.” Nevertheless, this 
did not stop Greece from trying to delay the Association Council due for 19 
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December1994. Although she did not manage to postpone it, Greece successfully 
blocked the Customs Union deal between Turkey and EU due to the Cyprus problem 
and human rights conditions in Turkey. Greece‟s obstruction of a deal came though 
at a cost, as Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın (quoted in Sarıoglu, 1994, 
December 20) pointed out: 
Before the meeting Turkey was facing 15 [EU] countries. Now 15 
countries including Turkey have turned against Greece … Turkey 
took part in yesterday‟s talks to point out an injustice, to underline 
once again our legitimate rights born of agreements and to show that 
Greece hides behind the EU to abuse its membership rights … We 
hope Greece will respond to our calls for solving bilateral problems 
without hiding behind the EU. If it wants to solve the issues, the 
address is Turkey, not the EU. 
 On 5 February 1995, European Union Foreign Ministers agreed on a deal 
which would lift Greece‟s veto on an EU-Turkey Customs Union in return for a 
timetable for Cyprus joining the European Union. As German Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Clayton, 1995, February 7) described it, “Greece has lifted 
its block ... on the understanding that six months after the end of the [1996] inter-
governmental conference [on the Maastricht treaty], the European Union will open 
negotiations with Cyprus.” The Greek government spokesman Evangelos Venizelos 
(quoted in Kyriakidou, 1995, February 7) responded cautiously that “The Greek 
government has reservations until it examines this deal assiduously”, and on 9 
February, he (quoted in “Greece Rejects”, 1995, February 9) reported that “We 
studied the issue assiduously and the position of the Greek government is negative”, 
adding that “Certain aspects are unbeneficial to the Greek side.” In reaction to 
Greece‟s stance, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (quoted in “Turkey‟s Çiller”, 
1995, February 13) warned that “Europe can‟t commit a historic error like keeping 
Turkey out of the customs union. If it does, history will judge it as a great mistake.” 
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Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın (quoted in “Turkey Says” 1995, 
February 13) added 
We are not of the opinion that the customs union should be achieved 
at all costs. We see it as an outcome of obligations carried under 
agreements Turkey and the EU have signed. 
Evangelos Venizelos then announced that Athens would probably sign an 
EU-Turkey customs deal in Brussels on March 6, but only if four issues were 
resolved beforehand: Cyprus‟ EU candidacy; Cyprus‟ participation in dialogue with 
the EU on the same level as that between the EU and East European states; 
ratification by the European Parliament of financial aid to Turkey; and compensation 
for Greek textile producers. He (quoted in “Greece To”, 1995, February 13) 
emphasized that “Greece is only asking for minor and easy-to-make changes to the 
text under discussion.” Finally, on March 3, Greece (Barber, 1995, March 7) 
accepted the text and the common position on the EU-Turkey Customs Union, 
allowing the EU to sign the accord with Turkey on 6 March 1995 in return for the 
EU offering a timetable for Cyprus‟ accession to the EU. According to Venizelos 
(quoted in “Greece Ready”, 1995, March 3) for Greece, the negotiations had been 
“especially successful, securing all of the important points”, while Turkish Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller (quoted in Clayton, 1995, March 7) stated that “Today is an 
historic moment not only for Turkey but for her partners as well. It is an important 
and vital milestone in our relations with the European Union.” 
 After the Customs Union deal had been signed, however, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Murat Karayalcin reportedly warned that if the EU accepted Cyprus‟ 
candidacy, Turkey would annex Northern Cyprus. In response, Venizelos (quoted in 
Kyriakidou, 1995, March 7) warned that “As long as the Turkish threat exists and it 
is expressed so provocatively then Greece can exercise a veto.” Turkish Foreign 
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Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman (quoted in Kyriakidou, 1995, March 7) then 
stated that Karayalçın had “never used the word annex, he never said that at all. But 
he has mentioned in the past the possibility of economic integration with northern 
Cyprus if the Greek Cypriot side is let into the EU”, and quoted Karayalçın as 
suggesting that “Turkey will continue to be against membership for all or part of 
Cyprus before it [Turkey] itself becomes a member of the EU.” 
 To sum up, Turkish customs union challenged the Greek political interest due 
to Cyprus problem and Greece continued to be a brakeman. However, after the 
negotiations, Customs Union turned out to be in Greek political interest because 
European Union Foreign Ministers agreed on a deal which would lift Greece‟s veto 
on an EU-Turkey Customs Union in return for a timetable for Cyprus joining the 
European Union. Therefore, Greece consented to Turkish customs union for her 
political interest of Cyprus‟s accession to the EU. 
 
4.3 From Helsinki Decision to Accession Negotiations 
 
4.3.1 EU-Turkey Relations 
4.3.1.1 From Candidacy to Accession Negotiations 
In this period, the relations between Turkey and the EU started with the 
tension between Greece and Turkey.  The dispute in Aegean over Imia/Kardak islets 
caused concern in the EU. In the declaration which was released in 15 July 1996, it 
was stated  that  relations  between Turkey  and  the European  Union had to  be 
based on a  clear commitment to the principle of   respect  for   international  law   
and  agreements,   the  relevant international  practice,   and  the   sovereignty  and   
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the  territorial integrity of the Member States and of Turkey and it was underlined 
(EU, 1996, July 15)  that the  cases of  disputes created  by territorial claims, such as 
the Imia  Islet issue, should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.” In the 
presidency conclusion of Dublin European Council of December 1996, the political 
reservations of human rights, Aegean dispute and Cyprus issue were emphasized. 
On 16 July 1997, the Commission presented “Agenda 2000: For A Stronger 
and Wider Union” which explained the policies of the Union, the challenge of 
enlargement and the new financial framework for the years 2000-2006. In the part of 
“Challenge of Enlargement”, it was emphasized that the conclusions and the 
recommendations were based on the Copenhagen Criteria and having evaluated the 
extent that candidates already met these criteria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus were recommended by the European 
Commission to start accession negotiations. However, with respect to Turkey, 
political reservations such as unconsolidated character of democracy, problems with 
Greece and Cyprus and economic reservations of financial instability were 
emphasized and Turkey was not proposed as a candidate state.  Instead, the 
Association Agreement and the customs union were (European Commission, 1997: 
56-57) suggested to be the foundations for building an increasingly close political 
and economic relationship with Turkey. 
In the presidency conclusion of the Luxembourg European Council of 
December 1997, the Commission opinion about dividing applicants into two was 
accepted and the European Council decided to begin negotiations with Poland, 
Hungary, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Turkey was not 
accepted as a candidate state but Turkey‟s eligibility for accession to the EU was 
confirmed. It was also underlined that strengthening Turkey's links with the EU 
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depended on Turkey‟s pursuit of the political and economic reforms including the 
alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European 
Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and 
stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular 
by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for 
negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the 
basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Turkey, especially Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz (“Turkey Accuses”, 1998, 
March 7) reacted very harshly to the Luxembourg decision and blamed German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl as discriminating Turkey. As a reaction, Turkey did not 
attend to the European Conference that was held in March 1998. Moreover, Turkey 
declared to suspend political dialogue with the Union and therefore no longer wished 
to discuss with it issues such as relations between Greece and Turkey, Cyprus or 
human rights. Furthermore, as Schimmelfennig (2008:15) emphasized, Turkey 
threatened to veto the use of NATO facilities for EU military missions. 
In the first progress report of the Commission about Turkey‟s accession to the 
EU that was released in October 1998, Turkey‟s progress towards fulfilling the 
Copenhagen Criteria was analyzed. Political reservations such as human rights, 
minority problems, civil control of military, peaceful settlement of disputes with 
neighboring countries were underlined as well as economic reservations such as need 
for macroeconomic stability and preventing regional development disparities. 
The capture of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 triggered violent PKK 
demonstrations in some member states. As a response to these violent acts, the EU 
made a declaration in 22 February 1999 and in the declaration, the violent acts were 
condemned. However, it was also underlined (EU, 1999, March 9) that “The 
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European Union takes note of the assurance of the Turkish Government that 
Abdullah Ocalan will have a fair trial….It underlines once more its strict opposition 
to the death penalty.” On the other hand, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a 
day after, (quoted in European Commission, 1999: 6) responded that 
Questioning the independence of courts in Turkey is unacceptable. 
The intention of the EU to send observers to the hearings is 
tantamount to accepting and encouraging the efforts to intervene in 
and influence the independent judiciary. This attitude which is against 
the principle of the rule of law is also unacceptable. 
 
Ankara State Security Court began the trial of Abdullah Ocalan on 31 May 
1999 and explained its verdict as death sentence on 29 June 1999. As a reaction, the 
presidency of the EU (1999, June 29) underlined “the hope that Turkey will follow 
what has invariably been the practice for the last fifteen years and not carry out the 
death sentence passed on Mr. Ocalan.”  
In the progress report of the Commission that was released in October 1999, 
it was underlined that although basic features of democratic system existed in 
Turkey, it still did not meet the Copenhagen political criteria due to the political 
reservations of human rights, protection of minorities, role of national Security 
Council in political life and death sentence of Ocalan. Moreover, economic 
reservations also emphasized. 
A historic decision to accept Turkey as a candidate state was held in the 
Helsinki European Council. In the presidency conclusion, recent positive 
developments in Turkey as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards 
complying with the Copenhagen criteria were welcomed. It was emphasized that 
“Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European 
strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession 
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strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.” Moreover, in this European Council, 
the two-tier approach was abandoned and Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria Latvia, 
Lithuania and Malta were invited to begin negotiations together. 
Three significant developments were behind this decision. First of all, a 
change of government was seen in Germany. In October 1998, Gerhard Schroeder, 
leader of Social Democratic Party of Germany became the chancellor and he led the 
coalition government of Social Democratic Party and Green Party of Germany.  As 
opposed to the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, Gerard Schroeder‟s attitude 
towards Turkey is more conciliatory and he supported Turkish candidacy in Helsinki 
Summit. Secondly, as Heraclides (2010:144) explained, the change of attitude, 
namely the détente20 in Turkish-Greek relations, due to the triggering event of 
Kosovo Crisis and catalyst of earthquakes of 1999, led Greece not veto Turkish 
candidacy in the Helsinki European Council. Finally, as Avcı (2003: 150) underlines,   
the US under the presidency of Clinton supported Turkish candidacy and lobbied for 
Turkey in the European capitals.  
The EU prepared the Accession Partnership document for Turkey which was 
adopted on March 8, 2001. In particular the political reservation of the Copenhagen 
political criteria was stressed in this document. The document included political 
reservations of the issue of Cyprus, strengthening legal and constitutional guarantees 
relating to the freedom of expression, freedom for non-violent demonstrations and 
meetings, the fight against torture, support for the development of civil society, 
freedom of broadcasting for Turkish citizens in their mother tongues, and 
constitutional and legal arrangements relating to the abolition of the death penalty. It 
also pointed to economic criteria and changes to be made for legislative 
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 According to Heraclides, it is more correct the label the thaw in Greek-Turkish relations as detente 
due to the fact that the thaw was tangible and proved to be far from ephemeral.  
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harmonization. With this document, the EU presented an important roadmap to 
Turkey to satisfy the criteria for membership by setting out the short-and medium-
term measures. In order to institutionalize the reforms asked for by the EU, Turkey 
established „The Turkish National Programme for the adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA)‟ in March 19, 2001, the first part of which dealt with the political criteria.  
In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament initiated the reforms that were stated 
in the NPAA by passing a package of thirty four amendments to the constitution. 
Amendments were related to the articles affecting the freedoms of expression, 
organization and assembly, the use of minority languages, the partial abolition of the 
death penalty, and the role of the military in politics. For the role of the military in 
politics, structural reforms have been passes to curtail the NSC‟s powers by 
increasing the number of the civilians in the council. The reform process continued 
with the „Harmonization Laws‟(HLs)-The Democratization Packages- which were 
designed to translate the Constitutional Amendments into action as part of the 
process of bringing Turkish Law into line with the European Acquis. HLs were 
passed in 2002 and 2003 in seven reform packages. Two of the most controversial 
HLs were, the removal of death penalty, including for those convicted of terrorist 
activity and the broadcasting and education in Kurdish encountered, as Onis 
(2003:14) indicates, major opposition from the military and nationalist parties, 
especially, the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party.
21
 However, despite the 
resistance, in the summer of August 2002, the parliament approved the removal of 
death penalty except for the crimes committed in cases of war, or the imminent threat 
of war. Moreover, the scope of freedom of expression was also broadened by 
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 Nationalist Action Party was a key member of the incumbent coalition government and it has been 
playing a major role in terms of explicitly blocking some of the major political reforms needed to 
meet the EU‟s democratic norms in the post 1999 era.  
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permitting the use of local languages other than Turkish in radio and television 
broadcasting and their teaching by private language courses. With this law, the state 
television started to broadcast in Kurdish (in two dialects), Bosnian, Arabic and 
Circassian.  
On 9 October 2002, in the progress report of the Commission, it is pointed 
out that although Turkey has made considerable progress in meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria through constitutional reform and a series of legislative packages, further 
reforms are needed for advancing Turkish candidacy. Therefore, it was not 
recommended to open accession negotiations with Turkey. 
On November 3, 2002, the Justice and Development Party, led by Tayyip 
Erdogan won an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections, returning Turkey, 
which were governed by coalition governments for the last fifteen years, to single-
party rule. Contrary to the suspicions that he would oppose the EU membership 
because of his Islamist background, as Phillips (2004:90) suggests, “he appears to 
embrace without qualification Ataturk‟s vision of Turkey as a secular democracy” 
and Erdogan government, with its majority in the parliament, has continued the 
reform process even more effectively than the previous government.  
In the presidency conclusion of Copenhagen European Council of December 
2002, the steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, in 
particular through the recent legislative packages were welcomed. However, it was 
underlined (2002:5) that “If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of 
a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations 
with Turkey without delay.” Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul (quoted in 
228 
 
Andrews, 2002, December 13) reacted harshly to the result of the Summit and 
suggested that discrimination towards Turkey was made. Furthermore, the 
Commission was given the duty of preparing a revised accession partnership which 
was adopted by the Council in May 2003 and in July 2003; a revised National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis was adopted. In order to comply with 
the Acquis, Erdogan government has pursued legislative and constitutional reforms 
liberalizing the political system and relaxing restrictions on freedom of the press, 
association, and expression. On 19 July 2003, the notorious Article 8 of the anti-
terror law was abolished. On May 7, 2004, ten articles of the constitution have been 
amended. Among the most important amendments were related to death penalty and 
the role of the military in politics. As Ozbudun and Yazici (2004:22) emphasize, “the 
2004 constitutional amendment totally abolished death penalty including the cases of 
war or the imminent threat of war, thereby removing the constitutional obstacle to 
the ratification by Turkey of the 13th Additional Protocol to the ECHR.” When the 
role of the military in politics is considered, state security courts were totally 
abolished and the military‟s privilege of exclusion from the judicial control of the 
Court of Accounts was eliminated. It is argued (Ozbudun and Yazici, 2004:39) that, 
“These reforms not only contributed to the civilianization process of Turkey but also 
provided entire transparency for public expenditure.” In June, 2004, Leyla Zana and 
three other Kurdish parliamentarians, who were jailed after the closure of the DEP in 
1994, were released which was recommended by the EU since their detention. 
Therefore, it can be argued that, Turkey has made extensive reforms to democratize 
its institutional structure in order to start accession talks on 17 December 2004.  
With respect to Cyprus issue, in 24 April 2004, the Turkish Cypriots accepted 
the United Nations‟ Annan plan for a peaceful reunification of Cyprus with 65 percent of 
229 
 
votes whereas Greek Cypriots rejected the proposal by 76 percent. As decided by the EU 
before the referendum, Cyprus became a member of the EU in May 1, 2004. 
In the 2004 progress report of the European Commission, it was 
acknowledged that Turkey achieved noteworthy legislative progress in many areas, 
through further reform packages, constitutional changes and the adoption of a new 
Penal Code. However, it was highlighted that implementation of the political reforms 
needed to be further consolidated and broadened. 
In the presidency conclusion of Brussels European Council, Turkish reform 
process was welcomed and it was expected that Turkey would actively pursue its 
efforts to bring into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the 
Commission. Moreover, the European Council invited the Commission to present to 
the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations with Turkey and it requested 
the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 
October 2005. 
 
4.3.1.2 Attitudes of Commissioners towards Turkey 
In October 1999, the president of European Commission Romano Prodi 
(1999, October 27) underlined that “Turkey too is a candidate country.” Likewise, 
Commissioner Verheugen (1999, November 4) suggested that “Turkey should now 
be considered as a candidate.” In addition, Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou 
(2000, June 23) underlined “the importance the EU attaches to Turkey as a candidate 
country.  
Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek (1997, February 27) labeled Turkey as 
partner by suggesting that “We want the closest possible relations with Turkey in all 
230 
 
areas: political, economic and commercial. We have shown this by creating a 
customs union with Turkey, one of the closest relationships the Union has with any 
partner country.” Geopolitical arguments were also used. As Commissioner Van Den 
Broek (1997, November 27) underlined:   
Turkey's geo-strategic position and its steadfastness over decades as a 
secular Moslem country engaged in modernisation and economic 
development further reinforce its position as a valued neighbour in a 
sensitive region. 
 
He (1998, April 17) also suggested that “there is no doubt in our minds that 
Turkey is a vital and strategic partner to the EU.” Commissioner Verheugen (2001, 
October 24) also asserted that “Its significance clearly goes beyond its geo-strategic 
position between the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle 
East.” Moreover, Olli Rehn (2004, December 12) underlined that “A Turkey where 
the rule of law is firmly rooted in its society and state will prove that, contrary to 
prejudices, European values can successfully coexist with a predominantly Muslim 
population. Such a Turkey will be a most valuable crossroads between civilizations.” 
 European Commissioners pointed out security interest in their speeches as 
well. For example, Romano Prodi (2004, January 15) suggested that “I am convinced 
that Turkey can bring a unique contribution to peace and regional stability at the 
beginning of this new century.” 
For the first time in the speeches, ideational arguments are emphasized in the 
support speeches in 2004. Europeanness of Turkey is underlined though with 
reference to Association Agreement.  Romano Prodi (2004, January 15) suggested 
that “The fact that Turkey belongs to Europe was recognized already in our 
Association Agreement of 1963.” Similarly, Olli Rehn (2004, October 5) underlined 
that 
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The question is often raised whether Turkey is in fact a European 
country. The European Community gave its answer to this question 
over forty years ago, in 1963, when the then President of the 
Commission, Walter Hallstein, said: ”La Turquie fait partie de 
l’Europe. Elle établit des rapports constitutionnels avec la 
Communauté européenne. Comme cette Communauté elle-même, ces 
rapports sont régis par l’idée d’évolution.” [Turkey is part of Europe. 
It is forming constitutional ties with the European Community. Like 
the Community itself, those ties are intended to evolve.] 
In most of the speeches, political arguments were used by Commissioners as 
reservations. For instance, Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek (1997, June 5) 
indicated that “The tense relations with its neighbor and EU member Greece, as well 
as its position on Cyprus and the issue of human rights in Turkey, influence the 
quality of Turkish relations with the European Union.” Moreover, he (1997, 
November 27) also stressed that “We are emphasizing the need for positive signals 
from Turkey in three areas: the protection of human rights, the improvement of 
relations with Greece and progress towards a settlement of the Cyprus question.” 
Furthermore, considering Copenhagen Criteria, he (1998, April 16) also underlined 
that “At this point in time it does not fulfill these criteria and the situation is further 
complicated by tensions over Cyprus but also by tensions in the Aegean.” Likewise, 
(2000, November 8) Verheugen also underlined that  
We are still concerned about the inadequate respect for human rights 
and the rights of minorities as well as about the constitutionally 
enshrined role played by the armed forces in political life via the 
National Security Council. The situation of the Kurds has to be 
improved and the state of emergency still in effect in the 4 south-
eastern provinces must be lifted.  
 
Similarly, in 2002 Romano Prodi (2002, December 4) suggested that “It is in 
our interest that a great partner such as Turkey, whose role is enormously important 
strategically, politically and economically, should reinforce its institutions, improve 
the quality of its democratic life and commit itself to the values and principles we 
share.” He (2003, November 5) also stressed that “We will be watching further 
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developments closely in the areas where progress is still needed. This concerns both 
legislation and the actual implementation of the new rights and freedoms.” In 
addition, Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou (2003, November 4) suggested that 
“Before we can start negotiations, Turkey must undertake major reforms in its 
political system so as to ensure full control of the military by the political leadership 
and full operation of the rule of law in accordance with international agreements and 
international practice.” Gunter Verheugen (2004, June 16) also suggested that “The 
Copenhagen political criteria sets out the conditions that needs to be met. The 
sequence is clear. First meeting the political criteria and then negotiations. These 
criteria were not invented for Turkey, but apply equally to all candidates.” 
Cyprus Problem, as a political reservation was also raised. For instance, Hans 
van den Broek (1997, November 14) underlined that 
Tensions over Cyprus have slowed down Turkey's ever closer 
relations with the European Union. During my recent visit to Ankara, 
I brought the message that progress on Cyprus would greatly facilitate 
the development of our mutual relations.  
Commissioner Verheugen (2001, October 17) suggested that “A solution will 
also greatly facilitate the development of EU - Turkey relations.” Moreover, 
Commissioner Verheugen (2003, March 4) also highlighted that  
Turkey is also well advised to reflect over the consequence of a non-
settlement for its EU-aspirations. After 1 May 2004 they would face a 
situation where Turkey does not recognize one of EUs member states. 
It is difficult to see how it would be possible to start accession 
negotiations under such circumstances.  
 
Moreover, Prodi (2003, November 5) also underlined that “Reaching a 
settlement quickly is in Turkey's interest too, because this would prevent the Cyprus 
issue from becoming an obstacle to its own aspirations.”  
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On the hesitation towards Turkey in the public opinion, Commission 
President Romani Prodi (2004, January 15) suggests that 
It is in my view important for the political leadership in the EU and in 
Turkey to recognise and manage this political reality. There are those 
who are concerned about the religious dimension. Others have raised 
issues such as the capacity of the Union to integrate a country of the 
size and with the demography of Turkey, the economic development 
of Turkey and Turkey's geographical situation. We need to reply to 
these concerns. 
 
The Commissioners also mention political reservation of absorption capacity. 
Olli Rehn (2004, October 5) underlined that “We must also not lose sight of another 
important factor identified at Copenhagen: the EU‟s capacity to absorb new 
members, if it is to keep up the impetus of European integration and serve its own 
and the candidate countries‟ broader interests.”  
 
 
4.3.2 Attitudes of Member State towards Turkey 
 
4.3.2.1 Germany 
In the period of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the relations between Germany and 
Turkey were tense due to the fact that Germany had reservations for Turkish 
accession.  In the Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan, relations with Germany 
strained more with the statements of Erbakan. German Foreign Minister Kinkel 
visited Turkey and during his visit, Erbakan (quoted in “Germany‟s Kinkel”, 1997, 
March 27) criticized that “There will be a $5 billion loss for Turkey because it has 
entered the customs union ... After they have done this they will bow their heads 
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when they talk with Turkey,” and as a response to Erbakan, Kinkel told that “No 
European will have to bow their head to Turkey in shame.” 
 Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz (quoted in “Yılmaz Says” 1997, September 
29), in his visit to Germany underlined the strategic importance of Turkey by 
suggesting that “It would be unfair and a fatal, strategic mistake to exclude Turkey 
from the expansion plans of the EU… I will try to convince the German government 
to avoid making a mistake.” After the Luxembourg Summit, as a response to 
criticism about blocking Turkish accession, Helmut Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Denies”, 
1997, December 13) suggested that 
I do not know where you get the idea from that I or the German 
government are particularly nervous with respect to the question of the 
accession of Turkey. This is totally erroneous…Turkey has the same 
treatment as others.  
 However, Turkish diplomats declared explicitly the German blockage. Selim 
Yenel (quoted in Freeman, 1997, December 19), deputy head of Turkish mission to 
the EU in Brussels highlighted that “Great Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands 
have all supported us as a candidate…It was only German opposition and Greek 
opposition that stopped us.” Kinkel (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1997, December 20) 
protected Helmut Kohl by underlining that “No one has worked harder at European 
integration, and the integration of Turkey, than Chancellor Kohl.” 
 After the Luxembourg Summit Turkey declared not to attend the European 
Conference but German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his French counterpart 
Hubert Vedrine (quoted in “France-Germany”, 1998, February 4) emphasized that 
“Germany and France have an intense interest on a lasting integration of Turkey in 
Europe.” Yilmaz however, made relations tenser by his sharp remarks. In an 
interview with Financial Times, Mesut Yilmaz charged the German government with 
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pursuing in Eastern Europe a policy of Lebensraum
22
 and made discrimination 
against Turkey. He (quoted in Barham, 1998, March 6) suggested that 
The Germans continue the same strategy as before….They believe in 
Lebensraum. That means the central and eastern European countries 
are of strategic importance for Europe and for Germany as their 
backyard….Their final goal is to include these countries in Nato and 
the EU, and to divide Europe between Bulgaria and Turkey. Turkey 
should be a good neighbour for Europe, but not a member of the 
EU…If we attend the European conference, it would mean accepting 
the discrimination against us. 
As a reaction to Yilmaz‟s remarks, Foreign Ministry spokesman Martin 
Erdmann (quoted in Boston, 1998, March 6) suggested that “If these statements are 
true then it is an inexcusable defamation of German policies….The German 
government does not want to add fuel to the fire.” Moreover, Government 
spokesman Peter Hausmann (quoted in Boston, 1998, March 6) stated that Yilmaz's 
statements were in contrast to the "friendly relations" over decades between Bonn 
and Ankara and added that “We formally reject these statements.” Yilmaz (quoted in 
“Turkey Accuses”, 1998, March 7) continued to attack Germany by suggesting that 
“The decision in Luxembourg aimed to isolate Turkey and was influenced to a great 
extent by Germany.” Kohl (quoted in Hamilton, 1998, March 12) responded to 
Yilmaz‟s comments about lebensraum by underlining that “At various times in the 
European process people need a bogeyman. The Germans are the genetically natural 
candidates because of their history.” Kinkel (quoted in “Kinkel Urges”, 1998, March 
13) also suggested that “Yilmaz's remarks were not helpful. I have openly rejected 
his remarks. We now have to look ahead.” 
Yilmaz needed to make an explanation about his remarks about Germany. He 
(quoted in “Turkey‟s Yılmaz”, 1998, March 14) suggested that “In no way did I want 
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 Adolf Hitler's policy of aggressive expansion in the 1930s to create "living space" for the German 
people 
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to draw a direct comparison between the National Socialist (Nazi) dictatorship and 
the present…It is, however, important to make Germany's incorrect behavior clear.” 
Yilmaz (quoted in Thompson, 1998, April 25) also emphasized that “The decision 
not to include Turkey was unfair and constituted a historic and strategic mistake…I 
believe the German government has understood Turkey's position and that this 
mistake will be corrected in the near future.” 
 In May 1998, relations started to get warmer with the dialogue of foreign 
minister Ismail Cem and Klause Kinkel. Kinkel (quoted in “Turkey Angry”, 1998, 
May 28) emphasized that “We have indeed been in heavy waters in recent months 
but partnership and friendship between Turkey and Germany are simply too 
important for us to ignore the fact that we must get out of these stormy seas.” 
However, Yilmaz suggested that the Cardiff Summit did not yield a progress and 
(quoted in “Turkish Premier”, 1998, July 29) emphasized that   
On the one hand, they say: Europe needs Turkey, Turkey belongs to 
Europe, Turkey will become a full member of the EU - on the other, 
they are trying very carefully to keep Turkey away from all bodies and 
decision-making mechanisms of European cooperation. 
 In October 1998, Gerard Schroeder, even before becoming the chancellor of 
Germany, showed sign of a change of attitude in future German government towards 
Turkey. Although he mentioned the economic and human rights problems, he 
(quoted in “Schroeder Europe”, 1998, October 2) also underlined that “The European 
door for Turkey must remain open.” Likewise, German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer (quoted in “New German”, 1998, November 19) suggested “if Turkey wishes 
to walk the road of accession to the EU, then it is a candidate-country like all the 
others.” He (quoted in “Turkey Needs”, 1998, November 24) added that “We are 
expending effort on achieving a significant improvement in our relations with Turkey 
after they dramatically worsened through statements (by Helmut Kohl).” Similarly, 
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Fischer (quoted in Boulton, 1999, July 22) reiterated that “We want obstacles that 
have existed in the past, and that we regret, to be overcome and we want Turkey 
formally to become a candidate for entry to the European Union.” 
 After the devastating earthquake of August 1999, Chancellor Schroeder 
promised to help Turkey by inducing other governments‟ objections by (quoted in 
“Schroeder German”, 1999, September 1) stating that “we are trying to explain to 
other countries that after the quake disaster Turkey faced, this country's process of 
approaching with the EU has to be speeded up.” Before the Helsinki Summit, after 
meeting with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, Schroeder (quoted in “Germany‟s 
Schroeder”, 1999, October 20) suggested that “Ideally we would like to give Turkey 
entry candidate status in Helsinki. Turkey knows a lot remains to be done, but the 
prospect of (joining) Europe should be there.” Similarly,  although he reminded 
Copenhagen Criteria, Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Urges”, 1999, December 3) 
reiterated that “We want a European Turkey and therefore we want to open up for 
Turkey a credible prospect of Europe…The government strongly supports giving 
Turkey the status of membership candidate for the European Union.” 
 Germany continued to support Turkish bid of EU membership after the 
candidacy. In 2002, Turkey was expecting opening of accession talks. Before the EU 
summit in Copenhagen, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (“Germany To”, 2002, 
October 23) underlined that “As far as we are concerned, we are going to do all we 
can to get the most positive possible signal.” However, after the victory of Islamist 
based JDP, a hesitation was seen in Germany with respect to Turkey. For instance, 
Schroeder suggested that Turkey's future lay with the European Union, and (quoted 
in Germany‟s Schroeder”, 2002, November 13) called on its new ruling party to 
continue the reform process and added that “Europe is keen that a country as 
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important as Turkey does not slide into Islamic fundamentalism.” Fischer (quoted in 
“UK Throws”, 2002, November 21) called for the Copenhagen summit to issue a 
„clear signal‟ toward Ankara, but said “whether it will go as far as Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan wants, that I cannot tell you.” After meeting with Turkish President Sezer, 
Schroeder (quoted in “Turkish President”, 2002, November 27) underlined that “We 
have noted with great respect how much progress the reform process in Turkey has 
made…We believe this reform process will be pursued with great determination by 
the new leadership.” This reservation of Germany was also realized by Erdogan 
(quoted in Godoy, 2002, November 28) who underline that “only Germany is still 
hesitating, and all other leaders have expressed their support for Turkey.” 
 At the same time, Christian Democratic Union leader Angela Merkel also 
raised concern about Turkey. She (quoted in “German Conservatives”, 2002, 
December 3) suggested that Ankara should instead be offered a privileged 
partnership and added that “It would be a mistake to think that the prospect of a date 
for the start of talks ... would accelerate democratic and economic reforms in Turkey, 
still less cement them into place.” 
 Before the Copenhagen European Council, a date for the date of opening 
accession negotiations were proposed by Germany and France together and Erdogan 
(quoted in Keaten, 2002, December 5) criticized this proposal as follows: 
I find this decision still disputable…This is not fair. This is 
unacceptable….To display such double standards against a country 
with such an interest, affection and determination (toward the EU) 
brings questions to our minds. 
Fischer (quoted in “Turkey Should”, 2002, December 9) responded that “I 
will appeal that people use their common sense and look at the German-French 
proposal and so conclude that this is not a matter of prestige, but a strategic 
decision… I think that Turkey should realize what this means for the country and see 
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this as not a date in the far-off future but in a reasonable time-frame.” The Prime 
Minister Gul (quoted in “Turkey Rejects”, 2002, December 11) complained that “It 
is not possible to accept the 2005 date. We absolutely reject it…We insist on a date 
by the end of 2003.” In the same vein, Erdogan (quoted in Culpan, 2002, December 
11) expressed his disappointment to learn that some countries still want to give 
Turkey a date for a date and suggested that “Unfortunately Germany was one of 
these countries. That really hurt us. We had especially expected Germany to stand by 
us.”  Fischer (quoted in Utku, 2002, December 13) responded to the criticisms from 
Turkey 
We worked so hard to get a date. Everybody understands that we are 
under strong pressure at home, we took some risk. But we were 
convinced it was a justified decision…It was really not easy to 
achieve this breakthrough and the breakthrough is the date. There is 
definitely a fixed date. We are not a Christian Club, we are a club of 
shared values. 
 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (quoted in “Turkey Unlikely, 2002, 
December 13) warned that it was too optimistic to predict that Turkey could join the 
European Union before 2010 and membership negotiations, which could start in 
2005, “will last a very long time because there are very difficult questions to be 
settled.” 
In the end of 2002, Turkey‟s trial of  members of several German non-
governmental organizations, accused of undermining national security, was criticized 
by Interior Minister Otto Schily. He (quoted in “German Minister”, 2002, December 
28) suggested that this trial prove to be “serious set-back on (Turkey's) road toward 
European membership…I call on the Turkish government and judiciary to come to 
its senses. Germany is taking this event very, very seriously.” 
 In September 2003, Gerhard Schroder (quoted in Williamson, 2003, 
September 2) suggested that he had “lots of respect for progress made by Turkey 
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under the leadership of Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan. I'm pretty sure this 
will be helpful in achieving Turkey's wish of joining the EU.” As a response to the 
remarks of Angela Merkel, Schroeder (quoted in “(EU)/EU”, 2003, September 4) 
also underlined that “Turkey's expectations and hopes for its future membership of 
the EU should not be disappointed. This lies also in Germany's interests.”  
After the suicidal attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in “Don‟t Slam”, 2003, November 29) suggested 
that “For 40 years promises have been made to Turkey, and now that Turkey has 
undertaken a determined programme of reforms and that terrorism has caused 
hundreds of victims in Istanbul, we must keep open the gates to Europe for Turkey.” 
German Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel (quoted in “Turkey 
Wows”, 2004, February 5) reiterated that she was in favor of a „specific partnership‟ 
with Turkey and (quoted in “Turkey Wows”, 2004, February 5) added that “Over the 
past 40 years were have made mistakes. We have fueled hopes. It is better to be 
honest and to say what is achievable and what is not.” Erdogan (quoted in “Turkish 
PM”, 2004, February 16) responded that “An issue such as a special partnership is 
not on Turkey's agenda. Such a thing is out of the question.” 
 In October 2004, Schroeder (quoted in “Erdogan-Schroeder”, 2004, October 
4) suggested that the Commission would publish a positive report on October 6
th
 and 
“Germany will vote in a positive way regarding the start of entry talks with Turkey in 
December.” Likewise, about the French objections, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gul (quoted in “Turkey Counts”, 2004, October 14) suggested that 
“Germany is among the countries who are the biggest supporters of Turkey.” Fischer 
also (quoted in “Germany Will”, 2004, October 18) suggested that “We will do 
everything in our power to ensure a positive decision in December.” 
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For Turkish politicians, the main reason of German reservation was the fear 
of free movement of labor. After the entering into force of Customs Union 
agreement, Prime Minister Yilmaz (quoted in “Turkey‟s Yilmaz”, 1996, 14 May) 
suggested that Germany was concerned about free movement of labor for Turks that 
EU membership would bring and underlined that “Our goal is Turkey's full 
membership in the EU. We hear everywhere that Germany's attitude is the biggest 
obstacle, not that of Greece.” Helmut Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Denies”, 1997, 
December 13) also accepted this fear and suggested that “A dramatic change in the 
number of Turks in Germany would not be tolerable to German public opinion nor to 
those in the rest of the European Union.” 
The main reservation for Germany that was stated explicitly was the 
compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. As early as 1997, Foreign Minister Kinkel 
(quoted in Barham, 1997, March 27) underlined that “Turkey has serious problems 
with the EU…Its EU membership will not come in the near future because of human 
rights problems, the Kurdish problem, problems with Greece and economic 
problems.” Similarly, Kinkel (quoted in “Kinkel Says”, 1997, September 9) pointed 
out that 
Turkey has had a place reserved for it on the European train since 
1963 but there is no chance of it getting on the train in the near 
future… (Turkey) has to do its domestic chores…The first of these are 
human rights, the Kurdish problem and economic problems. 
German politicians mainly underlined human rights, as a part of Copenhagen 
Criteria. Kinkel (quoted in “EU Barred”, 1999, October 22) suggested that “Turkey 
knows that the route to Europe only follows a significant improvement in the human 
rights situation there.” However, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (quoted in “Turkey 
Says”, 1997, October 23) criticized Kinkel by stating that 
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We must accelerate our improvement in some areas in Turkey ... but I 
tell them (European officials) Turkey's deficiencies have been 
exaggerated by some circles in the European Union for political 
reasons…I am opposed to putting this (human rights) issue on the 
agenda with the aim of delaying Turkey's entrance into the European 
Union. 
 After the Luxembourg European Council, Turkey criticized Germany for 
excluding Turkey for different reasons but Kinkel (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1997, 
December 20) responded that “Democracy is insufficient in Turkey and the 
relationship with Greece is insufficient. These are the reasons that Turkey is not 
being invited.” Kinkel (quoted in “Germany Urges”, 1998, April 19) also 
emphasized that high emotions and expectations of Luxembourg had led to 
disappointment of Turkey and suggested that “Turkey must deal with its problems, 
with the occupation of north Cyprus, the Kurdish question and human rights 
problems.” Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Urges”, 1999, December 3) reiterated 
that  
Only when the political criteria of Copenhagen and Article Six of the 
EU treaty are met - that means safeguarding human rights and respect 
and protection for minorities as well as the stable rule of law - can the 
question of starting actual entry negotiations be raised….There can be 
no exceptions on this. Whoever wants to belong to Europe, to the 
European Union, must acknowledge its values. 
In 2004, Fischer (quoted in “Germany Will”, 2004, October 18) suggested that 
the prospect of membership was a longer-term one that will still require great efforts 
and added that “From our point of view, it is clear that the reform process must be 
pushed forward energetically.” 
German politicians also used geopolitical arguments such as strategic 
importance of Turkey, together with the reservations for accession. For instance, 
Kinkel (quoted in Barham, 1997, March 27) suggested that “Turkey is an important 
member of Nato. Turkey's strategic importance gives it responsibility, and Turkey 
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should show this responsibility over Nato's enlargement.” Likewise, Kinkel (quoted 
in “German FM”, 1997, June 30) highlighted that 
Turkey serves as a very important bridge to the Islamic world, new 
Turkic states and Asia. Turkey for us is an indispensable ally that we 
cannot afford to lose. This country has also been a member of the 
Association Council with the EU since 1964, and nearly two million 
of Turkey's citizens live with us. All of this compiled together shows 
that Turkey is an indispensable ally. However, they have to solve the 
problems which they themselves know must be solved. 
German Foreign Minister Fischer (quoted in 1998, December 15) also 
highlighted that “Her geopolitical significance is great and there is a Turkish 
minority in many EU countries which has a strong status.” Likewise, Schroeder 
(quoted in “Schroeder Warns”, 2002, December 19) also argued that “If its citizens 
so choose, Turkey can be an important, perhaps the most important, bridge between 
continental Europe and the eastern Mediterranean region.” Fisher (quoted in 
“Germany‟s Fischer”, 2004, January 21) also underlined that “For us, for Europe, 
Turkey is a strategic partner... Turkey's strategic importance has become even more 
evident since September 11.” Before the EU summit in December 2004, Schroeder 
(quoted in “Schroeder Build”, 2004, November 26) suggested that the importance of 
accepting Turkey as follows: 
It is not history, language or religion that make Europe unique...but 
political principles and cultural attitudes - standing up for peace, 
respect for the individual and tolerance in company with cultural 
diversity…Europe has the historic chance to build a bridge to the 
Islamic world.  
Similarly, Fischer (quoted in “Turkey EU, 2004, December 15) also underlined 
that  
If, as seems highly likely, EU leaders give the go-ahead on Friday... a 
new chapter will be written in the history of Europe…Turkey belongs 
to Europe. Seen from a historical point of view, Christianity and 
Western values have left their mark on Turkey just as much as Islam 
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and Oriental traditions…A tolerant, modern and moderately Islamic 
Turkey at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East would have a 
big effect on the whole Islamic world…Slamming the door of the EU 
in Turkey's face would only strengthen those in Ankara who reject 
Europe and democratic traditions. No one can want that and no one 
has the right to want that.  
Fear of Islamic fundamentalism was another geostrategic argument for Turkey. 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in “German Fischer, 1999, 
September 16) suggested that “If the 15-nation EU did not give Turkey a realistic 
hope of joining it would ultimately lead to "self-isolation and strengthen Islamic 
forces there.” Similarly, Schroeder (quoted in Cole, 2002, December 4) also 
suggested that “We have a national interest in making sure that Turkey does not drift 
into Islamic fundamentalism. That we have a national interest in Turkey having an 
ever closer bond to the West.” Fisher (quoted in “German FM”, 2004, January 21) 
underlined that “If Islam and democracy (in Turkey) can be brought together in an 
open and strong civil society that would be of tremendous importance…If we shut 
the door in Turkey's face we will pay a heavy price.”  
 After the suicidal bombing in Istanbul in November 2003, security arguments 
were also used by German politicians. For instance, Schroeder (quoted in 
Kirschbaum, 2003, November 26) suggested that “From a political point of view it's 
a hugely interesting thought that we should fully examine: whether the security 
interests of Germany, and Europe, could be served if an experiment in Turkey 
succeeds and creates a link between the Islamic religion and values of freedom.” 
Similarly, he (quoted in “Germany Renews”, 2004, April 27) underlined that 
Turkey's „non-aggressive‟ Muslim society would bring “an incredible security boost” 
to Europe when it joins. Moreover, he (quoted in “Germany‟s Schroeder”, 2004, 
June 24) referred to stability by suggesting that “a Turkey which has started 
accession talks will play a greater role of stability in its region.” Furthermore, he 
245 
 
(quoted in “Erdogan Schroeder”, 2004, October 4) underlined that “We all see how 
unstable the Middle East and front Asia are. Turkey has become a stability element 
in the region under the leadership of Erdogan.” 
Although the problems of Turkey in the compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria were emphasized, ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey were 
also used by German politicians. For instance, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
(quoted in Smith, 1996, November 6) underlined that “Turkey belongs to Europe. 
Europeans must do everything to show Turkey we want it with us.” After the 
disappointing Luxembourg European Council, Klause Kinkel (quoted in “Focus-
EU”, 1997, December 15) underlined that “We are not going to close the door on 
Turkey. Turkey belongs within Europe, we want it to be there with us.” 
Ideational arguments such as not sharing common religion were also believed 
to be behind German opposition to Turkey. According to Yilmaz (quoted in John, 
1997, December 19), Kohl told that EU was based on “Christian principles and there 
is no space for a country which doesn't share this cultural identity” and Yilmaz 
suggested that this clearly referred to predominantly Islamic Turkey and added that 
“Of course, the German government will deny it.” However, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl 
Denies”, 1997, December 13) denied that by suggesting  
It is particularly wrong to say that we have an anti-Islamic 
position…Perhaps it would be interesting for a reporter...to do a 
comparative report seeing how many Christian churches are in 
Turkish cities. 
Foreign Minister Kinkel was also in Kohl‟s side by (quoted in Kirschbaum, 
1997, December 20) underlining that “The attacks that (Yilmaz) made against the 
chancellor are completely off target and inappropriate…You can accuse him of many 
things, but not that.” Likewise, he (quoted in Fleck, 1998, March 13) stated that 
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“Candidates for the EU are not judged on the basis of religion, the decisive thing is 
that they must fulfill the criteria.” 
After the change of government, however, Guenter Verheugen (quoted in 
Gray, 1998, November 12), state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, criticized the 
previous German government's stance on possible Turkish EU membership by 
suggesting that  
We reject the idea that the European Union cannot be open to a 
country because it does not belong to the Christian cultural sphere … 
If we want Turkey to change, to become a country which meets 
Western democratic and constitutional standards, we must offer it a 
perspective. 
Likewise, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in “New 
German”, 1998, November 19) suggested that his new government's position is that 
“The European Union is not a Christian community, but a community of values and 
interests…Turkey would implement these values within the country…It is a 
condition of membership which all candidate countries must fulfill.”  
Before the EU summit in Copenhagen, the leader of JDP, Erdogan (quoted in 
“UK Throws”, 2002, November 21) warned that “We do not see the EU as a 
Christian club and we do not want it to be considered as such … Turkey will be the 
best example of the compatibility between Islam and democracy.” Schroeder also 
(quoted in “Schroeder Warns”, 2002, December 19) warned Merkel about using 
Islam issue and suggested that  
Those who want to use the topic of Turkish accession to instigate a 
new clash of civilizations along the lines of Christian Western Europe 
against Islam want to fool people that Muslims can be kept out of our 
culture and society…That is false and dangerous. Muslims belong to 
the obvious daily life of all European societies. 
 
 Consequently, Germany, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, had political and 
ideational reservations towards Turkey and did not let Turkey become a candidate in 
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the Luxembourg European Council. However, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz reacted 
harshly to this decision and did not attend the European Conference. In addition, he 
also froze Turkey‟s relations with the EU. So, Germany, in the period of Helmut 
Kohl was a brakeman in Turkey‟s European aspirations. On the other hand, with the 
Chancellorship of Gerard Schroeder, the German attitude towards Turkey changed 
dramatically. Hence, Germany, in the period of Schroeder became a driver of 
Turkey‟s European bid. 
 
4.3.2.2 France 
This period was marked with French support for Turkish bid for EU until the 
election of JDP in November 3, 2002. From this date on, due to the hesitations about 
Turkey‟s European orientation and secular character, public concern about Turkish 
accession to the EU came to the fore. Although government, especially Chirac, 
supported Turkish accession explicitly, it can be argued that reservations towards 
Turkish accession increased and there were reservation statements just for the sake of 
domestic politics. 
After the Customs Union agreement, France continued to support Turkish bid 
to the EU. For instance, Chirac (quoted in “Chirac Says”, 1996, July 9) emphasized 
that “I noted your government's programme with great interest and congratulate you 
on your desire to continue tightening links between Turkey and the European 
Union…France will support your efforts in this direction.” In the way towards 
candidacy, France was supporting a financial protocol for Turkey so far blocked by 
Greece  and Catherine Colonna, President Jacques Chirac's spokeswoman, quoted 
(“Chirac See”, 1999, August 31) Chirac as telling Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail 
Cem that “We must find a way for Turkey and the EU to collaborate. This tragedy 
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may in the end be a way to advance things.” Moreover, she (quoted in “France 
Says”, 1999, December 8) also pointed out that “We want the European Council 
meeting (of December 10-11) to recognize Turkey's candidacy with the same rights 
and obligations as other candidates.” 
French support for Turkey continued after the candidacy. In 2000, European 
Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici reminded the EU to respect the undertakings made 
regarding financial assistance to Turkey and also (quoted in “EP/Turkey”, 2000, 
November 16) warned that “we must refrain from imposing new or exorbitant 
conditions on Turkey's candidacy” and he added that “equal treatment for Turkey in 
relation to the other candidates” was needed. Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique 
de Villepin of France (quoted in “De Villepin”, 2002, October 22) suggested that the 
EU should send an encouraging and clear message to Turkey during the summit to be 
held in Brussels between October 24 and 25, 2002 and added that “We will try to 
find a method to assess Turkey's efforts appropriately. We, as 15 members of the EU, 
should clearly tell Turkey that they have been progressing on the right way.” 
 The victory of JDP in November 2002 elections and coming to power of an 
Islam oriented government, however, caused hesitation in French politicians about 
Turkey‟s EU orientation and secularism. For instance, French Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin (quoted in Stokrotsky, 2002, November 9) suggested that 
there were no doubts that Turkey would remain a candidate for joining the European 
Union but added that “I believe that at the upcoming EU summit in Copenhagen 
Turkey will be informed about demands needed to join the European Union.” 
Moreover, Villepin (quoted in “Turkey‟s EU”, 2002, November 12) also pointed out 
that “We're ready to work with them in a demanding partnership, based on common 
European values presumably shared by Union members…It's on these common 
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values that the Turkish government's actions and its (EU) candidacy will be 
evaluated.” After talking to Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the date for opening of 
accession talks, Chirac's spokeswoman (quoted in Gehmlich, 2002, November 27) 
told that “France has not set its position yet because it is seeking a consensus across 
Europe (on the date) that is both acceptable and viable for Turkey.” 
In December 2002, France and Germany came up with a proposal which 
necessitated the commission to compile a report in the second half of 2004 on 
Turkey‟s democratic reforms, and if the report was positive Turkey would be offered 
a start date of July 1, 2005. Chirac (quoted in “Chirac Confirms”, 2002, December 5) 
confirmed this proposal by suggesting that “If that were the case, then there could be 
negotiations from July 2005.” However, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (quoted in Keaten, 
2002, December 5), the leader of the party of Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, 
criticized this proposal by underlining that “This is not fair. This is 
unacceptable…To display such double standards against a country with such an 
interest, affection and determination (toward the EU) brings questions to our minds.” 
French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in “French Premier”, 2002, 
December 10) also expressed his concern about new government by warning that “In 
the name of France, I wish that a message of consensus may be expressed in 
Copenhagen, a message of openness but also of vigilance…We will judge the 
Turkish government only on its acts, and the Turkish people only on its capacity to 
adhere to our values.” On the eve of EU summit, Catherine Colonna (quoted in 
“Most EU”, 2002, December 11) Chirac‟s spokeswoman underlined that “This 
proposition has received majority support…Turkey is not ready…. We think the 
most simple and wise thing to do is to set a date in two years, at which to verify 
whether Turkey is respecting the Copenhagen criteria.” In the Council, it was 
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decided to give Turkey only a conditional date for entry talks after a review in 2004. 
Prime Minister Gul (quoted in “EU Stands”, 2002, December 13) referring to a 
report that Chirac stated in the EU meeting that the Turkey was blackmailing the EU, 
criticized Chirac by suggesting that “When there is no reaction against France from 
government and official circles I am very sad that Chirac influenced the meeting. 
The real blackmail is to take the meeting under his influence and try to change the 
direction of the meeting.” Moreover, he (quoted in Andrews, 2002, December 13) 
also underlined that “There is great discrimination here…There is prejudice against 
us, and there needs to be great efforts to correct this. Clear sentences should be put 
into the draft to remove uncertainty.” 
Relations with France seemed to relax in April 2003, after Turkey declared 
that Turkey would not send forces to Iraq. French Foreign Minister Dominique de 
Villepin (quoted in Kılıcarslan and Demirelli, 2003, April 24) congratulated Turkey 
on this decision by suggesting that “France greatly appreciated the restraint, the 
moderation and the maturity that Turkey showed” and showed his support to Turkish 
accession by underlining that  
There are several arguments in favor of (Turkey's) candidacy, be they 
strategic, security related, economic or related to cultural 
diversity…We see Turkey's deep aspiration to join the union and 
France plans to stand by your side on this road, which is the road of 
democracy, economic development and social cohesion. 
 
 In 2004, the wind was reversed again towards Turkey. For example, Alain 
Juppe (quoted in “Turkish Leaders”, 2004, April 8), the leader of French President 
Jacques Chirac's centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), suggested that 
he was against Turkish membership and instead wanted „privileged partnership‟ with 
Turkey but Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul responded that “Various exaggerated 
words can be said for reasons related to domestic politics.” 
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Foreign Minister Barnier (quoted in “Turkish EU”, 2004, April 21) 
underlined the distant prospect of Turkish membership by suggesting “There is no 
question of Turkey joining the EU today or tomorrow… We haven't started 
negotiations, and they could last 10 to 15 years.” Moreover, despite his declared 
position of favoring Turkey‟s eventual accession, Chirac (quoted in “EU 
Enlargement, 2004, April 29) stressed that “I believe that Turkey has a European 
vocation. But the conditions for its entry are not fulfilled today.” He (quoted in 
“Chirac Foresees”, 2004, April 29) also said that “Let's be clear - if conditions allow 
the negotiations to start at the beginning of next year, we have to know these 
negotiations will be long, very long.” On the other hand, he (quoted in Marlowe, 
2004, April 30) also acknowledged that “In the long term, it is in our interest that 
Turkey be stable, modern, and democratic.” 
 In June 2004, US President Bush asked from the European Union to fix a date 
for Turkey to start accession negotiations. However, President Chirac (quoted in 
Bretton, 2004, June 28) criticized Bush by suggesting that “If President Bush really 
said that the way I read it, well, not only did he go too far but he went into a domain 
which is not his own…It is like me trying to tell the United States how it should 
manage its relations with Mexico.” 
After Erdogan‟s visit to France in June, French Foreign Minister Michel 
Barnier (quoted in Boyle, 2004, July 20) suggested that “The road is still long, but it 
is on this path and has been making progress for some time.” In September, French 
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in “French PM”, 2004, September 23) 
shared the skepticism of French citizens towards Turkey‟s bid by suggesting that 
“We are not doubting that good faith of Mr. Erdogan, but to what extent can today's 
and tomorrow's governments make Turkish society embrace Europe's human rights 
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values…Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?” But he 
also gave some hope by stressing that “We don't think we should tell Turkey that the 
doors of Europe are forever closed to it.” 
In October, in order to show that he understood public concern about Turkish 
accession, President Chirac promised (quoted in Johnson, 2004, October 1) that 
France would hold a referendum in enlargements by pointing out that “The French 
people will have their say…It would be compulsory to ask the people via a 
referendum on this enlargement and other possible enlargements, and not via the 
parliamentary process.” As a response to Chirac‟s referendum proposal, Erdogan 
suggested that the move by Chirac was unjust because none of the 10 EU members 
that joined the bloc in May had to win voter approval first and (quoted in “Update 
Turkey”, 2004, October 6) added that “It will destroy the motivation of Turkey to 
stay the course on economic and political reforms to get into the E.U.” Moreover, 
Prime Minister Raffarin (quoted in “French PM”, 2004, October 14), in order to 
soothe widespread opposition to Turkey‟s eventual membership, suggested that 
“Neither Europe nor Turkey are ready for membership….Today, Turkey is very far 
from Europe politically, economically and socially….Let us not lie to the Turkish 
people. Let us confirm clearly that its membership in the European Union is not 
possible today, nor tomorrow nor in the next few years.” Erdogan (quoted in Boyle, 
2004, October 20) criticized these comments by suggesting that  
It is difficult for me to understand the approach of our French friends 
on this subject…Why are people so afraid of the Turks and Turkey, 
why so many reservations? I don't think it makes any sense…Turkey, 
for its part, would bring to the EU its position in the Muslim world, 
which will also bring an important richness, because it will be an 
important partner. 
 
He (quoted in Heritage and Gemlich, 2004, October 21) also asked to have “a 
declaration from my friend President Chirac which would put an end to all the 
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chatter…I am sure that he will manage this, because of his great genius. Isn't he one 
of the senior figures in politics?” Erdogan (quoted in Heritage and Gemlich, 2004, 
October 21) also argued that “France has always supported us. We saw that in 
previous summits. I am convinced that on December 17, at the EU summit, political 
will be expressed.” President Chirac (quoted in “Germany France”, 2004, October 
26), after having talks with Chancellor Schroeder, underlined that “This decision (in 
December) is based on the recommendations of the European Commission, whose 
favorable conclusion we know and I agree with too” but reminded that there would 
be a long term process of negotiations.  
In November, on the other hand, Chirac again changed his stance towards 
Turkey and started to talk about another form of relations instead of full membership. 
He (quoted in “Chirac Says”, 2004, November 5) underlined that  
Naturally one can't underestimate the possibility that in a few years' 
time we come to realize that ... the road that Turkey has to travel 
doesn't permit it to adopt all the values of Europe…In that case, what 
has to be found is a means to create a sufficiently strong link so that 
there is no separation between Europe and Turkey, without there 
being integration.  
Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul commented that Chirac‟s remarks 
reflected French domestic politics and (quoted in “Chirac Says”, 2004, November 5) 
added that “President Chirac is very wise, he's handled it very wisely, he's a great 
statesman. I think his statement should not be misread.” In December, Chirac (quoted 
in Barkin, 2004, December 2) reiterated his call for an alternative option by 
suggesting that  
If all the necessary conditions for entry are not fulfilled, of course 
negotiations will be interrupted…In that case we would have to look 
for a way of ensuring that this rupture did not lead to a form of 
separation between Turkey and Europe and we would look for ways 
of finding a sufficiently strong link between these two major political, 
economic and cultural bodies. 
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Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 2004, December 
9), on the date of opening of accession talks, underlined that “We want the 
membership talks to be opened at the end of 2005 or the beginning of 2006” but 
(quoted in “Turkish PM”, 2004, December 10) warned that “It will be a rocky road.”  
After the compromise to start EU accession talks with Turkey in next October, 
Chirac (quoted in “Chirac Eyes”, 2004, December 17) reiterated that “The road will 
be long and difficult.” In order to respond to public concern, French Foreign Minister 
Michel Barnier (quoted in Heritage, 2004, December 20) underlined that negotiations 
would be long and decided by the French people added that “Once again I repeat that 
the way is open, it's conclusion is not written in advance, and many guarantees, 
precautions and safeguards will be there to ensure that Turkey will respect (the entry 
criteria) if it joins the European Union one day.” In addition, Nicolas Sarkozy 
(quoted in Boland, 2004, December 19), head of the governing UMP party and most 
vocal opponent of Turkish accession, underlined that “Europe already has difficulty 
functioning with 25 members. The more members Europe has, the less we will be 
integrated, the less we will share common values, and the more fragile we will be.” 
Security related arguments were used by French politicians in their support 
for Turkish accession to the EU. For instance, French European Affairs Minister 
Michel Barnier (quoted in “France Criticizes”, 1997, March 10) suggested that “I 
think it is important for the stability of the Union, that is to say for the stability of the 
whole of Europe, that the Turks retain a European prospect, even if we know that 
membership would not be realistic in the short-term.” Moreover, President Chirac 
(quoted in “Roundup Turkey‟s ”, 2004, October 1) also emphasized that  “We have 
an interest in having Turkey with us…It opens the perspective of democracy and 
peace taking root on the whole of the European continent -- in the wider sense of the 
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term -- so that we avoid the mistakes and violence of the past.” Furthermore, despite 
the fact that negotiations with Turkey would last long, President Chirac (quoted in 
“Germany France”, 2004, October 2004) underlined that “The membership of 
Turkey would be in the interest of Turkey and in the interest of the stability and 
democracy of the world and our region.” In addition, Chirac (quoted in Benoit et al, 
2004, December 16) stressed that “It is obvious that on the issue of security, stability, 
and peace, having this great nation at our door today is totally positive. Rejecting 
them would present a risk of instability and insecurity at our borders.” 
Ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey were also underlined. 
For example, French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette (quoted in “France‟s De”, 
1997, April 2) suggested that “France clearly believes that Turkey has potential to 
take part in the building of Europe…We are in agreement with you over the future of 
Europe.” Chirac (quoted in Ertan, 1998, February 19) also highlighted that “My 
conviction is that Turkey should come to the European Conference and be an active 
member because this conference is the family meeting of Europe.” After the 
Conference, he (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1998, March 12) suggested that  
This first meeting of the European family is a great political occasion. 
I have only one regret - the absence of Turkey…Turkey has a place 
among us...the EU must make concrete gestures of willingness to 
welcome it. 
However, in 2002, after the JDP‟s landslide victory in November 3 elections 
of Turkey, Europeanness of Turkey was questioned by former French President 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing who was head of the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
He underlined that accession of Turkey to the EU would be the end of European 
Union and he (quoted in Taylor, 2002, November 8) suggested that Turkey had 
A different culture, a different approach, a different way of life…Its 
capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population live outside 
256 
 
Europe, it is not a European country…In my opinion, it would be the 
end of the European Union. 
As a response to d'Estaing, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
(quoted in “French Prime”, 2002, November 9) emphasized that “The position of 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing against Turkey's entry into the European Union is an old 
conviction, with arguments (behind it), but personal.” In addition, Chirac (quoted in 
Wielaard, 2002, November 22) also refuted d‟Estaing by underlining that “Turkey 
absolutely has its place in Europe…We cannot dispute this.” 
 Geopolitical arguments were also used by French politicians. For instance, 
French Foreign minister (quoted in “Turkey EU”, 2004, April 18) warned that “If we 
reject it (Turkey), if we slam the door in its face as some would like to do quite 
quickly, there is a risk that it will turn to another model…It would be better for it to 
be with us than for it to be alone and in poverty and under-developed.” 
Ideational argument of not sharing common religion was also raised during 
these period but French politicians refuted the argument that Turkey‟s Moslem 
religion was one of the reasons for keeping it outside the EU. For instance, French 
Foreign Minister Herve de Charette (quoted in Gaunt, 1997, March 16) emphasized 
that “Turkey has the right to join the EU and that right has to be confirmed 
forcefully…We can only judge the membership of a country on objective criteria, 
and certainly not on religious or ethnic criteria.” Similarly, European Affairs 
Minister Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “Turkey Not”, 1998, March 12) suggested that 
“Europe is not a Christian club. It is not on the basis of this criterion that Turkish 
membership of the European Union will be judged when the time comes, but on 
political and economic conditions.” Moreover, Moscovici (quoted in Jones, 2002, 
November 14), the French government's representative on the European Convention, 
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reiterated that “Europe is not a Christian club….In the enlarged Europe that we are 
building, a Europe of 500 million people, there are and will be Muslims who will 
also have their place.” In 2004, President Chirac (quoted in Marlowe, 2004, April 30) 
emphasized that “For Europe to reject Turkey for ethnic or religious reasons could 
only play into the hands of those who advocate the clash of civilizations, who try to 
pit the West against Islam.” Erdogan (quoted in Boyle, 2004, October 20) also 
criticized people in France who suggested that Turkish culture was so different and it 
would change the nature of European Union and underlined that “Membership would 
signal a reconciliation between civilizations.” 
The most important reservation of France in Turkish accession to the EU was 
the compliance to the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkey was asked to make reforms in the 
area of human rights, especially Kurdish problem and solve the problems related to 
territorial disputes and Cyprus. For instance, French Foreign Minister Herve De 
Charette (quoted in Holmes, 1997, January 29) suggested that there were no 
obstacles in principle to a future EU place for Turkey but that the outstanding issues 
naturally represent difficulties on the path to Turkey's possible membership. 
Likewise, European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “Turkey Not”, 
1998, March 12) also underlined that “Some serious problems must be resolved first, 
such as the Kurdish problem, human rights or indeed the Cypriot question.” Even 
after Turkey becoming a candidate, Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “France Says”, 
2001, April 10) pointed out that “Turkey must enact reforms and restructure its 
democratic institutions to meet European standards.” Moreover, French President 
Jacques Chirac (quoted in “Turkey Demands”, 2002, November 22) suggested that 
Turkey had a rightful place in Europe but that accession negotiations could not begin 
until Ankara had met key conditions, especially on improving human rights and 
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democracy. In addition, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in 
“French FM”, 2002, December 2) also underlined that “The commitment made by 
the Europeans (to Turkey) should not be placed in doubt, though it must continue its 
efforts and satisfy the great democratic principle which are ours.” Furthermore, 
Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in Picot, 2004, April 7) underlined that 
“Turkey does not respect the conditions, even if it is preparing to do so” and added 
that there was no question of Turkey's joining the EU under current circumstances. 
The huge population that Turkey had also became a reservation for French 
politicians. French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in “Turkish EU”, 
2004, December 12) suggested that “The entry of Turkey is, or rather can be if it is 
confirmed in the next few years, a new stage in the history of the European Union 
due, mostly, to its size…It would signify a substantial enlargement, equivalent in 
terms of population to the one which we just experienced on May 1, 2004.”  
Another reservation for France was Armenian issue. Just one day before the 
European Council, Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in “France Wants”, 
2004, December 13) suggested that “It is a request that France will make, to 
recognize the tragedy from the start of the century .... Turkey must carry out this task 
as a memorial.” However, he (quoted in “Armenian Genocide”, 2004, December 14) 
needed to explain his remarks and underlined that “France does not pose it 
(acknowledging the Armenian genocide) as a condition, notably not for opening 
negotiations (on EU accession)… Legally, that would not be possible.” 
To sum up, President Chirac was a driver of Turkish European till November 
2002. After the election of JDP, French politicians started to question Turkish 
European bid and secularism. Public opposition to Turkish membership also 
increased. In this condition, Turkish membership challenged the political interest of 
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France and Chirac, who was a driver of Turkish membership, became a brakeman in 
order to soothe public opposition. He started to talk about another way of dealing 
Turkey and he promised to have referendum on Turkish accession. Hence, France 
attitude towards Turkey changed after the election of the JDP from being a driver to 
being a brakeman. 
 
4.3.2.3 Great Britain 
Great Britain continued to support Turkey‟s relations with the EU in this period. 
In the beginning of 1997, British Foreign Secretary Mr. Rifkind (quoted in Holmes, 
1997, January 29) criticized that Turkey‟s current relations with the EU was 
“unsatisfactory” and added that “We believe Turkey should be treated in the same 
way as other applicant countries.” In November 1997, Great Britain planned to stage 
a grand 27-nation summit in March 1998, as a consolation prize for applicant who 
would not be included in the next wave of the EU‟s enlargement, and the Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in “Bonn Boosts”, 1997, November 11) supported the 
idea of inviting Turkey to the conference and suggested that “We have always taken 
the view that it is important to encourage those in Turkey who see Turkey's vocation 
as European.” In December 1997, in the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was not 
declared as a candidate of the EU membership and the EU wants Turkey to improve 
its human rights record, protect the rights of its Kurdish minority and move to solve 
territorial disputes with Greece, including the future of the divided island of Cyprus. 
However, Prime Minister Blair (quoted in “Blair Appears”, 1997, December 13), in 
order to show Turkey that the door was not closed, suggested that 
People recognize that Turkey is a great power, Turkey is a great 
people. It is important for the future of Europe as well as for Turkey 
that we move closer together and that we envisage the day in which 
Turkey becomes a member of the European Union … It is going to 
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require some work to get there and what I would plead with (Turkey) 
for is a positive response to what has been set out in the EU 
document…Europe is willing and wants to work with Turkey for the 
future…The criteria we apply in relation to Turkey are the same 
criteria we apply in relation to all countries… document makes it clear 
that we want to see Turkey both as a closer partner in Europe and be 
part of the European Conference that we will be holding in Great 
Britain next year. 
Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, however, criticized the EU decision on 
Turkey and about the invitation to the conference, he (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 1997, 
December 14) underlined that 
Turkey's attendance at the EU conference has been made dependent 
on the fulfillment of conditions. This invitation does not have any 
importance for us…We will not accept any conditions. 
Elaborating on Yilmaz's comments, State Minister Sukru Sina Gurel (quoted in 
Goktas, 1997, December 14) told that “Turkey will not participate.” As a response, 
Tony Blair (quoted in “EU Tries”, 1997, December 15) told that 
I understand Turkish disappointment at being treated in an apparently 
different way from others. But I continue to hope they will come to 
see the advantages for them of participation in the European 
Conference as a further step towards eventual membership. 
In addition to Blair, the foreign secretary Robin Cook also (quoted Walker 
and Black, 1997, December 16) underlined that “I think Turkey was wrong to turn 
down the opportunity to have a new forum for political dialogue with Europe, and it 
remains to be seen whether they will stick with their refusal.” In April 1998, Robin 
Cook (quoted in “EU Reiterates”, 1998, April 2) also tried to improve the relations of 
the EU with Turkey and suggested that “The upcoming gathering of the Turkey-EU 
Association Council in May would provide a chance for the EU to display the 
importance it attributed to Turkey and a platform for some advance in solving the 
problems.” and in May he (quoted in “Cook Visits”, 1998, May 19) added that “I am 
looking forward to that meeting and I hope today we can agree on a basis that will 
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make it a successful meeting to put Europe and Turkey back on track for closer, 
successful relations.” However, Turkish Foreign Ministry, in a written statement, 
(quoted in “Foreign Ministry”, 1998, May 23) underlined that “it will be more 
appropriate to hold the Turkish-European Union (EU) Association Council meeting 
when the conditions are ripened by the EU” and indicated that Turkey is open to new 
proposals and expects Great Britain to continue her goodwill efforts. 
In the Cardiff Summit, Great Britain was the most ardent supporter of the 
declaration of Turkey as a candidate state but Great Britain only got the phrase that 
“rules applying to other candidates also apply for Turkey.” This can be suggested to 
be the first, tough implicit, official designation of Turkey as a candidate. Blair 
(quoted in “EU Offers”, 1998, June 17) emphasized that “We have subjected the 
candidacy of Turkey more clearly than Luxembourg.” As seen in the words of Cook 
who suggested (quoted in “Britain To”, 1999, September 2) that “We will be arguing 
for that (candidate) status to be recognized...this weekend among foreign ministers.” 
Great Britain continued to work for the Turkish candidacy. After the Commission 
report that suggested candidacy for Turkey, Cook (quoted in “Britain Says”, 1999, 
October 14) underlined that “It is time to open a new chapter in the EU's relationship 
with Turkey… We agree with the Commission that the Helsinki Summit should 
confirm Turkey's status as a candidate for membership.” Likewise, Blair (quoted in 
McEvoy, 1999, October 16) stressed that “My own assessment of this situation is 
that there will be agreement in Helsinki that Turkey should be considered a candidate 
country, and we will certainly be supporting that position.” 
After the candidacy, Great Britain continued to support Turkey‟s bid to the 
EU membership. As a response to the reform package of Turkey in order to comply 
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with the Copenhagen Criteria, Blair (quoted in “Prime Minister”, 2002, September 
10) suggested that  
The reforms will be of great benefit to your citizens…I welcome them 
also as a boost for Turkey's EU candidature. …I recalled the United 
Kingdom's strong political support for Turkey's application for the EU 
membership.  
Similarly, Straw (quoted in “Peacock”, 2002, October 17) underlined that 
“Turkey has made significant progress in recent months towards meeting the political 
criteria necessary to start negotiations for membership.”  
Great Britain continued to be the main supporter of Turkey in her bid for the 
EU. For instance, Straw (quoted in “British Turkish”, 2002, September 25) reiterated 
British position by suggesting that Great Britain was a “long-standing and strong 
supporter of Turkey's goal to join the EU.” Moreover, in the process towards the date 
for opening of accession negotiations, Straw (quoted in “Britain Urges”, 2002, 
December 3) pointed out that “What we want to see is... a firm date set for the 
beginning of Turkey‟s negotiations towards accession of the EU.” Likewise, Blair 
(quoted in “Blair Backs”, 2002, December 12) also suggested that “I believe we have 
a historic opportunity to set a firm date of accession negotiations for Turkey.” As a 
response to a criticism that Great Britain supported Turkey due to Iraq war, Straw 
(quoted in “British Support”, 2002, December 13) underlined that  
Our support for Turkey's membership of the European Union pre- 
dates any possibility of action against Iraq by about 20 years…We've 
been very actively supporting Turkey's application for membership, 
particularly since we came into Government in May 1997. 
Security arguments related to Turkey were used by British politicians. For 
instance, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in Shiels, 1997, November 
27) stated that “If we are serious about tackling the drug problem in western Europe, 
for example, it is much more helpful to do it with Turkey present than with Turkey 
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absent.” Moreover, Cook (quoted in Taylor, 1998, June 4) underlined that “The big 
issue is whether the EU can forge a working relationship with Turkey...It is of 
immense importance for our stability and security.” Likewise, Straw (quoted in 
“Delaying Turkey”, 2002, December 5) also highlighted that “Accepting Turkey -- 
with its balance between a Muslim majority and a secular, democratic government -- 
would be a boon to European and global stability.”  
 Moreover, Blair used ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey 
in showing British support to Turkey in her bid to the EU as well. For example, Blair 
(quoted in Buchan and Blitzs, 1998, January 9) emphasized that they would use 
intensive diplomacy to repair EU ties with Turkey, which should realize “The 
tremendous sense that we want Turkey to be part of the family of Europe.” Likewise, 
he (quoted in Sultan, 1998, January 10) reiterated that “I do not mind to repeat that 
we see Turkey as natural part of Europe and we will try to do everything so that it 
stays that way.” Furthermore, about the conference, he (quoted in Walker and Black, 
1998, March 13) underlined that “I hope that Turkey understands the door remains 
open to them. We want them very much to be part of the people of Europe.” 
Similarly, Blair (quoted in “Blair Backs”, 2002, December 12) also suggested that 
the Copenhagen Summit, should “send the clearest possible signal that the European 
Union wants Turkey inside the European family as a full partner in the European 
Union...Certainly that is what Great Britain will be arguing for.” Furthermore, before 
the start of accession negotiations, Jack Straw (quoted in “Britain‟s Straw”, 2004, 
August 31) also underlined that “Turkey is a European nation and part of Europe's 
history, it is entitled as a member of the Council of Europe and NATO to make an 
application for membership of the European Union and I hope a decision will be 
made in December for a start to negotiations.”  
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Ideational argument of not sharing common religion was used by Jack Straw 
(quoted in “Delaying Turkey”, 2002, December 5) 
The most disreputable reason of all for feet-dragging on Turkey would 
be to treat it differently from other applicant states because the 
majority of the country's population was Muslim…We need to 
remember this, that so much of Europe's own history, written in blood, 
has arisen through violence and conflict defined by religious strife. 
Straw (quoted in “UK Says”, 2004, March 23) also emphasized that “If we 
believe, as I strongly do, that Europe's strength lies not in a Judaeo-Christian club but 
in a diversity of traditions underpinned by common and universal values, then we 
must fulfill our engagements to Turkey.” In the same vein, Straw (quoted in “Turkey 
In”, 2004, December 15) pointed out that “But Turkey's European destiny is also 
important for wider reasons, because of the signal which a European Turkey would 
send to people everywhere of Europe's commitment to diversity and to truly 
universal values.”  
 Foreign Secretary Cook (quoted in “Robin Cook”, 1998, January 17) used 
geopolitical arguments related to Turkey by underlining that 
Turkey matters as a longstanding ally and friend, and a major player 
in an important region. The European Union confirmed at its recent 
Luxembourg Summit that Turkey was eligible for accession to the 
European Union, and we set out a strategy to prepare Turkey for 
accession…We recognize [Turkey's] European vocation, and the need 
to involve Turkey in the process of European enlargement. …Turkey's 
candidacy for membership of the EU will be judged by the same 
objective criteria as any other country. 
Likewise, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 2002, 
October 17) also made similar comments by stressing that “Turkey is a key member 
of NATO and a vital ally in the campaign against terrorism. Its accession to the EU 
would be in the best interests of Great Britain and indeed Europe” Furthermore, 
about Iraq war, Straw (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 2002 November 20) suggested that 
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“In this, as so many issues, Turkey is a key strategic ally. We share a common 
determination to deal with this threat to regional security and have agreed to stay 
closely in touch.” In addition Straw (quoted in “UK Says”, 2004, March 23) also 
stressed that  
The EU would benefit greatly from integrating a country with such 
enormous potential - a key NATO ally at the intersection of the 
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. …The example of an 
economically successful, democratic Turkey anchored in Europe 
would be an inspiration to many others in the Islamic world.  
Similarly, before the opening of accession negotiations, Straw (quoted in 
“Britain‟s Straw”, 2004, August 31) suggested that “I know that views differ on this 
but people need to think very carefully about the strategic implications of pushing 
Turkey away, of pushing Turkey to the east and to the south…I don't think that's in 
anybody's interests in Europe.” 
 The most significant British reservation of Turkish candidacy for EU was the 
Copenhagen Criteria and the pace of reform in the implementation of these criteria. 
For instance, British foreign secretary, Malcolm Rifkind (quoted in “Turkey Seeks”, 
1997, January 30) suggested that there had been some improvement on human rights 
but “there was still room for more progress.” Moreover, with respect to Copenhagen 
Criteria, Cook (quoted in Taylor, 1998, June 4) underlined that “Those are the 
criteria which Turkey has to meet and I know from discussions with politicians in 
Turkey that they fully appreciate there's a lot of work to be done before Turkey can 
claim to be in conformity with these criteria.” After the positive commission report 
about Turkey‟s candidacy status, Cook (quoted in “Britain Says”, 1999, October 14) 
underlined that “The next stage is a sustained effort by Turkey with the EU's support 
to meet the Copenhagen criteria for membership which would in time allow Turkey 
to move to accession negotiations with the Union.” In the process towards opening of 
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accession negotiations, Straw (quoted in “Britain‟s Straw”, 2004, March 3) 
underlined that  
December is an important opportunity for both Turkey and the 
EU...Turkey can continue to enjoy the support of EU countries by 
preserving its current momentum and implementing the reforms in 
order to meet all the EU conditions…The EU promise is clear - if 
Turkey does what it has to do, the EU will start negotiations without 
delay. 
Likewise, Blair (quoted in Boland and Hall, 2004, May 17) also emphasized 
that “If it complies with the Copenhagen criteria, there can be no other obstacles to 
Turkey's membership of the EU.” 
Therefore, British attitude towards Turkey did not change in this period and 
Britain continued to be a driver of Turkish European bid. The most significant 
reservation of Britain was compliance with Copenhagen Criteria. 
 
 
4.3.2.4 Greece 
 After the Customs Union Agreement, Greece continued to block Turkish 
relations with the EU. The arguments of Greece that were used in this period were 
still political. These are the problems in the Aegean, continental shelf or Kardak 
crisis and Cyprus. However, 1999 became a breakpoint in Greek-Turkish relations 
and as Heraclides calls it, a detente in relations led Greece not veto Turkish 
candidacy at the Helsinki Summit. Therefore, in this period, a change of attitude was 
seen in Greece. 
 In December 1995, a Turkish cargo ship ran ashore on the Kardak/Imia islets 
and was needed to be rescued and this rescue operation led to a sovereignty crisis 
between Turkey and Greece which both raised their flags on the islets in the end. The 
immediate war was prevented with the help of US diplomacy.  This crisis also 
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influenced Turkish relations with EU due to the Greek concerns. For instance, Prime 
Minister Coastas Simitis (quoted in “Greece Renews”, 1996, February 22) threatened 
to disrupt Customs union  with Turkey by  suggesting that “One cannot expect us to 
cooperate on the customs union with Turkey until the Aegean issue is cleared up, at 
least until we have guarantees that no new problems will arise.” As a response to the 
Greek blockage, Turkish foreign ministry recalled Turkish ambassador of Greece for 
consultations and (quoted in Erdem, 1996, February 22) declared that “We have seen 
a need for a wide-ranging assessment on our part after a series of hostile actions 
against Turkey's vital interests by Greece -- using the Kardak crisis as an excuse -- 
and by its moves aiming particularly to hurt Turkey-EU ties.” Prime Minister Ciller 
(quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1996, February 29) also highlighted that  
Greece may be a European Union member. But using its European 
Union membership against Turkey will only restrict Turkey's 
contribution to the world as it restructures itself…It will be the EU's 
loss. 
 According to Foreign Minister Pangolas (quoted in Kambas, 1996, May 2), 
Greece  would extended its veto on EU funds to Turkey and there would be no 
climate of trust between Greece and Turkey “as long as the Cyprus question is 
pending, as long as part of Cyprus remains under Turkish occupation and there are 
Turkish military forces in Cyprus.” 
 Prime minister Yilmaz (quoted in Fox, 1996, June 5) criticized Greek attitude 
by highlighting that it was time to stop putting pressure on Turkey through the EU 
and suggested that “The majority of member nations -- maybe 14 -- are aware of the 
disadvantages of this for European unity and they are determined to overcome this 
obstacle.” 
In June 1996, Greece (Fox, 1996, July 16) finally agreed to lift its veto of an 
ambitious European Union trade and investment plan for the Mediterranean with the 
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help of the EU foreign ministers‟ resolution, mainly towards Turkey,  that included 
calls for MEDA nations to respect democracy and also promote good neighborliness. 
As a response to the declaration, Ciller (quoted in “Foreign Minister”, 1996, July 20) 
underlined that “We discussed the declaration because we wanted to find out if it was 
in any way related to, or a precondition to, the lifting of the veto, and we found out 
that it was not.” 
Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos (quoted in Giacomo, 1997, 
March 6), after talks with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright suggested that 
“Turkey certainly belongs to Europe. It's a big part of European history and Greece 
shall never change its mind about that because if Turkey is not a part of European 
history then Greece is not a part of European history.” In February 1997, Great 
Britain and Germany pressed Greece to include Turkish Cypriots in accession talks 
however, Foreign Minister Pangolas (quoted in Paris, 1997, February 26) threatened 
to block EU‟s enlargement to the East whether they pushed further and suggested 
that “Mr. Kinkel and Mr. Rifkind gave a gift to Turkey. Now they must pay the bill.” 
Greece continued to block EU aid to Turkey due to the dispute in the Aegean and 
Pangolas (quoted in “Greek Foreign”, 1997, April 30) suggested that “We have 
repeatedly declared that we cannot accept Turkish behavior vis-a-vis our 
sovereignty.” Turkish President Demirel (quoted in Paris, 1997, May 24) criticized 
Greek behavior and emphasized that “It could take years to solve our problems (with 
Greece) and Turkey should not be excluded from the EU for this reason.” 
The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem refused to bring 
Imia/Kardak dispute before the international court of justice in exchange for lifting 
of Greek veto on community financing. He (quoted in “EU Greece”, 1997, 
September 9) suggested that financial aid to Turkey was a concrete commitment on 
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the part of the EU stemming from the Customs Union agreement and it was 
“meaningless that the EU adds a condition to its commitment which it has not yet 
fulfilled.” 
Turkish relations with Greece got even more strained with the issue of Greek 
support to PKK. Prime Minister Yilmaz, in a written statement, accused Greece of 
adopting a strategic objective of undermining Turkey's development and its relations 
with the Western world, particularly the EU. Yilmaz (quoted in “Yilmaz Warns”, 
1998, May 1) underlined that 
Supporting the PKK, which challenges Turkey's territorial integrity 
and security, and keeping alive the tense atmosphere in Turco-Greek 
relations, are the primary methods which Greece implements [to 
achieve its objective]….Expressing concern over the state of human 
rights in Turkey, while the evidence of their support for the PKK is 
increasing, is a tragicomic contradiction, which can be expressed only 
by those whose antagonistic feelings have come to the level of 
fanaticism. 
Turkey launched a diplomatic offensive to focus European Union scrutiny on 
Greece on the issue of Ocalan and Foreign Minister Cem (quoted in Bryant, 1999, 
February 21) suggested that “We expect the EU to seriously examine the case of one 
of its members which has violently opposed the organization‟s charter, commitments 
and obligations.” It was understood that Ocalan was sheltered in Greek embassy in 
Nairobi and as a response, Cem was quoted (Hemming, 1999, March 5) to state that 
“Greek politicians with their incredible heartlessness, pitilessness and irresponsibility 
have made Greece a terrorist country…Turkey will not talk with Greece about the 
Aegean, Cyprus or any other important problem.” 
In the mid of 1999, relations with Greece started to get warmer. According to 
Heraclides (2010:144), Kosovo Crisis and response of Turkey and Greece to this 
crisis is the reason behind this rapprochement. As he indicates, the dialogue, 
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intensified due to the devastating earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. In addition, 
Schimmelfennig (2008: 8) also underlies the change of Foreign Ministry from 
Pangolas to Papandreou as one of the reasons of these warmer relations. Therefore, 
1999 became a breakpoint in Turkish Greek relations. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem 
(quoted in “British Turkish”, 1999, September 4) suggested that  
There is a positive atmosphere between Turkey and Greece. The 
dialogue that Mr. Foreign Minister Yeoryios Papandreuo and I started 
together has been continuing for nearly three months. We will 
continue the second round talks on six issues on 9th September and I 
am sure we will bring further the current level we reached. Although 
we have some differences of opinion in the issues like the Aegean, I 
am not pessimistic that at least the problems between Turkey and 
Greece can be solved if the issues are taken up with good will and if 
we understand our mutual concerns. 
Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou (quoted in “Greece Signals”, 
1999, September 5) also suggested that “We are in favor of Turkey becoming a 
member of the European Union…it is in its own interest to see Turkey move closer 
to Europe”, though he also emphasized that Greece and Turkey still needed to go far 
in settling long-standing differences, notably over Cyprus and Aegean Sea territorial 
disputes. 
About Turkey‟s becoming an EU candidate in the Helsinki European Council 
Papandreou (quoted in “Greece Offers”, 1999, September 5) emphasized that “Yes, 
certainly. We are not...in principle against, and we will be working constructively to 
see if we can make this happen.” After the earthquake in Greece, Turkish Prime 
Minister Ecevit was quoted (Hemming, 1999, September 8) to state that “Just as 
Greece shared our pain and grief over our earthquake, we share the pain of the Greek 
people.” Earthquake diplomacy, had seemingly improved the relations between 
Turkey and Greece. For instance, Ambassador Loukas Tsilas (quoted in “Greek 
Diplomat”, 1999, October 1), the permanent representative of Greece to the EU 
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underlined that “Very important and high-ranking people in Greece defend that 
Turkey, which is a European country, has to be an EU member, it deserved it, and 
this is in favor of also Greece.” On the candidacy in October 1999, however, 
Papandreu (quoted in Hamilton, 1999, October 13) suggested that “Our vote is not a 
given…Regardless of how much we move forward on bilateral issues there cannot be 
substantial progress if there is no solution in Cyprus.” Likewise, in November, 
considering Cyprus and dispute in the Aegean, he stated that Greek position was still 
under consideration and quoted in Paris, 1999, November 23) added that “There is 
ongoing tough negotiation and it will all depend on the EU's final position on 
Turkey's candidacy.” As a response to Papandreou‟s remarks, Foreign minister Cem 
(quoted in “EU Membership”, 1999, November 30) issued a statement and 
highlighted that  
Problems between Turkey and Greece should be resolved with 
peaceful methods... Turkey does not have any territorial ambitions 
from Greece…Turkey is absolutely opposed to evaluation of the 
relations with the EU within the context of Cyprus. 
Prime Minister Costas Smitis had also reminded Greek reservations and used 
security arguments about Turkish accession. He (quoted in “Greece Wants”, 1999, 
December 3) underlined that 
Greece does not wish to find itself tomorrow facing obstacles to 
Cyprus's accession prospects... (and) its sovereign rights being 
disputed, without clearly defined and accepted procedures by all on 
the most efficient way of resolving such disputes… We hope for an 
agreement in Helsinki but the participation of any country (in the EU) 
must guarantee development, peace and cooperation. If we don't 
achieve this framework, then we will say 'no' in Helsinki… It is to the 
benefit of Turkey, but also of Greece and the EU for Turkey to 
become part of this framework... We do not believe that Turkey's 
isolation is to Greece's benefit... Precisely because we do not believe 
in isolation, because we believe that the development of cooperation is 
necessary, we recently undertook a series of moves and initiatives to 
develop our relations. But Turkey's participation in the process of 
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European integration will lead to problems... if there are no clear 
positions on the outstanding differences…The guiding criterion for 
our position is the country's interest. The interest in peace, security, 
development". 
Demirel (quoted in “Turkish President”, 1999, December 6), before the 
Helsinki summit warned that “If Greece once again prevents Turkey's candidacy, the 
mild atmosphere that has been going for a while will disappear.” Foreign Minister 
George Papandreu (quoted in “EU Foreign”, 1999, September 5) told that they did 
not make up their mind and underlined that “We have not said yes, we have not said 
no. It depends very much on what the (EU) Council will decide.” 
According to the Helsinki European Council presidency conclusions, a 
political solution to reunite Cyprus would not be a precondition for an EU decision 
on Cyprus‟s accession and outstanding territorial disputes were called to be put to the 
International Court of Justice. These statements caused hesitation in Turkey. Prime 
Minister Simitis suggested that this text was decided upon and it stands for Greece 
and for Turkey, as long as they accept it and (quoted in “Greece Says”, 1999, 
December 10) added that “We are not changing this text unless there are grammatical 
errors.” EU special envoy Javier Solana flew to Ankara to try to overcome Turkish 
misgivings. After talking with Prime Minister Ecevit, Solana (quoted in “EU‟s 
Solona”, 1999, December 11) told that “We have a yes." After Turkey became a 
candidate state, considering chronic disputes with Greece, Premier Costas Simitis 
(quoted in “Greek PM”, 1999, December 14) suggested for the first time he saw 
realistic possibilities and added that “The road will be long and difficult, but now we 
see that it is achievable.” 
In April 2000, Papandreu (quoted in “Greek Foreign”, 2000, April 11) stated 
that he saw Sunday's election victory of socialist PASOK as “confirmation of the 
foreign policy we have been following over our last term, and I think in particular the 
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important success we have seen in the change in relations between the EU and 
Turkey.” 
Considering Turkish Cypriot troops advancement to a Greek Cypriot village 
and setting up a checkpoint on the road Greek Government spokesman Dimitris 
Reppas (quoted in Kyriakidou, 2000, July 4) underlined that “Turkey has another 
field where it is called to prove that it is ready to accept rules and behaviors that 
prevail in the European Union.” 
Papandreu (quoted in “Turkey Needs”, 2000, October 2000) underlined that 
“We want the EU to contribute first of all to a European course for Turkey in the best 
possible way, with the necessary reforms that we think are in the interests of Turkey, 
and more broadly for the region.” 
In the accession partnership program, an article was put urging Turkey to 
back UN efforts to settle the Cyprus conflict as a short-term objective and there was 
the possibility of inclusion of an article related to the resolution of its territorial 
disputes with its arch-rival, EU member Greece. As a response to these articles, 
Ecevit (quoted in “Ecevit Says”, 2000, November 22) underlined that 
Both issues in question are of vital importance for Turkey and there 
are concessions that we will never make over them…The way to 
settlement does not go through bowing to Greece's caprices, but 
through encouraging Greece to engage in a civilized dialogue with 
Turkey. 
The EU Commission report, released in October 2012, demanded EU leaders 
to include Cyprus and nine other countries in a major expansion eastward in 2004 but 
Turkey was left off the enlargement timetable. As a reaction to this report, although 
Papandreu highlighted Turkey took many important steps but still had some 
significant shortcomings and (quoted in “Greece Applauds”, 2002, October 9) added 
that Greece stresses “its support for Turkey's course toward Europe.” He also (quoted 
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in “Greece Urges”, 2002, October 10) underlined that “I believe a positive message 
must be given to Turkey in Copenhagen. (Whether) that could be a specific date or 
not, I think we must discuss with the other 14.” Similarly, considering a positive 
signal to Turkey, Prime Minister Simitis (quoted in “Greece Renews”, 2002, 
November 11) pointed out that 
What this will look like depends significantly on developments in 
Turkey before the EU summit. A concrete date for the beginning of 
negotiations could come out of it, or at least a date for talks during 
which we can speak with Turkey about it moving closer to the EU. 
Ideational arguments such as not sharing the same religion were also used by 
Greek politicians. For instance Prime Minister Simitis (quoted in “Greek Prime”, 
2003, January 8) suggested that “The European identity can be viewed in several 
ways - geographical, political, economic. But I do not agree on there being a 
religious criteria.” Greek politician used geostrategic arguments as well. Prime 
minister Simitis (quoted in “Greek Prime”, 2003, January 8) underlined that  
Turkey has been a great European power since the 16th century and 
the Ottoman Empire played a role in creating the Europe that exists 
today. It would be politically negative to exclude Turkey. It could be 
an important partner for Europe in the Middle East and central Asia. 
In June 2003, there was a rise in dogfights in the Aegean between Turkish 
and Greek air forces, and as a response, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreu 
(quoted in “EU Greece”, 2003, June 18) warned that “The game of violation in the 
Aegean is senseless and dangerous.” 
Prime Minister Karamanlis had a more conciliatory attitude towards Turkey.  
He (quoted in “Grohmann”, 2004, April 16) supported Turkey's drive to set a date to 
start European Union accession talks by pointing out that “The European route of 
Turkey must continue and the neighboring country will find us as its supporter in 
every effort...which brings it closer to Europe.”  
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Therefore, until 1999, Greece continued to be a brakeman in Turkey‟s 
European bid. However, with Kosovo Crisis, Earthquakes and change of Foreign 
Minister, a detente was seen in Turkish Greek relations which led to Turkish 
candidacy in the Helsinki Summit. But Greek political interest was also served in the 
Summit because it was stated that political solution would not be a precondition for 
Cyprus‟s accession. Hence, after 1999, Greece was no longer a brakeman in Turkish 
relations but due to Cyprus problem, Greece could not support Turkey as a driver. 
 
 
4.4 Accession Negotiations 
 
4.4.1 EU-Turkey Relations 
 
4.4.1.1 Stalemate in Relations 
Turkey has been facing challenges (Guney, 2008, 2009) in the accession 
process and it is not wrong to call the relations as being in stalemate. To start with 
the delay for the opening of accession talks led to public suspicion about the EU‟s 
intentions. After the Brussels Summit, the main assumption in Turkey was that no 
matter how much the country reforms, the EU would ultimately reject a Muslim 
candidate. Turkish public suspicion increased after the Referendum on the 
Constitution of the EU. The French people rejected the EU constitution in a 
referendum held on 29 May 2005. In Netherlands, the EU constitution was also 
rejected in a referendum held on 1 June 2005. The „No Vote‟ reflects a variety of 
factors; one of which is, concerns at possible future membership of Turkey in the 
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EU. These votes also raised a debate in the EU about the speed and the content of the 
enlargement. In the mid of the June, another crisis erupted in the EU about the 
British EU rebate for the budget of the EU for the 2007 and 2013 period.  
In 29 June 2005, following the request of the European Council, the 
Commission proposed to the EU Member States a rigorous negotiating framework 
for accession negotiations with Turkey. The Brussels European Council of December 
2004 decided that talks could start with Turkey on 3 October 2005 provided it 
brought into force six outstanding pieces of legislation. In the Commission 
framework (EU, 2005, June 29), it was underlined that Turkey fulfilled this condition 
on 1 June 2005. However, it was also suggested that Turkey was expected, prior to 
the start of negotiations, to sign the protocol extending the Ankara Agreement to the 
ten new Member States. Another striking emphasis in the document was the explicit 
declaration that negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which 
cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Moreover, it was also pointed out that in case of a 
serious and persistent breach by Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the 
Union was founded, accession negotiations might be suspended. Therefore, as 
Schimmelfennig (2008:3) suggests the emphasis on open-ended negotiations and 
suspension of talks reflected the divisions among the member states. 
The Ankara Protocol extends the customs union between Turkey and the EU 
to the 10 countries that joined the bloc in May 2004, including Cyprus. Turkey 
signed the protocol in 29 July 2005, but underlined that this signature did not mean 
recognition of Cyprus and Cypriot vessels would remain barred from Turkish 
facilities unless the EU honored its promise to ease trade restrictions on the Turkish 
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Republic of Northern Cyprus. Erdogan (quoted in “EU Talks”, 2006, October 5) 
suggested that “We are absolutely not in favor of opening our air and sea ports (to 
Cypriot use) if the isolation (of the TRNC) is not lifted.”  
As a reaction to Turkish declaration, the EU adopted a counter declaration on 
21 September 2005. In the declaration, it was emphasized that the declaration by 
Turkey was unilateral, did not form part of the Protocol and had no legal effect on 
Turkey‟s obligations under the Protocol. Moreover, it was underlined (EU, 2005: 
September 21) that “The European Community and its Member States expect full, 
non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of 
transport.”  
After hard bargaining between Great Britain, France and Greece, negotiating 
framework was finally signed on October, 3 2005. Therefore, opening of accession 
negotiations on October 3, 2005 is a historic moment for Turkey-EU relations. 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul (quoted in “EU Trumpets”, 2005, October 4) 
underlined that “What is important for us is that the prospect of full membership is 
very clear. There is no alternative such as a privileged partnership.” 
 
The Revised Accession Partnership was adopted in January 2006. The 
negotiations on „Science and Research‟ chapter was opened and provisionally closed 
in June 2006.  In October, the first phase of accession process, screening, was 
completed.  
With respect to domestic developments, terrorist attacks increased and as a 
response, in June 2006, amendments to the anti-terror law were adopted in which list 
of the issues that is labeled as terrorism was broadened.  Moreover, a new reform 
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package related to the Copenhagen Criteria was also submitted by the government in 
June. 
Criticisms towards non-implementation of Additional protocol with respect to 
Cyprus increased in the second half of 2006. There were many proposals such as 
freezing of accession negotiations for 18 months or freezing of some chapters. In 
response to the debate, in 29 November 2006, Commission presented its 
recommendation on the continuation of Turkey‟s accession negotiations. However, it 
was recommended that the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession with Turkey 
should not open negotiations on chapters
23
 covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's 
restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus until the Commission confirmed that 
Turkey had fulfilled its commitments. Moreover, it was also recommended (EU, 
2006, November 29) that no chapter would be provisionally closed until the 
Commission had confirmed that Turkey had fully implemented its commitments with 
respect to the Additional Protocol. 
Turkey criticized the European Commission's recommendation to freeze 
Turkey‟s membership negotiations. Government spokesman Cemil Cicek (quoted in 
Hacaoğlu, 2006, December 4) underlined that “It is not possible for us to accept the 
recommendation of the Commission as objective and just…Turkey is expecting 
objective and just decisions and attitudes from the EU.”  
In the General Affairs and External Affairs meeting of December 11, 2006, 
the Council decided as recommended by the European Commission and suspend 
negotiations in 8 chapters. The European Council of December 2006 endorsed the 
conclusions adopted by the Council. 
                                                          
23
 These chapters are: Chapter 1 free movement of goods, Chapter 3 Right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services, Chapter 9 Financial services, Chapter 11 agriculture and rural 
development, Chapter 13 fisheries, Chapter 14 transport policy, Chapter 29 customs union, and 
Chapter 30 external relations .  
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With respect to developments in Turkey, a presidential and constitutional 
crisis was occurred with the expiration of the presidential term of President Sezer in 
May 2007. In the first round of elections, the only candidate, Abdullah Gul could not 
get the required two-thirds majority and on the same day, a memorandum (e-
memorandum) was issued by the General Staff about the presidential candidate. In 
the other rounds, Abdullah Gul could not get the required vote and quit candidacy 
which led to early elections. In May 10, 2007, a constitutional reform was proposed 
by the government which asked for changes in election of presidency and terms of 
office and government‟s term of office. On 22 July 2007, parliamentary elections 
were held and the JDP got 46, 6 percent of the votes. In August, Abdullah Gul was 
elected as president by the new parliament. On September 5, the government formed 
by the JDP was approved by the Parliament. Constitutional reforms were adopted by 
a referendum on 21 October.  
In the negotiations, five chapters were opened in 2007. The chapter on 
„enterprise and industrial policy‟ was opened in 29 March 2002. The chapters on 
„financial control‟ and „statistics‟ were opened in 26 June 2007 whereas chapters on 
„consumer and health production‟ and „trans-European networks‟ were opened in 19 
December 2007. 
In February 18, 2008, the Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for 
Turkey. New chapters were also opened. The chapters on „company law‟ and 
„intellectual property rights‟ were opened in 17 June 2008 whereas chapters on „free 
movement of capital‟ and „information society and media‟ were opened in  19 
December 2008.  In 10 November 2008, the new National Programme of Turkey was 
accepted. 
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Turkey witnessed another political crisis in 2008 with the application of Chief 
Public Prosecutor to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the JDP and banning 
of 71 members of the JDP together with president and prime minister from politics 
for five years. The decision was made in favor of the JDP on 30 July 2008, however, 
it was (European Commission, 2008: 6) considered that the JDP had carried out 
activities against the secular principles of the Republic and ordered that 50 percent of 
the government funds to be cut off. 
In January 10, 2009, Egemen Bagis -Minister of EU Affairs- was appointed 
as the Chief Negotiator of Turkey in full membership negotiations. In 30 June 2009, 
the chapter on „taxation‟ and on 30 June 2010 the chapter on „food safety, veterinary 
and phytosanitary policy‟ were opened.  
Due to the stalemate in Turkey-EU relations, a new positive agenda was 
launched in 17 May 2012 by Commissioner Stefan Füle in order to bring fresh 
dynamic into EU-Turkey relations, keep Turkish accession process alive and put it 
back on track. Stefan Füle (quoted in EU, 2012, May17) emphasized that “the 
positive agenda is not to replace, but to complement and support the accession 
process of Turkey.” On 22 January 2013, Stefan Füle is quoted (“AB‟den 
Türkiye‟ye”, 2013, January 22) to suggest that “Member states demand to put 
Turkish accession on track by means of opening new chapters.” 
To sum up, Turkey‟s accession process continued with ups and downs.  A 
new dynamic is needed, especially with regard to implementation of Additional 
Protocol in order to overcome the stalemate. 
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4.4.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards 
Turkey 
 The security interest in improving relations with Turkey is constantly 
emphasized by the Commissioners. For instance, Olli Rehn (2005, March 8) 
underlined that “As a combined result of its population, size, strategic location and 
economic potential, Turkey has the capacity to make a major contribution to regional 
and international stability.” Similarly, he (2008, September 18) underlines that “This 
has been underlined by Turkey's constructive role in the Caucasus crisis and its 
recent diplomatic activities in relation to Syria, Armenia and the Middle East. These 
have demonstrated Turkey's strategic importance for Europe in building stability in 
our common neighborhood.”  Moreover, Turkey‟s role in energy security is also 
underlined. For instance, Olli Rehn (2007, June 30) emphasizes that “Turkey is also 
becoming more and more important partner for the EU in energy.” 
 European Commissioners use geopolitical arguments in their support 
speeches as well. Olli Rehn (2005, July 13) suggests that “Europe needs a stable, 
democratic and prosperous Turkey, which adopts and implements our values, our 
rule of law, our policies, our standards. It is in our own strategic interest.” Moreover, 
Olli Rehn (2006, March 9) underlines that “on issues as different as the energy crisis, 
Iran, Iraq or the cartoons crisis, Turkey appears as a key player which we absolutely 
need on our side or as a bridge and a moderator between civilizations.” Furthermore, 
Peter Mandelson (2006, September 15) points out that “Turkey is key for the overall 
stability of the Middle East, the dialogue with the Muslim world. Europe needs 
Turkey as much as Turkey needs the EU.” 
Ideational argument of unification of European Continent is underlined for 
the first time with respect to Turkey. Olli Rehn (2005, March 8) underlines that “The 
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decision by the European Council to open negotiations with Turkey opens a new 
chapter in the historic process of peacefully unifying the European continent.” 
European Commissioners also use ideational argument of commitments 
towards Turkey or keeping promises, Pacta Sunt Servanda, for the first time. Olli 
Rehn (2006, October 18) points out that “we should not lose sight of the progress 
accomplished in the last decade, nor of our commitment towards Turkey.” Similarly, 
he (2006, June 20) suggests that “the European Council reaffirmed that it will honour 
its existing commitments – pacta sunt servanda. Thus it confirmed the EU‟s 
consolidated enlargement agenda, which covers South Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and 
Romania, Turkey and Croatia, and the other countries of the Western Balkans.”  
 One of the political reservations for Commissioners is compliance to 
Copenhagen Criteria and implementation of the reforms. For instance, Olli Rehn 
(2006, October 18) underlines that “Crucial areas are freedom of expression, freedom 
of religion and the problems faced in the country's South-east, which should be 
addressed in accordance with European values and standards.”  
 European Commissioners also raise the non-implementation of additional 
protocol. Peter Mandelson (2006, September 15) notifies that “The failure of Turkey 
to ratify and implement the Ankara protocol poses a serious risk for our negotiations. 
Your refusal to open your ports to vessels under EU flags plays into the hands of 
those who have reservations about Turkish accession as justification for pushing the 
whole membership process into a siding.” Likewise, Jose Manuel Barroso (2006, 
July 5) underlines “Turkey must fulfill its commitments, just as the EU must fulfill 
its commitments. Turkey‟s commitments include respect for the Ankara protocol.”  
 Absorption capacity is continued to be raised. Olli Rehn (2006, October 3) 
suggests that “Absorption capacity is a factor important for both Turkey and the EU: 
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it is in your country's interest to ensure that you join a well functioning European 
Union – not a weak or a messy EU!” 
 
 
4.4.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey  
 
4.4.2.1 Germany 
This period also marked with change of attitude of Germany towards Turkey 
with the Chancellor Angela Merkel. To start with Schroeder, he showed his support 
for opening of accession talks with Turkey. He used all rational arguments to 
encourage Turkey to continue reform process. He (quoted in Krah and Elci, 2005, 
May 4) suggested that “For economic, political and strategic reasons we need to 
maintain the dynamic we developed last December - the dynamic of the reform 
process on one side and on the other the firm trust of the Turkish people that the 
negotiations will begin on time on Oct. 3.” Similarly, he (quoted in “Schroeder 
Urges”, 2005, August 27) emphasized that “My government believes Turkey has 
fulfilled every pledge it made, including those on Cyprus. I am sure the European 
Union will also keep its pledge.” Following opening of membership talks German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was delighted that a deal had been hammered out in 
Luxembourg and (quoted in “Schroeder Welcomes”, 2005, October 4)  pointed out 
that “It is now up to Turkey to pursue its course of reforms so that the negotiations 
can be pursued through to their goal of Turkey joining the European Union.” 
In January 2005, after talking with Sarkozy, the opposition leader Merkel 
(quoted in “French German”, 2005, January 8) reaffirmed its “commitment to the 
idea of a special partnership between the EU and Turkey.” Merkel (quoted in 
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“Germany‟s Merkel”, 2005, August 26) highlighted that “We are firmly convinced 
that Turkey's accession would strain the EU politically, economically and socially, 
and endanger the European integration process.” However, on the issue of special 
partnership, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 2005, June 5) warned that 
Turkey's aim is full membership of the E.U. -we are not prepared to 
accept anything else…A so-called privileged partnership goes against 
the spirit of relations between Turkey and the E.U… It also violates 
the commitments that the E.U. has undertaken toward Turkey. 
Likewise, Foreign Minister Gul (quoted in “Turkish Minister”, 2005, August 
31) argued that “I find such an offer illegitimate and immoral,” and added that this 
nullified Turkish common effort of half a century and had the potential to handicap 
the future of Turkish-EU relations. 
Emphasis on Copenhagen Criteria was again the main reservation for 
Germany. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (quoted in “Germany‟s Warns”, 2005, 
March 21) warned Turkey that “We are firmly committed to seeing Turkey fulfill the 
criteria, not only on paper but in reality.”  
Security arguments were also used by German politicians. For instance, 
Chancellor Schroder (quoted in “Turkey Moves”, 2005, September 27) highlighted 
that “An economically dynamic, socially modern Turkey that brings a commitment 
to Islam and enlightened European values into harmony -- such a Turkey would 
bring enormous gains in terms of stability and security for us all.” 
 German politicians also used geopolitical arguments. Before the European 
Council of December 2006, in which partial freeze of talks with Turkey would be 
discussed, German Foreign Minister (quoted in “German Foreign”, 2006, December 
9) warned that “if Turkey were to turn away from Europe, that would be a serious 
strategic loss for the EU.” 
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 After the 2005 elections in Germany, the leader of Christian Democratic 
Union Angela Merkel became the Chancellor of Germany in November 2005.
24
 
Prime Minister Erdogan visited Germany in order talk about Merkel‟s opposition to 
Turkish accession and Merkel (quoted in “Germany‟s Merkel”, 2005, November 27) 
stated that “We talked about the fact that 'pacta sunt servanda' (Latin for agreements 
must be respected) applies, and that things will develop well.” Moreover, She 
(quoted in Moulson, 2006, May 26) underlined that “There are and were in my party 
certainly skeptical views on the question of full membership for Turkey….But we 
have always said that, as a government, we ... abide in continuity by what the 
previous government agreed.” Furthermore, as a response to the comments of 
Christian Social Union leader Edmund Stoiber that Turkey was not a part of Europe, 
Foreign Minister Social Democrat Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Germany  
Foreign”, 2006, September 25) emphasized that “Turkey is entitled to fair entry 
negotiations…I would like us all to behave in a more responsible manner.” 
In October 2006, however, Merkel started to use the concept of privileged 
partnership again. She (quoted in “Germany Chancellor”, 2006, October 6) 
underlined that her party still considered a privileged partnership with Turkey and 
she highlighted that the negotiations of the EU “expressly provide for an open-ended 
process…In the end, we will have to decide what the result is.” Similarly, she 
(quoted in “Germany Leader”, 2006, November 27) emphasized that “We are 
conducting negotiations with Turkey that are open in terms of results…But, as party 
chairwoman, I say that it is and was right to offer Turkey a privileged partnership 
with the European Union rather than full membership.” In 2007, she (quoted in 
“Germany‟s Merkel”, 2007, July 2) reiterated her position by underlining that “We 
                                                          
24
 Merkel led a grand coalition of Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Social 
Democratic Party 
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want a very close linkage of Turkey to the European Union; we favor the idea of a 
privileged partnership; we are loyal to agreements and so are participating in the 
membership negotiations, which have now been extended by two chapters.” After 
having talks with US President Barack Obama, Merkel (quoted in “Merkel Says”, 
2009, April 5) underlined that “I believe that a close link between the Muslim world 
and in particular with Turkey is interesting for us all…In which manner and way that 
occurs, whether as a privileged partnership or a full (EU) member state, we're still 
talking about that.” Similarly, before the European elections of June 7, she (quoted in 
“Germany French”, 2009, May 10) emphasized that “We have to talk about the 
borders of this Europe…It is right that we say to people in the European election 
campaign ... our common position is: a privileged partnership for Turkey, but no full 
membership.”  
Turkish president Abdullah Gul (quoted in “Turkey Blasts”, 2009, May 12) 
criticized these comments and pointed out that “Politicians come and go... They may 
say some things for various reasons -- and maybe because of a shortage of vision -- 
but we will not pay attention to that…Turkey will pursue the negotiation process 
with determination... The reforms will continue.” In the same vein, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (quoted in “Don‟t Make”, 2009, May 14) called 
European Union Countries that “Please do not make the Turkish EU integration 
process a domestic issue of discussion.” Moreover, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey 
Pushes”, 2009, June 26) also warned that “Our European friends unfortunately have 
a unilateral expectation which is rather populist and it saddens us. I hope we will 
overcome this.” Furthermore, he (quoted in Barber, 2009, June 26) underlined that 
Turkey cannot accept the position that France and Germany have with 
regard to Turkey, because it is impossible for us to accept a type of 
membership that does not exist in the EU acquis…All the structural 
changes that have been done in Turkey have been done for the 
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purpose of full membership, and they will continue to be done for this 
purpose. 
The Copenhagen Criteria was one of the reservations that Merkel government 
proposed. As Merkel (quoted in Moulson, 2006, May 26) suggested, “We will follow 
these membership talks in such a way that all criteria naturally must be fulfilled, and 
certainly there will be tough negotiations in some places, but these talks continue.”  
Cyprus issue was another reservation for German government. German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Germany Presses”, 2006, June 
2) urged Ankara to ratify Ankara protocol by suggesting that “There is still no 
development regarding the protocol's ratification…We wish that this issue will be 
resolved by the end of the year, before Germany takes over the EU presidency.” 
Moreover, in Merkel‟s first visit to Turkey in October 2006, she (quoted in “EU 
Talks”, 2006, October 5) underlined that “The Ankara protocol must be 
implemented. It is standing before us as a pre-condition. This issue must be resolved 
for the continuation of (membership) talks.” However, Erdogan (quoted in “EU 
Talks”, 2006, October 5) responded that “We are absolutely not in favor of opening 
our air and sea ports (to Cypriot use) if the isolation (of the TRNC) is not lifted.” In 
November, concerning the implementation of Ankara Protocol, Merkel‟s tone 
became harsher and she (quoted in “Merkel Raises”, 2006, November 5) warned that 
“Otherwise we will have a very, very serious situation in terms of the continuation of 
accession talks…I call on Turkey to do everything not to get into this situation and 
not to lead the European Union into this situation.” As a response to Merkel‟s 
threats, Foreign Minister Steinmeier (quoted in “Germany Confident”, 2006, 
November 6) underlined that  
I know and I maintain that the Ankara Protocol will be ratified…In the 
interests of Europe and of Turkey, I urge that we do not now jump to 
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hasty conclusions and that we let the Finnish presidency try to reach a 
political compromise that it has been working on for months.  
 
In 29 November 2006, the European Commission recommended partial 
freeze on entry negotiations, 8 out of 33 chapters, due to the lack of progress in 
Ankara Protocol issue. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in 
“Barroso Says”, 2006, November 30) said later that “the commission had made an 
appropriate and responsible proposal” and added that “I am of the opinion that one 
should have another try -- without raising unrealistic expectations about further 
attempts at a compromise -- so long as we are still at a distance from decisive 
elections in the region, particularly the Turkish parliamentary elections.” Merkel 
welcomed the Commission proposal by suggesting (quoted in Watt, 2006, November 
30) that “The commission proposal is a strong signal that the Ankara protocol 
[opening ports to Cyprus] has to be accepted by Turkey.” German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel (quoted in “Merkel To”, 2006, December 4) also proposed that the European 
Commission should set a deadline of 18 months to review this issue before deciding 
whether to resume full membership talks with Turkey. As a response to German 
proposal to set a deadline for Ankara, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he 
telephoned German Chancellor Angela Merkel and reminded her what the costs of a 
wrong step could be. Moreover, he (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 2006, December 5) 
told her that “we hope such a historic mistake will not occur at the summit of EU 
leaders on December 14-15.” Furthermore, Erdogan (quoted in Ames, 2006, 
December 5) warned that “Turkey has nothing to lose. If anyone will lose it will be 
the EU.” 
At a summit with French President German Jacques Chirac and Polish 
President Lech Kaczynski, Chancellor Angela Merkel softened her stance about 18 
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month deadline and came up with the idea of a progress report on Turkey's 
membership bid. She (quoted in “Turkey Awaits”, 2006, December 6) suggested that 
“We will campaign for the European Commission to draft a report sometime 
between the elections in Turkey in autumn 2007 and the European elections in spring 
2009.” She (quoted in “Cyprus Positive”, 2006, December 6) proposed that “We are 
not fixing a date but around that time we will see whether Turkey has adopted the 
Ankara accord” and she added that “We don't want to set any kind of ultimatums, but 
we want ... the commission to say to us what has been achieved and how we could 
proceed.” Prime Minister Erdogan criticized this idea of having report and (quoted in 
Boland et al, 2006, December 6) suggested that “Turkey's EU membership is part of 
a global vision and the most important project of the 21st century… It cannot be 
sacrificed to small plans and daily domestic policies.” He (quoted in “Erdogan Says”, 
2006, December 7) also emphasized that “We don't have any such understanding as 
halting our progress en route to the EU. Of course, we have a Plan B, a Plan C ... but 
first we must see the steps taken on Dec. 11 and on Dec. 14-15.” 
 According to a spokesman of Finnish Presidency (quoted in “Turkey 
Agrees”, 2006, December 7), “The Turks are going to open a port and an airport.” 
However, Turkish foreign ministry refused to give details and a foreign ministry 
spokesman told that “Talks are still under way…For the safety of the talks, we will 
not share details with the media at this stage.” German Foreign Minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Germany Says”, 2006, December 7) commented that 
“If these proposals are constructive, they could be a positive element for the 
discussions of the European Council.” Before the European Council, he (quoted in 
“German Foreign”, 2006, December 9) also underlined that “I argue for the 
European reaction being marked by a sense of proportion and responsibility…We 
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must not overstrain things to the extent that the process of moving closer, which has 
taken many years, is brought down in one week.”  
Another reservation was „Absorption Capacity‟. Angela Merkel (quoted in 
Dombey et al, 2006, June 16) pointed out that “There are countries such as France, 
Germany and Austria, for whom this absorption capacity is very important and there 
are countries that tend to be more supportive of enlargement who sense this is an 
additional hurdle.” 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Politics EU”, 
2006, December 12) highlighted Turkey‟s political importance to the EU as follows:  
“Turkey‟s rapprochement towards Europe, the integration of Turkey in the system of 
European values is a project of outstanding importance.” In the European Council, 
the EU leaders were expected to approve partially freezing Turkey's membership 
talks because of its refusal to implement a 2005 deal to open its ports to E.U.-
member Cyprus  and Merkel (quoted in “Germany‟s Merkel, 2006, December 14) 
commented that 
This is not a small matter -- it is about a matter of course, that 
candidates for membership and EU member states must recognize 
each other politically and diplomatically…The EU has reacted, in my 
opinion, in a way that is both resolute and prudent -- prudent in that it 
is always made clear to Turkey that it is worth it to continue working 
on reforms. 
 In 29 March 2007, during the German presidency, the chapter on Enterprise 
and Industrial policy was opened and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier welcomed the progress and (quoted in “EU Turkey”, 2007, March 29) 
suggested that “The talks with Turkey are back on the rails..The German presidency 
is trying to open several chapters in the negotiations with Turkey in the first half of 
the year.” Turkey was not invited to the  celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the 
Treaty of Rome in the end of March 2007 and Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey 
291 
 
Reproaches”, 2007, April 14) explicitly criticized this decision by suggesting that 
“Seriously, I expected more from Germany” and added that this had “overshadowed 
the German presidency.” He also pointed out that “We would like a clear idea of a 
date, a roadmap, a calendar for negotiations…if the EU doesn't want us, it should say 
so clearly now. If we are not wanted, the two sides need not continue wasting their 
time in talks.” After he talked with Chancellor Merkel, she (quoted in “Merkel Says” 
2007, April 15) suggested that “Under the German presidency of the EU, two more 
chapters could probably be opened if things go well,” and she reminded that it was 
important that Turkey normalized ties with Cyprus and Erdogan commented that 
“One cannot attack a lady. We are on a long, narrow road and we have to be patient.”  
 In June 2007, Germany hoped to open economic and monetary policy chapter 
but it was pulled at the last minute when France threatened a veto. However, German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Roundup Croatia”, 2007, June 
26) appealed to European governments to treat Turkey fairly and suggested that “We 
hope Turkey stays on a European course.”  
Ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey were also highlighted. 
For instance, a draft of a revamped Christian Democratic Union party platform stated 
that “only European states can join the European Union.” Merkel (quoted in 
“Germany‟s Merkel”, 2007, July 2) commented that “Turkey has at least a European 
element, and so the pure question of demarcation is certainly not the question of 
appraisal for Turkey.”  
 After the 2009 elections, Chancellor Angela Merkel formed a new centre-
right government. Due to the concern in Ankara whether new government wanted to 
close the door to EU membership for Turkey, German Foreign Minister Guido 
Westerwelle (quoted in “Germany Backs”, 2010, January 7) suggested that “Let me 
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state categorically that what has been agreed between the EU and Turkey is still 
valid. This German government will honor these undertakings. You have my word 
on that.” However, he also warned that “(Membership talks) are an open-ended 
process. They do not imply anything automatic. The outcome cannot be guaranteed 
at the outset.” Chief Negotiator, Egemen Bagis (quoted in “new Turkeys”, 2010, 
January 8) thanked Westerwelle's for his support to Turkey's EU membership bid and 
added that “Our prime minister, our foreign minister and I attach great importance to 
his support.” In September 2010, Westerwelle (quoted in “Turkey Westerwell”, 
2010, September 13) reiterated his support for Turkey by proposing that 
Turkey has a right to be treated fairly, with respect and on equal 
terms…We don't want to rashly promise something before the time 
comes, but nobody can rebuff and exclude such an important, 
obviously modernizing country…We encourage those forces in 
Turkey that are continuing this process of reform. 
 
On the issue of integration of Turkish workers, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey 
PM”, 2007, November 2) suggested that “German politicians do not acknowledge 
enough the integration of the three million Turks in Germany…Germany should do 
much more for Turkey's EU membership bid as this would massively support 
integration. Because we Turks regard Germany very positively, we feel very let 
down on this issue.” 
In May 2012, foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (quoted in “Westerwelle 
EU”, 2012, May 15) suggested that EU-Turkey relations and accession negotiations 
must be re-dynamised and added that “For too long we have not opened a single 
chapter. For too long we have moved around in circles…I am optimistic to overcome 
the standstill.” 
 Copenhagen Criteria was also concern for this government, Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle (quoted in “Germany Urges”, 2010, January 7) suggested that “I would 
293 
 
like to express my respect and my deep respect to the Turkish government, 
parliament and the active Turkish civil society for making progress on EU 
reforms…I encourage you to press on” particularly in the areas of freedom of 
religion, expression and the press. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted on „privileged partnership‟ for 
Turkey instead of full EU membership. She was quoted (“Merkel Wants”, 2010, 
March 24) to suggest that “There are 35 chapters in the (membership) talks. I am 
confident that 27-28 of them can be taken up and this will really mean a privileged 
partnership…Some issues, like institutional integration, will be left out of the scope.” 
As a response to these comments, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey Insists”, 2010, March 
24) highlighted that “We are already conducting negotiations, and these are aimed at 
full membership. For us, there is no alternative.” Likewise, European Affairs 
Minister Egemen Bagis (quoted in “Turkey Snubs”, 2010, March 27) suggested that 
“The privileged partnership just does not exist…This does not have any legal basis in 
the European Union.” 
According to Turkish politicians, fear of shift of EU‟s center of gravity was 
one of the reservations for Germany. For instance, Babacan (quoted in “Turkey 
Says”, 2010, September 23) suggested that 
When Turkey becomes a member of the EU, Turkey is not going to be 
in a secondary position and that's one of the reasons why countries 
like Germany and France are quite nervous about our 
membership…From day one were going to be influential as Germany 
and France. It's not going to be a Germany and France axis EU, it's 
going to be a Germany, France and Turkey axis EU and we're not sure 
if they are ready to share that power with us.  
Moreover, Babacan also underlined that “The relevance of the EU ... is 
decreasing very fast and especially after this economic and financial crisis…The 
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weight of the European economy in the world has shrunk and will continue to shrink 
and only with enlargement the EU will be able to protect its power and influence.” 
 Therefore, change of government affected German-Turkish relations. 
Germany, especially under the chancellorship of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, 
became one of the brakeman of Turkish European bid. Instead of full membership, 
Chancellor Merkel asked for „privileged partnership‟ for Turkey by emphasizing 
political reservations of burden of Turkey on European integration process, borders 
of Europe, and non-recognition of Cyprus and absorption capacity. 
 
4.4.2.2 France 
In this period, French attitude towards Turkish bid was negative due to the 
public opposition to Turkey‟s accession. France rejected the new European Union 
constitution on 29 May 2005 and it was believed that fear of accession of Turkey was 
one of the reasons behind this French refusal. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul 
(quoted in “Turkey Says”, 2005, May 25) suggested that “It is not going to affect us 
because the decision to start negotiations with Turkey had already been taken. This 
referendum is on the constitution, not on Turkey's membership.” 
In their support for Turkish membership, French politicians generally used 
geopolitical arguments. For instance, President Chirac (quoted in “Turkey Could”, 
2005, October 2005) underlined that  
If, on a whim or as a knee-jerk reaction, we say 'They're not European, 
they should go away,' who can say that this region won't tip into 
extremism?" You know the danger this represents. It's that in the 
whole Muslim world around Turkey, that represents 350 million 
people. Beyond Turkey, you realize the responsibility we'd shoulder if 
we said Non, there's nothing to see, keep going, we don't want you. 
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Likewise, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in “Update 
1, 2005, October 7) emphasized that “I am in favor of (Turkey's) accession….It is in 
Europe's geopolitical interest not to close the door to Turkey.” 
 One of the main political reservations for France was Cyprus issue. 
French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in Gehmlich, 2005, August 2) 
suggested that “It doesn't seem conceivable to me that a negotiation process of 
whatever kind can start with a country that does not recognize every member state of 
the European Union, in other words all 25 of them.” As a response to the remarks, 
Prime Minister Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey Reproaches, 2005, August 4) argued that 
“It is out of the question for us to discuss or consider any new conditions with regard 
to Oct. 3…We are saddened by the statements of the French prime minister and of 
President (Jacques) Chirac.” France continued to press Turkey in Cyprus issue. 
French President Jacques Chirac (quoted in “EU Says”, 2005, August 29) suggested 
that “Following the unilateral declaration on Cyprus, Turkey should assure the 25 
members of the Union that it is ready to fully respect its obligations.” Similarly, 
French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy (quoted in Williard, 2005, August 
30) asked Turkey to recognize Cyprus and added that France would “respect its 
commitments but expects Turkey and other candidate countries to respect theirs and 
satisfy the conditions for joining the Union.” Moreover, French Prime Minister 
Dominique de Villepin (quoted in “France Maintains”, 2005, September 4) reiterated 
that “What I want is for Turkey to get on the path of recognition of Cyprus as quickly 
as possible…It seems to me indispensable that every state starting an accession 
process should have a serene and calm relationship with all Europe.” In the end of 
September, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin dropped objections to start 
of Turkey‟s entry talks by (quoted in Heritage, 2005, September 29) confirming that   
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“I am in favor of a process of engagement, provided the conditions are met so that 
accession can actually take place," but he warned that "We have demanded that the 
whole process ... is dealt with carefully, is open and monitored, and the requirements 
are clear at each stage.”  
 French politicians carried on to have concerns about Cyprus. In November 
2005, Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy acknowledged that Turkey did not 
respond to its obligation by not opening its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and 
planes and (quoted in “Turkey Risks”, 2006, November 8) warned that “If by the end 
of the year Turkey still does not recognize the 25 (EU) member states, including 
obviously Cyprus, then it seems to me necessary to review the membership timetable 
for Turkey into the European Union.” Likewise, French interior minister Sarkozy 
(quoted in “Sarkozy Says”, 2006, December 16) underlined that “If Turkey wants to 
come into Europe, and you know my reservations, it must first recognize Europe is 
25 countries not 24.” 
French politicians used political arguments as a reservation for Turkish 
membership and they called for „privileged partnership‟. One of the main 
reservations for France in Turkish accession talks was French voters well known 
hostility to Turkey‟s entry. For instance, just after the EU launched membership talks 
with Ankara on October 3, Prime Minister Villepin (quoted in “EU Partnership”, 
2005, October 6) suggested that “No one can say today what the outcome of these 
negotiations will be and all options are open, including a privileged partnership.” 
However, Turkish politicians were also aware of the French public discontent with 
Turkish accession. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told that he understood 
the domestic political concerns of the French leadership and thanked France by 
(quoted in “Turkey Holds”, 2005, October 7) underlining that “France is one of the 
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driving forces of the EU and if France had really said 'no' we would not have been 
able to start the negotiations.” Moreover, Prime Minister Villepin (quoted in “EU 
Cannot”, 2006, January 18) reiterated the open-endedness of the negotiations with 
Turkey and underlined the importance of public opinion by suggesting that “In 
France the last word will go to the French people via a referendum.” Furthermore, 
French Interior Minister Sarkozy (quoted in “Turkey‟s EU”, 2006, October 5) 
suggested that if Turkey joined the European bloc, “It would be the end of political 
Europe” and he called for „privileged partnership‟.  
Ideational argument of Europeanness of Turkey was also questioned by 
French politicians. For example, French Interior Minister Sarkozy (quoted in 
“Turkey‟s EU”, 2006, October 5) pointed out that “Turkey is in Asia Minor... I will 
not explain to little French school children that the frontiers of Europe are Iraq and 
Syria.” He (quoted in “French Pol”, 2006, December 1) also reiterated his position 
by stating that “The place of Turkey is not within the European Union…Europe is 
made for European states.” Concerning the Commission proposal of partial freeze of 
some chapters with Turkey, Sarkozy (quoted in “Sarkozy Says”, 2006, December 16) 
emphasized that “Angela Merkel, Jose-Manuel Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
Wilfried Martens -- we are all in agreement that we need a Europe with borders.”  
 Security arguments were also used by French politicians for their reservation. 
For instance, considering acceptance of Turkey, French interior minister Sarkozy 
(quoted in “Turkey‟s EU”, 2006, October 5) underlined that “We will have made the 
Kurdish problem a European problem…Then Europe, which will become a sub-
region of the United Nations, will no longer exist…If to stabilize Turkey we must 
destabilize Europe, I say that's a high price to pay.” 
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 Sarkozy‟s opposition to full Turkish membership continued throughout his 
presidency. One of the main arguments of Sarkozy in his election campaign was his 
proposal for „privileged partnership‟ for Turkey instead of full membership. Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey Uneasy, 2007, May 7) expressed his 
wish for softening of Sarkozy‟s stance on Turkey by suggesting that “We hope we 
will not see in our bilateral relations from now on the same attitudes that Sarkozy 
displayed during his election campaign regarding our European Union (accession) 
process and Turkish-French ties.” However, Sarkozy gave clues for not changing his 
position on Turkey by (quoted in “France‟s Sarkozy”, 2007, May 23) underlining 
that “I couldn't have been a candidate for the presidency with one view and then 
changed it having become president.” 
 In February 2007, before the presidential elections, Sarkozy came up with the 
idea of Mediterranean Union in which Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus 
would be members and this Union would have its own council of heads of state and a 
Mediterranean Council. This Union would have dialogue with Malta, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania and Sarkozy thought (“EU/Mediterranean”, 
2007, February 9) that Turkey, which was not European in his mind, would play a 
key role in the Mediterranean Union. In May 2007, he reiterated his position with 
Mediterranean Union and (quoted in “France‟s Sarkozy”, 2007, May 28) underlined 
that “We must do in the Mediterranean region what we did in Europe 60 years ago.” 
During the French presidency in 2008, Turkey was invited to a Paris summit for 
Union for the Mediterranean, but Jean-Maurice Ripert (quoted in “French Diplomat”, 
2008, July 1), permanent representative of France to the United Nations underlined 
that “We have never said that the Mediterranean Union was an alternative for 
Turkey's EU membership. However, as one of the biggest powers of the 
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Mediterranean, Turkey needs to be a part of this project.” After the Summit, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Babacan (quoted in “Turkey Asks”, 2008, July 12) suggested that 
“Turkey supports this initiative. We believe that it will promote peace, stability and 
development in the region.” 
Before the European Council of June 2007, there were media reports 
(“Enlargement Anxiety”, 2007, June 14) about French intention to block the opening 
of talks between the EU and Turkey on economic and monetary policy - one of the 
three chapters set to be opened on the European Council. However, commenting on 
these reports, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner (quoted in “France Will”, 
2007, June 15) suggested that “Brake or block? I think that neither of these terms 
will be used at next week's meeting.” On the other hand, in the European Council, 
the chapters on statistics and financial control were opened but France was argued to 
prevent the expansion of the negotiations to the more important economic and 
monetary policy. Ali Babacan, Turkey's top negotiator with the European Union 
expressed his reservation about French move by (quoted in Brandt, 2007, June 26) 
suggesting that “We are not satisfied with the technical justification that was given to 
us” and added that it was important for both sides to maintain confidence in making 
progress in the entry talks and otherwise not only Turkey but the EU would be 
damaged by this. 
 In August 2007, Sarkozy seemed to soften his opposition to Turkey on the 
condition of EU's launching of a committee of high-level experts to examine 
questions concerning the bloc's future but also expressed partnership instead of full 
membership. He (quoted in “France Will”, 2007, August 27) underlined that “If that 
vital reflection on the future of our union is launched ... France will not oppose new 
chapters of negotiations between the union and Turkey being opened in the months 
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and years to come” but added that “I'm not going to be a hypocrite. Everyone knows 
that I am only in favor of an association ... I think that the idea of an association will 
one day be recognized by everyone as being the most reasonable.” Likewise, he 
(quoted in “Turkey Does”, 2007, September 20) suggested that “What I wish to offer 
Turkey is a true partnership with Europe, it is not integration with Europe.” 
 In December 2007, France was argued (Barber, 2007, December 11) to 
persuade its EU partners to drop the word „accession‟ in connection with Turkey‟s 
talks with 27 nation bloc. EU Foreign Ministers used „intergovernmental 
conferences‟ rather than „accession conferences‟ with Croatia and Turkey in a 
statement on enlargement strategy. French attitude was criticized by Prime Minister 
Erdogan who was quoted (“Turkish PM”, 2007, December 12) to suggest that “Mr. 
Sarkozy says one thing in our bilateral meetings and says something else behind our 
back. This is not a becoming attitude in politics.” Moreover, in January 2008, 
Erdogan suggested that Turkey would have a trilateral meeting with Germany and 
France in Germany in May in order to learn the reason of current stalemate in EU-
Turkey relations and (quoted in “Enlargement Turkey”, 2008, January 16) added that 
“The European Union has to explain in a scientific and intelligent way why they do 
not accept us in the EU. Up to now they have not done so.” 
 French National Assembly approved on 31 May 2008, a constitutional 
amendment which requires France to hold a referendum to approve the EU accession 
of any country whose population surpasses 5% of the EU's population - currently 
about 500 million people. Turkey reacted to this decision and on June 3, The Turkish 
Foreign Ministry (quoted in “Enlargement Turkey”, 2008, June 6)) suggested that it 
was “irked by efforts to enshrine such a discriminatory approach towards Turkey in 
the French constitution despite the fact that accession negotiations [between Turkey 
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and the EU] have started with France's consent.” Turkish remarks seemed to have an 
effect on France and it is reported (“France Scraps”, 2008, June 25) that French 
senate voted on 24 June to drop the constitutional amendment. 
In May 2008, before the start of French presidency, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ali Babacan told French Secretary of State for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet 
that Turkey expected that accession process would continue normally without 
problems during the French presidency and Jouyet (quoted in “France Pledges” 
2008, May 6) responded that “France has no intention of breaking up Turkey's 
negotiation process…The French presidency will be impartial, fair and objective.” 
Similarly, in June 2008, Babacan (quoted in Brandt, 2008, June 17) reiterated that 
“We expect that the French presidency will be a fair, impartial and transparent 
presidency term. Turkey will expect to join the union as an equal partner with all the 
rights and obligations this would imply.” With the beginning of French presidency, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy's adviser for European Union affairs Alain 
Lamassoure (quoted in “87”, 2008, July 2) suggested that French position against 
Turkey's full EU membership did not change but added that “Chapters linked to full 
membership will be blocked, but France will support opening all the chapters not 
linked to full membership.” 
 In April 2009, US President Obama asked EU leaders to anchor Turkey in 
Europe but EU leaders reacted harshly on his comments. French president suggested 
(quoted in Champion and Fassihi, 2009, April 16) that “I have been working hand in 
hand with President Obama, but when it comes to the European Union it's up to 
member states of the European Union to decide" and (quoted in Zain, 2009, April 7) 
added that  
I have always opposed this membership and will continue to do so. I believe 
that the overwhelming majority of EU states support France's position… 
302 
 
Turkey is a very big country and an ally of NATO and of the US, and should 
remain a privileged partner. However, my position will not change. 
In May 2009, he reiterated his position by (quoted in “Update Sarkozy”, 
2009, May 5) suggesting that "There are countries, such as Turkey, which...should 
build with Europe a privileged relationship, which are bound to be associated to 
Europe as tightly as possible, but which should not become members (of the E.U.).” 
As a response to these comments, President Gul (quoted in “Turkey Blasts, 2009, 
May 12) suggested that “Politicians come and go... They may say some things for 
various reasons -- and maybe because of a shortage of vision -- but we will not pay 
attention to that….Turkey will pursue the negotiation process with determination... 
The reforms will continue.” Moreover, Prime Minister Erdogan (quoted in “Erdogan 
Criticizes”, 2009, June 26) also expressed his concern by stating that “Turkey cannot 
accept the position of Germany and France. A privileged partnership doesn't exist in 
(European law)…Our European friends unfortunately have a unilateral expectation 
which is rather populist and it saddens us. I hope we will overcome this.” 
 French President carried on his position about Turkey‟s „privileged 
partnership‟. Sarkozy (quoted in Nordstorm, 2009, July 3) pointed out that “France 
will not be against the opening of new chapters under Swedish chairmanship, but of 
course this chapter should allow that Turkey should be an associated member of 
Europe and not a full-fledged member.” Turkish foreign minister Davutoglu (quoted 
in “Turkey Urges”, 2009, November 6) argued that “No-one can force us to accept 
an option like a special partnership... The European Union's key selling point is its 
respect for agreements. It's thanks to that principle that the EU has become a draw. If 
it loses that, it loses all its legitimacy.” 
 In April 2010, after having talks with Prime Minister Erdogan, European 
Affairs Minister Pierre Lellouche (quoted in “France and Turkey”, 2010, April 7) 
303 
 
suggested that “We agree to disagree…Turkey has its project, that of integrating with 
the 27 (EU members). We respect this project but we have our own project, that of a 
big Europe, the 27 in a partnership with Russia and Turkey.” 
Ideational argument of non-Europeanness of Turkey emphasized in this 
period. President Sarkozy (quoted in Mahony, 2007, May 24) reiterated that “I 
believe that Turkey does not have a place in the European Union. We are going to 
have this debate on Turkey - we cannot avoid it.” Similarly, he (quoted in “Turkey 
Does”, 2007, September 20) asserted that “I do not believe that Turkey belongs in 
Europe, and for a simple reason, which is that it is in Asia minor.” Sarkozy‟s 
spokesman (quoted in “French President”, 2007, November 13) also reported that 
“He said Turkey was a country of 100 million inhabitants who were not in Europe 
but in Asia Minor, and that he wouldn't want to be the one who was going to explain 
to French pupils that Europe's borders were with Syria.” 
Security arguments were also used by French politicians in the explanation of 
their reservations toward Turkey. For instance, Sarkozy (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 
2009, November 6) underlined that “We want Turkey to be a bridge between East 
and West …I told President Obama that it's very important for Europe to have 
borders. For me, Europe is a force for stability in the world and I cannot allow that 
force for stabilization to be destroyed.” 
To sum up, France under the presidency of Nicholas Sarkozy became one of 
the brakemen of Turkish accession to the EU. Like Chancellor Merkel, president 
Sarkozy also asked for privileged partnership instead of full membership by 
underlining the political reservation of Turkish nonrecognition of Cyprus and 
ideational reservation of non-Europeanness of Turkey. 
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4.4.2.3 Great Britain 
British support for Turkey‟s membership bid continued in this period. On the 
eve of presidency, Blair (quoted in Grajewski, 2005, June 23) declared that “In our 
presidency, we will try to ... carry out the Union's obligation to those like Turkey and 
Croatia that wait in hope of a future as part of Europe.” Similarly, Foreign Minister 
Jack Straw (quoted in “Britain Strongly”, 2005, June 30) highlighted that "The 
British government remains strongly committed to Turkey joining the European 
Union.” in September 2005, Cyprus was pressing for counter declaration for Turkey 
but fearing of a harsh response towards Turkey,  Straw believed that negations 
should begin on time and  (quoted in Kambas and Taylor, 2005, September 8) 
warned that  “To do otherwise would not only compromise the credibility of the EU 
but might also endanger the considerable progress already made in Turkey.” 
Commenting on a no to Turkey, Straw (quoted in “Britain Warns”, 2005, September 
28) notified that “It would now be a huge betrayal of the hopes and expectations of 
the Turkish people and of Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan's programme of 
reform if, at this crucial time, we turned our back on Turkey.” With only hours to go 
before formal membership negotiations with Ankara were due to start, hard 
bargaining was seen between Great Britain and Austria, Straw (quoted in “Britain 
Uncertain, 2005, October 3) admitted that  
What I know from negotiations is you get a sense fairly quickly 
whether there is a clear will to resolve matters by being imaginative 
about text, or whether one is simply going through the motions and 
there is a gulf in principle..That's the issue we've been trying to tease 
out with our Austrian colleagues. 
He (quoted in “EU Fails”, 2005, October 3) also added that “It's a frustrating 
situation, but I hope and pray that we may be able to reach an agreement.” Finally, 
agreement was reached that negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European 
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Union could begin and Straw (quoted in Bowley, 2005, October 4) showed his 
enthusiasm by suggesting that “This is a truly historic day for Europe and for the 
whole of the international community.” 
 British support was also seen in the fourth quarter of 2006 in which partial 
freeze of talks with Turkey was discussed among member states and European 
Commission due to her refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. 
Blair (quoted in “Blair Warns”, 2006, November 29) warned that “Just at the 
moment to send an adverse signal to Turkey I think would be a serious mistake… 
The Council is the critical date. We have got to make sure that we allow Turkey's 
accession to proceed.”  
 Cyprus issue was one of the main stumbling blocks on the road to Turkey‟s 
accession but Great Britain supported Turkey. Although Labour governments 
supported Turkey in Cyprus issue, Great Britain‟s ministers for Europe had some 
reservations. For instance, in September 2006, Great Britain's Minister for Europe 
Geoff Hoon joined Greek foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis and (quoted in “Turkey 
Must”, 2006, September 12) underlined that “We want to see Turkey accept its 
obligations under the law of the European Union...it's very important that Turkey 
should satisfy its obligations.” After the Commission report about partial freeze of 
chapters, Hoon (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 2006, November 8) underlined that 
“Turkey must implement its obligation to all (EU) member states. If it fails to do so, 
the EU must act in accordance with its declaration of 21 September, 2005.” 
Similarly, British Minister for Europe Chris Bryant suggested that 
I urge the Turkish government to honour the commitments that it has 
already made. We would like to see the ports opened, we'd like to see 
them making that commitment again and seeing action rather than just 
words…We don't want (Turkey's accession process) to stop, we don't 
want to slam the door shut. We think it is really important that the 
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process towards EU accession of Turkey is maintained as a strong 
possibility.  
 
In 11 December 2006, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to freeze 8 chapters. The 
Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett (quoted in Watt, 2006, December 12) suggested 
that “Train in fact still firmly on the track. Yes, eight chapters frozen but 27 out of 35 
not and every prospect that work can continue steadily and effectively to make 
Turkey in the fullness of time a member of the EU.” After the European Summit, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair flew straight to Ankara and (quoted in Casert, 2006, 
December 15) underlined that “It is important that we continue the process of 
accession with Turkey, that we do not shut the door on Turkey's membership.” In 
March 2007, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 2007, 
March 27) renewed British support by suggesting that “We strive to be always 
(Turkey's) staunchest ally … it will be to the advantage of the EU and to the 
advantage of Turkey when Turkey's membership application succeeds.” 
Gordon Brown, after becoming prime minister continued British policy 
towards Turkey. Following talks with Prime Minister Erdogan, Prime Minister 
Brown (quoted in “Britain Eyes”, 2007, October 23) underlined that “We will 
support the Turkish accession negotiations to the European Union. We believe at the 
December council of the European Union we will be able to reach agreement on the 
next stage.” 
In 2008, Sarkozy proposed an idea of Mediterranean Union and demanded to 
include Turkey in this framework. However, Foreign Minister Miliband (quoted in 
“Britain Says”, 2008, May 14) highlighted that “The Mediterranean Union can and 
should be a beneficial project for the European Union but it is not, repeat not, an 
alternative to enlargement of the EU to include Turkey.” In May 2009, Miliband 
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reiterated British support by (quoted in “Britain Seeks”, 2009, May 27) suggesting 
that “The UK remains strongly committed to the vision of Turkey as a full and equal 
member of the European Union. This is a top priority for the UK.” In November 
2009, following talks with chief negotiator Egemen Bagis, Miliband was quoted to 
(“Turkish British”, 2009, November 4) told strong support Great Britain extended to 
Turkey‟s EU negotiations and added that we could see the benefits of Turkey's EU 
membership in Turkey and Europe. 
Geopolitical arguments were used by British politicians in their support to 
Turkey. For instance, Straw (quoted in “British FM”, 2005, September 8) underlined 
that “By welcoming Turkey we will demonstrate that Western and Islamic cultures 
can thrive together as partners in the modern world. The alternative is too terrible to 
contemplate.” Moreover, he (quoted in “Turkey Hints”, 2005, September 28) also 
pointed out that “Anchor Turkey in the West and we gain a beacon of democracy and 
modernity, a country with a Muslim majority, which will be a shining example 
across the whole of its neighboring region.” Likewise, Europe Minister Douglas 
Alexander (quoted in “Britain Tries”, 2005, September 30) highlighted that “Turkey 
is of enormous strategic importance to the EU… Successfully integrating Turkey in 
the EU we believe would help us tackle most of the many difficult problems that we 
face in the modern world.” Furthermore, Straw (quoted in “EU In”, 2005, October 2) 
stated that “We're concerned about this theological-political divide, which could 
open up even further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states 
and those of Islamic heritage…We need to see Turkey in the European Union and 
not pushed the other way.” After the opening of membership talks with Turkey, 
Straw (quoted Bowley, 2005, October 4) suggested Turkey's entry into the EU, “will 
bring a strong secular state that happens to have a Muslim majority into the EU, 
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proof that we can live, work and prosper together.” Great Britain's Minister for 
Europe Geoff Hoon (quoted in “British Minister”, 2006, October 9) also underlined 
that “it is important to send the right message to a secular country, which looks to the 
West and wants to join the EU.” Blair (quoted in “Blair Warns”, 2006, November 
29) also emphasized that “In Europe we face a division today between short-term 
political considerations... and the long-term strategic interest of Europe and the wider 
world which is to have Turkey inside the European Union.” Tony Blair was in favor 
of „arc of moderation‟, which includes moderate Muslim countries such as Turkey 
and Blair‟s official spokesman (quoted in Wat et al, 2006, December 15)  told that it 
was “also an important reason why we support Turkish membership of the EU.” 
Foreign Secretary David Miliband (quoted in “Inclusion Of”, 2007, September 5) 
underlined that   
In bridging the gap between Europe and Asia, in showing that 
common humanity overshadows religious differences, there is no 
more pivotal country than Turkey…If Turkey can play a role as a 
member of the European Union, engaged in shared projects, 
promoting shared values, the prize for Turkey, for Britain and for 
Europe as a whole is immense: to witness an age where the world is 
not only more connected, and more interdependent, but also more at 
ease with the different identities that Turkey bridges, and, as a result, 
more secure. 
Moreover, in May 2009, Miliband (quoted in “Politics European”, 2009, May 
28) reiterated that “Britain is more convinced than it has ever been that the strategic 
decision to support Turkey's accession to the European Union is the right one.” 
 British politicians also used political arguments. After the reelection of JDP, 
Great Britain's Foreign Secretary David Miliband (quoted in Brand, 2007, July 23) 
suggested that “It is very important that across Europe we reach out to the new 
government in Turkey when it is formed…A stable and secure political situation in 
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Turkey is massively in our interest and we will certainly want to be taking forward 
our links with this very, very important country.” 
Compliance to Copenhagen Criteria was one of the reservations. Geoff Hoon 
(quoted in “Britain Urges”, 2006, November 8) stated that  
I know that the Turkish Government is committed to reform and to 
providing its citizens with the quality of life they demand and deserve. 
I urge Turkey to reflect on just how much has been achieved in recent 
years and to be confident in continuing this process and taking the 
necessary steps forward. 
  
Moreover, Foreign Minister David Miliband (quoted in “France Deals”, 2007, 
December 10) underlined that “we think it's important that the European Union fulfill 
its responsibilities towards Turkey, but also that Turkey continues the reform process 
that is an important part of its passage to the European Union.” British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown's spokesman Michael Ellam (quoted in “Britain After”, 
2009, April 6)  also pointed out that “The technical negotiations which are part of 
Turkey's EU accession process have been, in the view of the British government, a 
major driver of reform to improve the way the country is governed, develop the 
economy, and address human rights issues.” Another reservation for Great Britain 
was Turkish controversial article 301 of penal code which was about insulting 
Turkish identity. Great Britain‟s European Affairs Minister, Geoff Hoon (quoted in 
“Government Hints”, 2007, January 25) has called for changes in the controversial 
article and suggested that the Turkish government must remove obstacles before 
freedom of expression. 
Security interest was also emphasized by British politicians. For instance, 
Foreign Minister Miliband  (quoted in Bruges, 2007, November 6) suggested that 
“Enlargement is by far our most powerful tool for extending stability and prosperity . 
. . If we fail to keep our promises to Turkey, it will signal a deep and dangerous 
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divide between east and west.” He (quoted in “Britain Says”, 2008, May 14)  also 
underlined that “I hope our counter-terrorism relationship will both have practical 
measures to make our countries safer but also some of the deeper ideological and 
theological roots of terrorism that need to be tackled.” 
The ideational argument of not sharing common religion was refuted by 
British politicians. For instance, Miliband (quoted in “Britain Reiterates”, 2007, 
September 7)  said rejecting Turkey's bid to join the bloc would „give a very bad 
signal‟ that the EU was a „closed Christian state‟ but allowing the mainly Muslim 
country to enter would be „good for business‟.  Moreover, Justice Minister Jack 
Straw (quoted in “Britain Reaffirms”, 2007, November 23)  suggested that Turkey 
was a primarily Muslim nation but he shared the view of Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the idea of an exclusively Christian Europe “belongs to 
the Medieval Ages and it should be left there.” 
 David Cameron (quoted in Bila, 2010, July 27) suggested that he would 
remain Turkey's “strongest possible advocate for EU membership.” British support 
for Turkey was also praised by Turkish politicians.  In October 2010, chief negotiator 
Bagis (quoted in “Turkey Britain”, 2010, October 24) highlighted that “Britain is the 
country that would understand the best the ups and downs Turkey goes through in its 
accession process. Because Britain's accession talks was not without pain. Britain is a 
source of inspiration for us with its commitment to the EU integration.” Moreover, in 
November 2011, President Gul (quoted in “Turkish President”, 2011, November 20) 
suggested that “I will underline the importance of England's continued support in 
making sure negotiations are not blocked by artificial political obstacles.” 
Security arguments were used. Conservative Prime Minister Cameron 
(quoted in Bila 2010, July 27) suggested that “When I think about what Turkey has 
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done to defend Europe as a NATO ally and what Turkey is doing now in Afghanistan 
alongside European allies, it makes me angry that your progress towards EU 
membership can be frustrated in the way it has been” and he underlined that “I 
believe it's just wrong to say Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit 
inside the tent.” Moreover, he (quoted in Grice, 2010, July 27) also pointed out that 
“A European Union without Turkey is not stronger but weaker, not more secure but 
less, not richer but poorer” and added that “We want you to be Turkey - because it's 
as Turkey that you can play the unique role I have described on building greater 
security and greater prosperity for all our citizens.” 
 Economic arguments were also used together with the security arguments. 
Cameron (quoted in “Britain Says”, 2011, March 31) suggested that “The case for 
Turkish membership of the European Union in my view is clearer than ever, for 
increased economic prosperity, for a bigger market for our goods and services, for 
more energy security and for real benefits for the EU's long term stability. 
Geopolitical arguments also used. The British leader also turned on those who 
oppose Turkey's EU bid on the grounds of its Muslim majority population and  
(quoted in Bila, 2010, July 27) saw "the history of the world through the prism of a 
clash of civilizations….They think Turkey has to choose between East and West and 
that choosing both is not an option.” 
Consequently, Great Britain continued to be the driver of Turkish accession 
to the EU. Although political reservations of Turkish nonrecognition of Cyprus and 
non-compliance to Copenhagen Criteria are underlined, political support arguments 
of geopolitical importance of Turkey and security interest in having closer relations 
with Turkey are emphasized more than reservations. Therefore, it is observed that 
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supporting enlargement of the EU is a state policy in Great Britain and this policy 
has not been affected with the changes in government. 
 
4.4.2.4 Greece 
 Greek politicians used political arguments in their support for Turkey‟s 
accession to the EU. As Heraclides (2010:154) underlined, “Costas Karamanlis 
remained a firm supporter of Turkey‟s EU aspirations.” For instance, Prime Minister 
Costas Karamanlis (quoted in “Greek and Luxembourg”, 2005, March 17) suggested 
that “We support the European prospect of Turkey, because we expect that a 
Europeanized Turkey will be a much more compatible neighbor for Greece and the 
other countries.” Similarly, he (quoted in “The EU‟s”, 2005, May 26) underlined that 
“They should eventually be permitted to join the European Union. A Europeanized 
Turkey is in everybody's interest.” Moreover, Greece also criticized France for the 
proposal of privileged partnership to Turkey. Karamanlis (quoted in “A European”, 
2005, September 23) warned that “The EU recognized Turkey as a candidate country 
in 1999 without expressing any such reservation. …The EU must maintain its 
credibility…A European Turkey is in everyone's interest, particularly Greece.” 
Following the opening of accession talks with Turkey, Greece's Foreign Minister 
Petros Molyviatis (quoted in “Greece Says”, 2005, October 4) suggested that “It is 
really a very important agreement. An agreement that will not, immediately, 
tomorrow, but in its future course replace the bad past and bad name of our region. It 
is a start of a new era.” In 2009, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis (quoted in “Miliband 
Meets”, 2009, May 26) underlined that “We want to see a European Turkey on our 
borders, we believe that this is in the interests of both countries.” 
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In Athens, Greek Foreign Minister Petros Moliviatis (quoted in “Spain No”, 
2005, June 3) considering the decision of European Council in December 2004, 
suggested that “Turkey must continue its path to Europe as outlined in these 
decisions, and the position of Greece on this has not changed,” and added that “I 
don't see a connection between the Cyprus settlement and Oct. 3. This date does not 
have any relation with the re-starting of negotiations for a solution on Cyprus.”  
Security arguments were also used by Greeks. Greek President Papoulias 
(quoted in “Papaoulias”, 2005, June 13) suggested that “Security and peace in the 
Balkans are conditions for security and peace in the whole of Europe” and added that 
“Turkey must have the way to Europe opened.” Prime Minister Karamanlis also 
(quoted in “Karamanlis Visits”, 2005, November 28) suggested that Greece 
supported European prospect of Turkey and added that “We believe that this will 
lead to new prospects of peace, good neighboring relations, cooperation, economic 
growth and prosperity for both countries.” In addition, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis 
(quoted in “Support For”, 2007, March 30) underlined that “We support the idea of 
European neighborliness. This strategy concerns all of SE Europe, including Turkey. 
We believe that in this way there will be peace, security and prosperity.”   
Compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria was one of the reservations that 
Greece had in her relations with Turkey. For example, Karamanlis (quoted in “Greek 
And”, 2005, August 29) reminded that “But Turkey must meet all the criteria 
requested by the EU.” Likewise, he (quoted in “Karamanlis Visits”, 2005, November 
28) underlined that “If Turkey indeed wants to access the EU, it ought to respond to 
the preconditions set by the EU, and of course to respect the principles and values of 
Europe and international law and of course this should be reflected in its behavior to 
its neighbours.” Moreover, President Papoulias (quoted in “Turkey Needs”, 2006, 
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April 23) underlined that the EU had a “responsibility to its citizens not to accept as 
members states that do not fully respect its values and principles.” Furthermore, 
Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted in “FM Bakoyannis”, 2006, December 
11) emphasized that “The only safe way for Turkey's smooth accession course is its 
full compliance to European criteria and preconditions…"Our policy is summarized 
in 'complete fulfillment equals full accession.”  
Political arguments related to Cyprus continued to be the main reservation of 
Greece. Considering Turkey‟s refusal to recognize Cyprus, Karamanlis suggested 
(quoted in “Greece Stands”, 2005, September 11) that “It isn't possible for a country 
which wants to start negotiations with the European Union to not respect the 
obligations to which it has previously engaged. They have to be respected….The EU 
must provide a solution to this problem.” Moreover, he (quoted in “A European”, 
2005, September 23) underlined that “all obstacles created by Turkey in terms of the 
recognition of Cyprus would be a problem for the negotiation process.” He also 
(quoted in “Greek PM”, 2005, October 31) suggested that “Turkey can become an 
EU member when and if it fully meets EU rules and values…And these values are 
not compatible with (threats) and the occupation of European soil.” Furthermore, 
regarding opening of ports to Cyprus, Karamanlis (quoted in “Turkey Must”, 2006, 
September 10)  underlined that “We back Turkey's move towards Europe... on the 
condition that it respects the rules and criteria bound to a European country” and 
added that “Turkey must fulfill its obligations.” Likewise, considering Ankara 
Protocol, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted in “Bakoyannis Rules””, 
2006, November 2) warned that “Greece's position is clear: Turkey cannot progress 
on its European course without any repercussions or sanctions arising from its 
potential refusal to conform to its obligations.” As a response to the Commission 
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proposal to partial freeze of Turkish chapters, Deputy Greek Foreign Minister 
Yiannis Valynakis (quoted in “Greece Says”, 2006, November 8) underlined that 
“The commission notes a lack of tangible progress, specifying that Turkey's response 
to its European obligations is meager.” Karamanlis (quoted in “Greek and British”, 
2006, November 21), considering Ankara Protocol, underlined that “We support 
(Turkey's) its European orientation on condition, of course, that it will adopt 
European values and principles, it will fully implement all criteria and prerequisites 
set by the European Union and will honour its commitments.” Following the collapse 
of Cyprus negotiations on 27 November, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted 
in “EU/Turkey”, 2006, November 29) warned that “I have repeatedly said that 
Turkey should honor the obligations it has committed to. If Turkey does not do that, 
the European Union will have to have a certain answer. This will necessarily lead to 
certain European decisions.” 
 Instead of partial freeze of talks, Greece sought for tougher action against 
Turkey and came up with its own proposal for a time schedule of 18 months to 
review Turkish progress on Cyprus issue. Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted 
in “Greece Seeks”, 2006, December 10) suggested that “(Such a mechanism) would 
be based on a decision to freeze an important number of chapters linked with the 
implementation of the Ankara Protocol.” and (quoted in “RPT-Greece”, 2006, 
December 4) added that “such a timeframe would enable us to evaluate (Turkey's) 
real intentions and see the real progress that would be achieved.” However, in the 
European Council, instead of time frame proposal, 8 chapters were frozen but that 
Bakoyannis (quoted in “FM Bakoyannis”, 2006, December 11) suggested it was 
decided on a “mechanism of assessment and control of Turkey's compliance on the 
issue of the protocol which begins in 2007, with an emphasis given in 2008 and if 
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necessary in 2009, with a special reference to the European Commission's reports to 
the Council of Ministers.”  
In March 2007, Bakoyannis (quoted in “Support For”, 2007, March 30) 
reiterated Greek position about Cyprus issue that “If Turkey carries out …reforms, 
fulfils …criteria and fully implements the Protocols with all EU member-states, then 
Turkey must join the EU as a full member. Fully meeting its contractual obligations 
must lead to full accession.” In January 2008, Karamanlis (quoted in Kyriakidou and 
Mesci, 2008, January 24) also underlined that “Provided Turkey continues on the 
reform path and meets criteria...Europe must accept it as a full member of the 
European family… It is necessary for Turkey to normalize its relations with Cyprus 
(for its EU bid).” Moreover, in January 2009, Karamanlis (quoted in “RPT-Update”, 
2009, April 23) reiterated that “We have fully supported the full entry of Turkey to 
the European Union. But it is not possible to give our consent unless the Cyprus 
problem is solved, and Turkey meets all its obligations towards the European 
Union.” Furthermore, Bakoyannis  (quoted in “Miliband Meets”, 2009, May 26) 
stressed that “This is the reason by we once again call on Turkey to fully implement 
the Ankara Protocol, a necessary condition in order to open eight chapters and allow 
the accession process to go forward, which is something that Greece supports.” In 
addition, Karamanlis (quoted in “RPT Interview”, 2009, March 30) emphasized that 
“The pace ... is not satisfactory. That is not only our evaluation but the general 
evaluation…Its record so far has not been particularly promising…Our policy 
towards Turkey is very clear and can be spelled out in four words -- full compliance, 
full membership.” 
Illegal immigration from Turkey and signing of readmission agreement were 
also another reservation for Greece. Greek Interior Minister Pavlopoulos (quoted in 
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“Greece Cyprus”, 2007, December 3) suggested that illegal immigration was not 
only concern Greece and Cyprus but also all the EU countries and demanded that 
“We will seek from the EU to take seriously into consideration the fact that all the 
countries that wish to become EU members must assume their responsibilities, and 
chiefly to sign the readmission treaties.” The European Commissioner for 
immigration, Jacques Barrot (quoted in “EU/JHA”, 2009, July 1), also supported 
Greek stance on immigration and suggested that “We cannot continue to discuss with 
Turkey or to help it financially to keep its eastern borders if this EU candidate does 
not guarantee application of the re-entry agreement signed with Greece.”  
Air space violations between Greece and Turkey were another reservation for 
Greece.  In May 24, Turkish and Greek fighter jets crashed over the Aegean and 
Karamanlis (quoted in “Update1 Greece”, 2006, May 24) warned that “Yesterday's 
incident should be a signal ... to persuade Turkey to abandon such tactics which do 
not tally with its European perspectives,” and added that “All this is taken into 
consideration vis-a-vis the European perspectives of Turkey. All behaviors are taken 
into consideration.”  
Greek minority in Turkey and opening of Halki (Heybeliada) seminary were 
another reservation for Greece. For instance, Prime Minister Karamanlis (quoted in 
Kyriakidou, 2008, January 24) emphasized the importance of re-opening of Halki 
seminary and underlined that “Protection of minority rights are among the most 
important criteria for joining the European Union.” As a response, Erdogan 
suggested that his government was trying to find a solution for reopening the 
seminary but he also reminded Greece's own obligations to protect its Turkish-
speaking Muslim minority in northern Greece.  
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 In Papandreu‟s period, Cyprus issue continued to be the main reservation of 
Greece. Prime Minister George Papandreu (quoted in “Turkey Must”, 2009, October 
19) warned that “It cannot be permitted for Turkey to have occupation troops in an 
EU member state, especially for a candidate country…I will always be sincere about 
problems that divide us and problems that we must solve, and a major problem is that 
there is still occupation in the Cyprus Republic.” Moreover, Foreign Minister 
Dimitris Droutsas (quoted in “Greece Wants”, 2010, November 22) pointed out that 
“Turkey cannot become a member of the EU as long as there are occupation forces 
on the island.” 
 In November 2010, due to the stalemate in Turkey-EU-Cyprus relations, 
Greece proposed to have a summit on Turkey‟s EU membership bid. Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Grigoris Delavekouras (quoted in “Greece Wants”, 2010, 
November  24)  suggested that “We want a membership procedure that is real and 
not virtual” and added that a summit would help clear and sincere dialogue in order 
to bring back momentum and have Turkey realize its commitment to implement 
internal reforms and recognize Cyprus. 
On the Halki Seminary issue, Turkey's EU Minister and Chief Negotiator 
Egemen Bagis (quoted in “Bagıs Reopening”, 2012, March 27) suggested that “I 
don't see the re-opening of Halki Seminary on Heybeliada Island as a threat to 
Turkey. I believe that it will enrich Turkey”,  however, he  also underlined that “It 
will be significant, if Greece also takes steps of good will” and added that  the 
problems of both the Muslims living in western Thrace and the Orthodox citizens in 
Turkey would be solved immediately. 
Hence, Greece continued to the one of the brakemen in this period. Although 
Karamanlis supported Turkish European aspirations by underlying that Europeanized 
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Turkey is in everyone‟s interest, political reservations of non-compliance of Turkey 
to Copenhagen Criteria and Cyprus issue emphasized frequently. Under the 
Papandreu government, the argument of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus, which was 
emphasized in the 1990s, came back and used against Turkey. So, as long as no 
solution is found to the Cyprus problem, Greece continued to be the brakeman in 
Turkish European bid. 
 
4.5 General Assessment 
 
4.5.1 Comparison between Different Periods of Each Member 
State 
 
4.5.1.1 Germany 
 
Table 23: Comparison of Different Periods for Germany 
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1990-1995 117 60 5 55 2 3 40% 14 41 25% 
1996-2004 665 484 38 446 34 4 89% 216 230 48% 
2005-2012 379 280 14 266 4 10 29% 56 210 21% 
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 In the period of 1987-1989, out of 1 primary and 12 secondary press releases, 
there were no primary or secondary support press releases that can be obtained from 
Factiva database. Therefore, it can be argued that, in this period, Germany had 
reservations towards Turkish application for EU membership.  
In the period of 1990-1995, 40 percent (2 out of 5) support is observed in the 
primary press releases whereas in the secondary press releases, percentage of support 
decreases to 25 percent (14 out of 55).  One of the primary support press releases is 
from 1993; the other one is from 1995 related to the support of Germany regarding 
the Customs Union. Similarly, 10 out of 14 secondary support press releases are 
about support of Germany in the Customs Union negotiations. 
 In the period of 1996-2004, 89 percent (34 out of 38) of primary press 
releases were supporting improvement of relations of Turkey with the EU. Whereas 
percentage of support was 48 percent in the secondary press releases. 32 out of 34 
primary support press releases are observed within the period of 1999-2004 and 174 
out of 216 secondary support press releases are from the end of 1998 to 2004. 
Similarly, there are only four primary reservation press releases (%11). 101 out of 
230 secondary reservation press releases are from the period of 1996 to October 
1998. Therefore, it can be argued that there were significant reservations in the 
period of Helmut Kohl‟s chancellorship. Consequently, the analysis indicates that 
1996-2004 was the period in which Germany‟s support for Turkish membership bid 
was highest. This period also coincided with Gerhard Schroder‟s chancellorship 
(October 1998-November 2005) who was the leader of Social Democratic Party of 
Germany and led the coalition government of Social Democratic Party and Green 
Party of Germany. 
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 In the period of 2005-2012, %29 (4 out of 14) of primary press releases are 
support press releases. 3 out of 4 primary support press releases are observed in the 
period of Schroder‟s chancellorship and the other primary support press releases is 
observed in Merkel‟s chancellorship. However, the press release in the Merkel‟s 
chancellorship is from the speech of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle 
who is the chairman of Free Democratic Party.  
In the same period, 21 percent (56 out of 266) of secondary press releases 
were support press releases.  19 out of 56 secondary support releases are from the 
period of Schroeder‟s chancellorship.  In this period, except for the period of 1987-
1989, the support for Turkish bid was lowest. This period also coincided with Angela 
Merkel‟s chancellorship, the leader of Christian Democratic Union, who was 
favoring privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership.  After the 
2005 federal elections, she led the coalition government of Christian Democratic 
Union, Christian Social Union and Social Democratic Party of Germany. Moreover, 
after 2009 federal elections, she led the coalition government of Christian 
Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party.  
 Consequently, when all the periods of Germany are compared, the analysis 
indicated that support for Turkish bid for EU membership changed with the different 
chancellors coming from different parties. Support rate is highest in Social Democrat 
Gerard Schroeder period and lowest in Christian Democrat Angela Merkel period. 
Although Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl supported Turkish Customs Union, in the 
Luxembourg Summit, Helmut Kohl did not support Turkish candidacy.  
Consequently, it can be suggested that, Turkey should campaign more proactively 
during the chancellorship of a Social Democrat governments since those periods 
provide more favorable conditions for Turkey‟s full accession to the EU.   
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Figure 5: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for Germany 
 
 Comparison of the primary and secondary press releases shows that, the 
percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than 
percentage of support in the secondary press releases in all periods of the analysis. 
 
Table 24: Germany Primary Press Releases 
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 In the period of 1987-1989, there are no primary support press releases that 
could be obtained. In the same period, there is only one primary reservation press 
release and neither material nor ideational reasons are mentioned of regarding this 
reservation.  In the period of 1990-1995, 50 percent of primary support press releases 
(1 out of 2) indicate material arguments. This press release is about geopolitical 
argument (a subsection of political arguments) where it is suggested that Turkey 
should be supported by the West due to its strategic importance. 100 percent of all 
primary reservation press releases (3 out of 3) are referring to material factors (All of 
them are political reservations). 2 of these reservations are about the use of German 
weapons in the operations in the South East of Turkey whereas one of them is about 
court ruling of DEP deputies.   
 In the period of 1996-2004, 29 percent of primary support press releases (10 
out of 34) are about material arguments. 8 out 10 support press releases indicate 
political arguments such as geopolitical arguments of preventing Turkey from 
drifting Islamic fundamentalism or political argument of Turkish bid to the EU is in 
German interest. 2 out of 10 primary support press releases are about security 
arguments which suggest that there would be enormous increase in security if Turkey 
were admitted.  In the same period, %3 of primary support press releases (1 out of 
34) point to ideational arguments and in this press release; Europeanness of Turkey is 
emphasized after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit where Turkey was not accepted as a 
candidate country. On the other hand, 75 percent of all primary reservation press 
releases (3 out of 4) are due to material factor.  All three are political reservations 
and the issues are human rights, political reforms and Cyprus. The remaining one 
does not include any reason. 
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 Between 2005 and 2012, 50 percent of support releases (2 out of 4) are about 
material arguments.  Both of these support releases are containing security arguments 
in which Turkish accession would boost stability and security of Europe. 
Additionally, 25 percent of support press releases (1 out of 4) are about ideational 
arguments indicating moral duty. For example, German politicians suggest that the 
EU should keep promises to Turkey. In one of the releases no reason is inferred for 
the support. When the reservation releases are analyzed, it is observed that 60 percent 
of them (6 out of 10) are about material arguments.  Among the 6 support releases 5 
of them are about Cyprus issue and the remaining one is about the criticism toward 
fulfilling the criteria. Other 4 press releases do not specify a reason. 
 Consequently, it is observed that in all periods except the period of 1987-
1989, the number of primary material press releases is higher than the number of 
primary ideational releases. German politicians used ideational arguments in two 
releases among 58 primary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors 
are used only in the support releases.  
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Table 25: Germany Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total  
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Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    -    - 
Reservation 1 0 10 11 0 0 0 1 12 92% 0% 
1990-1995                       
Support 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 11 14 21% 0% 
Reservation 37 0 3 40 0 0 0 1 41 98% 0% 
1996-2004                       
Support 30 9 2 41 3 0 3 172 216 19% 1% 
Reservation 111 6 12 129 4 0 4 97 230 56% 2% 
2005-2012                       
Support 11 5 0 16 0 3 3 37 56 29% 5% 
Reservation 72 0 2 74 1 0 1 135 210 35% 0% 
 
 
In the period of 1987-1989, there are no secondary support press releases. In 
the same period, 92 percent of reservation press releases (11 out of 12) are pointing 
to material factors.  10 out of 11 reservation press releases include economic interest; 
the fear of mass migration of Turkish workers to the EU market and especially to 
Germany. One out of 11 reservation press releases is a political reservation indicating 
human rights problems in Turkey.  
In the period of 1990-1995, 21 percent of secondary support press releases (3 
out of 14) are due to material factors. All three support press releases are about 
geopolitical arguments suggesting Turkey should be supported due to its strategic 
importance or to maintain its westward orientation or to prevent Turkey from drifting 
into the orbit of Islamic fundamentalism. In this period, 98 percent of secondary 
reservation press releases (40 out of 41) are about material factors.  37 out of 40 
reservation press releases are political reservations pointing toward human right 
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problems, use of German origin weapons in the operations in the South East region 
of Turkey, Turkish operation in the Northern Iraq, Cyprus problem and 
imprisonment of DEP deputies.  3 out of 40 reservation press releases include 
economic reservations such as economic problems of Turkey and the threat of 
Turkish workers. 
Between 1996 and 2004, 19 percent of secondary support press releases (41 
out of 216) include material factors. 30 of these 41 support releases are showing 
political factors where geopolitical significance of Turkey and national interest of 
Germany are emphasized.  In the remaining 9 security arguments and stability of 
region and Europe is underlined and the final 2 releases include economic arguments. 
1 percent of releases (3 out of 216) are about ideational arguments in which 
Europeanness of Turkey and not sharing common religion are highlighted. 
According to the analysis, remaining 172 releases do not include a specific reason.   
In this period, 56 percent of secondary reservation press releases (129 out of 
230) are about material arguments.  111 out of 129 reservation press releases contain 
political reservations such as human right problems, Copenhagen Criteria, domestic 
pressure, Kurdish minority, ban of Welfare Party, death penalty, Cyprus problem. 6 
of 129 reservation releases indicate security reservations and Kurdish immigration 
problem.  12 out of 129 reservation press releases are economic reservations which 
are economic bill of Turkey to the EU and the threat of Turkish workers.  Moreover, 
only 2 percent of releases (4 out of 230) are about ideational arguments. European 
values, not having same religion and not Europeanness of Turkey is underlined in 
these releases. Finally, in the remaining 97 releases no reason is specified. 
In the period of 2005-2012, 29 percent of secondary support press releases 
(16 out of 56) include material factors. 11 out of 16 releases include political 
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arguments whereas 5 out of 16 releases include security arguments. Geopolitical 
importance of Turkey as a bridge to Muslim world and national interest of Germany 
are emphasized in political support releases. Security interest of Germany is 
underlined in security related releases. 5 percent of releases (3 out of 56) include 
ideational factors. All of these three support press releases are about moral duty of 
respecting agreements with Turkey.  In this period, 35 percent of secondary 
reservation press releases (74 out of 210) is about material factors where almost all 
of the reservation press releases (72 out of 74) are political reservations and the 
remaining 2 reservation press releases are economic reservations. 
Consequently, it is seen that in all periods, the number of press releases 
indicating material factors are higher than the number of press releases ideational 
factors. Ideational arguments are seen only in 8 press releases among 779 secondary 
press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used both in the support 
and reservation releases. 
 
4.5.1.2 France 
 
Table 26: Comparison of Different Periods for France 
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1987-1989 7 4 0 4 0 0 0% 2 2 50% 
1990-1995 106 68 9 59 7 2 78% 36 23 61% 
1996-2004 432 292 20 272 7 13 35% 119 153 44% 
2005-2012 749 580 31 549 5 26 16% 13 536 2% 
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Between 1987 and 1989, there are no primary press releases.  In the 
secondary press releases, 50 percent support rate (2 out of 4) is observed. In two of 
the support press releases, it is stated that France would not be against Turkish 
application whereas in the reservation press releases, deepening of the EC was 
highlighted by suggesting that no new members should be allowed before the EC‟s 
integrated market was introduced in 1993. In the period of 1990-1995, 78 percent of 
primary press releases (7 out of 9) are supporting Customs Union and all of them are 
originating from 1995. Due to its role as the president of the EU in the first half of 
1995, France is the country which tries most to persuade Greece to lift her veto 
against Turkish Customs Union. In that period, 61 percent (36 out of 59) of 
secondary press releases are support press releases and all of them are about Customs 
Union.  2 primary and 14 secondary press releases are reservations regarding 
Turkey‟s military operations in Northern Iraq against terrorist activities. The analysis 
indicates that 1990-1995 is the period in which French support for Turkish 
membership bid was highest.  
In the period of 1996-2004, 35 percent of primary press releases (7 out of 20) 
are supporting improvement of relations where 6 out of 7 support press releases are 
from the period of 1996-1999. Only one out of 7 support press release is originating 
from 2004. When the secondary press releases are analyzed, it is observed that 44 
percent of them (119 out of 272) can be considered   as support releases. 92 out of 
119 secondary support press releases are published before November 3, 2002.  
In the same period 65 percent of primary press releases (13 out of 20) are 
reservation press releases. 56 percent of secondary press releases (153 out of 272) 
include reservations. Among these 153 secondary reservation press releases 145 of 
them are after November 3, 2002. To sum up, from 1996 to 3 November 2002, 66 
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percent of primary releases and 89 percent of secondary releases show support for 
Turkish European bid. After the election of Justice and Development Party, 
European orientation of Turkey was started to be questioned. 10 percent of primary 
releases and 16 percent of secondary releases show support for Turkish European 
aspirations.
25
 
Therefore, it can be suggested that after the election of JDP in November 
2002, reservations towards Turkey increased significantly. When the secular 
character of French state is considered, it can be argued that hesitations towards 
Islamic credentials of JDP and JDP‟s European orientation could be one of the 
reasons behind this French attitude. 
In the period of 2005-2012, 16 percent of primary press releases (5 out of 31) 
are supporting improvement of relations. Within these 5 support press releases 4 of 
them are from the period of September and October 2005 in which accession 
negotiations with Turkey began. Only one out of 5 support press releases belong to 
after 2008 period, from the period of Sarkozy‟s presidency. Only 2 percent of 
secondary press releases (13 out of 536) include support factors and 10 of them are 
from the year 2005. Moreover, 3 out of 13 support press releases are from French 
presidency. On the other hand, 84 percent of primary press releases (26 out of 31) is 
highlighting reservations and 14 of them are from 2005. When the secondary press 
releases are considered, it is observed that significant portion of them (i.e. 98 percent, 
536 out of 549) is reservation press releases.  In May 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy, the 
leader of Union for a Popular Movement, was elected as President of France and 
similar to Angela Merkel; he openly supports privileged partnership for Turkey 
                                                          
25
 This difference is significant at 99% confidence level (p-value: 2.2 e-06). 
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instead of full membership. Therefore, in this period, except for the period of 1987-
1989, the support for Turkish bid was lowest.  
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for France 
 
When the comparison of the primary and secondary press releases is made, it 
is seen that percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher 
than percentage of support in the secondary press releases in the periods of 1990-
1995 and 2005-2012. There is no primary support in the period of 1987-1989. 
Between 1996 and 2004, the percentage of support in secondary releases is higher 
than percentage of support in primary releases. 
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Table 27: France Primary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total  
Total 
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1987-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    -    - 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1990-1995 
 
Support 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 7 14% 0% 
Reservation 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1996-2004 
 
Support 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 3 7 29% 29% 
Reservation 8 0 0 8 1 0 1 4 13 62% 8% 
2005-2012 
 
Support 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 5 40% 0% 
Reservation 13 0 0 13 1 0 1 12 26 50% 4% 
 
 In the period of 1987-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press 
releases. Whereas in the period of 1990-1995, 14 percent of primary support press 
releases (1 out of 7) is about material arguments indicating geopolitical factor of fear 
of Turkey‟s turning its back to the West. Remaining 6 primary support press releases 
are related to French support of Customs Union without mentioning of reason. On 
the other hand, all of the primary reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are pointing 
to material factors in which political reservations about Turkish military operations 
in Northern Iraq are stressed. In the period of 1996-2004, 29 percent of primary 
support press releases (2 out of 7) are related to material factors. One of two support 
press releases includes political factors -French admiration of Turkish reform about 
human rights-. Other press release is about security where relation between stability 
of Europe and Turkish accession is emphasized. Among the primary press releases 
29 percent (2 out of 7) is about ideational arguments. These two releases are about 
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collective identity where Europeanness of Turkey is underlined. The remaining 3 
primary support press releases are related to improvement of relations without 
mentioning of reason. Additionally, when the reservation press releases are analyzed, 
it is seen that 62 percent (8 out of 13) of reservations  are specifying material factors 
where all of them are due to political factors such as fulfillment of Copenhagen 
Criteria and referendum in France about Turkish accession to soothe domestic 
concerns. 8 percent of primary reservation press releases (1 out of 13) include 
ideational arguments. This press release is about collective identity –on the 
expectation that Turkey might not adopt all the values of Europe-. In the remaining 4 
out of 13 reservation press releases, no reason is mentioned for reservation.  
Finally, in the period of 2005-2012, 40 percent of primary support press 
releases (2 out of 5) include material factors. One of the two press releases is about 
geopolitical support due to the active role of Turkey in the war of Georgia. The other 
one is about geopolitical support where the fear of Turkey‟s sliding to Islamic 
fundamentalism is highlighted. In other three support press releases no reason is 
specified. When the reservation press releases are analyzed it is observed that 50 
percent of primary releases (13 out of 26) is due to material factors where in all 13 
press releases political reservations such as Turkey‟s not recognition of Cyprus and 
nonfulfilment of reforms are criticized and referendum for the domestic concern is 
underlined. Only 4 percent of primary reservation press releases (1 out of 26) is 
about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Turkey is questioned by 
referring Turkey as an Asia Minor country. In the remaining 12 press releases, there 
is no reason specifying reservation. 
 
 
333 
 
Table 28: France Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   Total 
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1987-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2    0%    0% 
Reservation 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1990-1995   
Support 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 31 36 14% 0% 
Reservation 23 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 23 100% 0% 
1996-2004 
 
Support 10 2 0 12 4 0 4 103 119 10% 3% 
Reservation 104 4 3 111 6 0 6 36 153 73% 4% 
2005-2012 
 
Support 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 9 13 31% 0% 
Reservation 186 2 3 191 20 0 20 328 539 35% 4% 
 
Similar to primary press releases, in the period of 1987-1989 there are no 
ideational or material support press releases. In the two support press releases, no 
reference is given for the reason behind the French decision of not blocking Turkish 
application to the EC. Additionally both of the two secondary reservation press 
releases include material factors where political argument of deepening of the EC is 
emphasized.   
In the period of 1990-1995, 14 percent of secondary support press releases (5 
out of 36) is due to material arguments and all of which are including geopolitical 
arguments such as fear of Turkey‟s turning its back to the West or strategic 
importance of Turkey. Remaining 31 out of 36 secondary support press releases are 
related to French support of Customs Union without mentioning of the reason. In that 
period all the secondary reservation press releases (23 out of 23) include material 
factors, specifying political reservations about human rights, democratic reforms, 
Cyprus and Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq.  
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In the period of 1996-2004, only 10 percent of secondary support press 
releases (12 out of 119) is about material arguments. 10 of these 12 support releases 
include political arguments that are about strategic importance of Turkey, fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. Other 2 press releases are about security in which 
relation between stability of Europe and Turkish accession is underlined. 3 percent of 
secondary press releases (4 out of 119) is about ideational factors where all of them 
specify collective identity in which Europeanness of Turkey is underlined and it is 
stated that Turkey would not be evaluated on the basis of religious criteria. In that 
period, 103 out of 119 secondary support press releases are related to improvement 
of relations without mentioning of reason. Whereas, 73 percent of secondary 
reservation press releases (111 out of 153) is about material factors. Among them 
104 are political reservations such as criticism towards fulfillment of Copenhagen 
Criteria, democratic reforms, human rights, Cyprus, French weights in the EU, fear 
of losing deepening or France having referendum about Turkish accession in order to 
soothe domestic concerns. 4 out of 111 reservations are about security factors like 
fear of Muslim immigration and 3 out of 111 reservations are about economic 
arguments which include economic competition in jobs and CAP subsidies. Only 4 
percent of secondary reservation press releases (6 out of 153) contain ideational 
factors. These press releases are about values of Europe, Turkey not having same 
religion, Islam phobia, cultural differences, etc. In 36 out of 153 reservation press 
releases, no reason is specified for the reservation.  
Finally, in the period of 2005-2012, 31 percent of secondary support press 
releases (4 out of 13) contain material factors. All four of these press releases are 
about geopolitical support (i.e. the role of Turkey as a bridge to Muslim world and 
fear of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey). Other 9 support press releases do not 
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include a specific reason. When the distribution of reservation press releases is 
analyzed it is seen that 35 percent of them (191 out of 539) includes material factors. 
Among them 186 are political reservations in which Cyprus issue, nonfulfilment of 
reforms, human rights, absorption capacity and Armenian issue are stressed and 
referendum for the domestic concern is underlined. Only 2 out of 191 are about 
security and 3 out of 191 are about economic factors. In that period 4 percent of 
primary reservation press releases (20 out of 539) is about ideational arguments in 
which Europeanness of Turkey is questioned by referring Turkey in the Asia Minor 
and indicating that Turkey is not sharing common religion or common culture. In the 
remaining 328 press releases, no explanation for the reservation can be found. 
 
4.5.1.3 Great Britain 
Table 29: Comparison of Different Periods for Great Britain 
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1987-1989 11 7 0 7 0 0 0% 4 3 57% 
1990-1995 52 24 1 23 1 0 100% 14 9 61% 
1996-2004 413 277 21 256 18 3 86% 235 21 92% 
2005-2012 349 274 32 242 30 2 94% 238 4 98% 
 
 
Between 1987 and 1989, no primary press releases could be obtained.  In the 
secondary press releases, %57 support rate (4 out of 7) is observed. In four of these 
support press releases, it is clearly stated that Great Britain is supporting Turkey‟s 
European aspirations. Remaining 3 are reservation press releases.   
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In the period of 1990-1995, the only primary press releases that could be 
obtained through database search is a support press release regarding Customs 
Union.  Whereas, 61 percent of secondary press releases (14 out of 23) are support 
press releases and 10 out of 14 support press releases are about British support for 
Customs Union.  39 percent of secondary press releases (9 out of 23) are reservation 
press releases where 7 of them are about military operations against PKK. 
Between 1996 and 2004, 86 percent of primary press releases (18 out of 21) 
support improvement of relations. 7 out of 18 support press releases are observed 
after 1997 and 6 out of 18 press releases are observed after 2004. In that period only 
14 percent of primary press releases (1 out 21) are indicating reservation. Similarly, 
92 percent of secondary press releases (235 out of 256) include supportive 
references. 
In the period of 2005-2012, majority of primary press releases (94%, 30 out 
of 32) is supporting improvement of Turkish relations with the EU. Only 6 percent of 
primary press releases (2 out of 32) include reservation. Likewise, 98 percent of 
secondary press releases (238 out of 242) can be considered as supportive and only 2 
percent (4 out of 242) is reservation press releases.   
To conclude, in all periods, (except primary release between 1990 and 1995 
where there was only one release) percentage of support is increasing in both primary 
and secondary press releases and in the period of 2005-20012, the support for 
Turkish bid is highest. Consequently, from this analysis it is observed that Great 
Britain is the main driver of the Turkish accession and she is the only country which 
persistently supports Turkish European aspirations in all periods and it can be 
suggested that British support for Turkey is a state policy and do not change with 
governments. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for Great Britain 
 
When the comparison of support rate in different periods is made, it is 
observed that percentage of support in the secondary press releases is uniformly 
higher than percentage of support in the primary press releases in the periods of 
1996-2004 and 2005-2012. There is no primary support in the period of 1987-1989. 
Between 1990 and 1995, the percentage of support in primary releases is higher than 
percentage of support in secondary releases. 
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Table 30: Great Britain Primary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   
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1987-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
1990-1995 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0% 0% 
Reservation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -  -  
1996-2004 
 
Support 
5 1 0 6 1 0 1 11 18 33% 6% 
Reservation 
3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 100% 0% 
2005-2012 
 
Support 
6 0 0 6 0 3 3 21 30 20% 10% 
Reservation 
2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
 
 
Between 1987 and 1989, there are no primary support or reservation press 
releases related to Great Britain. In the period of 1990-1995, there is only one 
primary support release and there is no mention of reason behind the support. In the 
period of 1996-2004, 33 percent of primary support press releases (6 out of 18) are 
about material arguments. Among these 6 support press releases, 5 of them are 
related to geopolitical arguments. In those releases, it is stated that a democratic 
Turkey anchored in Europe would be an inspiration to other states in the Islamic 
world. The other press release is about security where regional security is underlined. 
Additionally, 6 percent of primary press releases (1 out of 6) are about ideational 
arguments. In that case, collective identity is mentioned through European vocation 
of Turkey. The remaining 11 primary support press releases point to improvement of 
relations without mentioning a specific reason. Moreover, 100 percent of primary 
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reservation press releases (3 out of 3) are related to material factors. All 3 
reservations are due to political factors such as criticism towards fulfillment of 
Copenhagen Criteria, death penalty or ban of Welfare Party.  
Finally, in the period of 2005-2012, 20 percent of primary support press 
releases (6 out of 30) include material factors. Among these support press releases 6 
of them are about geopolitical arguments. Turkey is suggested to be a shining 
example to the neighbors and her strategic importance is emphasized. On the other 
hand, 10 percent of primary support press releases (3 out of 30) are about ideational 
arguments. In all of these releases moral duty of EU is emphasized. British 
politicians suggested that the EU should meet its obligations towards Turkey 
otherwise it would be a huge betrayal to Turkey.  In the primary reservation releases 
(2 out of 2) only material factors could be observed. All of these press releases 
indicating political reservations where Turkey‟s not recognition of Cyprus is 
criticized.  
 
Table 31: Great Britain Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total  
Total 
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1987-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4  0% 0% 
Reservation 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 100% 0% 
1990-1995   
Support 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 9 14 36% 0% 
Reservation 9 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 9 100% 0% 
1996-2004   
Support 11 7 1 19 9 0 9 207 235 8% 4% 
Reservation 20 0 1 21 0 0 0 0 21 100% 0% 
2005-2012   
Support 13 1 0 14 0 0 0 224 238 6% 0% 
Reservation 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 100% 0% 
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In the period of 1987-1989, there are no ideational or material secondary 
support press releases related to Great Britain. In all the secondary support press 
releases that could be obtained for that period (4 press releases) it is observed that 
Great Britain is supporting Turkey‟s European vocation without any explicit reason 
that could be inferred from the releases.  On the other hand, 100  percent of 
secondary reservation press releases (3 out of 3) is about material arguments in 
which political arguments of human rights, Cyprus and digesting Spain and Portugal 
are emphasized.   
In the period of 1990-1995, 36 percent of secondary press releases (5 out of 
14) are related to material arguments. Geopolitical arguments are identified in all five 
support press releases such as Turkey‟s being emerging power in Central Asia or 
having the role of bridge between west and Muslim world. In 9 out of 14 press 
releases, no specific reason is mentioned. 
Between 1996 and 2004, 18 percent of secondary support press releases (19 
out of 235) include material factors. Among them 11 out of 19 are about political 
support focusing on strategic importance of Turkey and the role of Turkey in 
reshaping Middle East. 7 out of 19 releases point to security arguments where illegal 
drug trafficking, Iraq war and role of Turkey in the fights against international 
terrorism are stressed. The remaining one press release is about economic argument 
and in this press release; Turkey is underlined to be an important market for Great 
Britain. Only 4 percent of secondary press releases (9 out of 235) are about ideational 
arguments. In these press releases Europeanness of Turkey is underlined and it is 
suggested that there should not be religious criteria or religious Berlin Wall in 
Turkish accession. 207 out of 235 primary support press releases are related to 
improvement of relations without explicit reasoning. With respect to secondary 
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reservation press releases, it is observed that 100 percent of them (21 out of 21) 
include material arguments. 20 out of 21 reservations are political which are about 
fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria, democratic reforms, human rights, death penalty, 
Cyprus, adultery bill and ban of Welfare party.  Remaining one press release includes 
an economic reservation.  
In the final period of analysis, namely 2005-2012, only 6 percent of 
secondary support press releases (14 out of 238) specify material arguments. 13 out 
of 14 material press releases indicate geopolitical factors. In those releases it is stated 
that Turkish membership is British strategic priority and Great Britain wants to 
anchor Turkey in West with membership. There is only one support press release 
where security arguments are included. In that release, it is emphasized that Turkey 
is important for British national security. Other 224 support press releases do not 
include particular reasons that could be categorized under this research. On the other 
hand, all the secondary reservation press releases (4 out of 4) are due to material 
factors indicating political reservations. Among them 3 are about Cyprus and one is 
about criticism of freedom of expression.    
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4.5.1.4 Greece 
Table 32: Comparison of Different Periods for Greece 
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1987-1989 46 41 2 39 0 2 0% 0 39 0% 
1990-1995 289 242 6 236 0 6 0% 0 236 0% 
1996-2004 641 532 40 492 16 24 40% 106 386 22% 
2005-2012 312 221 57 164 5 52 9% 17 147 10% 
 
Between 1987 and 1989, no support is observed in primary releases. In all of 
the primary press releases (2 out of 2) Greece is apparently against Turkish 
membership application. Similarly, no support is observed in the secondary press 
releases. All 39 secondary releases include reservations towards Turkish European 
aspirations.  In the period of 1990-1995, similar to earlier period, there is no support 
releases in 6 primary releases. In those support press releases 4 of them are from the 
period of Customs Union negotiations. In the same way no support could be 
observed in secondary releases and all 236 releases there are reservations.  Therefore, 
the analysis indicates that 1987-1990 and 1990-1995 are the periods in which there 
was no Greece support for Turkish membership at all.  Due to the bilateral problems, 
exclusively Cyprus problem, Greece tried to veto any positive movement of EU or 
member states towards Turkey‟s improvement of relations with the EU.   
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On the contrary, in the period of 1996-2004, 40 percent of primary releases 
(16 out of 40) are supporting improvement of relations. All of the support releases 
are from the period of September 1999 to December 2002.  Among the secondary 
press releases 22 percent (106 out of 492) can be categorized as support. 103 out of 
106 secondary support releases are observed in the period following August 1999.  
%60 of primary press releases (24 out of 40) is reservation press releases and 9 out of 
24 reservation press releases are for the period before August 2009. In that period, 78 
percent of secondary press releases (386 out of 492) include reservation and 263 out 
of 386 secondary reservation press releases are before August 1999. Therefore, it is 
observed that Turkish and Greek Earthquakes, namely Earthquake diplomacy, had an 
impact in the improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey. Highest 
percentage of support in both primary and secondary releases is reached in this 
period. Nevertheless, strong Greek reservations still continues in that period. 
In the period of 2005-2012, only 9 percent of primary press releases (5 out of 
57) are supporting improvement of relations. Similarly, 10 percent of secondary 
press releases (17 out of 164) are support press releases.  
It is observed that in all periods, except for August 1999-December 2004, 
Greece does not support Turkish membership bid to the EU. Therefore, it can be 
suggested that Greece is the main brakeman and the Cyprus problem should be 
resolved in order for Greece to support, or not veto Turkish relations with the EU. 
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Figure 8: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for Greece 
 
When the comparison of support rate in different periods is made, it is seen 
that percentage of support in the primary press releases is higher than percentage of 
support in the secondary press releases in the periods of 1996-2004. There is no 
primary support in the period of 1987-1989 and 1990-1995. Between 2005 and 2012, 
the percentage of support in secondary releases is higher than percentage of support 
in primary releases. 
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Table 33: Greece Primary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   Total 
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1987-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    -    - 
Reservation 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100% 0% 
1990-1995   
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   -   -  
Reservation 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 6 83% 0% 
1996-2004   
Support 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 14 16 13% 0% 
Reservation 18 0 0 18 0 0 0 6 24 75% 0% 
2005-2012   
Support 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 4 50% 25% 
Reservation 47 4 0 51 0 0 0 1 52 98% 0% 
 
 
As explained above in the period of 1987-1989, there are no primary support 
press releases whereas %100 of primary releases include reservations.  In the period 
of 1990-1995, there are again no support releases. On the other hand, %83 of primary 
reservation press releases (5 out of 6) is about material arguments in which Greece 
vetoed Customs Union deal for Cyprus issue. In one out of 6 reservation press 
releases, reason for reservation is not specified. In the period of 1996-2004, 13 
percent of primary support press releases (2 out of 16) are about material arguments. 
In all two support press releases, it is stated that closer Turkish relations with EU is 
in Greek interest. In the remaining 14 releases, there is no explicit reason is specified. 
Among the primary reservation press releases 75 percent (18 out of 24) is about 
material arguments including Kardak crisis, Ocalan crisis, criticism towards reform 
process and Cyprus problem. Only 8 percent of primary reservation press releases (1 
out of 13) is about ideational arguments.  
In the period of 2005-2012, %50 of primary support press releases (2 out of 
4) contain material factors. In these articles, Greek interest is emphasized. One of 
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these press releases is about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Turkey 
is emphasized. The remaining press release does not include a specific reason. 
Whereas 98 percent of primary reservation press releases (51 out of 52) include 
material factors. Among these 51 releases 47 contain political reservations where 
Cyprus issue and nonfulfilment of reforms are criticized. 4 out of 51 releases are 
about security arguments. In these press releases, Greece held Turkey responsible for 
not controlling illegal immigration and not accepting the immigrants that Greece 
refused. In the remaining one press release, no explanation is provided for the 
reservation. 
 
Table 34: Greece Secondary Press Releases 
  Material Ideational Other Total   Total 
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Support 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 
33 0 0 33 0 0 0 6 39 85% 0% 
1990-1995 
 
Support 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
Reservation 
213 1 0 214 0 0 0 22 236 91% 0% 
1996-2004 
 
Support 
5 0 0 5 2 0 2 99 106 5% 2% 
Reservation 
320 2 0 322 0 0 0 64 386 83% 0% 
2005-2012 
 
Support 
1 3 0 4 1 0 1 12 17 24% 6% 
Reservation 
133 12 0 145 0 0 0 2 147 99% 0% 
 
 
As explained above in the period of 1987-1989, there are no support press 
releases. Whereas 85 percent of secondary reservation press releases (33 out of 39) is 
about material factors and all 33 press of them are about political reservations. The 
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main issues in that period were Turkey‟s restrictions on sale and transfer of property 
owned by Greek minority in Turkey, human rights, Cyprus problem and disputes in 
the Aegean. In 6 out of 29 releases, only Greek opposition to Turkish European 
aspirations is highlighted.  
When the period of 1990 and 1995 is analyzed, it is observed that there are 
again no secondary support releases. Among secondary reservation press releases 91 
percent (214 out of 236) is about material arguments. For instance, 213 out of 214 
releases contain political reservations and the remaining one contains security 
reservation. The main issues are Cyprus problem and dispute in the Aegean. 
Additionally, human rights problems are also criticized. In the single press release 
about the security issue illegal immigration is highlighted. In the remaining 22 out of 
236 releases, there is no reason behind Greek objections.  
In the period of 1996-2004, only 5 percent of secondary support releases (5 
out of 106) are about material factors. All of these five support releases are about 
political arguments in which improvement of Turkish relations with the EC is argued 
to be in Greek interest and it could help the solution of Cyprus problem. On the other 
hand, two percent of support press releases are about ideational arguments. In one of 
these releases, Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized whereas in the other, it is 
stated that religion should not be criterion for Turkish accession. Other 99 releases 
do not have any explicit arguments. In that period 83 percent of secondary 
reservation releases (322 out of 386) is about material factors. Among them 320 
reservations are due to political factors which are related to Kardak crisis, Cyprus 
issue and other problems is the Aegean. 2 out of 322 reservations are about Greece‟s 
security concerns. In 64 out of 386 reservation press releases, there no specific 
reason is stated.  
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In the final period of analysis, i.e. between 2005 and 2012, 24 percent of 
secondary support releases (4 out of 17) include material arguments. 3 out of 4 
releases are about security issue in which Greece suggested that Turkish accession is 
necessary for regional stability whereas 1 out of 4 releases are about political 
arguments in which it was emphasized that Europeanized Turkey is in everybody‟s 
interest. Only 6 percent of support releases (1 out of 17) is about ideational 
arguments where Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized. Other 12 support do not 
include reasoning. When the secondary reservation press releases are analyzed it is 
observed that almost all (99 percent, 145 out of 147) of them is about material 
factors. Among these releases 133 are political reservations in which Cyprus issue, 
airspace violations, nonfulfilment of criteria and territorial waters are emphasized. 
Whereas 12 out of 145 are related to security arguments in which illegal immigration 
is underlined. In the remaining 2 press releases, there is no explicit reason behind 
reservation. 
 
4.5.2 Comparison between Different Periods of 
Commissioners Speeches 
Table 35: Comparison between Different Periods of European Commissioners 
Speeches 
European Commissioner Speeches  
Total  EU 
Speeches  
EU Speeches Related to 
Turkey's Improvement 
of Relations with the 
EU 
Number of 
Support 
Number of 
Reservation 
Percentage of 
Support  
1987-1989 5 2 2 0 100% 
1990-1995 27 14 8 6 57% 
1996-2004 155 52 6 46 12% 
2005-2012 308 145 51 94 35% 
 
349 
 
In the period of 1987-1989, there are no support speeches. In the second 
period, %40 of speeches shows support of improvement of relations with the EU, on 
the basis of Association Agreement which led to the Customs Union agreement. 
When the speeches that are made in the period of 1996-2004 are analyzed, it is seen 
that in only 12 percent of speeches, support is seen for Turkish membership. For the 
final period, in the speeches, 35 percent of Support is seen for Turkey. 
 
Table 36: Turkey-European Commissioner’s Speeches-Material/Ideational 
Factors 
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1987-1989 
 
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  -   -  
Reservation 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 100 % 0% 
1990-1995 
           
Support 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 3 6 50% 0% 
Reservation 9 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 9 100% 0% 
1996-2004 
           
Support 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 6 33% 0% 
Reservation 45 0 1 46 0 0 0 0 46 100% 0% 
2005-2012 
           
Support 24 11 0 35 0 7 7 9 51 67% 13% 
Reservation 94 0 0 94 0 0 0 0 94 100% 0% 
 
In the period of 1987 and 1989, 100 percent of speeches (2 out of 2) have 
political reservations to Turkey‟s improvement of relations with the EU. In both 
speeches, it is emphasized that priority must be given to deepening of the 
Community, namely to complete single market, rather than widening.  
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When the period of 1990-1995 is analyzed, in the support speeches, material 
factors such as political interest of having closer relations with geostrategically 
important Turkey and security interest of stability of region are observed. However, 
there is no speech indicating ideational factors. Considering reservations, it is 
observed that Commissioners have political reservations such as Cyprus issue, 
human rights problems and priority of deepening of the EC. 
For the period of 1996-2004, in the support speeches, material factors such as 
political interest of having closer relations with geostrategically important Turkey are 
seen. Though, like the period of 1990-1995, there is no speech indicating ideational 
factors. For reservations, it is observed that Commissioners have political 
reservations such as Cyprus issue, human rights problems and non-compliance to 
political criteria. 
For the last period, in the support speeches, material factors such as political 
interest of having closer relations with geostrategically important Turkey which 
fights against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism are seen. Moreover, security 
interests in having secure and stable region and having secure energy channels is also 
underlined. For the first time, ideational arguments are used for Turkey. It is 
underlined that agreements should be respected and the EU needed to keep its 
promises and commitments towards Turkey. For reservations, it is observed that 
Commissioners have political reservations such as Additional Protocol for 
recognition of Cyprus, human rights problems and non- compliance to political 
criteria with respect to freedom of speech, freedom of press as well as the 
implementation of reforms. 
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4.5.3 Comparison of Member States’ Attitudes towards 
Turkey 
Table 37: Comparison of attitudes of Member States between 1987 and 1989 
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Germany 17 13 1 12 0 1 0% 0 12 0% 
France 7 4 0 4 0 0 0% 2 2 50% 
Great Britain 11 7 0 7 0 0 0% 4 3 57% 
Greece 46 41 2 39 0 2 0% 0 39 0% 
 
Between the years 1987 and 1989 only limited number of press releases can 
be obtained from the Factiva Database. Among these press releases only 3 of them 
were from primary resources and none of them were supporting Turkey's 
improvement of relations with the EC. However, when we compare the secondary 
resources there were higher number of press releases. In press releases regarding 
Germany and France around 50 percent of those releases were supportive. On the 
other hand, there were also no supportive releases emanating from Germany and 
Greece where the number of speeches was the highest among these countries. 
Table 38: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1990 and 1995 
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Germany 117 60 5 55 2 3 40% 14 41 25% 
France 106 70 9 59 7 2 78% 36 23 61% 
Great Britain 52 24 1 23 1 0 100% 14 9 61% 
Greece 289 242 6 236 0 6 0% 0 236 0% 
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When we analyze the findings regarding the period 1990-1995 we observe 
that there was significant increase in the number of press releases that could be 
obtained from the Factiva Database. Highest number of speeches was obtained 
related to Greece (similar to the 1987-1989 period) and none of them were 
supporting Turkey‟s improvement of relations with the EU. In the primary resources 
there was important number/percentage of supportive releases in France (7 
supportive releases comprising 78% of all releases). A similar result can be obtained 
for France in the secondary releases where around 60% of the releases obtained were 
supportive. Likewise, in press releases regarding Great Britain a 61% support rate is 
obtained. Whereas, for Germany this rate is significantly smaller when compared to 
France and Great Britain. 
 
Table 39: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1996 and 2004 
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Germany 665 484 38 446 34 4 89% 216 230 48% 
France 432 292 20 272 7 13 35% 119 153 44% 
Great Britain 413 277 21 256 18 3 86% 235 21 92% 
Greece 641 532 40 492 16 24 40% 106 386 22% 
 
Between 1996 and 2004 there were a huge number of press releases that can 
be obtained from Factiva Database. Among more than 2000 releases that was 
analyzed for this study, in press releases regarding Germany and Great Britain, 
support rate for Turkey‟s improvement of relations with the EU was very high 
reaching almost 90% levels. In that period in primary resources support rate was 
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relatively low in France and Greece compared to these two countries. In the 
secondary resources, a similar result can be obtained for the case of Great Britain.  
Table 40: 1996-2004 - Statistical Tests for Comparing Support Rates in Primary 
Releases (p-values) 
 France Greece Germany Great 
Britain 
France - - - - 
Greece 0.4626 - - - 
Germany 2.806e-05 * 7.919e-06 * - - 
Great Britain 0.001318 * 0.0008331 * 0.4972 - 
 
In order to decide whether or not there are significant differences in support 
rates for various countries, a two sided proportion test
26
 is applied
27
. In the table 
above the numbers in the table corresponds to the p value of the proportion test 
regarding the related countries. In that setting, the hypothesis tested is; 
 H0: The support rate is the same in both countries.  
 HA: The support rate in one country is higher than the other one. 
 At the 99 percent confidence level the table above indicates the tests marked 
with (*) indicate that the difference in those countries support rates is significant (i.e. 
all the p-values are less than 0.01). Therefore, this result indicates that in the period 
1996-2004 the support rate in the primary releases regarding Germany is 
                                                          
26
 All statistical tests are conducted with R statistical software package. 
 
27
 No statistical test is applied for the period of 1987-1989 and 1990-1995 as in these periods number 
of primary press releases is very low. 
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significantly higher than the support rates in France and Greece. Similarly, the 
support rate in the primary releases regarding Great Britain is significantly higher 
than the support rates in France and Greece. However, no significant difference is 
observed when the support rates of Greece and France are compared. Same result 
applies to the comparison of Great Britain and Germany. 
 
Table 41: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 2005 and 2012 
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Germany 379 280 14 266 4 10 29% 56 210 21% 
France 749 580 31 549 5 26 16% 13 536 2% 
Great Britain 349 274 32 242 30 2 94% 238 4 98% 
Greece 312 221 57 164 5 52 9% 17 147 10% 
 
 
In the latest period that was analyzed in this study, namely 2005-2012, it is 
again observed that the support rate is significantly higher regarding Great Britain 
compared to all other countries and the support rate related to France decreases to the 
level of support rate in Greece. The results of the analysis of secondary releases also 
support this assessment. It is interesting to note that out of 549 press releases only 13 
were supportive in the secondary resources regarding France. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
355 
 
 
Table 42: 2005-2012 - Statistical Tests for Comparing Support Rates in Primary 
Releases (p-values) 
 France Greece Germany Great 
Britain 
France - - - - 
Greece 0.246  - - - 
Germany 0.2865 0.06095 - - 
Great Britain 1.382e-09 (*) 1.009e-14 (*) 9.889e-06 (*) - 
 
Statistical tests indicate that in the period 2005-2012 the support rate in the 
primary releases regarding Great Britain is significantly higher than the support rates 
in France, Greece and Germany (at 99% confidence level). All the other tests show 
that no significant difference is observed when the support rates of Greece and 
France are compared. Same result applies to the comparison of France and Germany 
and Germany and Greece. To conclude, in the primary press releases, the support 
from Great Britain exceeds the support rates in all other countries that are considered 
in this study. 
The analysis leads to some major conclusions. First of all, as stated in the 
literature, Great Britain is the main driver for Turkey for the period of 1990-2012. 
Turkish case also indicates that the British support for enlargement of the EU is a 
state policy which does not change with changes in government. Secondly, in the 
period of 1987-1989, Germany had economic reservations due to the fear of Turkish 
workers coming into Germany and therefore Germany did not support Turkish 
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membership application. However, in the Customs Union negotiations, some 
German support is observed together with reservations. But when the overall 
relations with Germany in Kohl‟s chancellorship are analyzed, it is observed that 
Kohl had reservations towards Turkey. On the other hand, unlike Poland, Gerard 
Schroder supported Turkish European aspirations. In Angela Merkel‟s 
chancellorship, wind towards Turkey changed again and privileged partnership 
instead of full membership is offered. Therefore, like Poland, Turkish case also 
shows that German support for Turkish European relations changed with 
governments. 
 Thirdly, Turkish case also indicates that France, in all periods, prioritizes 
deepening of the Community. Moreover, French governments are sensitive about 
domestic concerns. Between 1988 and 1989, France did not oppose Turkish 
membership application. In the period of 1990-1995, due to its role as the president 
of the EU in the first half of 1995, France is the country which tried hardest to 
persuade Greece to lift her veto against Turkish Customs Union and the analysis 
indicates that 1990-1995 is the period in which French support for Turkish 
membership bid was highest. On the other hand, in the period of 1996-2004, the 
French, especially Chirac‟s support for Turkey is seen. However, it can be suggested 
that after the election of Justice and Development Party in November 2002, 
reservations towards Turkey increased significantly. When the secular character of 
French state is considered, it can be argued that hesitations towards Islamic 
credentials of Justice and Development Party and its European orientation could be 
one of the reasons behind this French attitude. After the French veto to the 
constitution of the EU, supporting accession of Turkey became even harder for 
French politicians due to the domestic opposition to Turkish accession. In May 2007, 
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Nicholas Sarkozy, the leader of Union for a Popular Movement, was elected as 
President of France and similar to Angela Merkel; he openly supports privileged 
partnership for Turkey instead of full membership. Therefore, in this period, the 
support for Turkish bid was lowest.  
 Finally, Greece is the main brakemen for Turkey. Solution to the Cyprus 
problem and bilateral disputes in the Aegean has been the main reservations in all 
periods. Although there was conciliation after the earthquakes in both Countries and 
this led Greece not to veto Turkish candidacy in Helsinki Summit, Cyprus problem 
continued to be the main reservation afterwards. In the period of 2005 onwards, 
Turkey did not recognize Cyprus and the EU froze negotiations in 8 chapters. In 
Papandreou period, the argument of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus, which was 
used in 1990s, came back again. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
5.1.Comparison of the European Commissioners’ and Member States’ 
Attitudes towards Poland and Turkey 
 
5.1.1 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and 
Turkey 
European Commissioners have a special role in the EU‟s enlargement 
process. They monitor candidate states‟ compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria 
and report to the European Council their preparedness for membership. During the 
candidacy and accession negotiations, European Commissioners highlight problems 
in Poland and Turkey and, according to the approach that is used in this dissertation, 
such criticisms are labeled as reservations.  
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Table 43: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
and Turkey between 1987 and 1989 
European Commissioner Speeches 
Total  EC 
Speeches 
EC Speeches Related to 
Improvement of 
Relations with the EU 
Number of 
Support 
Number of 
Reservation 
Percentage of 
Support 
Poland-   1988-1989 14 8 7 1 88% 
Turkey-   1987-1989 5 2 0 2 0% 
 
European Commissioners have a special role in the EU‟s enlargement 
process. They monitor candidate states‟ compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria 
and report to the European Council their preparedness for membership. During the 
candidacy and accession negotiations, European Commissioners highlight problems 
in Poland and Turkey and, according to the approach that is used in this dissertation, 
such criticisms are labeled as reservations.  
Comparison of the results for 1988-1989 for Poland and 1987-1989 for 
Turkey shows that European Commissioners supported the deepening of relations 
with Poland, but expressed only reservations regarding Turkey. More specifically, in 
all press releases regarding Turkey, they emphasized that deepening of the 
Community should be prioritized over widening through enlargement.  In contrast, in 
the Polish case, they used phrases referring to the EU‟s „moral duty‟ and 
„responsibility‟ to help Poland‟s democratic and free market transition, These phrases 
signaled the involvement of ideational factors, as well as phrases referring to security 
and political interests implying the importance of material factors. Overall, the 
findings of this dissertation are that, for both Poland and Turkey, the number of 
supportive speeches referring to material factors is greater than the number referring 
to ideational factors. During the two periods, the only press release expressing 
reservation mentioned political conditionality for European aid. Thus, during 1988-
360 
 
1989 for Poland and 1987-1989 for Turkey, European Commissioners can be labeled 
as drivers of the deepening of Poland‟s relations with the EU, on the basis of the high 
level of support expressed in their speeches. Regarding Turkey, however, a 
conclusion cannot be reached as it was not possible to obtain a sufficient number of 
speeches for the analysis.  
 
Table 44: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
and Turkey between 1990 and 1995 
European Commissioner Speeches 
Total  EU 
Speeches 
EC Speeches Related to 
Improvement of 
Relations with the EU 
Number of 
Support 
Number of 
Reservation 
Percentage of 
Support 
Poland-   1990-1993 59 56 39 17 70% 
Turkey-   1990-1995 27 15 6 9 40% 
 
 Comparing 1990-1993 for Poland and 1990-1995 shows that Poland‟s 
support rate was comparatively higher.  In supportive speeches towards Poland, 
ideational factors like responsibility and common culture were observed, as well as 
material factors such as political interest in helping Poland‟s transition to democracy 
and a market economy, simultaneous widening and deepening of the Community, 
together with the EU‟s economic and security interests. The percentage of speeches 
referring to material factors was higher than that for ideational factors. Regarding 
reservations, the analysis showed that economic reservations about Poland‟s 
economic backwardness were expressed, in addition to political interest in deepening 
the EU before further widening. 
With respect to Turkey, material factors, such as the political interest in 
having closer relations with a geostrategically important country and the security 
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interest of stability of Turkey‟s region, were observed in the supportive speeches. No 
speeches invoked ideational factors. Considering reservations, analysis of the 
speeches indicated that EU commissioners had various political reservations, such as 
the Cyprus issue, Turkey‟s human rights problems and prioritizing deepening of the 
EU. Thus, European commissioners can also be labeled as drivers of deepened 
relations with Poland, whereas their support rate for Turkey was neither high nor low 
enough to justify labeling them as either drivers or brakemen. 
 
Table 45: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
and Turkey between 1994 and 2004 
European Commissioner Speeches 
Total  EU 
Speeches 
EC Speeches Related to 
Improvement of 
Relations with the EU 
Number of 
Support 
Number of 
Reservation 
Percentage of 
Support 
Poland-   1994-1997 46 43 24 19 55% 
Turkey-   1996-2004 155 52 6 46 12% 
 
Analysis of the speeches of the two periods shows that 55 percent of speeches 
indicated support for Poland‟s EU membership bid, but only 12 percent indicated 
support for Turkish membership.  
 With respect to the factors involved in the speeches, for Poland, ideational 
factors, such as the EU‟s responsibility towards Poland and overcoming the division 
of Europe were emphasized, although material factors, such as the EU‟s political 
interest in helping Poland‟s transition and widening the Community, and its security 
interest in increasing stability in Europe by accepting Poland, were also observed. 
Ten out of 24 support speeches referred to material factors whereas 4 out of 24 
speeches referred to ideational factors. With respect to reservations, political interest 
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in EU institutional reform before widening and Poland‟s compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria were both found, and economic reservations over Poland‟s 
agriculture sector and its economic backwardness were also underlined.  
For Turkey, in supportive speeches, material factors like the EU‟s political 
interest in having closer relations with a geostrategically important country were 
seen. As in 1990-1995, speeches indicated the use of ideational factors. Regarding 
reservations, European commissioners again included in their speeches political 
reservations over the Cyprus issue, Turkey‟s human rights problems and its non-
compliance with the EU‟s political criteria. Overall, during these two periods, the 
EU‟s mixed or moderate level of support for Poland meant it was not possible to 
label the European Commissioners as either driver or brakeman. On the other hand, 
they can be labeled as the brakeman regarding the deepening of Turkey‟s EU 
relations due to the relatively high level of expressed reservations.  
 
Table 46: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland 
and Turkey between 1998 and 2012 
European Commissioner Speeches 
Total  EU 
Speeches 
EC Speeches Related to 
Improvement of 
Relations with the EU 
Number of 
Support 
Number of 
Reservation 
Percentage of 
Support 
Poland-   1998-2004 120 73 34 39 46% 
Turkey-   2005-2012 308 145 51 94 35% 
 
 Regarding the two periods, Poland received a 46 percent level of 
support in speeches made whereas Turkey received 35 percent. For Poland, material 
factors, such as the EU‟s security interest in having stability, security and peace were 
emphasized. With respect to ideational factors, the importance of the unification of 
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Europe was underlined. Fifteen out of 34 supportive speeches referred to material 
factors whereas 14 out of 35 speeches referred to ideational factors. With respect to 
reservations, the EU‟s political interest in institutional reform before accession and 
concerns about Polish compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria as well as 
implementation of the reforms were emphasized. Finally, speeches also included 
economic reservations as about problems in Polish agriculture and Poland‟s 
protectionism.  
For Turkey, supportive speeches referred to material factors, such as the EU‟s 
political interest in having closer relations with a geostrategically important country 
that was fighting against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and security interests 
in ensuring a secure and stable region around Turkey and maintaining secure energy 
channels to Europe. During this period, ideational arguments were deployed in 
discussing Turkey for the first time. In such speeches, it was underlined that 
agreements should be respected and that the EU needed to keep its promises and 
commitments towards Turkey. Regarding reservations, the commissioners expressed 
similar reservations as before about an additional protocol for the recognition of 
Cyprus, Turkey‟s human rights problems and its non-compliance with EU political 
criteria with respect to freedom of speech and freedom of press, as well as 
implementation of EU-mandated reforms. 
 On 9 October 2002, the European Commission reported that Poland, along 
with nine other candidates, had fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria and recommended 
concluding the accession negotiations with all countries concerned by the end of 
2002 with the aim of signing the Accession Treaty in spring 2003. Poland duly 
became a member of the EU on May 1, 2004. However, Turkey‟s accession 
negotiations are still continuing.  
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Overall, from the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that support rates 
for both Poland and Turkey were neither high enough nor low enough to label 
European commissioners as either driver or brakeman. The arguments in this 
comparison part are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 47: European Commissioners Enlargement Preferences for Poland and 
Turkey 
 Period I. Period II. Period III. Period IV. 
 Poland Turkey Poland Turkey Poland Turkey Poland Turkey 
 1988-
1989 
1987-
1989 
1990-
1993 
1990-
1995 
1994- 1997 1996-2004 
 
1998-May 2004 2005-2012 
Driver +  +      
Brakeman      -   
No Label  -  - -  - - 
  
5.1.2 Attitudes of Member State’s towards Poland and Turkey 
According to rationalist institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, 
utility driven member states of the EU should only accept a country if they all agree 
that the applicant country contributes to the EU, and that its membership would not 
challenge the national interests, whether political, economic or security, of any other 
member states. Instead, the membership of the applicant country should advance the 
interests of member states. Moreover, according to the two approaches, leaders of 
member states make rational choices which are predominantly affected by the 
constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful 
domestic constituents. 
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In contrast, for Constructivist/Sociological institutionalism, in accepting an 
applicant state, member states do not make cost-benefit calculations. Instead, social 
identities, values and norms are the determining factors in decision making. For 
member states, justification for enlargement comes from emphasizing the 
responsibilities and duties emerging as a result of sharing (European) identity, 
culture and history, being a part of the same family (sense of kinship) and belonging 
to the EU. 
 
Table 48: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 
1988 and 1989 
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Germany 52 4 0 4 0 0 0% 2 2 50% 
France 52 12 3 9 3 0 100% 7 2 77% 
Great Britain 46 5 0 5 0 0 0% 4 1 80% 
Spain 4 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
 
Table 49: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 
1987 and 1989 
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Germany 17 13 1 12 0 1 0% 0 12 0% 
France 7 4 0 4 0 0 0% 2 2 50% 
Great Britain 11 7 0 7 0 0 0% 4 3 57% 
Greece 46 41 2 39 0 2 0% 0 39 0% 
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Regarding the attitudes of member states in 1988-1989 for Poland and 1987-
1989 for Turkey, the findings show that France and Great Britain supported 
deepening Poland‟s relations with the EU, especially by means of aid EU and 
bilateral agreements. Great Britain supported Poland for political reasons whereas 
ideational factors lay behind French support. The number of press releases involving 
material factors was higher than the number with ideational factors. Both countries 
also expressed political reservations over deepening the EU or rectifying the EU‟s 
institutional deficiencies in contrast to deepening Poland‟s relations with the EU. For 
Germany, 50 percent of press releases showed support, particularly through giving 
aid to Poland through EU channels. However, Germany also expressed some 
economic reservations over easing quotas for Poland in the agriculture and steel 
sectors. For Spain, there were no press releases regarding Spanish attitudes towards 
Poland.  
On the other hand, when the Turkish case is analyzed, it shows that 50 
percent of press releases from France showed support whereas 57 from Great Britain 
did. France had some political reservations over deepening the EU while Great 
Britain had some political reservations including Turkey‟s human rights record, the 
Cyprus issue and consolidation of previous EU enlargement with Spain and Portugal. 
Germany and Greece also expressed reservations towards Turkey. Germany referred 
to economic reservations of a fear of mass migration of Turkish workers to Germany 
and political reservations over human rights in Turkey. Greece‟s political 
reservations concerned Cyprus and Aegean, Turkey‟s restrictions on the sale and 
transfer of property owned by the Greek minority in Turkey and human rights.  
Thus, the findings suggest that France and Great Britain were the main 
drivers of improving EU relations with Poland with respect to aid despite also 
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mentioning political reservations such as the priority of deepening the EU‟s internal 
relations first. Germany expressed some economic reservations whereas there are no 
press releases regarding Spanish attitude. Regarding Turkey, however, none of these 
countries were drivers, and Greece and Germany were actually brakemen. All of the 
member states mainly referred to political reservations, while only Germany 
expressed a significant number of economic reservations. For both Poland and 
Turkey, the number of press releases that included material factors were higher than 
the number of releases expressing ideational factors.   
In terms of the arguments of rationalist institutionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism, giving aid to support Poland‟s transition to democracy did not 
challenge the national interests, whether economic, security or political, of EU 
member states so France and Great Britain became drivers. On the other hand, 
Turkey‟s membership application challenged the economic interests of Germany and 
the political interests of Greece so Germany and Greece became brakemen. 
 
Table 50: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 
1990 and 1993  
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Germany 78 41 1 40 0 1 0% 29 11 72% 
France 107 98 9 89 3 6 33% 5 84 5% 
Great Britain 76 41 4 37 4 0 100% 35 2 94% 
Spain 67 37 1 36 0 1 0% 3 33 8% 
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Table 51: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 
1990 and 1995 
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Germany 117 60 5 55 2 3 40% 14 41 25% 
France 106 70 9 59 7 2 78% 36 23 61% 
Great Britain 52 24 1 23 1 0 100% 14 9 61% 
Greece 289 242 6 236 0 6 0% 0 236 0% 
  
During the period of 1990-1993 for Poland and 1990-1995 for Turkey, both 
Germany and Great Britain supported deepening Poland‟s relations with the EU, 
though Germany had some economic reservations during the negotiations of the 
Europe Agreements. In Germany‟s supportive press releases, material factors, 
political and security interests were more prominent than ideational factors. In the 
primary releases, Great Britain supported Poland for ideational reasons. British 
politicians suggested that they had the moral duty and responsibility towards Poland 
due to their common history of being allies in the Second World War and the fleeing 
of the Polish Government to exile in London. In secondary releases, material factors 
dominated, particularly the political interest in widening the EU and its security 
interest. During this period, British support for Poland‟s European aspirations was 
highest. In contrast, France and Spain were the brakemen in the negotiations of the 
Europe Agreements because their economic interests were at stake. For France, the 
main issues were Poland‟s agricultural exports, particularly beef, and car quotas 
whereas for Spain the main issues were steel and agricultural exports, but also the 
competition for EU funds. In the supportive press releases of France and Spain, there 
are no ideational factors. Regarding the Turkish case, 78 percent of French primary 
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releases and 61 percent of secondary releases indicated support whereas 100 percent 
of British primary releases and 61 percent of secondary releases showed support. 
Most of the support from these two countries was for the Customs Union 
negotiations. In both French and British support, material factors, Turkey‟s 
geopolitical importance and binding Turkey to west were emphasized. At the same 
time, however, France and Great Britain had some political reservations regarding 
Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq, human rights problems and the Cyprus 
issue. For Germany, political reservations over human rights and Turkish operations 
in Northern Iraq were emphasized. For Greece, political reservations over Cyprus 
and the Aegean and human rights were underlined. Greece finally consented to the 
Customs Union agreement for Turkey in return for a promise on Cyprus‟s accession 
to the EU. 
Thus, from this analysis Great Britain emerges as the main driver for 
deepening both Poland‟s and Turkey‟s relations with the EU. France was the driver 
of the Turkish Customs Union deal, despite some political reservations, while 
Germany was the driver of Poland‟s European aspirations, despite some economic 
reservations. France and Spain were the brakemen over Polish relations with the EU 
while Greece and Germany were the brakemen over Turkish relations with the EU. 
For both Poland and Turkey, except for the primary supportive press releases from 
Great Britain for Poland, the number of releases involving material factors was 
greater than the number of releases for ideational factors.  
negotiations over the Europe Agreements challenged the economic interests 
of both France and Spain. The powerful farm lobby in France and Spain‟s steel lobby 
affected the rational decision-making of French and Spanish governments. As 
Schimmelfennig suggested, the fear of losing EU funds created another economic 
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concern for Spain. Therefore, France and Spain became the brakemen. Although 
Germany also expressed some economic reservations during the Europe Agreement 
negotiations, these reservations did not affect the actions of German government in 
supporting Polish European aspirations. The Europe Agreements did not challenge 
national interest of Great Britain. Therefore, Germany and Great Britain became the 
drivers of Poland‟s European bid. In contrast, the Customs Union agreement did not 
challenge French and British interests so these two countries were the drivers of 
Turkish Customs Union despite some political reservations. Although Germany 
expressed some support in the Customs Union negotiations, this was outweighed by 
political reservations over human rights and Turkish operations in Iraq so Germany 
became the brakeman regarding Turkey‟s European bid. Due to the Cyprus problem 
and disputes in the Aegean, Turkey‟s Customs Union deal challenged Greek political 
interests. Therefore, Greece was the brakeman in the Turkish Customs Union 
decision. Nevertheless, Greece eventually consented to the Customs Union in return 
for the promise of Cyprus‟s accession to the EU. In other words, the Customs Union 
decision actually advanced Greece‟s interest with respect to Cyprus‟ membership.  
 
Table 52: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 
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Germany 147 130 9 121 7 2 78% 94 27 78% 
France 87 77 2 75 2 0 100% 32 43 42% 
Great Britain 78 41 4 37 4 0 100% 24 13 64% 
Spain 113 69 1 68 0 1 0% 5 63 7% 
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Table 53: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 
1996 and 2004  
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Germany 665 484 38 446 34 4 89% 216 230 48% 
France 432 292 20 272 7 13 35% 119 153 44% 
Great Britain 413 277 21 256 18 3 86% 235 21 92% 
Greece 641 532 40 492 16 24 40% 106 386 22% 
 
For the period of 1994-1997 for Poland and 1996-2004 for Turkey, similarly 
to the previous period, Germany and Great Britain supported deepening Poland‟s 
relations with the EU. For Germany, support for Polish accession was highest during 
this period. In Germany‟s primary supportive press releases, material factors were 
emphasized less than ideational factors. In the secondary supportive press releases, 
material factors such as Poland‟s geopolitical significance, the security interest in 
stabilizing the German-Polish border and European stability and economic interests 
were emphasized, as well as ideational arguments about the Europeanness of Poland 
and Germany‟s special responsibility in the unification of continent. In the secondary 
supportive press releases, material factors were more prominent than ideational 
factors, while in the primary press releases, ideational arguments were expressed 
more than material arguments. In the secondary press releases, material factors 
dominated over ideational factors. The political interest in widening of the EU, 
Europhobia and enlargement as a means of forcing the EU to reform its institutional 
structure were included, as well as references to security interests.  
With respect to France, this period can be divided into two periods: 
Mitterrand‟s presidency and Chirac‟s presidency. There was a statistically significant 
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difference between the attitudes of France in these two periods. During Mitterrand‟s 
presidency, there were no primary support or reservation press releases, whereas for 
secondary releases, there was 16 percent support for Poland‟s European aspirations. 
France‟s main reservations during Mitterrand‟s presidency were political: the fear of 
a change in the center of gravity of the EU and criticisms about a lack of interest in 
Mediterranean states. In contrast, during Chirac‟s presidency, 100 percent of primary 
releases (2 out of 2) and 56 percent of releases showed support for Poland‟s 
European aspirations (28 out of 50). In the primary press releases, no reasons were 
specified to justify this support. In the secondary releases, ideational arguments were 
more frequent than material arguments. Regarding ideational factors, a sense of 
kinship, „our sister in the east‟ and unification of continent were emphasized, while 
for material factors, political and security interests were common. Considering 
reservations, the political reservation of giving priority to EU institutional reform 
before enlargement and economic reservations over changes the CAP and protecting 
French farmers were pointed out.  
Spain continued to be the brakemen for Polish European aspirations. 
Competition for EU funds and Poland‟s tax on Spanish farm products were the main 
reasons for Spanish reservations during this period. Like France, Spain also 
expressed political reservations about the fear of a change in the center of gravity of 
the EU and criticisms about a lack of interest in Mediterranean states. No ideational 
arguments were made by Spanish politicians.  
With respect to the Turkish case, Great Britain was the main supporter of 
Turkey‟s European bid. The number of supportive releases that emphasized material 
factors was greater than the number of supportive releases mentioning ideational 
factors. Expressions of Turkey‟s geopolitical importance and the security interest in 
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having closer relations with Turkey were common in this period. The political 
reservations of Great Britain were Turkey‟s human rights problems, the ban on the 
Welfare party, the Ocalan case and Turkey‟s non-compliance with the Copenhagen 
Criteria.  
For Germany, this period can also be divided into two, for Chancellor Kohl‟s 
period and Chancellor Schroeder‟s period, because the differences between German 
attitudes changed significantly.  During Kohl‟s chancellorship, the primary press 
releases expressed 66 percent support whereas the level of support was 24 percent in 
the secondary releases. The main material reservations of Germany during Kohl‟s 
chancellorship were political reservations about Turkey‟s human rights problems and 
the Cyprus issue, security reservations about immigration of Kurds. Economic 
reservations about a possible influx of Turkish workers were also highlighted.  In 
contrast, during Schroeder‟s period, 91 percent support was observed in the primary 
press releases and 59 percent of support in secondary releases. In supportive press 
releases, Turkey‟s geopolitical importance, its role as a bridge to the Muslim world 
and German political interests were expressed as political factors and security 
interests. The main reservations were political reservations over Turkey‟s non-
compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and economic reservations over a possible 
influx of Turkish workers.  
For France, this period can also be divided into two, but this time in reference 
to a change of government in Turkey. The difference is also supported statistically.  
From 1996 to 3 November 2002, 66 percent of primary press releases and 89 percent 
of secondary releases showed support for Turkey‟s European bid. Supportive press 
releases deployed geopolitical arguments about the fear of Turkey sliding into 
Islamic fundamentalism and the geopolitical importance of a secular Turkey. 
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Ideational factors, such as Turkey‟s Europeanness were also expressed. The main 
political reservations were Turkey‟s non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, 
its human rights problems and the Cyprus issue. After the election of Justice and 
Development Party, however, French press releases began to question Turkey‟s 
European orientation. During this second period, only 10 percent of primary press 
releases and 16 percent of secondary releases showed support for Turkey‟s European 
aspirations. France‟s main political reservations were Turkey‟s non-compliance with 
the Copenhagen Criteria, the idea of having a French referendum on Turkish 
accession, the Armenian issue, and domestic opposition to Turkey. Ideational 
reservations of not sharing common values, a common religion and a common 
culture were also found in releases at this time.  
For Greece, the earthquake in Turkey in 1999 was a turning point in Turkish-
Greek relations. Between 1996 and July 1999, there were no primary supportive 
press releases although 1 percent of secondary releases showed support. The main 
political issues were the Imia/Kardak crisis in the Aegean, the Cyprus problem and 
the Ocalan affair. After August 1999, however, 55 percent of primary press releases 
and 46 percent of secondary releases showed support. The supportive releases 
emphasized that Greece supported Turkish European aspirations. However, the 
Cyprus issue and Greece‟s insistence on taking the Aegean disputes to international 
courts continued to represent the main reservation in this period. 
Thus, Great Britain continued to be the main driver for both Poland‟s and 
Turkey‟s European aspirations. Under the presidency of Mitterrand, France was a 
brakeman for Poland‟s European aspirations. In contrast, Chirac supported Poland‟s 
European bid and France under Chirac became a driver. Until 3 November 2002, 
France can be labeled as a driver of Turkey‟s European aspirations, but after the 
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election of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, France can be labeled as a 
brakeman regarding Turkish European aspirations. Germany continued to be the 
driver of Poland‟s European bid while, under Kohl, acting as a brakeman over 
Turkey. However, under Schroeder, Germany became a driver for Turkey‟s 
European aspirations as Turkish workers in Germany gave electoral support to 
Schroeder. Spain continued to be brakeman for Poland‟s European aspirations while, 
until the start detente between Greece and Turkey, Greece was the brakeman for 
Turkey‟s European bid. However, after their reconciliation, Greece started to support 
Turkey‟s European aspirations, although its level of support was not high enough to 
call Greece a driver. For Turkey, except for France's primary supportive press 
releases, the number of releases involving material factors was greater than the 
number of releases indicating ideational factors. In contrast, for Poland, except for 
German and British primary supportive releases and French secondary supportive 
releases, the number of releases invoking material factors was higher than the 
number expressing ideational factors. 
Deepening Poland‟s and Turkey‟s relations with the EU did not challenge 
British interests. Rather, as Schimmelfennig suggests, Europhobia and the need for 
reform of the EU‟s institutional structure were used to justify British support of 
Poland. In contrast, British support for Turkey was justified by its geopolitical 
importance, security interests and the ideational argument of the Europeanness of 
Turkey. Thus, Great Britain was the driver in this period. For France, during 
Mitterrand‟s presidency, deepening Polish relations with the EU challenged French 
political interests so France became a brakeman in that period.  During Chirac‟s 
presidency, as Sjursen indicates, a sense of kinship was used to justify supporting 
Poland, as well as references to political and security interests. Thus, France became 
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a driver for Poland. With respect to Turkey, until the election of the Justice and 
Development Party, France was a driver of Turkish European aspirations. However, 
after the elections in Turkey, France started to have hesitations about Turkey‟s 
secular character and European orientation, while there was also increasing domestic 
opposition to Turkey‟s membership. That is, Turkish membership challenged French 
political interests so France became a brakeman in this period. For Germany, 
Poland‟s European bid was in Germany‟s political, security and economic interests.  
Hence, Germany was a driver for Poland‟s European aspirations.  
During Christian Democrat Kohl‟s chancellorship, Germany had political 
reservations, security reservations and economic reservations about Turkey so it 
acted as a brakeman. However, after Social Democrat Schroeder took the presidency, 
Turkey‟s European bid no longer challenged Germany‟s interests. Hence, Germany 
became a driver of Turkey‟s European bid. For Spain, deepening Poland‟s relations 
with the EU challenged Spanish political and economic interests. Politically, 
enlargement would shift the EU‟s balances in favor of Germany. Economically, 
Spain feared that she would no longer be able to get EU funds. Therefore, Spain 
became a brakeman. In 1996, Greece and Turkey had been on the verge of war due 
to the Imia/Kardak crisis so Greek security interests were challenged by Turkey‟s EU 
bid, while political reservations over the Cyprus issue and the Ocalan case were also 
significant. Therefore, Greece was a brakeman in that period. However, after the 
earthquakes, although Cyprus issue remained unresolved, it was acknowledged that 
supporting Turkey was in Greece‟s political interest. Therefore, Greece did not veto 
Turkish candidacy and supported Turkey till 2004. 
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Table 54: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 
1998 and 2004  
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Germany 610 220 8 212 4 4 50% 51 161 24% 
France 946 282 11 271 10 1 91% 75 196 28% 
Great Britain 557 107 8 99 8 0 100% 53 46 54% 
Spain 585 124 7 117 2 5 29% 21 96 18% 
 
Table 55: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 
2005 and 2012  
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Germany 379 280 14 266 4 10 29% 56 210 21% 
France 749 580 31 549 5 26 16% 13 536 2% 
Great Britain 349 274 32 242 30 2 94% 238 4 98% 
Greece 312 221 57 164 5 52 9% 17 147 10% 
 
For the period of 1998-2004 for Poland and 2005-2012 for Turkey, only 
Great Britain supported Poland‟s desire to deepen relations with the EU, although 
this support was lower than at all other periods.  British support depended on 
political arguments such as Europhobia, prioritizing enlargement over deepening, 
and security interests. Britain‟s main reservation was economic: the need for reform 
of the CAP and British contributions to the EU budget. In contrast to other periods 
under Chancellor Schroeder, Germany did not support Poland‟s European 
aspirations. The main economic reservations were the need for a transition period 
regarding free movement of Polish workers, EU institutional reforms before 
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widening, Germany‟s contribution to the EU budget and reform of the CAP. French 
primary press releases showed 91 percent of support but only 28 percent in 
secondary releases. The main French reservations were economic, specifically 
French resistance to reform of the CAP, but there were also political reservations 
including the need for EU institutional reform, elections in France, Poland‟s non-
compliance with the Acquis and its support for the US in Iraq. Spain continued not to 
support Poland although its support rate increased compared to previous periods. 
Spain‟s main economic reservations were sharing of EU funds with Poland and 
opposition to the reform of the CAP.  
With respect to Turkey, Great Britain continued to support its bid. In 
supportive press releases, Britain mentioned geopolitical interests as well as security 
interests. Germany, under the chancellorship of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, 
did not support Turkey‟s European bid. Instead of full membership, Chancellor 
Merkel asked for a „privileged partnership‟. Germany‟s main political reservations 
were Turkey‟s non-recognition of Cyprus and its non-compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria, together with concerns over the EU‟s absorption capacity. 
France, under Nicholas Sarkozy, did not support Turkey either. Like Chancellor 
Merkel, President Sarkozy also supported a „privileged partnership‟ instead of full 
membership. France‟s main political reservations were Turkey‟s non–recognition of 
Cyprus, its non-fulfillment of reforms, human rights issues, France‟s demand for a 
referendum over Turkey‟s accession, the Armenian issue and the EU‟s absorption 
capacity. Ideational arguments were also expressed in French reservation releases, 
which questioned Turkey‟s Europeanness. Greece reversed her previously positive 
stance in this period and no longer supported Turkish European aspirations. Greece‟s 
main political reservation was Turkey‟s non-recognition of Cyprus with the 
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additional protocol and its non-fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. Security 
reservations over illegal immigration from Turkey were also expressed. 
To sum up, Great Britain was again the main driver for both Poland‟s and 
Turkey‟s desire to deepen relations with the EU. Regarding Poland, France was not a 
driver but also was not a brakeman, but it was a brakeman for Turkish European 
aspirations. Unlike other periods, and as opposed to earlier findings in the literature, 
Germany was a brakeman for Poland‟s European bid. Germany was also a brakeman 
for Turkey. Spain continued to be a brakeman for Poland and Greece became a 
brakeman again for Turkey. For both Poland and Turkey, except for the German and 
French primary supportive press releases about Poland, the number of releases that 
involved material factors was higher than the number of releases including ideational 
factors.  
Poland‟s membership bid challenged the economic interests of both Germany 
and Spain. In order to prevent Polish workers pouring into the German labor market, 
Germany demanded a seven-year transition period after Poland‟s accession. 
Germany also questioned her own contribution to the EU budget, especially to the 
CAP.  Due to a fear of domestic resistance to German contributions to the EU 
budget, Germany did not want to negotiate on that issue before 2002 elections. After 
the elections, however, Germany and France were able to reach a deal on the CAP 
issue that paved way for the enlargement to proceed. For Spain, sharing of funds and 
opposition to the CAP reform were her main economic reservations. Therefore, due 
to the challenge that Poland‟s accession created to the economic interests of 
Germany and Spain, they both became the brakeman regarding Poland‟s European 
bid.  
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Turning to the Turkish case, Germany had political reservations as supporting 
Turkey challenged Germany‟s political interests. Hence, Germany became a 
brakeman under the chancellorship of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel. For 
France, Poland‟s accession challenged its economic interest with respect to the CAP 
but in its primary press releases France still supported Poland‟s accession. Therefore, 
France cannot be labeled as either driver or brakeman. France‟s veto over the EU 
constitution can also be understood as a reaction to enlargement with Turkey. Due to 
a fear of domestic opposition, France could not support Turkey‟s accession process. 
That is, Turkish membership challenged French political interests. Hence, France 
continued to be a brakeman. For Greece, Turkey‟s non-recognition of Cyprus 
challenged Greek political interests so Greece could not support Turkey‟s accession 
process either, and became a brakeman again. The arguments in this comparison part 
are summarized in the table below. 
Table 56: Member State Enlargement Preferences 
 Period I. Period II. Period III. Period IV. 
 Poland Turkey Poland Turkey Poland Turkey Poland Turkey 
 1988-
1989 
1987-
1989 
1990-
1993 
1990-
1995 
1994-
May 
1995 
June 
1995-
1997 
1996-
Oct 
1998 
Nov 
1998-
June 
1999 
Aug 
1999- 
Nov 
2002 
Dec 
2002-
2004 
1998- 
Oct 
1998 
Nov 
1998-
May 
2004 
2005-
2012 
Driver FR 
GB 
- GB 
GE 
 
GB 
FR 
GB 
GE 
GB 
GE 
FR 
GB 
FR 
GB 
GE 
FR 
GB 
GE 
FR 
GB 
GE 
GB 
GE 
GB GB 
Brakeman - GE 
GR 
SP 
FR 
GE 
GR 
SP 
FR 
SP GE 
GR 
GR - FR SP GE 
SP 
GE 
FR 
GR 
No Label GE 
SP 
FR 
GB 
- - - - - - GR GR FR FR - 
FR: FRANCE, GB: GREAT BRITAIN, GE: GERMANY, SP: SPAIN, GR: GREECE 
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5.2 Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation aimed to explain EU enlargement policies, specifically Eastern 
enlargement, within the framework of the rationalist-constructivist theoretical debate. 
With the help of the case studies of the EU application processes of Turkey and 
Poland, different stages of the enlargement process involving these two countries 
were analyzed in order to determine the extent to which European Commissioners‟ 
and member state politicians‟ attitudes reflected a „logic of consequentialism‟ or a 
„logic of appropriateness‟. 
From the perspective of rationalist institutionalism, member states are seen as the 
principal actors of enlargement, whereas for sociological institutionalists, the 
principal actors are norm and principle entrepreneurs, particularly the European 
Commission in this study. In order to understand whether or not material factors, 
such as political,, security, or economic interests, or ideational factors, such as 
collective identity and moral duty, led European Commissioners and member states 
to support Poland in completing her accession process and support Turkey in 
opening her accession negotiations, this study employed content analysis of 
documents,  press releases , selected from the FACTIVA database and speeches by 
European Commissioners obtained from the EU‟s RAPID database. All the 
categories, themes and coding units used in the content analysis of this study were 
derived from the rationalist institutionalist and sociological/constructivist 
institutionalist literature.  
Considering case selection, due to their similarities in terms of having large 
populations, large agricultural sectors, geopolitical significance, western orientation 
and unconsolidated democracy, Poland and Turkey were chosen as the cases for the 
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analysis of attitudes towards the EU‟s enlargement process. Out of the 12 members 
of the EU in the 1990s, this study followed Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig in 
choosing Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain for the analysis regarding 
Poland, and Germany, France, Great Britain and Greece for the analysis regarding 
Turkey.  
 From a systematic reading of the selected press releases and speeches, it was 
possible to reveal the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states 
towards intensifying the EU‟s relations with Poland and Turkey. Following 
Schimmelfennig again, the analysis allowed each member state to be categorized as 
either a „driver‟ or „brakeman‟ according to their level of support for Turkey or 
Poland. Based on the content analysis, the factors behind their attitudes, namely 
material and ideational factors, were examined within the theoretical framework of 
this dissertation.  
 The first hypothesis of this dissertation, that „European Commissioners‟ offer 
for improvement of Poland‟s and Turkey‟s relations with the EU is nearly same,‟ 
was disproved by the findings of this dissertation. In all the periods that were 
compared, European Commissioners‟ support for developing Poland‟s relations with 
the EU was consistently higher than their support for Turkey. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of Support Rates of European Commissioners towards 
Poland and Turkey 
There were also additional findings about the attitudes of European 
Commissioners. First, except for 2005-2012, they did not use ideational arguments in 
speeches about Turkey, such as moral duty to integrate Turkey, ending the division 
of Europe, having common values and common culture. Only in 2005-2012 was 
there evidence in the Commissioners‟ speeches of ideational arguments about, the 
moral duty of Pacta Sunt Servanda (that agreements should be respected, or 
promises kept). Instead of ideational arguments, Commissioners generally used 
geopolitical arguments to express support, such as the strategic importance of Turkey 
as a moderate Muslim country struggling against Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism, or security arguments about Turkey‟s contribution to regional and 
international stability and security.  
Secondly, speeches expressing support for Poland were characterized by 
material arguments, such as the EU‟s political interest in supporting Poland‟s 
transition to democracy, and the security interest of maintaining internal stability and 
peace within Europe. On the other hand, speeches expressing reservation usually 
included political arguments about the need to deepen the Community, specifically 
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introducing institutional reforms proposed at intergovernmental conferences, before 
moving on with enlargement to the CEECs in general, and Poland in particular. 
During Poland‟s negotiation process, political reservations about Poland‟s non-
compliance with the acquis communautaire were also emphasized, together with 
economic reservations about the problems of its agricultural sector. With respect to 
Turkey, supportive speeches deployed arguments about the EU‟s political interest in 
establishing closer relations with a geostrategically important country such as Turkey 
and the security interest in maintaining regional stability. Speeches expressing 
reservation focused on the Cyprus issue, Turkey‟s human rights problems, its non-
compliance to the political criteria and the EU‟s need to prioritize deepening over 
widening. During Turkey‟s negotiation process, similar political reservations were 
also raised, including Turkey‟s non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, the 
Cyprus issue, human rights problems related to the Kurdish minority and the EU‟s 
absorption capacity. 
The second hypothesis, that „Logic of appropriateness best explains the 
attitudes of the European Commissioners‟, was also disproved by the findings of this 
dissertation. In all periods, it was observed that material factors were used more than 
ideational factors to express the support of the European Commissioners for 
intensifying both countries‟ relations with the EU. This indicates that the 
Commissioners‟ attitudes were based on the logic of consequentialism rather than the 
logic of appropriateness. As Gunter Verheugen put it, “The Commission‟s job is to 
defend the interests of the entire Union.”  
 The third hypothesis that „Poland‟s EU candidacy has been prioritized over 
Turkey‟s‟ was confirmed. Comparing attitudes in all four periods revealed that the 
number of drivers of Poland‟s accession to the EU was higher than the number of 
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drivers of Turkey‟s accession. Moreover, the percentages of support for Poland are 
also higher than for Turkey. 
 The fourth hypothesis, that „ France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and 
Greece can be categorized as „drivers‟ or „brakemen‟ and that their positions do not 
change within the time periods studied‟ was confirmed for Great Britain and Spain, 
but disproved for France, Germany and Greece. 
Great Britain was the main driver for Poland‟s European aspirations in all 
periods, and also the main driver for Turkey from the 1990s onwards. Statistical 
analysis shows that Great Britain‟s level of support for Turkey28 was statistically 
higher than other member states‟ in both 1996-2004 and 2005-2012. With respect to 
the factors behind this support, the study‟s findings indicate that, for Poland, material 
factors such as Great Britain‟s political interest in widening the EU and its security 
interest in European stability were emphasized, as were ideational factors, such as 
the responsibility and moral duty of British politicians towards Poland. For Turkey, 
British support was expressed in terms of geopolitical and security interest, although 
Europeanness of Turkey was also mentioned. Thus, the findings demonstrate that 
British support for EU enlargement is a state policy that does not vary despite 
changes in government. 
Despite the expectations of the literature on Eastern enlargement about 
Germany‟s being a driver for Polish EU membership, this study found that support 
for deepening either Polish or Turkish European relations changed with 
governments. For instance, in the Association Agreement negotiations, Germany had 
some economic reservations, whereas after the signing of the Europe Agreements, 
Germany, especially under Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl, became the 
                                                          
28
 For Poland, due to the limited number of primary press releases, a statistical analysis could not be 
conducted. 
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main driver of Poland‟s application. Then, with the chancellorship of Social 
Democrat Gerard Schroeder, Germany again began to express economic reservations 
over issues like the free movement of Polish workers and Germany‟s contribution to 
the CAP, making Germany a brakeman in this period. Regarding Turkey, Germany 
had economic reservations from the beginning due to its fear of an influx of Turkish 
workers into Germany so it did not support Turkey‟s membership application, that is, 
as a brakeman. In the Customs Union negotiations, some German support was 
expressed through geopolitical arguments alongside the political reservations, 
although Germany continued to be a brakeman during this period. For example, 
Helmut Kohl acted as a brakeman at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. Turkish 
Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, in refusing to attend the European Conference, 
accused Helmut Kohl of pursuing a policy of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe and 
discriminating against Turkey. Gerard Schroder, however, supported Turkey‟s 
European aspirations (in contrast to Germany‟s reservations about Poland) by 
emphasizing geopolitical and security interests. Germany then became a driver of 
Turkey‟s European aspirations. More recently, under Christian Democrat Angela 
Merkel‟s governance, Germany has once again become the main brakeman regarding 
Turkish relations with the EU, asking for the EU to offer merely a „privileged 
partnership‟ instead of full membership, on the basis of political reservations over 
Turkey‟s non-implementation of the Additional Protocol, its non-compliance with 
the Copenhagen political criteria and the EU‟s absorption capacity. Thus, the 
findings of this study indicate that German support for deepening both Polish and 
Turkish European relations varied according to the ideology of successive German 
governments.  
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France is known for prioritizing, in all periods, deepening of the Community 
over enlargement. Moreover, French governments are sensitive about domestic 
concerns so economic reservations are emphasized in order to protect French citizens 
from the effects of enlargement. In 1988-1989, French-Polish relations were based 
on French support for Poland‟s transition to democracy, through confirming aid 
packages and advocating Polish interests in terms of aid in international forums. 
Thus, France was a driver of improving Poland‟s relations with the EU. On the other 
hand, in 1990-1993, France became a brakeman in order to protect her farmers due to 
economic reservations related to the Association Agreement. In 1994-1997, during 
the presidency of François Mitterrand, France continued to be a brakeman due to 
political reservations, such as its fear that Poland‟s membership could change the 
EU‟s center of gravity. After the election of Jacques Chirac as president, expressions 
of French support for Poland‟s accession to the EU and NATO increased and France 
became a driver. In the final period, during the accession negotiations, France‟s main 
reservation concerned the proposals of other member states for changing CAP to 
include Poland. In order to protect French farmers, France asked Poland to accept a 
transition period for its inclusion in CAP. Thus, France cannot be clearly categorized 
as either driver or brakeman during this period. Regarding Turkey, although France 
did not oppose its membership application in the first period, it cannot be categorized 
as driver or brakeman. In the second period, due to its role as the president of the EU 
in the first half of 1995, France was the country which tried most to persuade Greece 
to lift her veto against the Customs Union with Turkey. Thus, France became a 
driver for Turkey. On the other hand, in 1996-2004, up till the election in Turkey of 
the Justice and Development Party in November 2002, France continued to be a 
driver for Turkey. However, after the elections, French politicians started to raise 
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concerns about Turkey‟s European vocation and secularism. For instance, the 
Europeanness of Turkey was questioned by the head of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe, former French President, Valery Giscard d‟Estaing on 8 November 2002, 
and in April 2004, Alain Juppe, leader of Chirac‟s Union for Popular Movement, 
started to ask for just a „privileged partnership‟ for Turkey. President Chirac then 
promised French voters to hold a referendum on Turkey‟s accession to the EU. 
Hence, France became a brakeman. In the final period, following the French veto of 
the new EU constitution, it became even harder for French politicians to support 
Turkey‟s accession o due to domestic opposition to Turkish membership. In May 
2007, Nicholas Sarkozy, the leader of Union for a Popular Movement, was elected as 
President of France and, like Angela Merkel; he openly supported a „privileged 
partnership‟ for Turkey instead of full membership. In this period, French support 
expressed in secondary press releases for Turkish accession (2%) was even lower 
than of the level in Greece (10%). That is, France continued to be a brakeman in this 
period. In short, the findings indicate that French support for advancing both Polish 
and Turkish European relations varied with different French governments.  
With respect to Spain, the findings of this study were in line with the 
literature in demonstrating that Spain was the main brakeman for Poland in all 
periods. In the negotiations for the Europe Agreements, according to secondary press 
releases, the Spain‟s main economic reservation concerned the steel sector. 
Following this, the main economic reservation, in all periods, was Spain‟s fear of 
losing EU funding as a result of enlargement, as previously suggested by 
Schimmelfennig. Spain even used the funding issue to resist the demands of 
Germany and Austria for a transition period for the free movement of Polish workers 
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after enlargement. Overall, opposition to enlargement due to economic reservations 
was state policy for Spain and did not vary with changes of government. 
Turning to Greece, the findings of this dissertation again confirmed previous 
studies that Greek attitudes towards Turkey vary with domestic developments, with 
the lack of a solution to the Cyprus and Aegean problems being the main political 
reservation in all periods. Until 1999, Greece was a brakeman, but then a period of 
detente developed as a result of the Kosovo Crisis, earthquakes in Turkey and Greece 
and a change in the foreign minister in Greece. After August 1999, although the 
Cyprus issue remained unresolved, it was nevertheless understood that supporting 
Turkey‟s EU membership bid was in Greece‟s interest. This was because a 
Europeanized Turkey would be a much more compatible neighbor for Greece, and   
Greece‟s security interest in the stability of Balkans would also be better served. 
Therefore, Greece did not veto Turkey‟s candidacy, thus becoming a driver. In the 
final period, however, when Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus as required by the 
Additional Protocol, Greece criticized Turkey‟s attitude and the EU froze eight 
chapters of the acquis related to the Cyprus issue. In 2009, Greek Prime Minister 
George Papandreou began to use arguments about the Turkish occupation of 
Northern Cyprus, previously used in the 1990s, in his speeches. Hence, Greece 
became a brakeman again. However, looking across all periods shows that being a 
brakeman was not Greek state policy because Greece‟s position changed according 
to its own domestic developments.  
The final hypothesis of this dissertation, that „logic of consequentialism has 
prevailed in the attitudes of member states towards Poland and Turkey‟, was 
confirmed, although with some exceptions. For Britain, these exceptions were 
expressed in the primary supportive press releases concerning Poland for 1990-1993 
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and 1994-1997. Of these primary supportive press releases, 75 per cent (3 out of 4) 
expressed ideational factors and 25 per cent (1 out of 4) expressed material factors. 
For Germany, the exceptions were observed in primary supportive press releases for 
Poland in 1998-2004, when 25 per cent of primary releases (1 out of 4) included 
ideational factors. For France, ideational factors dominated in 13 per cent of the 
secondary supportive press releases (4 out of 32) concerning Poland in 1994-1997, 
and in 20 per cent of primary supportive press releases (2 out of 10) in 1998-2004.. 
However, taking the results of the content analysis as a whole, the number of 
material factors expressed in the press releases was higher than the number of 
ideational factors. This leads to the conclusion that the logic of consequentialism has 
prevailed in forming the attitudes of member states towards both Poland and Turkey. 
With respect to Turkey‟s still incomplete accession process, an important 
lesson can be derived from Poland‟s experience. The findings of this dissertation 
imply that when the economic or political interests of an EU member state are at 
stake, a compromise is usually found that favors that member states. As liberal 
intergovernmentalism argues, applicant states are in the weaker negotiating position. 
For instance, in negotiations over the free movement of labor, Poland did not want to 
accept a transition period at first. However, the following Polish government 
softened its stance and asked for a two-year transition period following Polish 
accession, while Germany and Austria demanded seven years. In the end, a 
compromise was found in which Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark gave up 
all restrictions on labor movement on the day of Poland‟s accession to the Union, 
while Spain, Great Britain and France promised to liberalize employment procedures 
for Poles within two years after enlargement, and Germany and Austria within seven 
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years. This example demonstrates how the bargaining power of candidate countries 
is low in such negotiations.  
Consequently, Turkey is needed to respond to the reservations of European 
Commissioners and member states in order to continue with negotiations. In the light 
of enlargement fatigue and domestic opposition to enlargement  in member states, 
after responding to the reservations, Turkey also need a grand coalition of drivers in 
the member states in order to realize her aim of being a full member. 
The limitations of this dissertation can provide a starting point for future 
work. First, the content analysis performed in this study could also be carried out 
using press releases in other relevant languages, such as French, Spanish, Polish or 
German. Second, the same press release analysis could be done with different 
databases, such as Lexis-Nexis. Third, a comparison of the Turkish and Romanian 
accession processes could also be done together with a comparison to other candidate 
states. Finally, the analytical approach of this dissertation opens the way for further 
research into the attitudes of the European Council or European Parliament towards 
Poland and Turkey, or other candidate states.  
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